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ABSTRACT 
WORKING CLASS IN BRITISH FILMS 1950s-2000s: 
IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY 
Tongyun Shi 
October 14, 20 II 
Britain was the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and 
therefore had the world's first industrial working class. In the 20th century, the 
traditional British working class went through many social and political changes, 
represented especially by the post-war "rise" and a lasting "decline" since the 1970s, a 
fate which is worth academic study. 
Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. This 
dissertation, through close text analysis of seven British social realist films--two New 
Wave ones, Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960); three bleak ones by independent directors, High Hopes 
(Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), and Sweet 
Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002); and two commercial comedies, Brassed Off (Mark 
Herman, 1996) and The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997), explores major themes in 
the screen representation of British working class from the 1950s to the present and 
analyzes the changes from the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies, 
probing into the relationship between identity, power, the impact of ideology and 
VI 
cultural resistance behind the working-class identities. It also adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach to the understanding and evaluation of the cultural identity 
of British working class, with sociological and historical understanding of the issue of 
class and working class provided. 
The dissertation concludes that the British working class screen identity has 
transformed from an image of masculine energy, pride and dignity of the 1950s and 
1960s to "underclass" collective shame and loss of respect in the 1990s and 2000s. 
The shift reflects changes in fundamental attitudes in British post-war society from 
welfare egalitarianism to the neo-liberal enterprise culture. The cinematic 
representation has reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position, but at the 
same time conveyed more left-wing progressive views. The dissertation therefore 
calls for cultural policy support for socially purposive British national cinema to keep 
social realism as a democratization of representation of national cultural life as well as 
a sustained concern for working-class dignity. 
Key Words: working class; films; Britain; cultural studies; identity; ideology; 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Research Significance and Issue of Study 
Britain was the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and 
therefore had "the world's first industrial working class" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 81). At the 
beginning of the 19th century four-fifths of its population lived in rural areas; by the 
end, four-fifths lived in towns and cities. Briggs argues that the term "social class" 
started to be used in the country only after the Industrial Revolution (as cited in Reid, 
1998, p. 8) and Thompson believes that the English working class was originally 
formed during 1780 and 1832 when they "came to feel an identity of interests" as 
between themselves, and as against their rulers and employers (1963, p. II). "Class 
consciousness" or "awareness" was of marked significance for the Victorian age, for 
which reason Marx chose England as the model on which to base the development of 
his ideas. The 20th century witnessed the British labor movement developing into "one 
of the strongest bulwarks of Britishness," fortressing working-classness as one 
essential ingredient of British identity (Kumar, 2003, p. 169). However, the traditional 
British working class has gone through many social and political changes, especially a 
lasting "decline" since the 1970s after the post-war "rise" (Hopkins, 1991), leading to 
the rhetoric of the "end of class" (Kirk, 2007, p. 2). Working class is deemed to have 
departed the social scene, either as an economic entity, as a distinct cultural formation, 
or as an agent of political change or action. Looking back in time, it is fair to say that 
the politics of the 20th century was largely about the achievements and failures of 
working class power. 
Does this imply that class no longer matters? The 20th century witnessed drastic 
capitalist development from Fordism to Post-Fordism, greatly raising people's living 
standard and relieving the hardship of the working class. However, despite the 
embourgeoisement cry since late 1950s, sufficient statistics on economic inequality 
prove that class is the major influence on the distribution of income and wealth in 
modem societies. The pivotal role of class described by Marx and Weber is still of 
importance to the analysis of social equality today. Though not the only factor which 
shapes people's social and political life, class is "arguably the most fundamental" 
(Edgell, 1993, p. 115). After years of research on British postwar class 
transformations, Gordon Marshall concluded in 1988 that "class is by far the most 
common and seemingly the most salient frame of reference employed in the 
construction of social identities" (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 35). In the 21 st century, 
Gerdinand Mount argued that there is a new class divide in Britain "as vicious ... as the 
old one" (2004, front cover 2). Therefore, the issue of class is still of essential 
significance and should be a worthy topic of academic concern. 
Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. As 
Andrew Sayer claims in The Moral Significance of Class, "class matters to us not 
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only because of differences in material wealth and economic security, but also 
because it affects our access to things, relationships, experiences and practices which 
we have reason to value, and hence of chances of living a fulfilling life" (2005, p. 1). 
It is absolutely true that class involves not only our relations to the means of 
production, but also our behavior, our expectation from ourselves and others, and our 
feeling of cultural dignity. In this aspect, it is more worthy of concern as "the gradual 
decline" of working class culture has been "one of the most powerful, telling 
developments in British society" since the early 1980s (Charlesworth, 2000, p. 2) and 
with the new class divide, "the worst-off in Britain today are more culturally deprived 
than their parents or grandparents" (Mount, 2004, front cover 2). The ultimate 
deprivation as a consequence of all the other deprivations is "the deprivation of 
respect" (Mount, 2004, p. 108) with the gradual loss of reverence for the working 
class people, their effort and values. As a result of the destruction of Britain's 
traditional industry and trade unionism in the past 3 decades, the working class 
identity has shifted from the Victorian notion of the "deserving poor" and the 
"affluent workers" of the 1960s to the present notion of social "waste," particularly 
the underclass. Hence, a cultural analysis of the working class would meet the 
challenge of the changed focus of the issue of class. 
In Britain, there has been an extraordinary preoccupation with class. The 
Observer Magazine issue for II September 1988 had "Class: The British Obsession" 
as its front cover headline (Marwick, 1990, p. 1). The UNESCO Tension Project 
survey recorded 60 per cent of the British identifying themselves as working class, 
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revealing that "the British had among the highest levels of working-class 
consciousness" (Mandler, 2006, p. 206). It needs to be noted here that although class 
has long been a focus of the British, it is not thought a fit subject for public discussion. 
The Establishment has spared no effort in cheering the post-war c1asslessness 
progress. And the priority of social class as a way of interpreting society has been 
sidelined in today's postmodern society, replaced by issues of gender, race, and etc. 
Charlesworth points out that while universities celebrate ethnic diversity, "class as a 
topic has sunk to the bottom of the hierarchy of intellectual objects" (2000, p. 14), 
signifying a cultural decline and political abandonment of the working class. In the 18 
years of Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997, the life of the unemployed received 
little pUblicity as life on the dole was despised and ignored. The transformed 
significance of class suggests that "having once been the fundamental source and 
subject of conflict in the political culture of capitalism, class inequality is now the 
problem that dare not speak its name" (Sayer, 2005, p. 224) and to reopen the whole 
question of class in Britain is to "blunder into a minefield" (Mount, 2004, p. 11). 
Class has obviously lost popularity, though it is still being talked about. And because 
of the silences that shadow the speaking of class, works that do exist become even 
more precious. Therefore my study of British working class from a cultural 
perspective bears considerable academic as well as practical significance. 
The reason that I choose an art form of film representation as my research 
object is that social class and artistic representation have a natural bondage for over a 
century. Marwick (1990) holds that to have a fully rounded understanding of class and 
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its significance, not only official and academic hard statistics (such as census reports, 
sociological surveys) of occupational distribution and economic and political 
inequality should be studied, but also those private and informal perceptions or 
images (in letters, diaries, autobiographies, interviews, etc) as well as fictional and 
media images (in novels, films, plays, photographs, etc.) need to be considered. For 
Marwick, the fictional and media images are "quite illuminating when studied in a 
comparative context" from which one can derive further insights into assumptions 
about social structure, though they need "to be handled cautiously" (2005, p. 76). 
Media representation is also crucial to the construction of class identity. Skeggs 
in Class, Self, Culture suggests that class "is dynamic, produced through conflict and 
fought out at the level of the symbolic" (2004, p. 5). She affirms that "[u]nderstanding 
representation is central to any analysis of class" and that the popular media is the site 
where the symbolic battle of representations can be demonstrated most visibly (2004, 
p. 117). For Stuart Hall, there is no understanding of identity outside of culture and 
representation, and representations "are not reflexive but constitutive and therefore 
have a real, material impact" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 125). 
Coming down to film representation, any film is part of the society which 
produced it, and must "bear traces of some of the basic assumptions of that society" 
(Marwick, 1990, p. 300). Besides, films do more than just "reflect" reality; they 
"actively explain and interpret the way in which the world is to be perceived and 
understood" (Hill, 1986, p. 2). In Britain, arguably, one medium in which the issue of 
class is still alive is film (Bromley, 2000, p. 52). Therefore, studying how images of 
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the working class have been conceived in British cinema not only makes sense, but 
also can enlighten us with vital clues for understanding people in the ever-changing 
British society. 
One clear advantage of using feature films as evidence about class is that the 
signifiers of class are never ambiguous. Social stratification can be vividly displayed 
on the visual and aural screen through housing, decor, clothing, food, speech, life 
style, and etc. Gillette argues that "social values exist in the mind as much as in their 
outward manifestations" (2003, p. 16). The screen is most powerful in these outward 
manifestations-the externalizing of the subjective awareness of being different 
experienced by the working class. 
Finally, class is an ever changing social and cultural existence. Frow invites us 
to view class as a set of contestable relations with due attention on "processes of class 
formation ... played out through particular institutional forms and balances of power ... 
through desires, and fears, and fantasies (1995, p. Ill). Therefore, class is "not a 
given, but a process," and it is "the process of evaluation, moral attribution and 
authorization" that is "central to understanding contemporary class relations" (Skeggs, 
2004, p. 117). My study of the screen representation of British working class identity 
over different decades will explore the process that is fundamental for understanding 
working class identity. 
I would add that the feasibility of my research is greatly enhanced by the 
existence of the social realism film tradition in Britain focusing on the exploration of 
working class life and feelings. 
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Thesis Statement 
This dissertation aims to explore the cultural condition of the working class 
through reviewing the representation of working class identity in British films from 
the 1950s to the present. I examine the major themes of social realist films of different 
decades, compare and contrast continuity and change in the representation of identity 
on screen, and finally analyze the transformation pattern from British cultural studies 
perspective, probing into the ideology and resistance behind the working-class 
identities. The dissertation argues that there has been a changing perception of 
working class on screen and it reflects the changing prevailing ideology. From "pride" 
to "shame," the shifts in images reflect changes in fundamental attitudes in British 
post-war society from welfare egalitarianism to the neo-liberal enterprise culture. 
Class is the major concern for this study with due attention paid to gender and 
race for their crosscut influence. While acknowledging that women and minority 
ethnic people tend to be marginalized in academic debates on class which 
oversimplifies the class identity formation, this dissertation is not intended to offer a 
balanced account due to its limited space and priority concern. 
Identity is an important matter as individuals and groups want to be seen and 
considered as possessing cultural significance and dignity. Therefore this dissertation 
ends with calling for cultural policy support for socially purposive British national 
cinema to keep social realism as a democratization of representation of national 
cultural life. 
British Social Realism Tradition 
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In Britain, there has been a rich tradition of social realist film-making from the 
documentary movement in the 1930s, the New Wave in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
to the contemporary scene. This social realism has been characterized by Raymond 
Williams, when talking about theatrical representation, as a "conscious movement 
towards social extension" (1977, p. 63) to cover the under-represented or 
marginalized groups, specifically to bring "working class to the center of dramatic 
action" (1977, p. 67). Within the British cinematic tradition, this has involved "the 
making visible of the working class" (Hill, 1999, p. 135) at moments of economic and 
social change. As Brown notes, "Realist characters in British films wear cloth caps, 
not top hats" (2009, p. 30). In her 1999 article "Reality Bites (Again)" commenting on 
the Cannes Festival, the journalist Vanessa Thorpe saw in the recent trends of British 
film-making a return "to the hard-bitten tradition of social realism" and traced the 
lineage back to the British New Wave's kitchen sink cycle of films (Thorpe, 1999). 
This acknowledgement ofthe enduring relationship between British cinema and social 
realism is also widely shared by scholars in film studies, e.g. John Hill (2000b, p. 249), 
Samantha Lay (2002, pp. 1-2), Geoff Brown (2009) and Julia Hallam (2000, p. 261). 
Social realism is "generally acknowledged to be a vital component of British cinema" 
(Hutchings, 2009, p. 304) or "a major mode of expression in British screen culture" 
(Lay, 2002, p. 2), constructing one of the three key genres of British national cinema. 1 
1 The literary heritage genre and soeml realist genre form two most Important tradItIOns of BrItish national cmema, enJoymg both box-office 
success and generous praIse from film critics They have been regarded as "quality" films because of their commitment to the portrayal of the 
authentic and indigenous "British way of life" and have been promoted In terms of their cultural values. Therefore, the pursuit of a quality cmema 
was the purSUlt of a natIonal cinema, dlstmct from Hollywood or European counterparts. The thIrd kmd IS the comedy genre, dating from Ealmg 
comedy of the 19405 and 19505. Brian McFarlane and Robert Murphy in British Cinema Book point out that the three genres were the most 
mfl uentIal in the 1990s 
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The representation of British working class before the Second World War was 
far from fair. Feature films of the 1930s tended to "portray working class caricatures 
rather than full-bodied characters in their own right, and as plot ancillaries rather than 
as the central focus" (Lay, 2002, p. 40). The documentary movement in the 1930s led 
by Grierson "represented the first attempt" to portray the working class as real human 
existence (Higson, 1995, p. 197), promoting social reform and cohesion through 
objective and positive images and stories of working-class individuals and 
communities. It was highly valued due to its infusion of social responsibility into 
British cinema. Andrew Higson thus comments, "[i]n the case of British cinema, if 
one movement has pride of place, it has been the documentary movement" (1995, p. 
22), and for some writers, "the realism associated with the documentary movement 
constitutes the only authentic national cultural tradition" (1995, p. 23). Second World 
War films in the 1940s brought this tradition to a new height, largely increasing 
working class representation, although they focused more on the loyalty of the 
working class to the nation and social harmony in the special time of war and were 
criticized as attempting to "flatten out the cultural and class differences" (Lay, 2002, p. 
48). Then for a long time afterwards, it was hard to find films on working-class life in 
British cinema. "The number of British films ... with working-class characters all 
through, can be counted on the fingers of one hand," observed Lindsay Anderson in 
1957, who viewed this rejection of three-quarters of the national population as 
"ridiculous" and "characteristic of a flight from contemporary reality" (Hill, 1986, pp. 
127-8). 
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This phenomenon was changed by the New Wave films of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, which placed industrial working-class characters at the center of their 
narratives. The tendency was influenced by realistic Angry Young Man novels and 
plays and was greatly helped by the efforts of cultural studies scholars like Richard 
Hoggart and Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson to inspire people to broaden 
their notion of British culture and show their concern about ordinary people's life. The 
films unfailingly demonstrated the "authenticity" and "realism" of the working-class 
experience and inspired a new interest in the regional and class base of Britishness. 
Represented by Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959), Look Back in Anger (Tony 
Richardson, 1959), Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), The 
Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner (Tony Richardson, 1962), This Sporting Life 
(Lindsay Anderson, 1963), and etc, the New Wave films focused on working class 
male protagonists, displaying to full extent their masculine energy and sexuality, class 
pride as well as anger, confidence in change for the better, and resistance as well as 
conformity to consumerism. New Wave director Lindsay Anderson sought to 
emphasize the urgency and importance of providing convincing representations of 
working-class life. However, the New Wave "failed to sustain a renaissance" (Quart, 
1993, p. 16) and social realism was to great extent only alive on the small TV screen 
for almost two decades afterwards. 2 
The 1980s saw a renewed interest, or rebirth, in social realism, in response to 
2 19705 was a hard decade regardmg film finance and many directors of New Wave films ermgrated to Hollywood. Ken Loach, who began his 
television and film career in the 19605 (famous for TV film Cathy Come Home, 1966), provided something ofa bridge between the New Wave 
working class films of the early 19605 and the films of the 19905, bemg almost single-handedly responsible for sustaining socIal realism 
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the harsh economic conditions of Thatcherism and greatly helped by the funding from 
Channel 4. Working-class films of the decade can be easily defined by its 
anti-Thatcherism, with the focus on the exploration of the damage brought by 
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, severe cuts in welfare benefits, 
leading to the statement that "some of the most potent political opposition to the 
Thatcher government, therefore, appeared in the movie theatres rather than in the 
House of Commons" (Friedman, 1993, p. xix). Films such as My Beautiful Laundrette 
(Stephen Frears, 1985), A letter to Brezhnev (Chris Bernard, 1985), High Hopes (Mike 
Leigh, 1988), RifJ-RafJ (Ken Loach, 1990) showed life as a difficult struggle in a 
society dominated by social injustice, greed and racism; little sense of the corrupting 
effects of affluence or embourgeoisement of the 1960s appeared in these films. With 
the fragmentation of the traditional working class and the changing concern of 
identity politics, films of the 1980s witnessed the polarizations along lines of gender, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation, apart from class. More working-class women, gays, 
blacks, and Asians began to occupy central focus. 
Working class representation was carried more strongly into the 1990s when the 
economic and social damage brought by globalization, local industrial decline and the 
restructuring of the labor market led to the redefining of British traditional working 
class as non-working "underclass" in a post-industrial context. Similar to the New 
Wave but different from the 1980s, the 1990s' films were more characteristically 
"men's films" with an obsessive focus on white, non-working class, projecting 
pessimistic images of alienation and masculine anxiety and a world of disintegration. 
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Stylistically they can generally be divided into 3 groups (Murphy, 2009a, p. 357). The 
first group had directors like Ken Loach and Mike Leigh, who produced a large 
number of films which dealt with the life of the poor and oppressed, projecting critical 
images of contemporary life in post-Thatcherite Britain to international audiences. 
These films include, for example, the bleaker films of Ken Loach's trilogy-Raining 
Stones (1993), Ladybird, Ladybird (1996) and My Name is Joe (1999), Mike Leigh's 
Naked (1993), Gary Oldman's Nil by Mouth (1998) and Lynne Ramsay's Ratcatcher 
(1999), all are somber work that has been hailed as renascent "British grit" (Thorpe, 
1999). The second group, represented by Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996), Twin 
Town (Kevin Griffith, 1997), dealt with young people accepting drugs, crime and 
violence and bearing their hardship with hedonism. The third group was the feelgood 
comedies represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off 
(Mark Herman, 1996), in which the Sheffield steel workers regained self-respect 
through collective stripping and Grimethorpe miners through their brass band 
performance. The first group aimed at a minority audience and was generally 
exhibited in art-house cinemas. The second, the petty crime genre, aimed at primarily 
the young "core" audience and the third, social realist comedies, by contrast, intended 
to catch a non-niche mainstream audience broader in terms of age and gender and 
nationality. John Hill identified two kinds of endings: failure with the first group and 
utopianism with the third group (2000a, p. 178). Loach and Leigh's works used class 
in an explicit political sense and were regarded seriously in mainland Europe, but 
have limited distribution in the UK and the US. 
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The tradition of social realism continued into the 21 sl century. Films like Billy 
Elliot (Stephen Daldry, 2000), Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002), Vera Drake (Mike 
Leigh, 2004), and This is England (Shane Meadows, 2006) were all well received, 
suggesting that the national cinema has a genuine and vital commitment to the life of 
ordinary British people. 
Samantha Lay points out that there are three thematic concerns in contemporary 
social realism: the crisis in masculinity, the de-politicization of the working class 
through a shift in emphasis from production to consumption, and the prevalence of a 
therapeutic discourse from the public to the personal (2002, pp. 104-106). 
In conclusion, from statements, such as, "I'm working class and proud of it" in 
Room at the Top (1959) to "We're obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." in The Full 
Monty (1997), the working class experienced heartbreaking transformation from an 
identity of masculine energy, pride and dignity to "underclass" collective shame and 
loss of respect. Such identity transformation and its cultural significance is the major 
concern of this dissertation. 
Research Methodology 
This dissertation is mainly a textual interpretation and ideological analysis of 
British working-class films. The discussion of films is analytic rather than evaluative, 
paying more attention to ideological attitudes than artistic merits. In exploring 
working class identity traits, general comprehensive illustration is always 
accompanied with detailed case studies of certain films involving hermeneutic close 
text analysis. And the exploration of identity will focus around the economic status, 
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political consciousness, masculinity as well as personal values of the British 
working-class on screen. The nearly 20 films discussed in the dissertation fall into the 
period stretching between the 1950s and the 2000s, while emphasis is given to two 
New Wave films--Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), three serious social criticism films--My 
Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988) and 
Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002), as well as two mainstream commercial 
comedies--The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off (Mark Herman, 
1996) as weighty research objects. This selected focus is largely based on the 
combinative concern of the artistic honor and commercial success won by the films, 
as well as their different focus for the broad range of themes, e.g. High Hopes is 
chosen for its anti-Thatcherism, My Beautiful Laundrette for race and class, and Sweet 
Sixteen for its concern on underclass youth. 
The dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding and 
evaluation of the cultural identity of British working class. It provides a sociological 
understanding of the issue of class and working class, explores the historical 
development-the rise and fall-of the working class, and finally analyses the 
cinematic representation of working class identity, with an obvious emphasis on the 
last approach as the topic of this dissertation fully displays. 
Theoretically, the analysis of the identity transformation pattern is approached 
from British cultural studies perspective, taking serious concern of the ideology 
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behind. The study of relationships between class, culture, and film is an area of 
interest within cultural studies. 
Literature Review 
There is quite some literature on British working class as well as its cinematic 
representati on. 
Books dealing with class from sociological and historical perspective generally 
offer sociological theoretical understanding or social survey analysis of the issue of 
class in Britain, and account for the changes in the collective experiences of the 
working class. 
Class in Modern Britain by Ken Roberts (2001) is marked by its clarity or 
user-friendliness. Using sociological theory and class schemes and drawing on a range 
of research evidences, the author identifies and analyses the main classes in 
contemporary Britain, namely the working class, the intermediate class, the middle 
class, and the upper class. The book also explores key debates about economic change, 
globalization, changing gender roles, the ethnic composition of the nation, social 
mobility and the relationship between class and politics. Roberts argues that Britain is 
far from being a classless society and demonstrates that "class still permeates virtually 
every part of its inhabitants lives, though there are important and fascinating changes 
occurring to the size, character and composition of all the main classes" (2001, back 
cover). In other words, class origin continues to be as important as ever in 
determining people's life-chances. Class in Britain by Ivan Reid (1998) is also an 
empirical research of class, with chapters on life-chances, income, employment and 
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social mobility, education, leisure, and etc. What is especially impressive is its 
conclusion entitled "Class in a Classless Society," in which he states that class is still 
"a meaningful and useful concept" in Britain (p. 238) with "relative differences 
hav[ing] resolutely remained, and in some cases widened" (p. 234); Britain is far from 
a classless society based on free mobility by talent; and there is "little evidence" that 
the Major Government in the 1990s provided the help which the Prime Minister saw 
as necessary for all to achieve the maximum of their ability (p. 236). 
Eric Hopkins's The Rise and Decline a/the English Working Classes 1918-1990 
(1991) is a social history examining the social, political and cultural changes that have 
happened particularly to the working classes from 1918 to 1990. It deals with such 
basic aspects of working-class life as working and living conditions, the standard of 
living, trade unionism, health, poverty, family, education and leisure activities. The 
political history of the Labor Party and Labor governments is also substantially 
covered. Hopkins argues for the post-WWII "rise" of the working class, with full 
employment, increasing standard of living and political activities, and for the 
"decline" since the 1970s to the present, with "the reduction in working-class political 
and industrial authority, the changed patterns of employment and economic status, the 
new instability of family life, and the change of image" (1991, p. 278). The traditional 
working class has evolved into an underclass; working-class solidarity has become a 
thing of the past; and the image of the working class has been defamed with the 
propaganda of aggressive Conservatism, all of which contributing to the decline of 
identity of the working classes as a whole. 
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On British Cultural Studies, Barker's Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice 
(2000) is a very comprehensive survey of all aspects concerned, such as key concepts 
and methodology, culture and ideology, Fordism and post-modernism, media and 
audience, youth style and resistance, cultural politics and cultural policy. Turner's 
British Cultural Studies 2nd edition (1996) has a better focus on the British Cultural 
Studies tradition--the Birmingham School--and ideology and politics of British 
context. I benefited more from analysis of cultural politics and cultural ideology of 
Barker's writing and of Birmingham School of Cultural Studies in Turner's work. 
Kirk's Class, Culture and Social Change: On the Trail of the Working Class (2007) 
has an informative chapter entitled "In Search of the Working Class: The Rise of 
British Cultural Studies." Besides, sensing the poverty of representation of 
contemporary working-class culture, authors for the introduction and first two 
chapters of Cultural Studies and the Working Class (Munt, 2000) expressed extreme 
sadness that class is in so many ways "the 'lost identity' of identity politics" 
(Medhurst, 2000, p. 29) and strongly argued for cultural studies to continue to have as 
one of its chief objectives "a concern to illuminate the present" (Munt, 2000, p. 7). 
Books simply on films can be divided into two kinds-those purely on social 
realism of working class representation and those doing general survey of British 
cinema or focusing on a particular period or a specific decade with certain chapters on 
social realism films. 
Of the first kind, Samantha Lay's British Social Realism is a general 
investigation of the realist genre. Lay begins by defining the term "social realism," 
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tracing its historical development, and examining the term through a consideration of 
practice, politics, form, style and content. Then the chapters review the rich tradition 
of social realist film-making in British from its beginning in the documentary 
movement of the 1930s to the more hybrid contemporary forms, with reference to 
social-historical contexts and with brief case studies of key texts. In so doing, Lay 
reviews some relevant key publications and analyses the key themes and differences 
in forms and practice. She affirms that there are three thematic concerns in 
contemporary social realism: the crisis in masculinity, the de-politicization of the 
working class through a shift in emphasis from production to consumption, and the 
prevalence of a therapeutic discourse from the public to the personal (2002, pp. 
104-106). The text brings out the concern that the focus on the private and the 
personal "undermines the 'social' message and meaning as we focus on the individual 
or family and their struggles without making connections to wider political, economic 
and social factors" (2002, p. 121). Due to the limited space and the length on social 
realism styles, the book only does brief case studies of 3 films. 
John Hill's "From the New Wave to 'Brit-grit': continuity and difference in 
working-class realism" in British Cinema Past and Present surveys the continuities 
and changes in the tradition with more focus on a range of realist films from the 1980s 
and 1990s--particularly works of Ken Loach, Alan Clarke and Mike Leigh, depicting 
the polarization of British society and the fragmentation of a traditional working class. 
Hill points out continuous trends such as downplaying of collective conditions and 
actions in favor of the individual and personal, and a reconfiguration of public and 
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private spaces. Hill's work is significant here in noting the common historical 
association made within British cinema between social realist mode and the 
representation of previously socially-marginalized and under-represented groups, 
most specifically the working classes (2000b, p. 250). 
Geoff Brown's "Paradise Found and Lost: The Course of British Realism" in 
The British Cinema Book is a brief, general survey of British social realism from the 
Documentary Movement to the 21 sl century. The history of British screen realism is 
persistent and convoluted from the Documentary Movement, WWlI films, the New 
Wave, Ken Loach, Mike Leigh, the 1980s, 1990s right to the 2006 This is England. 
Brown argues that the late 1970s saw rebirth of the Hollywood escapist spectacle 
attracting young people into the cinema to be amazed by special effects and the unreal. 
Despite Ken Loach and Mike Leigh's realism, cinema of the 1980s was weighted 
toward "fantasy, the surreal, and period nostalgia" (2009, p. 35), though realism was 
much alive on television. Realism of the 1990s was more marked by a feel-good 
mood and stereotyped representation. So, according to Brown, in present British 
cinema's commercial sector, "Grierson's concern for 'recording ... the real world' finds 
scant reflection" (2009, p. 37) and realist tradition was a "paradise lost--or at least 
mislaid" (2009, p. 35). Brown concludes that with such diverse films and film-makers 
"the Griersonian paradise may remain a conscious memory, and may even be 
glimpsed form afar; but it is unlikely even to be regained" (2009, p. 37). 
John Hill's book Sex, class, and realism: British Cinema, 1956-1963 is an 
authoritative book and key reference in my analysis of New Wave films. Covering the 
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years 1956-63 when films dealt genuinely with sexual themes, working class 
aspirations and problems, the book explores the social problem films and the New 
Wave films, offering valuable discussions of extensive filmography centering on sex, 
class and realism. Hill prioritizes their thematic concerns, pointing out that in dealing 
with the working class, there is the emphasis on "individual rather than collective 
situations," on "interpersonal rather than socially structured conflicts" and on 
"cultural attitudes rather political and economic relationships" (1986, p. 173). Hill 
sees the New Wave films as presenting "a striking riposte to any complacent ideology 
of 'classlessness'" (1986, p. 174). The book is also wide in its scope, surveying social 
history, the film industry and introducing theories of realism in the first few chapters. 
John Hill's British Cinema in the 1980s deals with the cinematic production of 
the decade through a number of themes and issues closely related with the social, 
economic, and cultural circumstances characteristic of the period. In discussing 
working-class films, the analysis of class extends substantially to class and gender and 
class and race, which is a unique contribution of the book. In Chapter 8 "Class, gender, 
and Working Class Realism," Hill looks at class and masculinity and class and 
femininity, seeing the loss of masculinity, community and collective action of 
working-class heroes as a result of the harsh economic realities of the Thatcher era, 
and identifying a new kind of working-class heroine in some "woman's films" which 
deliberately play with class and gender roles for comic effect. The heroine's desire for 
individual escape, from class and from traditional gender roles, is seen as a key theme. 
Chapter 9 "Class, Politics, and Gender: High Hopes and Riff-RaJ!' takes the two films 
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by two important British directors as case studies. It discusses class politics, 
anti-Thatcherism, and cultural barbarianism associated with the economic 
beneficiaries. Chapter 10 '''Race' and Cultural Hybridity: My Beautiful Laundrette 
and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid," again case studies of the two films, explores the way 
in which the directors challenge traditional conceptions of race and cheer hybrid 
identities-"living with difference" (1999, p. 208). The characters' identities are 
constructed across different axes-black/white, male/female, and gay/straight. 
British Cinema of the 90s edited by Robert Murphy contains two valuable 
chapters: Claire Monk's "Men in the 90s" and Hill's "Failure and Utopianism: 
Representations of the Working Class in British Cinema of the 1990s." Monk looks at 
the changed images of men in general in the 90s' films, identifying the emergence of 
"new lads" as well as growing masculine crisis. The part on working class male 
violence in Naked (1995) and Nil by Mouth (1997) and on male insecurity and fears in 
The Full Monty (1997) and Brassed Off(1996) is very inspiring. Coming up with such 
impressive terms as "post-industrial male trauma," "post-patriarchal masculinities" 
and "post-feminist male panic" (2000a, p. 157), Monk argues that British cinema's 
preoccupation with men's self-scrutiny in the 1990s largely resulted from a perceived 
crisis III male economic power and gender privilege. She takes "the 
self-consciousness," the "confessional and therapeutic impulses" and the 
"attentiveness to men and masculinity as subjects-in-themselves" (2000a, p. 157) in 
this preoccupation with men as something new or unprecedented. John Hill examines 
class conflicts in Loach's films and the more populist films such as The Full Monty. 
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He points out two kinds of endings for them: failure with the bleaker films about the 
very poor working class and utopianism with the feelgood comedies (2000a, p. 178). 
Both Monk and Hill stress films' representation of the masculinity crisis of working 
class, who are nostalgically patriarchal, jobless, impotent, and eager for respect. 
Claire Monk's "Underbelly UK: The 1990s underclass film, masculinity and the 
ideologies of 'new' Britain" in British Cinema Past and Present examines the 
underclass films in terms of what they say about gender, class and national identity in 
the context of the culture and politics of contemporary Britain. Monk argues that the 
success of Brassed Off and The Full Monty appears "superficially-but 
deceptively ... to mark the return with a vengeance of the class-consciousness and 
sense of collectivity and community repressed in the 1980s" (2000b, p. 275). With 
obsessive focus on white, non-working masculinity, these films transform underclass 
material into an appealing, profitable and exportable commodity, which manifests the 
abandonment of a socially committed British cinema and plays a paradoxical role in 
New Labor's "re-branding" British national identity. 
Paul Dave's Visions of England: Class and Culture in Contemporary Cinema is 
a provocative exploration of class in relation with national identity in contemporary 
cinema, especially during the 1990s. Focusing on such themes as "class, capitalism 
and nation" (2006, p. xv), the book studies the influence of ideologies of 
neo-liberalism on the representation of class across a wide range of films. While the 
book is on all classes, it has two key chapters on the working class: "The Working 
Class: Elegies" and "The Underclass: Fantasy and Realism," in which Dave addresses 
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the themes of the "disappearing" working class in Brassed Off, The Full Monty, 
Among Giants, Dockers, and Billy Elliot, as well as youth in crisis in Trainspotting, 
all of which are elegies for an older, industrial, northern working class. The class 
model Dave uses is one which rejects the "structural location" (Weberian) in favor of 
class as "social relation" (Marxist). Making substantial reference of Ellen Meiksins 
Wood's Marxist political analysis of capitalism, Dave seeks to show how the 
representations of underclass "reveal more about a complex range of middle-class 
attitudes towards the working class than they do about any contemporary 
reappearance of the lumpenproletariat" (2006, p. xiii) and in so doing offers sharp 
political critique of neo-Iiberalism. 
Much academic work on British working class films is finalized in chapter form 
edited into film study books. Due to their limited space, the authors can only focus on 
a few films sharing common themes or films of a particular decade. Lay's book is a 
historic survey of British social realism in all decades, yet is more successful in 
comprehensively reviewing British research achievements on the genre. The authors 
analyze from a variety of approaches, mainly social/historical and political. This 
dissertation offers my unique contribution in that it aims to analyze the changing 
perception and representation of working class identity through reviewing British 
cinema of over half a century, so as to explore patterns of cultural change to offer a 
humanities perspective study. To support patterns of cultural change, this study 
includes an interdisciplinary approach using sociological and historical analysis. 
Above all, the dissertation has a clear theoretical framework-British Cultural 
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Studies. 
In the present postmodern world, class has sunk to the bottom in the hierarchy 
list of oppression. This is largely due to the fact that it is no longer a fresh subject for 
interest and, according to Munt, poverty is "not sexy enough for the intelligentsia" 
(2000, p. 7). It is also largely because of the Thatcherite/Blairite campaign to project 
Britain as a classless society, making upward mobility connected to dreams of class 
escape. Naturally, the result is a lack of representation and a shortage of work on 
contemporary working-class culture. Munt calls for British Cultural Studies to 
continue to have class as one of its chief concerns to illuminate the present (2000, p. 
7). This dissertation of mine is intended as an effort to contribute to the continuation 
of British Cultural Studies tradition. 
Thesis Structure 
This dissertation is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter I is an introduction of 
research issue, research significance, research thesis and CONtent, literature review, 
methodology, and my contribution. Chapter 2 deals with theoretical framework of 
British Cultural Studies and key concepts such as culture, ideology, hegemony, class 
politics, the postmodern "New Times," identity, representation, realism and 
masculinity. Chapter 3 looks at class and working class in Britain from sociological 
and historical perspectives. It looks at the sociological understanding of the condition 
of British class and working class in the 20th century and explores the rise and fall of 
British working class from post-war affluence to the present decline and 
fragmentation. A combination of sociological analysis and historical comparative 
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analysis of working class transformation is used. The chapter illustrates that Britain is 
still far from a classless society and British working class has experienced massive 
changes-"rise and decline" or "rise and fall "-due to post-industrial economic 
development and Mrs. Thatcher's New Right politics. Chapter 4 focuses on working 
class identity in New Wave films (1950s & 1960s), particularly in Room at the Top 
(Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960). 
Chapter 5 focuses on working class identity represented in the serious social criticism 
films High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 
1985), and Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) by independent directors. Chapter 6 
focuses on working class identity in the commercial comedies of the 1990s 
represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off(Mark Herman, 
1996). In dealing with working-class screen identity in these three chapters, identity is 
explored through themes and representations, and a direct relationship with the 
broader social and cultural context will be established. Chapter 7 analyses the 
continuity and change of British working class screen identity from the theoretical 
framework of British cultural studies. Making wide reference of Raymond Williams 
and Stuart Hall, it probes the relationship between identity, power, the impact of 
ideology and cultural resistance. The chapter calls for cultural policy support for 
socially purposive British national cinema to keep social realism as a democratization 
of representation of national cultural life as well as a sustained concern for 
working-class dignity. Chapter 8 ends the dissertation with a conclusion of the 
research issue. 
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CHAPTER II 
BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES ON CLASS AND WORKING CLASS 
Raymond Williams, in his 1986 lecture "The Future of Cultural Studies," said 
"you cannot understand an intellectual or artistic project without also understanding 
its formation; that the relation between a project and a formation is always decisive; 
and ... the emphasis of Cultural Studies is precisely that it engages with both" (as 
cited in Munns & Rajan, 1995, p. 1). Therefore, this dissertation takes cultural studies, 
particularly British Cultural Studies, as the theoretical framework to explore and 
analyze British working class screen identity. 
Cultural studies is a field defined by the international journal Cultural Studies 
as "dedicated to the notion that the study of cultural processes, and especially of 
popular culture, is important, complex and both theoretically and politically 
rewarding" (Turner, 1996, p. 1). This notion is largely indebted to the writings of 
Raymond Williams (1958), Richard Hoggart (1957), and E.P. Thompson (1963), 
which greatly extended the meaning of culture to include the culture of the working 
class. Hoggart's "personal history of everyday life in prewar Britain," Williams' 
"strategic reorientation of the definition of culture towards the anthropological 'whole 
way oflife,'" plus Thompson's "recovery of 'history from below,'" all placed class at 
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the centre of cultural studies by directing fresh attention to the culture of the working 
class (Turner, 1996, p. 217). Their writings were seen as founding work of cultural 
studies. 
The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of 
Birmingham, also referred to as the "Birmingham School," is commonly regarded as 
the birthplace or institutional origin of British Cultural Studies and had a pivotal role 
in the later development of the theory. Richard Hoggart established the center in 1964 
and was its Director during 1964-1968; then Stuart Hall replaced as Director during 
1968-1979. "It is during the period of Hall's Directorship that one can first speak of 
the formation of an identifiable and distinct domain called cultural studies" (Barker, 
2004, p. 21), for which Hall was called "a 'founding father' of cultural studies" 
(Procter, 2004, p. 141). The Centre developed many typical subject-matters as well as 
the techniques of analysis of cultural studies. Greatly influenced by Althusser's 
analysis on ideology and Gramsci's hegemony theory, the center's research priority 
shifted from an initial interest in the "lived" culture of working class to the centrality 
of the mass media, youth subcultures, race and gender. 
Cultural studies rejects elitist notions of high-low culture or the critiques of 
mass culture, holding that "the symbolic experiences and practices of ordinary people 
are more important analytically and politically than culture with a capital C" 
(McGuigan, as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 47). Instead of making judgment on the 
formally and aesthetically "good" or "bad," it evaluates on political values and 
ideological construction. There has been a conscious and consistent effort to prioritize 
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marginalized social groups, from underprivileged working class to those 
disempowered on the basis of gender, race, age, sexuality, geopolitical location or 
colonialism. The focus has been on popular culture and oppositional subcultures, seen 
as capable of resisting the hegemonic modes of capitalist domination. This 
preoccupation positions cultural studies to the left of the political spectrum. 
What differentiates cultural studies from other subject areas is its connections to 
matters of power and politics and in particular to the need for social and cultural 
change. Take the article "Putting Policy into Culture Studies" by Tony Bennett (1992) 
as an example, cultural studies practitioners see themselves not just as detached 
observers of cultural practices, but also as having a political obligation to promote 
cultural change through providing useful tools for cultural/political activists and 
policy makers. 
This chapter surveys the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies on 
class and working class and defines certain key concepts such as culture, ideology, 
hegemony, class politics, the post-modem "New Times," identity, representation, 
realism and masculinity. 
Culture: From Elitism to "A Whole Way of Life" of People 
The concept of culture is central to cultural studies, yet this is a word open to all 
kinds of explanations. Raymond Williams in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society took it as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English 
language" (1983, p. 87), and defines culture as having three broad active categories of 
usage: the noun which "describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and 
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aesthetic development;" which "indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, 
a period, a group, or humanity in general" and which "describes the works and 
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity," with the third meaning in 
most widespread use (Williams, 1983, p. 90). 
The original meaning of the word "culture," according to Williams, is 
"cultivation," which is linked to growing crops or rearing and breeding animals. Later, 
the concept was extended to take in the active cultivation of the "human mind" 
(Williams, 1981, p. 10), hence the idea of the cultivated or cultured person. Since the 
late 19th century, culture has referred mainly to the arts. Culture carrying the meaning 
of aesthetic privileges was dominant until the mid_20th century. 
In the 19th century, English writer Matthew Arnold, in his famous book 
Cultural and Anarchy, published in 1869, described culture as "the best that has been 
thought and said in the world" and acquiring culture as the means toward moral 
perfection and social good (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 36). Culture is thus contrasted 
to the "anarchy" of the raw and uncultivated masses. In this way, Arnold offered 
justification for aesthetic and political preference of "high culture." 
In the 20th century, conservative literary critic F.R. Leavis shared with Arnold 
that culture is morally and aesthetically the "best" of human creativity. F.R. Leavis 
held that high or literary culture within the reign of an educated minority is to keep 
alive and nurture the ability to discriminate between the best and the worst of culture. 
For followers of Leavis, it was their duty to define and defend the best of culture and 
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criticize "advertising, films and popular fiction, the worst of mass culture with its 
'addictions' and 'distractions. '" (Barker, 2000, p. 36) 
These approaches were commented on by Turner as "unashamedly elitist" and 
by Bennett as a discourse of the "cultured" about the culture of those without 
"culture" (Turner, 1996, p. 40). It was against such definitions of culture that cultural 
studies struggled and through which it defined itself. 
Raymond Williams in Culture and Society (1958) and The Long Revolution 
(1961) applied the anthropological understanding of culture to post-WWII British 
society and developed an understanding which stresses the everyday lived character 
of culture as "essentially a whole way of life" (1958, p. 325). He actually formulated 
this idea in his 1958 essay, "Culture is Ordinary:" "We use the word culture in these 
two senses: to mean a whole way of life - the common meanings; to mean the arts and 
learning -the special processes of discovery and creative effort. Some writers reserve 
the word for one or other of these senses; I insist on both, and on the significance of 
their conjunction ... Culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind." (as cited 
in Laing, 1968, p. 201) This famous notion that "culture is ordinary" legitimated the 
serious study of working class life and of popular culture. Working-class 
contributions to the construction of culture through their experience was given due 
value, revealing the democratization of culture and politics. 
This effort directly resulted from postwar radical changes, which entitled the 
working class to welfare, health, employment and education, building a sense of pride 
and hope for a fairer future into the social identity of working-class people. Munt 
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emphasizes that "the principle that working-class identity emerged into a new 
self-consciousness after the war is pivotal to comprehending the eventual 
consolidation of working-class cultural studies" (Munt, 2000, p. 2). 
Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy, published in 1957, explores the widespread 
changes with English working-class life and culture from the 1930s to the 1950s. In 
the first half ("An 'Older' Order"), which is more autobiographical, Hoggart gives a 
sympathetic, humanist and detailed account of the lived culture of the working class 
in the 1920s and 1930s, which is signified by a deep sense of community feeling. For 
Hoggart, the working classes value two things above all else: the family and the 
neighborhood. The neighborhood is where "one knows practically everybody" (1998, 
p. 39) and its grip is strong. In the second half ("Yielding Place to New"), Hoggart 
gives a rather acid account of the explosive development of mass entertainment 
directed at the new "affluent" working class, expressing anxieties about erosion of 
working-class values and commercialization of working class culture. For Hoggart, 
the 1950s sees the shift towards "the creation of mass culture" which is "in some 
important ways less healthy" (1998, pp. 9-10). The working class, while economically 
more secure as beneficiaries of the welfare state, stands in danger of losing their 
self-identity, e.g., the solidarity and collective care of their communities. Hoggart's 
central legacy to cultural studies is "the legitimacy he accorded to the detailed study 
of working class culture, that is, to the meanings and practices of ordinary people as 
they seek to live their lives and make their own history" (Barker, 2004, p. 86). 
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Raymond Williams was more influential with a more enduring legacy than 
Hoggart and Thompson. His Culture and Society, published in 1958, is a cultural 
history focusing on great cultural thinkers and literary writers between 1750 and 1950. 
He established himself with the enlightening opening account of the four meanings of 
the word "culture"-as "a general state or habit of the mind," "the general state of the 
intellectual development, in a society as a whole," "the general body of the arts," and 
"a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual" (1958, p. xvi). The long and 
heavy conclusion chapter deals with mass communication and working class culture 
formation, which, according to Williams, should be viewed in a positive light. He sees 
the concept of "mass" as carrying an elitist disdain and suspicion signifying an older 
word "mob," and famously declares that "[t]here are in fact no masses; there are only 
ways of seeing people as masses" (1958, p. 300). He developed a notion of "common 
culture" or "culture in common" which he saw as inspired by the radical postwar 
socialist changes and would enable the many not the few. A common culture is not an 
equal culture, yet equality of being is essentially necessary to it. Inequality which 
denies the essential quality of being is "evil" and intolerable as it "rejects, 
depersonalizes, degrades in grading, other human beings" (1958, p. 317). In The Long 
Revolution, published in 1961, he reaffirms that "culture is a description of a 
particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and 
learning but also in institutions and ordinary behavior" (1961, p. 41). In dealing with 
the history of mass education, the reading public, the popular press, the realist novel, 
which involves wider public participation, the book argues that this expansion of 
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culture simply forms part of the long revolution towards a more democratic society. In 
this process, society should provide "the skiIIs of literary and other advanced 
communication, to all people rather than limited groups" (1961, p. xiv). This "cultural 
redistribution" is crucial for Williams in the development of his conception of a 
common culture (Kirk, 2007, p. 43). Williams continued to study the mass media, 
publishing Communications in 1962 and Television, Technology and Form in 1974, 
both being taken up as much with intervening in cultural policy as with any form of 
ideological or semiotic analysis of texts. Unlike Hoggart, who was skeptical of mass 
culture, WiIliams trusted working-class potential autonomy to make sound judgment 
and choices in a consumer society. From the 1970s, Williams shifted his earlier 
concern for a democratic theory of culture to his engagement with Marxism and 
consequent analysis of the political role of culture in class-divided societies. 
E.P. Thompson, a social historian, published The Making of the English 
Working Class in 1963--a "history from below" (Barker, 2000, p. 38) about the lives, 
beliefs, attitudes and practices of working people during the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. Like Williams, Thompson conceives of culture as lived and ordinary, and 
he is concerned with not only the cultural but also the socio-economic aspect of this 
history. Attacking ruling class history for leaving out the working class, with "[t]he 
blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers ... forgotten" (1963, p. 12), Thompson aims 
to rewrite the history of working class culture in order to redress the imbalance of its 
representation in "official" histories to "rescue" the casualties of ruling class 
history--"the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom 
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weaver. .. from the enormous condescension of posterity" (1963, p. 12). Thompson 
stresses the active and creative role of the English working class in bringing 
themselves into being as the title suggests that "[t]he working classes were not simply 
made by history but took part in its making" (Procter, 2004, p. 38). 
Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson were the forefathers 
of cultural studies initiating this decisive tum in post-WWII Great Britain. 
Working-class academics such as Hoggart and Williams-the scholarship 
boys-began to speak for themselves, exploring working-class cultures "from 
within," and "focused on working-class culture as a point of origin for the first time in 
British intellectual life" (Munt, 2000, p. 4), shedding light on the ordinary experiences 
of those traditionally excluded from the analytical gaze. Thus, British working-class 
culture became "the text, as well as the theory" for cultural studies (Munt, 2000, p. 4). 
Their way of studying working class culture was coined by Richard Johnson (director 
of CCCS after Hall) in 1979 as "cultural ism" (Procter, 2004, p. 38). This 
"cultural ism" is a form of historical cultural materialism, favoring the exploration of 
the meanings of lived culture within the context of its material conditions, as well as 
"humanist" as it places human experience and agency central to the formation of class 
and culture. In short, it is a less exclusive, more democratic understanding of culture, 
examining the place of culture in class power. 
Althusser on Ideology and Gramsci on Hegemony 
Turner takes ideology as the most important concept in the foundation of 
British cultural studies, quoting James Carey to affirm his position: "British cultural 
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studies could be described just as easily and perhaps more accurately as ideological 
studies for they assimilate, in a variety of complex ways, culture to ideology" (Carey, 
as cited in Turner, 1996, p. 182). While Marx defined ideology as "the system of the 
ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group" 
(Althusser, 1971, p. 107), the concept is later understood as "ideals, meanings and 
practices which, while they purport to be universal truths, are maps of meaning which 
support the power of particular social groups" under the influence of Gramsci (Barker, 
2004, p. 97). 
British cultural studies in its early years was clearly marked by "an extremely 
close relationship" with Marxist ideology and the centrality of class (Lacey, 2000, p. 
40). Marxist ideology holds that "the ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the 
ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the 
same time its dominant intellectual force" (Marx, as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 49). 
Consequently, culture is political as well as ideological. To be more specific, in 
capitalist society it is in the interests of the bourgeoisie to promote the notion of the 
social world as highly individualistic and competitive. By covering "the genuinely 
social and collective nature of human life" believed by Marx, the bourgeoisie can 
largely minimize the possibilities of effective proletarian resistance to capitalism 
(Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999, p. 190). To great extent, the failure of proletarian 
revolutions to materialize is due to the fact that the working class suffers from "false 
consciousness"-the mistakenly bourgeois world view serving the interest of the 
capitalist class represented by the ethos of the free market of "equality" which 
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obscures the true nature of exploitation. For Marx, there is a direct causal relationship 
between the economic base and the cultural superstructure, a stand which has been 
termed as "economic determinism" or "economic reductionism." However, such 
Marxist account of ideology was challenged and underwent two important revisions 
in the 20th century, one being Althusser's structuralist approach to ideology and the 
other being Gramsci's theory of hegemony. 
Althusser was the most influential structuralist imports to the CCCS, with his 
re-readings of Marx in texts such as For Marx (1965), Reading Capital (1968) and 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971) and his famous notion of the 
"Ideological State Apparatuses" (lSAs). In his essay "Ideology and the Ideological 
State Apparatuses" (ISAs), he argues that "[i]deology is a 'representation' of the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (1971, p. 
153) and is a far more effective means for maintaining class power than physical force 
of the State. Ideology masks the real exploitative nature of capitalism by displacing 
the emphasis of thought from production to free labor exchange and by stressing the 
character of people as individuals to fragment the vision of class. The ideology of the 
ruling class becomes the ruling ideology through the installation of the ISAs, which 
he designates as family, religious institutions, the education system, the system of law, 
the media, political parties, etc. ISAs "function 'by ideology'" (1971, p. 149) and is 
"secured ... by the ruling ideology" (1971, p. 142); hence, the ISAs are "the site of 
class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle" (1971, p. 140). For 
Althusser, ideology "hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects" 
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(1971, p. 162) and "has the function of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects" 
(1971, p. 160), which represents a kind of anti-humanism as the subject (person) is 
seen not as a self-constituting agent. 
Althusser in For Marx raised the notion of "over-determination" to mean that 
there are other determining forces-the ideological and the political-than just the 
economic, which breaks with the mechanistic Marxist base-superstructure version. 
Althusser also argues that ideology is not an illusory veil (false consciousness), but "a 
system (with its own logic and vigor) of representations (images, myths, ideas or 
concepts)" (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 56), stressing ideology's semiotic character. 
In short, Althusser made unique contributions in revealing the way in which 
ideology works through material practices and institutions (IS As) and that "there is no 
'real' uncontaminated by signification and ideology," which implies that "ideology 
becomes the very site of struggle," rather than a false consciousness to shrug off 
(Procter, 2004, p. 45). 
An important legacy of Althusserian structuralism for Hall is its move beyond 
the humanism of the culturalists. Hall saw that Althusser viewed "experience" "not as 
an authenticating source but as an effect: not as a reflection of the real but as an 
'imaginary relation'" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 45). Yet Hall felt that Althusser 
overemphasizes the system or structure of signs and representations. Ideology is seen 
as directly imposed from above, which denies agency and the possibility for 
resistance or active struggle. To compare and summarize, classical Marxism was 
flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role of the economy," Williams' 
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culturalism was flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role of human 
experience," and Althusserianism was flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role 
of language and ideology" (Procter, 2004, p. 46). And it was through Gramsci that 
Hall and the CCCS were able to address the limitations of Althusser and 
structural isms. 
The theory of hegemony was developed by Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci in 
the 1920s and 1930s to explain the popularity of fascism in Italy despite its 
restrictions on people's liberties. Since the first publication of Gramsci's works in the 
English language in the late 1960s and helped by Stuart Hall's promotion, the theory 
has played a significant part in the development of British cultural studies, with 
hegemony becoming a core concept of the field during the 1970s and 1980s, for 
which Turner defines British cultural studies as "neo-Gramscian" (1996, p. 210). 
Hegemony deals with the nature of authority in social relations and has been 
defined as the process of "making, maintaining and reproducing" the "authoritative 
set of meanings, ideologies and practices" (Barker, 2004, p. 84). The essence of 
Gramsci's hegemony is that the ruling groups (class, sexual, ethnic, etc) in democratic 
societies exercises social authority and leadership over the subordinate groups through 
various forces, but essentially "consent." As Gramsci argues, in the liberal-capitalist 
state, "consent is normally in the lead, operated behind 'the armour of cohesion'" (as 
cited in Hall, 1977, p. 332). So for Gramsci, social power is not a simple matter of 
domination on the one side and subordination or resistance on the other. Hegemony 
resists revolutionary resistance by working through negotiation, incorporation, 
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concession and consent rather than by simple oppression. In this hegemonic 
leadership, the subordinated groups consent to the "common sense" view offered by 
the dominant group because they are convinced that this will do them good. For 
Gramsci, common sense is the most significant site of ideological conflict and in the 
struggle to forge "good sense" the class character of capitalism can be recognized. In 
short, Gramscian hegemony describes "the process of establishing dominance within 
a culture, not by brute force but by voluntary consent, by leadership rather than rule" 
(Procter, 2004, p. 26). 
The consent from the people is largely achieved with the help of intellectuals 
sympathetic to the ruling class who will offer justifications of the domination 
persuasively, and through such institutions as the media, school, church, and family. 
Hegemony is temporary and unstable as it needs to be constantly re-won and 
re-negotiated, which makes culture a terrain of conflict and struggle over meanings 
and opens up the possibility of challenges to it. Power is not something that can be 
secured once and for all. 
In comparison with the theories of Marx and Althusser, Hall points out that a 
weakness of the Marxist account of ideology is its failure to account for the "free 
consent of the governed to the leadership of the governing classes" (as cited in Turner, 
1996, p. 192). Althusser's assessment of ideology also could be accused of a rigidity 
that discounted any possibility of change. Hegemony theory manages to explain both 
processes of maintaining the cultural power of the ruling minority as well as the active 
or inactive consent of the powerless majority and is able to concentrate on explaining 
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the process of change. Thus, it is "a more sophisticated and fluid paradigm of social 
critique" (Mikula, 2008, p. 85). 
Hegemony theory carried long-lasting influence in cultural studies because of 
its emphasis on popular culture as a site of ideological struggle, with the ruling class 
trying to win hegemony but resisted by marginal and disempowered groups. Popular 
culture was thus seen as "a conduit" which could both "promote hegemony" and 
"prompt resistance to it" (Mikula, 2008, p. 86); in other words, popular culture is 
"both dominated and oppositional, determined and spontaneous" (Turner, 1996, p. 
196). Due to this open possibility of political intervention, Hall takes popular culture 
very seriously. He argues that popular culture is a "contradictory space," a site of 
continuous negotiation: "we should always start from here: with the double stake in 
popular culture, the double movement of containment and resistance" (as cited in 
Procter, 2004, p. 25). Hall also challenges the notion that the popular is an authentic, 
pure expression of the working class, believing that there are no popular cultural 
forms that "'belong' to a particular class and whose meaning can be guaranteed 
forever;" rather, the struggle "depends upon the success or failure in giving popular 
culture 'a socialist accent,' not as class versus class but the power bloc versus the 
people" (Procter, 2004, p. 29). 
The theory of hegemony was of central importance to the development of 
British cultural studies. It facilitated analysis of "the ways in which subordinate 
groups actively respond to and resist political and economic domination" (Edgar & 
Sedgwick, 1999, p. 165). This emphasis on resistance is significant for British cultural 
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studies, which became more interested in the resistance to, rather than the 
reproduction of, dominant ideologies. This can be seen in the study of the "rituals of 
resistance" associated with a range of working-class and youth subcultures as well as 
the emphasis on agency within audience studies in exploring popular culture and 
media. 
Stuart Hall and the CCCS 
Hall's major concerns and profound influence mainly lie in 4 areas: the analysis 
of the media, the practices of subculture resistance, the construction of political power, 
and diasporic hybridity studies, the first three all being closely related with class. 
Gramsci has had a greater influence than any other intellectual on Stuart Hall. 
As having been mentioned earlier, with the contribution of Hoggart, Williams 
and Thompson, British cultural studies was working class cultural studies. This 
preoccupation with the working class culture continued into the 1970s with 
publications such as the CCCS collections Resistance Through Rituals: Youth 
Subcultures in Post-War Britain (Hall & Jefferson, 1976), Learning to Labor: How 
Working-Class Kids Get Working-Class Jobs (Willis, 1977), Subculture: The 
Meaning of Style (Hebdige, 1979) and The "Nationwide" Audience (Morley, 1980) 
(Kirk, 2007, p. 45). For the writers, the cultural field bears all the marks of unequal 
power relations. The cultural became the key arena for contestation or discursive 
struggle if the political and the economic had appeared settled. Gramsci's influence of 
hegemony theory allowed writers to celebrate agency of the subordinated in their 
subcultures. This preoccupation "revolutionized the study of popular culture from the 
41 
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s by dismantling the orthodox critiques of mass cultural 
forms and practices" (Turner, 1996, p. 217). It was a rediscovery of working class 
with the agency of struggle. 
Mass media analysis came to dominate the CCCS's research from the 1970s 
and has been its longest-running focus, overtaking Hoggart's concern of studying the 
everyday "lived" cultures of the working class. The Center approached the media as 
ideological and hegemonic institutions. Seeing the media as having "progressively 
colonized the cultural and ideological sphere" (Hall, 1977, p. 340), Hall tried to 
investigate the relations between media and ideology, namely structures of power and 
politics of the media, the ideological effectiveness, through textual analysis of 
signifying systems. In other words, Hall is more interested in the political rather than 
the linguistic implications of media messages. 
In his renowned essay "Encoding and decoding in the media discourse" (1973) 
and "Encoding/decoding" (1980), analyzing television discourse, Hall raised a new 
theory of communication, which challenges the traditional linear model and suggests 
a circuit, in which receivers become active consumers leading to the reproduction of 
meaning. For Hall, the "message form" encoded by the sender might or might not 
generate the designed and expected meaning as the audience are not passive recipients. 
It is at the moment of decoding, that the television message acquires "social use or 
political effectivity" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 65). So the connotative level is a 
significant site of ideological intervention and contestation because its "fluidity of 
meaning and association can be more fully exploited and transformed" for production 
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of hegemony (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 66). Hall also addressed political ideology 
through his notion of dominant or "preferred meaning:" though encoded meanings 
might be "accepted" or "rejected" by the viewing audience due to their diversified 
lived experience, institutionally shaped discourses strive to make hegemonic codes of 
dominant elites more effective to promote preferred readings. So, televisuallanguage 
"constitutes rather than reflects the world" with systematic distortions (Procter, 2004, 
p. 71). To summarize, "Encoding/decoding" argues that televisual discourse plays a 
key ideological role in securing the values and meanings of the dominant cultural 
order through "consent." However, these dominant or preferred meanings are always 
open to contestation and transformation. In this sense, the media is not just a vehicle 
for selling ideology, but more a site of ideological struggle. 
David Morley's The "Nationwide" Audience represented a productive shift of 
CCCS to reception studies. It is an empirical research to test Hall's 
encoding/decoding theory carried out by Morley, one of Hall's former students. The 
research is a media group project at the CCCS (1975-7) on the British television show 
Nation-wide, a popular early evening magazine program broadcast by the BBC. 
Morley tested the hypothesis of dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings by 
screening an episode of the show to different audiences grouped in terms of class, 
occupation, race, and etc. This "ethnographic" approach revealed that "audience 
responses are highly contradictory and are not rigidly determined by class or social 
position" (Procter, 2004, p. 71). So class does not directly determine audience 
responses. Morley's work was soon followed by numerous studies of soap opera and 
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the significance to popular audiences of mainstream film and television genres. In 
these works, Hall's renowned "encoding/decoding" principle provides a key mode for 
understanding the reception of media texts. 
On subcultures resistance, much attention was on British postwar urban youth 
subcultures--their rituals and practices that generated meaning, resistance and pleasure. 
In Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain (1976), Hall et 
al. read British postwar change as from hegemonic consent to "law and order" 
coercion based on Gramsci's theory of "hegemony." Hall et al. analyzed ideology in 
the early postwar years through the key terms of "affluence," "consensus" and 
"embourgeoisement" and challenged the idea that so-called affluence, combined with 
the political consensus around welfare state, produced a classless society. For Hall, 
affluence and classlessness are myths or "full-blown" ideologies, discourses which 
work to "cover over the gaps between real inequalities and the promised utopia of 
equality-for-all and ever-rising consumption to come" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 
37). So, affluence, consensus and embourgeoisement, while embodying evident 
postwar social change, were by no means innocent, descriptive terms but "ideological 
onslaught" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 25) used to "dismantle working-class 
resistance" by generating "spontaneous consent" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 40). 
Such ideological hegemonic myths exploded in the 1970s with rising unemployment, 
freezing wages and youth cultural revolts. All over the decades, deep-rooted and 
strong was "the stubborn refusal of class - that tired, 'worn-out' category -- to 
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disappear as a major dimension and dynamic of the social structure" (Hall and 
Jefferson, 1976, p. 25). 
Resistance through Rituals proclaims the presence of class, especially the 
working class, not as a political force, but as a cultural presence activating symbolic 
refusal or resistance of dominant value systems through marginal youth sub-cultures. 
Sub-cultural styles came to embody expressions of collective identity. Style is crucial 
here and style, or ritual resistance, is about using and adapting cultural signs. Hall et 
al. argue that "Commodities are, also, cultural signs," which "have already been 
invested, by the dominant culture, with meanings, associations, social connotations" 
(Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 55). Through the adoption and adaptation of particular 
styles, spaces and objects (e.g. the safety pin of the punk), signs are re-signified and a 
subversive style and collective group consciousness come into being. So, through 
stylization, things are "disarticulated from their dominant meanings, and rearticulated 
in new contexts" (Procter, 2004, p. 92). 
Hall et al. made it clear that hegemony is not "given" (guaranteed once and for 
all), but a site of continuous struggle: "It has to be won, worked for, reproduced, 
sustained" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 40). This unique feature grants youth 
subculture resistance an important role to play. However, sub-cultural styles and 
rituals can only be used to resist, negotiate or live through subordinate class 
experience; they cannot provide a solution to crisis. In other words, the subcultural 
resolution is a highly "symbolic" struggle "fated to fail" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 
47). Though the symbolic acts of ritual resistance are seen as tragic in the sense of 
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being empty of any political or institutional effect, Hall et al. 's study conferred a kind 
of dignity on their subjects. The seriousness of concern to the sub-cultural identities is 
quite absent in the mainstream media which delivered simply scare stories of youth 
delinquency. Hall et al. suggest that it is through moral panic that "dominant 
culture ... seek[s] and find[s], in 'youth', the folk-devils to people its nightmare" 
(Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 74). In Policing the Crisis, Hall et. al. further denounce 
the labeling of "moral panic" as being used by the establishment as a convenient 
means of legitimating authoritarian exercise of control and maintaining state 
hegemony: it "provide[ s] the basis ... for cross-class alliances in support of 
'authority"', particularly when the state is in "crisis" (Hall et. aI., 1978, p. 177). 
Dick Hebdige's Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979) sees "style" as the 
essence of sub-cultures and attempts to "discern the hidden messages inscribed in 
code on the glossy surfaces of style" (Hebdige, 1979, p. 18). For Hebdige, the central 
point behind sub-cultures lies in the "communication of a significant difference" 
(Hebdige, 1979, p. 102). Through analyzing the British post-war subcultures such as 
the Teddy Boys, the Mods, the Punk, the Reggae, the Skinhead, etc, Hebdige explores 
their semiotic resistance to the dominant culture. Marginalized subcultural groups 
gained symbolic solidarity and independent identity through the fusion of fashion and 
musical styles. 
Paul Willis's Learning to Labor: How Working-Class Kids get Working-Class 
Jobs aims to expose the reasons or logic which constrain or determine working-class 
kids getting working-class jobs, through analyzing the cultural and economic modes 
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of reproduction that make this possible. It focuses on "the determinants of a social 
class base out of which a particular class habitus shapes the trajectory of the lives 
lived" (Kirk, 2007, p. 49). Willis argues "that it is their own culture which most 
effectively prepares some working class lads for the manual giving of their labor 
power. We may say that there is an element of self-damnation in the taking on of 
subordinate roles in Western capitalism" (as cited in Kirk, 2007, p. 49). Willis 
explains that the working-class kids intentionally refuse to follow school discipline or 
study hard. They are not impressed by the common belief of self-salvation/upward 
mobility through educational success. They do not even care the practical need that 
successful school learning can possibly lead to some type of more decent and 
meaningful work. They are very pessimistic about what they can target. The boys' 
resistance and struggle is "a curious kind of hubris" (Kirk, 2007, p. 49); it seems that 
these working-class kids blindly "attempt one heroic last stand to define themselves, 
their autonomy and agency" (Kirk, 2007, p. 50). But it is highly tragic and hopeless 
that such defiance can bring nothing except harm. Through mocking the ideological 
interpellation of the school system and celebrating agency, working-class kids are 
more firmly fixed in the relationship of production they resist in the first place (Kirk, 
2007, p. 50). They can get no more than repeating the low-technique jobs of their 
parents. 
Finally, Hall's effort in combining Althusser's ideology and Gramsci's theory 
of hegemony as analytical tool led Cultural Studies after the 1970s to divert its 
attention to studies on power. 
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The winning of consent can be typically exemplified by British working class 
voting so many times for Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 1979-1990), who is a 
right-wing Conservative liberal, yet seen as identified with their interests. In her first 
prime ministerial term (1979-1983), Britain's Gross Domestic Product fell by 4.2 per 
cent and unemployment rose by a record 141 per cent to over three million (Procter, 
2004, p. 97). By the end of her second term, large scale de-industrialization reshaped 
the landscape of class formations, forcefully eclipsing those working class in the 
former industrial heartlands. The trade union power and labor movement as well as 
the Labor Party itself were profoundly weakened. Nevertheless, the Conservative 
Party secured a third term in office, making Thatcher one of the most popular leaders 
of the postwar period. Such unmatched outcome inspired Hall to develop a theoretical 
analysis which could explain the reasons for the continued electoral success of Mrs 
Thatcher's neo-liberal, right-wing Conservative Party and explore what the Left might 
learn from those reasons. In so doing, Hall coined the term "Thatcherism" (Procter, 
2004, p. 98), which he felt was hegemonic ideological interpellation based on such 
images as nation, family, neo-liberalism, competitive individualism. He also raised 
the notion of "New Times," a project Hall and some other Left intellectuals launched 
between 1988 and 1989 through Marxism Today-to force the Left to "move with the 
times" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p. 14). Theorists of "New Times" state that Western 
capitalism is witnessing the emergence of a "two-thirds, one-third society" (Hall and 
Jacques, 1989, p. 17), implying that two-thirds of the population are relatively well 
off with "rising expectations" while one-third are either engaged in de-skilled 
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part-time work or become the jobless underclass that is "left behind on every 
significant dimension of social opportunity" (Hall, 1989, p. 118). The postmodern 
New Times in Britain is characterized by the diversity of social and political 
upheavals including "the success of 'Thatcherism,' the decline of traditional 
working-class politics, the emergence of a politics of identity and consumption, and 
most importantly the challenge these represent to the left" (Turner, 1996, p. 219). 
Hall's study of the 1980s produced an ongoing critique of Thatcherism, which 
was first published as a series of essays in the socialist monthlies Marxism Today and 
The New Socialist and subsequently collected in two books: The Politics of 
Thatcherism (1983) and The Hard Road to Renewal (1988). 
For Hall, the uniqueness of Thatcherism lay in its capacity to "identify itself 
with 'the people'" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 10) and to "construct around itself an 
active popular consent" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, pp. 22-23), securing hegemony even 
among the working class whose economic interests was hardly the concern of 
Thatcher Governments. Thatcherism cut across divides and conflicting interests, 
including class interests, by deploying "the discourse of 'nation' and 'people' against 
'class' and 'unions'" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 27). And this political hegemony is 
distinctly featured as "authoritarian populism:" "[fJree market, strong state, iron 
times" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 10), a successful combination of "populist" appeal 
with the imposition of authority and "law" and "order." To be specific, by 
"populism," Hall means something more than the ability to secure electoral support, 
but "the project, central to the politics of Thatcherism, to ground neo-liberal policies 
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directly in an appeal to 'the people;' to root them in the essentialist categories of 
commonsense experience and practical moralism - and thus to construct.. . classes, 
groups and interests into a particular definition of 'the people'" (Hall, 1988, p. 71). By 
"authoritarian," Hall means the arousal of populist sentiment must be transformed into 
"the identification with authority, the values of traditionalism and the smack of firm 
leadership" (Hall, 1988, p. 72). As a matter of fact, Thatcherism was only committed 
to rolling back the state for free market; in all other aspects she is always prepared to 
strengthen state power and control for national recovery and social order. 
Hall argues that this hegemony of the right, which destroys the post-war 
political consensus of social democracy, proves the success of ideological 
interpellation, as the consent was structured around the ideological mobilizations 
across class lines around "the resonant themes of organic Toryism -- nation, family, 
duty, authority standards, traditionalism, patriarchalism--with the aggressive themes 
of a revived neo-liberalism--self-respect, competitive individualism, anti-statism" 
(Hall, 1988, p. 157). For Hall, it is imagery--ideological representation--as opposed to 
policy that "Thatcherism" secured its political success in the 1980s. In "Gramsci and 
Us," writing in the aftermath of Thatcher's third election victory in 1987, which is 
about Thatcherism's success and challenge and the Left inability to cope with the 
changing world, Hall explains, "People don't vote for Thatcherism, in my view, 
because they believe the small print. People in their minds do not think that Britain is 
now a wonderfully blooming, successful, economy. Nobody believes that, with 3 3/4 
million unemployed, the economy is picking up ... What Thatcherism as an ideology 
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does, is to address the fears, the anxieties, the lost identities, of a people. It invites us 
to think about politics in images. It is addressed to our collective fantasies, to Britain 
as an imagined community, to the social imaginary. Mrs Thatcher has totally 
dominated that idiom, while the left forlornly tries to drag the conversation round to 
'our policies. '" (Hall, 1988, p. 167) 
In "The Empire Strikes Back," Hall took the Falklands War (1982-3) as an 
example to illustrate how Thatcherism, in constructing the war into a populist cause, 
built its success partly in making people think politics in images. Thatcher's first term 
did not achieve much, but was saved by the War. The War, which cost a fortune, was 
largely fought on the grounds of moral principles, articulated through a series of 
images, such as Winston Churchill and Britain's imperial greatness. The nostalgic 
language of empire was enormously popular with the British electorate, with "52 
percent of manual workers" and "more men than women" prepared to vote Mrs 
Thatcher according to an opinion poll (Hall, 1988, p. 69). Mrs Thatcher made full use 
of the war to glamorize Englishness, imperial nostalgia, patriotism and patriarchy, 
traditional (moral) values - Thatcherism's ideological imagery. Hall sees this project 
of ideology as one of "regressive modernization" or even "reactionary modernization" 
(Hall, 1988, p. 164), by which he means that Thatcherism's vision of the future is 
founded upon and legitimated through a backward looking, nostalgic turn to the past, 
e.g. combining liberal free market discourses with conservative themes such as 
nationhood and empire. 
New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s (Hall and Jacques, 
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1989) was written near the end of Thatcher's reign to draw some conclusions about 
the deep political, economic, social, and cultural changes now taking place in western 
capitalist societies. Hall identifies "a qualitative change" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p. 
12) in advanced capitalist countries increasingly characterized by "diversity, 
differentiation and fragmentation" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p. 11). The rapid wave of 
de-industrialization since the early 1980s has resulted in shift of economy from 
manufacturing production to a predominantly service sector as well as shift towards a 
more flexible, specialized and decentralized form of labor process. More people work 
on flexi-time and part-time base. This has led to the weakening or even the demise of 
traditional working class, their politics, and their culture. For Hall et ai., New Times 
creates new subjectivities. There is an end of old collective solidarities with the "self' 
being "more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple 'selves' or identities," 
and hence the subject "is differently placed or positioned by different discourses and 
practices" (Hall, 1989, p. 120). With the death for good of the working class, agency 
is sought elsewhere in cultural studies. Hence, the concern with class is shifted to 
concerns with new social movements and identity politics of the margins. 
Hall sees in New Times "a leading role for consumption" with greater emphasis 
on choice and product differentiation, and on "the 'targeting' of consumers by 
lifestyle, taste and culture rather than by the Registrar General's categories of social 
class" (Hall, 1989, p. 118). Characterized by such words as "proliferation," 
"diversity" and "multiplication," Hall identifies in processes of market expansion "the 
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opening up of the individual" and "the democratization of culture" (Hall, 1989, p. 
128). 
Hall also advises that the renewal of the Left had to begin by learning from the 
lessons of Thatcherism. A decade before Tony Blair became British Prime Minister, 
Hall was able to predict and warn the danger "that the Left will produce, in 
government, a brand of New Times which in practice does not amount to much more 
than a slightly cleaned-up, humanized version of that of the radical Right" (Hall and 
Jacques, 1989, p. 16). Reality proved that New Labor in office since 1997 under Tony 
Blair seemed to have learned those lessons only too well. The re-branded, 
re-packaged Labor Party was fully aware of the importance of entering into the 
ideological struggle over image and imagery that was central to Thatcherism's 
success. Hall's fear came true as the New Labor's effort was "less an attempt to 
re-articulate the new times for the Left, than ... to reoccupy the old terrain of the 
Right" (Procter, 2004, p. 114). 
The Marginalization of Class and the Moral Significance for the Study of Class 
Yet since the 1970s the CCCS gradually began to move away from 
working-class subjects and youth subcultures to other aspects of identity. From the 
mid-1980s, in both social science and cultural studies, interest in gender, race, 
sexuality, ethnicity, etc., arose to replace the former interest in class. According to 
Martin Barker and Anne Beezer, class, at best, "has become one 'variable' among 
many" and, at worst, "has dissolved away altogether" (as cited in Medhurst, 2000, p. 
22). 
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Turner offers three reasons for this change. The first is the challenge from other 
marginalized groups with rising consciousness; the second, the decline in the 
influence of Althusserian theories of ideology and the subsequent tum to Gramsci; 
and the third, Thatcherism, which, with its radical neo-liberal cultural ethos and social 
reforms, defied any attempt to continue to stick to class interests (1996, pp. 217-218). 
In essence, the shift is a consequence of the recognition of "the diversification of 
social struggles" as the "structures of the modem state and society complexify and the 
points of social antagonism proliferate"--in short, "the proliferation of the sites of 
power and antagonism in modem society" (Hall, 1988, p. 168), a new cultural trend 
seen and named as New Times, which I have just mentioned. 
Hall was also responsible for "recovering the issue of race" as one key concern 
of cultural studies, very possibly due to his West Indian background (Turner, 1996, p. 
69). From 1980s or early 1990s, Hall spent more time and energy developing his 
theory on "difference," celebrating hybridity in today's globalized culture. 
Cultural studies' gradual withdrawal from a predominantly class-based analysis 
is read by some critics as "a retreat from politics" (Turner, 1996, p. 220) or "signs of 
political exhaustion" (Turner, 1996, p. 221). For Kirk, the "displacements" and 
"forgettings" of class elides domination, subordinating relations of exploitation and 
"[d]iasporic hybridity cannot stand outside class relations as a mode of cultural 
identity" (Kirk, 2007, p. 69). Reid sees the situation as "not unlike coal mining, the 
decline in which is related neither to the lack of coal nor to its utility, but to the 
changing and comparative attraction of other fuels" (1998, p. xix). 
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Munt is extremely sad to see that within the hierarchies of oppression, "class 
has sunk to the bottom because it is not sexy enough for the intelligentsia" and that 
there is a poverty of representation with few work on contemporary working-class 
culture (2000, p. 7). In the last two decades, there has been much public call for 
positive images of women, racial minority, and gays and lesbians, but no such 
equivalent urge for working-class representation. Academics of working-class 
background within universities "are encouraged to see 'others,' but not themselves" 
(2000, p. 7). Medhurst shares Munt's sadness that class is in so many ways "the 'lost 
identity' of identity politics" (2000, p. 29) and that too many academics speak from "a 
position of 'class blindness'" (2000, p. 28). 
Munt views it "a kind of shame" in cultural studies putting primary interest in 
audience studies and thus placing "the locus of responsibility onto readers, rather than 
producers" (2000, p. 8). She strongly holds that cultural studies should continue to 
have as one of its chief objectives "a concern to illuminate the present" (2000, p. 7). 
The reality is harsh. With the destruction of Britain's traditional industry and trade 
unionism, working class has been perceived from the Victorian notion of the 
"deserving poor" to the present notion of social "waste," particularly the underclass. 
Their production labor, which can be their only social contribution, is now 
discouraged and lost, making them redundant and useless. Kirk (2007) and Skeggs 
(2004) in their works also strongly argue for the cultural significance for the study of 
the post modern working class identity. This is a position widely shared, e.g. by 
Andrew Sayer (2005), Ferdinand Mount (2004), as I have covered in Introduction 
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Chapter. 
Cultural Studies is the study of everyday life, and the present British everyday 
life is still saturated with class relations as convincingly illustrated in Reid's Class in 
Britain and Hopkins' The Rise and Decline of English Working Class 1918-1990, both 
of which argue against that class differentiation has withered away in contemporary 
Britain. The fact that not everybody believes this "doesn't make it untrue," though the 
phenomenon displays the success of liberal pluralism ethos (Munt, 2000, p. 10). 
Munt suggests that, since working-class studies formed "the backbone" of 
many disciplines, an '"ethical and integral" approach needs to be adopted to combine 
the study of working-classness with that of gender, race, sexuality, etc. "If you take 
out 'class' from an exploration of gender and so on, you ignore a crucial determining 
factor of the experience of being a woman, man or transgendered person" (Munt, 
2000, p. 10). And some effort has already been made towards this direction, e.g. in 
Munt's Cultural Studies and the Working Class (2000) and in Kirk's Twenty-century 
Writing and the British Working Class (2003). Class was what ignited Cultural Studies, 
after all, and should always bear a mark seriously. Skegges warns that "[ w ]hen class 
becomes reduced to a matter of etiquette and taste, we know there is something 
clearly very wrong and very bourgeois happening" (2004, p. 44). 
Key Concepts 
Having established the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies, it is 
necessary here to explain some of the key operating concepts of the study. While 
quite a few concepts have already been covered in my exploration of British Cultural 
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Studies, such as "culture," "ideology," "hegemony," "cultural'politics," here I would 
add four more essential concepts, namely "identity," "representation," "realism" and 
"masculinity." Four more concepts, "class," "class consciousness," "working class" 
and "underclass," will be dealt with in Chapter III, which is sociological and historical 
understanding of class and working class and therefore a more appropriate place for a 
detailed elaboration ofthe terms. 
The word identity connotes both sameness as well as difference. It comes 
through identification and differentiation. Psychology and psychoanalysis focus on 
identity "as a person's essential self, or the subjective idea of oneself as an individual" 
while social sciences emphasize "the communal and cultural aspects of identity 
formation" (Mikula, 2008, p. 92). Identities are socially constructed and "cannot 
'exist' outside of social and cultural representations and acculturalization" (Barker, 
2000, p. 165). It is social and cultural as ''there are no transcendental or ahistorical 
elements to what it is to be a person" (Barker, 2000, p. 167). Identity is an essence 
which can be signified through signs of taste, beliefs, attitudes and lifestyles. So, 
Barker summarizes that "identity is concerned with sameness and difference, with the 
personal and the social and with forms of representation" (Barker, 2000, p. 166). Until 
the latter half of the 20th century, social sciences interpreted collective identities of 
social groups related to class, gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, etc. as "relatively 
stable categories" (Mikula, 2008, p. 93). 
The issue of identity is central to cultural studies as cultural studies examines 
"the contexts within which and through which both individuals and groups construct, 
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negotiate and defend their identity or self-understanding" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999, 
p. 183). Identity has been a continuous concern of cultural studies, though such 
concern greatly intensified from the 1990s to the new millennium, making identity 
politics "the central theme" of cultural studies (Barker, 2004, p. 53) marked with new 
characteristics. Identity subjects under close investigation shifted from working class 
people to women, ethnic minority, homosexual groups, etc. and identity within 
cultural studies has been understood much more through the notion of difference. 
Besides, identity is not a "fixed 'thing' that we possess but an emotionally charged 
symbolic description of ourselves" and is never stable but "a process of becoming" 
(Barker, 2004, p. 53). 
Identity politics refers to political activities mobilized to struggle for the equal 
treatment of specific identity groups-usually marginalized social groups. It is 
concerned with such people making identity claims for maintaining cultural rights 
within society and culture. Identity politics is "a sub-set of cultural politics" and is 
thus also concerned with "the 'power to name' and to make particular descriptions 
stick" (Barker, 2004, p. 95). 
Identity relies heavily on representations-practices and norms often used in 
the mass media to present images of particular social groups. Presentations are not 
"innocent reflections of the real" but are "cultural constructions" (Barker, 2004, p. 
177). The representations of identities are "political" in the sense that construction 
and consequences of representations are closely bound with power and ideology 
which regulates society through enabling some kinds of identities to exist while 
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denying others. Therefore, the "politics of representation" is a central concern for 
cultural studies scholars. For Hall, "there is no understanding of identity outside of 
culture and representation," for which he prefers the use of "cultural identity;" and 
"representations are not reflexive but constitutive and therefore have a real, material 
impact" (Procter, 2004, p. 125). 
Class representation is a key concept for this dissertation. Skeggs holds that 
"[ u ]nderstanding representation is central to any analysis of class" and that it is "the 
process of evaluation, moral attribution and authorization" as well as awareness and 
resistance of such that are central to understanding contemporary class relations (2004, 
p. 117). In Outlaw Culture (1994), bell hooks denounces the representations of 
poverty in the mass media and calls for intervention in existing systems for an 
alternative representation around poverty which would refuse worthlessness, shame, 
and the idea of perpetual aspiration: "To change the face of poverty so that it becomes 
once again, a site for the formation of values, of dignity and integrity, as any other 
class positionality in this society" (as cited in Haylett, 2000, p. 72). 
Realism emerged as a mode of oppositional or reform-seeking expression and 
representation in the 19th century. There is no universally agreed definition for it, but a 
common understanding is that realism presents life as it really is or shows things as 
they occur. Williams in "A Lecture on Realism" noted three emphases which are 
common to all forms of realism, namely, "the secular, the contemporary and the 
socially extended" (1977, p. 65). The secular means the actions are ruled by reason 
and logic instead of superstition and mysticism, reflecting the progress of humanity. 
59 
The contemporary means the story is set in the present in terms of setting, character, 
and social issues. The socially extended means "a conscious movement toward social 
extension" to broaden the range of characters and topics to include marginal or 
under-represented groups and issues in society, specifically the extension to themes of 
"working-class I ife, bringing the working class to the center of dramatic action" (1977, 
p. 63, p. 67). In addition, realist texts are influenced by the political intent of the artist, 
carrying "specific ideological features" and offering "a moral lesson" to people (1977, 
p. 64). Drawing on the work of Williams, Marion Jordan suggests that in social 
realism, "life should be presented in the form of a narrative of personal events;" that 
"these events are ostensibly about social problems;" that the "characters should be 
either working-class or of the classes immediately visible to the working classes;" that 
"the locale should be urban and provincial;" that "the settings should be commonplace 
and recognizable;" that "the time should be 'the present'" and "that the style should 
be as to suggest an unmediated, unprejudiced and complete view of reality" (as cited 
in Creeber, 2000, pp. 195-196). In British film criticism, "social realism" is often used 
interchangeably with "kitchen sink" realism, or "working-class" realism. 
Masculinity refers to qualities or appearance traditionally associated with men. 
As a cultural concept, it is an identity category that refers to "the cultural 
characteristics associated with being a man" (Barker, 2004, p. 115) or "normative and 
socially and culturally constructed patterns of manhood" (Mikula, 2008, p. 119). In 
patriarchal societies masculinity and femininity are set in simple binary opposition 
and heterosexual masculinity is typically constructed as the normative standard and 
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the foremost source of empowerment. Masculinity has traditionally valued strength, 
action, control, assertiveness, work, independence, competitiveness, aggression, 
camaraderie, and etc. Devalued were relationships, verbal expression, domestic life, 
tenderness, women and children. Masculinity is "a matter of representation;" it is 
"constituted by ways of speaking about and disciplining bodies" (Barker, 2004, p. 
115). Hence, it is a site of continual political struggle over meaning in the context of 
multiple modes of being a man. As Cornwall and Lindisfarne point out, "Hegemonic 
masculinities define successful ways of 'being a man;' in so doing, they define other 
masculine styles as inadequate or inferior" (as cited in Mikula, 2008, p. 119). 
Masculinity is not an unchanging given of nature. Since the late 1970s, for the 
first time some men in the West have seen themselves as experiencing a 
"problematic" masculinity, or "crisis" of masculinity due to post-industrial social and 
cultural changes. Cultural critics in the fields of feminism and queer studies have also 
strived hard to challenge the patriarchal maleness and destabilize normative social 
roles. To accompany this, there has been an upsurge of interest in the study of men 
and masculinity. Within cultural studies, critics have focused on "the ways in which 
media and cultural texts and cultural practices construct and disseminate 
representations of men and maleness, and on the role these representations play in 
negotiating notions of the masculine in society" (Mikula, 2008, p. 120). With a 
substantial number of men implicated in depression, alcoholism, drug abuse, violence 
and crime and even suicide, it has been argued that the central problems of men's 
61 
lives are "rooted in the adoption of impossible images of masculinity that men try, but 
fail, to live up to" (Barker, 2004, p. 115). 
In this chapter, I have surveyed the development of British Cultural Studies, 
which serves as the basic theoretical framework for this dissertation in general as well 
as for my ideological analysis of British working-class identity and representation in 
Chapter 7 in particular. The next chapter will look at British class and working class 
from the sociological and historical disciplines to provide contextual understanding of 
the issue of class and working class. 
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CHAPTER III 
CLASS AND WORKING CLASS IN BRITAIN: 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 
Britain is the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and 
therefore had "the world's first industrial working class" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 81). By 
the end of the 19th century, the working class had become a knowable, measurable and 
organizable force, potentially powerful. Between the later half of the 19th century and 
early half of the 20th century, the working class won suffrage, strengthened trade 
unionism, consolidated the Labor Party, and facilitated community support. New 
strength was gained in the two postwar decades due to full employment and affluence, 
from which working class youth benefited most. But the official claim of Britain as a 
classless society has not been approved by the general public and has been severely 
criticized by sociologists and cultural scholars. After the Second World War, the 
traditional British working class has gone through many social and political changes, 
especially a lasting "decline" since the 1970s after the post-war "rise," leading to the 
rhetoric of the "end of class" (Kirk, 2007, p. 2) and the coinage of the "underclass" 
(working class without jobs). Working class is deemed to have departed the social 
scene, either as an economic entity, as a distinct cultural formation, or as an agent of 
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political change or action. 
This chapter will look at class and working class from sociological and 
historical perspective to provide contextual knowledge and arguments for a 
comprehensive understanding of the issue of class and working class. It will explore 
the definition and classification of class and working class, assess the class or 
classless nature of British society and offer a general survey of the rise and fall of 
British working class conditions. It concludes that British working class is still a 
substantial social existence whose identity change is worthy of serious concern. 
Defining and Classifying Class and Working Class 
The working people in Britain had been known "as the 'the lower orders,' 'the 
masses' or even 'the mob,' 'the rabble' or 'the swinish multitude,' depending on the 
attitude of the observer" (Hopkins, 1991, p. 2). "Working class" as an identity 
category was formed and came into popular use in the early years of the 19th century 
in recognition of their position as wage earners faced with an intensification of 
capitalist relationships of production. The contemporaries and later historians 
identified the group as a working class, or more often "the working classes" due to the 
diverse range of occupations and distinctions of status involved. By the 1840s, then, 
middle classes and working classes had become common terms. The former became 
singular first. The latter became singular from the 1840s but still today alternates 
between singular and plural forms, often "with ideological significance, the singular 
being normal in socialist uses, the plural more common in conservative descriptions." 
(Williams, 1983, p. 64) The single and plural forms have the same signification and 
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have been used interchangeably, though Marxist historians customarily use the 
singular to emphasize the economic homogeneity of the workers (Hopkins, 1991, 
preface vii). 
E.P. Thompson chose the singular form for his book The Making of the English 
Working Class as he sees the difference as the following: '''Working classes" is a 
descriptive term, which evades as much as it defines. It ties loosely together a bundle 
of discrete phenomena. There were tailors here and weavers there, and together they 
make up the working classes. By class I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying 
a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of 
experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that this is a historical phenomenon. I 
do not see class as a 'structure,' nor even as a 'category,' but as something which in 
fact happens ... in human relationships." (1963, p. 9) 
The definition of working class can be found in some social welfare documents 
before the Second World War, which at the time concerned only the problems of one 
social group--the statutory working class or working classes. So the first piece of 
industrial injuries legislation, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, and the first 
legislation on national health insurance and unemployment insurance shortly before 
the First World War were restricted to those employed "by way of manual labor," with 
doubtful cases being settled by the income limit (Marwick, 1990, pp. 61-62). A more 
detailed definition was provided by the Housing Act of 1925 and 1936: "the 
expression 'working class' includes mechanics, artisans, laborers and others working 
for wages hawkers, costermongers, persons not working for wages, but working at 
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some trade or handicraft without employing others except members of their own 
family, and persons other than domestic servants, whose income does not exceed an 
average of three pounds a week, and the families of such persons who may be residing 
with them" (Marwick, 2005, p. 80). 
Social scientists have offered two opposing ways of thinking about class. Wood 
puts it in Democracy Against Capitalism that "There are really only two ways of 
thinking theoretically about class: either as a structural location or as a social 
relation" (1995, p. 76). Class understood as a location is Weberian in which class is 
imagined in terms of social layers, strata, identities and groupings. Class understood 
as a determining relation is associated with Marxism and historical materialism in 
which class is understood as the force or relationship which shapes such identities and 
groupings. 
Marx argued for the polarization of social classes in capitalist societies, with the 
bourgeoisie or capitalist class who own the means of production on one side and the 
proletariat or working class who have to sell their labor-power on the other. He 
claimed in the Communist Manifesto (1848), "Society as a whole is more and more 
splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each 
other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 2). He forecasted that 
conflict between the two classes, due to conflicting economic interests, would lead 
eventually to working-class revolutions which bring the downfall of capitalism. 
Marxist tradition tends to trace all social inequalities to the root of economic 
differences; the economically dominant class is also expected to dominate politically 
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and culturally. Marx did not foresee that the actual ownership of the means of 
production may be less important in a modern capitalist society, where ownership 
may be divorced from effective control by professional managers. 
In comparison with Marxist political philosophy, Max Weber's sociological 
analysis of class favored a more layered or hierarchical account of social inequality. 
He attached importance to differences in status between groups, particularly 
occupational groups. His conception centered on the market-people's class positions 
are determined by differential life-chances distributed by the capitalist market 
(Marshall et ai., 1988, p. 17). In other words, classes arose in the labor market based 
on the various assets or resources (skills, qualifications, ownership of stocks of capital, 
the ability to labor) that individuals could offer. While both Marx and Weber 
conceptualized class in economic terms, Weber stressed more than Marx the class 
advantages which draw from knowledge or skills. Thus the Weberian try to make 
differentiations within Marxism's proletariat class, in order to explain the higher 
levels of material reward and status gained by intellectuals and 
managers/administrators and the reason why their class interests and cultural identity 
may accord more closely with those of the property-owning bourgeoisie (Edgar & 
Sedgwick, 1999, p. 67). So, what was crucial for Marx was experiences at work 
(relationships to the means of production), but for Weber the process of gaining work 
(or hiring labor) and the rewards (life-chances) (Roberts, 2001, p. 3). Weber also 
added analyses of differences in power and social status. Status is the honor or 
prestige attached to the styles of life of different social positions. So class is also seen 
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as a cultural, rather than purely economic, phenomenon. 
Max Weber contributed to developing Marx's theory of class in the broader 
context of what has since become known as social stratification--the division of a 
society into hierarchical layers. Social stratification is essentially about groups' 
relationships to social wealth, yet it concerns not only wealth and income but also 
power and prestige, life style, education, values, beliefs, etc. Therefore it is the most 
all-embracing term used in sociology when analyzing inequalities. Most social 
analysts see social class, which has an economic basis, as the most important and 
fundamental form of social stratification. Marwick sees "stratification" as "an ugly 
metaphor drawn from geology" (Marwick, 1990, p. 4). 
Weber's analysis of social relations in the sphere of the market has been 
criticized as obscuring the capitalist exploitative nature in the realm of production. 
The notion of market sovereignty and equality (all are "free" labors and equal 
consumers) obscures the "real" base of inequality on the level of production (Barker, 
2000, p. 49). The Weberian approach can be reduced to an account of class purely in 
terms of occupational difference. Marxists such as Wood keep writing to expose the 
exploitive nature of capitalism and for class to be seen as social relations. Yet the 
Weberian approach to class relationship has been more widely accepted. Reid in his 
book Class in Britain, which concerns the empirical reality of social class differences, 
defines social class as "a grouping of people into categories on the basis of 
occupation" (1998, p. 10) for the reason that occupation is "easily collected and 
simple to treat" (1998, p. 11). Due to its user-friendliness, occupation has been seen as 
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"the best single indicator" of social standing and socio-economic circumstance of a 
person or a family in government census, sociological and commercial research 
concerns despite its limitations (1998, p. 10). 
Apart from Marx and Weber, Marwick defines in Class: Image and Reality in 
Britain, France and the USA since 1930 that "Class, in the historical and popular 
usage of this book, suggests overlapping areas of inequality, particularly in power and 
authority, income and wealth, conditions of work, life chances and lifestyles (1990, p. 
170). And E. P. Thompson in 1978 defines class as "a social and cultural formation", 
one which cannot be "defined abstractly ... but only in terms of relationship with other 
classes." Class is "a very loosely defined body of people who share the same 
categories of interest, social experiences, traditions and value-systems, who have a 
disposition to behave as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their 
consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways." (as cited in Kirk, 
2007, p. 7) So, social classes are seen as economic as well as cultural products within 
a societal and historical setting. The basic assumption is that "differences between 
classes and strata are caused by and persist because of their differing access to almost 
all social resources, to power positions and to opportunities that, in general, are to the 
decided advantage of some and the decided disadvantage of others" (Reid, 1998, p. 
14). 
Class is also a matter of perception. Class locations tend to get into people's 
heads and influence their minds, their consciousness and unconsciousness. Reid holds 
that there are two ways of looking at the existence of social class: "objective 
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existence" and "subjective existence" (Marx had recognized them both). Reid's 
"subjective existence" ("to the extent to which people in society perceive, or accept, 
social class") (1998, p. 9) equals class consciousness. E. P. Thompson says, "class 
happens when some men, as a result of common experiences ... feel and articulate the 
identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose 
interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs ... Class-consciousness is 
the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in 
traditions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms," (1963, pp. 9-10). Here, it is 
important to note Marx's distinction between "a class in itself' and "a class for itself." 
While the former is a social group that is determined by a common economic position, 
the latter refers to a group which is collectively aware of that economic determination 
and consequently of its real interests in social change. In seeking to explain why the 
working class haven't become a revolutionary force, Marx believed they were unable 
to recognize their exploitation and were suffering from "false consciousness" and 
therefore not a class for itself (Reid, 1998, p. 9). That is to say, a group of genuine 
class consciousness needs to overcome the illusions of ideology and false 
consciousness. Faced with the harsh realities and influenced by Gramsci's theory, 
present-day Marxists tend to accept that, apart from economic determinants, other 
factors-capitalist politics, ideology, etc-can play important roles in class formation. 
In summary, all the definitions of class have common denominators. 
Sociologists all agree that classes have an economic foundation and people with 
common experiences of making their livings are classed together. All class academics 
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commonly agree that class matters. "Class is related to people's wealth, health, 
education, but this is just the beginning of the list" (Roberts, 2001, p. 6). In this aspect, 
cultural scholars pay more attention to the emotional ingredients of this "long list." 
The book entitled Class Matters, edited by Pat Mahony and Christine Zmroczek 
(1997), deals extensively with the emotional politics of class. Medhurst argues that 
"Class is felt, class wounds, class hurts, and those of us on a cusp between classes 
bruise particularly easily" (2000, p. 21). 
While defining class is not easy, the classification of class is even more 
challenging. The difficulty lies in defining appropriate class boundaries for statistical 
purposes. Clearly there is no single measure of social class in Britain. Historically, 
there have been schemes of the Registrar-General (1911), John Goldthorpe (1972), 
and Eric Wright (1980s), representing the official, sociological and Marxist 
perspectives respectively. 
Britain was the first country in the world to institute a national census in as 
early as 1801, and was the first to introduce by Registrar General in 1911 an explicit 
class hierarchy as one of the forms in which census data could be presented (Marwick, 
1990, p. 56). The five-class scheme of 1911 went as follows: Class I, professional etc. 
occupations; Class II, intermediate occupations (including proprietors of businesses, 
managers and bankers, as well as certain professions not considered good enough for 
Class I-school and university teachers among them); Class III, skilled occupations; 
Class IV, partly skilled occupations; Class V, unskilled occupations (Marwick, 1990, p. 
56). The scheme was also considered to have six classes with Class III subdivided 
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into Class lIla comprising lower-level white-collar workers, and class IIIb comprising 
the skilled manual workers (Roberts, 200 I, p. 24). 
The Registrar-General's census class scheme is occupational, based on the 
assumption that society is a graded hierarchy of occupations ranked according to 
expertise and skill. Besides, the class allocations tend to be intuitive. Despite this, 
sociologists were generally happy to use the scheme due to its simplicity and clarity. 
It remained the UK's official (government) class scheme up to 1998, when it was 
replaced by a new scheme not so much different. The 1998 Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) official UK class scheme was based on John Goldthorpe scheme 
which had been used for the large-scale Oxford survey of social mobility in England 
and Wales in 1972 with only slight modifications. The ONS scheme has eight 
categories, four of which middle-class, three working-class, plus an eighth category of 
non-workers and long-term unemployed, which is an addition to the Goldthorpe 
scheme. The details are as follows: 1.1 Employers (large organizations) and senior 
managers, 1.2 Higher professionals, 2 Lower managerial and professional, 3 
Intermediate (e.g. clerks, secretaries, computer operators), 4 Small employers and 
own-account non-professional, 5 Supervisors, craft and related, 6 Semi-routine (e.g. 
cooks, bus drivers, hairdressers, shop assistants), 7 Routine (e.g. waiters, cleaners, 
couriers), 8 Never worked, long-term unemployed (Roberts, 2001, p. 25). 
The need for recognizing the 8th category has intensified since the 1970s due to 
economic recession, deindustrialization, and cuts in welfare expenditure. Its growth 
has become characteristic of the class structure of advanced capitalist societies. 
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Compared with the 1911 scheme, the 1998 scheme continues to measure social 
class by occupation; but different from the instinctive base for the 1911 scheme, the 
1998 one has an explicit theoretical rationale as Goldthorpe had well justified his 
categorization from a Weberian conception of class. Besides, while the majority 
categories of the old scheme were working-class, the new one made its majority 
categories to be middle class for the first time and added a petit-bourgeoisie and an 
underclass. The Office for National Statistics says: "Definitions like manual and 
non-manual have stopped being relevant. We have moved towards a service-based 
economy, and our social classifications have to adapt to that." (Bromley, 2000, p. 55) 
Marxist class schemes can be best represented by the Wright Scheme 3 
constructed by Eric Ohlin Wright, an American sociologist. His class scheme has been 
used in an international comparative research project to which the British contribution 
was Social Class in Modern Britain, a study conducted by Gordon Marshall and his 
colleagues (1988), all then at Essex University. The Wright scheme classified 
individuals not according to their occupations but by their jobs. Due to its confusing 
complexity, sociologists consider it less useful. 
In general reading, we more often encounter a system of classification used by 
Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) and commonly adopted by social 
scientists and political scientists, particularly in the analysis of voting and party 
allegiance, which defines as follows: A. Higher managerial, administrative or 
professional, B. Intermediate managerial, administrative or professional, C 1. 
3 For more detaIls, Roberts (200 I) has a table of the scheme on p. 34; Edgell (1993) has 2 tables on p. 19 and 21 
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Supervisory or clerical, and junior white-collar workers, C2. Skilled manual workers, 
D. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, E. State pensioners or widows (no 
other earnings), casual or lowest grade workers, long-term unemployed. (Coxall et al., 
2003, p. 27) 
In general, nowadays, most class theorists have become Weberians. Discussions 
of capital and labor seem out of date. Yet, occupation is not the same as class. 
Designating by occupation evacuates structural inequality and exploitation from 
perceptions of lived experience. Munt sees in it a tendency to "depoliticize class 
analysis so that it naturalizes social divisions, to take the engine of protest and replace 
it with a resigned, imperceptible social organicism" (2000, p. 3). 
Looking at Class: Britain--A Class or Classless Society? 
While on the one hand class has been acknowledged as an important feature of 
British society and key ingredient of British national identity, on the other hand the 
enthusiasm for claiming a classless Britain has always been strong after the Second 
World War among political scientists, journalists, and particularly politicians, such as 
Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63) and John Major 
(1992-1997) and Labor prime minister Tony Blair (1997-2007). Yet their optimism 
met the opposition of sociologists with facts and figures. For a better understanding of 
the true picture, a close look at the class or classless nature of British society is 
necessary here. 
Before the Second World War, "three-class society held strikingly true for 
Britain in 1939" as Marwick observes (2005, p. 78). In September 1937, even the 
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conservative BBC was persuaded and convinced by the Institute of Sociology to hold 
over its radio a discussion of social stratification and class conflict, which was bravely 
entitled "Class: An Enquiry" (Marwick, 1990, p. 153). A heart-searching 
documentary series on "Class" was broadcasted in the autumn of 1938, at the end of 
which, Prof. T.H. Marshall, sociologist, was again able to "raise the voice of sanity" 
by claiming that Britain did have an upper class, as well as a working class and a 
middle class (Marwick, 1990, p. 160). What is essential in the pre-war period is that 
class differences were sharp and there was an obvious lack of communication 
between different classes. 
Yet the Second World War and the reforms after it became a turning point 
which permanently disrupted the old pattern. The cruelty of the war pressed for the 
whole society to unite and fight a "People's War," which Churchill worked hard to 
mobilize with the rhetoric "All are united like one great family; all are standing 
together. .. " (Sinfield, 1989, p. 10). For the simple purpose to win the war, politicians 
promised a vision of drastic postwar social reform to bring true democracy and social 
justice to its people. At the same time, forceful state intervention was practiced in 
organizing wartime production and living, which immediately helped toward the 
direction. 
Class integration and equality was greatly facilitated by the common war effort. 
Through conscription and war production, men and women from different class 
backgrounds were thrown together in the armed forces, in factories and offices, 
serving the national needs. In this, there was an unprecedented mobilization of the 
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working class. In return for their endeavor and sacrifice, the government guaranteed 
workers and their families a real improvement in their living conditions through such 
paternalistic measures as food rationing and subsidies, higher nutritional standard, and 
etc. On the other hand, war integration greatly aroused the working class 
consciousness as well as the sympathy from the middle class. As George Orwell 
observed in 1944, "a considerable growth of political consciousness and an increasing 
impatience with class privilege" was to be found among the manual working class 
(Taylor, 2005, p. 371). The war greatly increased the bargaining power of the working 
class: their labor was earnestly sought for and they had their representatives in the 
seats of power. Out of this grew a sincere sense of pride and self-confidence as well as 
high expectations with the working class. The temporary social mix caused by large 
scale evacuation awakened middle class families and aroused their genuine concern 
about the appalling conditions of the slum children. So the common war effort 
mobilized middle-class understanding of and sympathy for the working class. The 
middle class were more willing to support improvements in working-class conditions. 
The Conservative Churchillian government won the war, but lost the election 
immediately followed in 1945. By voting the Labor Party to form "the people's 
government," the British people voted for change and for social inclusion. The 
working class had done their bit. Their war contribution was crucial to the saving of 
their country in its hour of need. Ernest Bevin, leader of the Transport and General 
Workers Union and Minister of Labor and National Service in Churchill's wartime 
coalition government, so acknowledged in 1940, "Without our people this war cannot 
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be won nor can the life of the country be carried on" (Taylor, 2005, p. 371). Now, if 
their war sacrifice were to be remembered, the working class should become the 
beneficiaries of a grateful nation. 
In 1942, the Beveridge Report was produced by a government committee 
setting out a system of national security aiming to provide for all an egalitarian 
"safety-net" below which nobody would be able to fall. Between 1942 and 1944, the 
government published a series of white papers such as Social Insurance, Employment 
Policy, A National Health Service, and The Public Schools and the General 
Educational System which made places in British public schools (privately funded) 
available to suitable children whose parents could not afford the high fees. The Butler 
Education Act 1944 made secondary education compulsory and free for all children, 
and allowed a whole new generation of able working class children to move up the 
educational ladder, many of them as far as university. The Labor Government of 
1945-50 put welfare state into effect with the passing of National Insurance Act (1946) 
(on social security benefits), National Health Service Act (1946) (on free medical 
treatment), and some minor acts such as The National Assistance Act and Family 
Allowances Act. So the world's first comprehensive state welfare system looking after 
people "from the cradle to the grave" came into being in Britain. 
Yet reforms in the 1940s could not play immediate magic. Austerity and 
rationing continued until the late 1940s F.M. Martin's investigations, conducted in 
Greenwich and Hertford in 1950, came to such a conclusion, "The great majority of 
our subjects thought in terms of a three-class system, and most of them described 
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these classes by the same set of names-upper, middle and working" (Marwick, 1990, 
p. 268). The Glass Survey of 1949 brought out the extreme immobility of the British 
occupational structure (Marwick, 1990, p. 284). 
The two postwar decades was from poverty to affluence in the narrating of class, 
represented in the wide use of three key terms--affluence, consensus, 
embourgeoisement. From 1951 to 1964 there was full employment, sharp increase in 
productivity and income, and the wide availability of new technologies. Statistics 
showed that "total production (measured at constant prices) increased by 40 per cent, 
average earnings (allowing for inflation) by 30 per cent, while personal consumption, 
measured in terms of ownership of cars and televisions, rose from 2Y4 million to 8 
million and I million to 13 million respectively" (Hill, 1986, p. 5). The welfare 
benefits were not targeting the working class only, but all citizens of the nation. 
Politically, the Conservatives had controlled the government most of the years since 
1951, whose election victories were much based on working-class votes; they largely 
followed the welfare state, mixed economy and educational reforms put in place by 
the Labor Party in the period 1945-51. The success of welfare capitalism with mixed 
economy appeared to negate the need for Labor's continuing commitment to public 
ownership. At the 1959 Labor Party conference, Gaitskell, the Labor leader, even 
proposed to remove the Clause 4 of the Party constitution concerning the public 
ownership, though failed to do so. The Party also began to woo the new and rapidly 
growing white collar, scientific and technical classes. Consensus was a dominant 
political practice and discourse until 1979 when Mrs Thatcher came into power with 
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her neo-liberalism right-wing politics. Both parties shared a political commitment to 
welfare state, which aroused a great deal of national pride. 
The working class naturally benefited tremendously from such changes. 
Academics (mainly political scientists and journalists) began to speak of an affiuent 
"new working class" (Roberts, 2001, p. 89), or "affluent worker" (Goldthorpe et aI., 
1969), who, through gradual embourgeoisement, was being assimilated into the 
middle-class economically, culturally and politically. Market researchers discovered 
the new "teenage consumer" with his commitment to style, music, leisure and 
consumption (Abrams, 1959). With the relative classless nature of the youth culture, 
youth became a "new class" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 22). Hence the talk of Britain as 
a classless society emerged from the late 1950s, with the belief that capitalism was 
undergoing fundamental changes, equality had gone as far as necessary, and the old 
class divisions were in the process of being dissolved. 
Politicians were also in favor of such optimism. In 1957, Harold Macmillan 
(PM 1957-63) boasted that "most of our people have never had it so good" and that 
"the class war is over and we have won" (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 5, 6). Macmillan 
himself told the electorate "You've never had it so good" (Lowe, 1989, p. 574). This 
mood is even shared by the Labor Party leader Hugh Gaitskell: "The day is gone 
when workers must regard their stations in life as fixed-for themselves or for their 
children" (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 7). With "affluence" and "mobility" dominating 
public discourse, the traditional base of Labor support was undermined. And there 
seemed no point preaching class consciousness if "class" was no longer in existence. 
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It was generally believed that as the working class were better paid, they adopted 
middle-class lifestyles and values and lost political militancy. 
However, despite the growing prosperity, income and class inequalities 
continued to exist. "In 1961, 1 per cent of the adult population derived 10 per cent of 
total post-tax incomes (Le. much the same as the poorest 30 per cent) while the richest 
5 per cent enjoyed much the same income as that of the poorest 50 per cent. Figures 
for the distribution of private wealth reveal a similar picture. According to estimates 
made by The Economist for 1959-60, 88 per cent of tax payers owned only 3.7 per 
cent of private wealth while the richest 7 per cent owned 84 per cent." (Hill, 1986, p. 
9) Moreover, these figures retain a remarkable consistency with figures of the early 
1950s. Yet the political debates tried to avoid dealing with the unpleasant social and 
economic facts. 
The embourgeoisement thesis was mainly promoted by political scientists and 
journalists, but not much supported by sociological surveys. The most thorough and 
influential research interrogating the embourgeoisement thesis was conducted in the 
mid-1960s by John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechoffer and Jennifer Platt 
in Luton, which was a rising new industrial city and therefore a more valid sample. 
Two hundred and twenty-nine (male) manual workers at three establishments in Luton 
(a car manufacturer, an engineering company and a chemical plant) were interviewed. 
Fifty-four white-collar employees were also interviewed as a comparison group. In 
their book on this research The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (1969), the 
findings and interpretations rejected the embourgeoisement thesis based on the 
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folIowing reasons: "First, the vast majority of their respondents identified with the 
working class. Second, they were nearly all not only trade union members but 
regarded trade union representation as indispensable. Third, 71 per cent had voted 
Labor in the most recent general election (a higher figure than for the working class 
nationalIy). Fourth, the manual workers had few if any white-collar friends." (Roberts, 
2001, p. 91) The Luton survey denied embourgeoisement so convincingly that after it, 
"the thesis lay dead and buried" in sociology (Roberts, 200 I, p. 91). 
Britain in the 1970s was troubled with world oil crisis, economic recession, low 
rate of growth, high level of inflation, and a deterioration in industrial relations such 
as the coal miners' militant strike, culminating in the so-called "winter of discontent" 
of 1978-9 when over one million low-paid public service workers were on strike for 
nearly three months due to Callaghan Labor government's pay freeze for inflation 
control. Under such embarrassing context, the voice of classlessness weakened, 
replaced with an official recognition of some of the realities of class. Throughout the 
decades, census reports had continued to make use of the (unsatisfactory) I-V 
classification; then the 1975 edition of the Central Office of Information publication, 
Social Trends, was devoted to Social Class (Marwick, 1990, p. 322). 
In 1980, shortly after Mrs Thatcher came into office, two opposing voices 
around the issue of classlessness were simultaneously heard. Arthur Scargill 
(President of the National Union of Mineworkers, 1982-2002) continued to tell people 
that "in a capitalist society it is inevitable that there will be class conflict. There are 
only two classes in Britain. The ruling class which arms and controls the means of 
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production, and the working class which provides the labor. There is no such thing as 
a middle class. How do you become a member of it? A building worker may earn 
more money than a man in pinstripes. Does this make the building worker middle 
class? It is an illusion." (Sunday Mirror, September 7,1980; as cited in Mount, 2004, 
p. 132). Conversely, Norman St John-Stevas, the Conservative Leader of the House of 
Commons, said: "I think that class is largely an irrelevancy in contemporary British 
society. Some people may use it as an excuse for their own failures, but 1 think we 
have very largely a mobile society, a society open to talent. The talented child or 
young person is able to reach the top of any profession or activity to which that child 
sets his or her mind, provided that the ability is there ... We talk a lot about class in 
British society, but I think its social significance is very small." (The Listener, 1980; 
as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 236). Generally, with Mrs Thatcher's reform policies, terms 
like "decline of class" and "classless society" continued to be common terms. 
Mrs Thatcher (Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990) practiced drastic economic 
reforms which terminated the political consensus. Her "revolution" of monetarism 
and privatization to cure the "British Disease" of relative economic decline was 
commented as removing class from the political landscape. Many of Thatcher's 
reforms were delivered in the rhetoric of "empowerment of the people" (Storry & 
Childs, 2002, p. 177), shifting power away from the Establishment and the trade 
unions to individual consumers and the free market. For example, parents were treated 
as consumers buying education and were encouraged to participate in school 
governance. Council houses were sold to tenants at discount prices. Employees were 
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encouraged to buy company shares for share-holding democracy. British society 
became fragmented with life revolving around the individual, the family, and the idea 
of a better life through home ownership and consumer goods. She encouraged private 
health insurance and personal pension schemes, the growth of which marks the arrival 
of what Bennett terms a "post-welfare paradigm" (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 122). 
Thatcherism benefited a substantial amount of people. However, the Thatcherite 
reform was at the cost of high unemployment rate, growing industrial conflicts and 
larger gap between the rich and the poor, and tougher law and order. Sinfield 
remarked that, with the Thatcherite New Right, the British experienced "a return to 
the conditions" that the postwar settlement "was designed originally to avoid: 
unemployment, poverty, social rupture and authoritarian government" (1989, p. 3). 
The distribution of wealth became more concentrated in the 1980s. The poor became 
poorer, with 20 percent of the people living under the poverty line, "reversing a 
forty-year pattern where incomes were gradually growing more equal." By 1988 the 
best-off tenth of the population enjoyed nearly nine times more income than the 
worst-off tenth, though the general earnings of the working public increased. (Quart, 
1993, p. 20) The country was also morally broken by the contrasting decaying 
industrial North represented by mining and steel towns and booming South dominated 
by high-tech and financial industries and office skyscrapers. 
The coming of a classless society continued to be acknowledged in the 1990s. 
Thatcher's policies were largely inherited by her successor John Major, who was very 
idealistic in saying: "I think we need a classless society, and I think we need to have 
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what I refer to as social mobility. And what I mean by social mobility is the capacity 
of everybody to have the help necessary to achieve the maximum for their ability." 
(The Guardian, 28 November 1990; as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 121) The 1997 
election ended the 18 years of Conservative rule and the trauma of Thatcherism; but 
optimism seemed to have outrun reality. New Labor, with its Third Way politics, 
appeared to have avoided the term "social class" from their political vocabulary. As 
Munt pointed out, "Class differences are seen by many as irrelevant to Blair's Cool 
Britannia; since the death of Di, we are New Britain, cobbled together in a new 
national truce of participatory politics" (2000, p. 2). Prime Minister Tony Blair put 
forward his own populist wording in December, 1998: "slowly but surely, the old 
establishment is being replaced by a new, larger, more meritocratic middle class" 
(Marwick, 2005, p. 87). 
Yet sharp class division continued to be spotted through sociological surveys, 
although in certain technical aspects, the old blue-white-collar divide has crumbled. 
Findings from a nationally representative sample on questions about jobs and labor 
market experiences in the early 1990s illustrated big contrasts between middle-class 
and working-class jobs: "The chances are that a middle-class employee will initiate 
and decide his or her own daily tasks, and supervise someone. The chances are that a 
working-class employee will do none of these things." (Roberts, 2001, p. 8). Social 
Trends listed explicit divergence in the distribution of wealth in 1999 as follows: 
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Table 1: The distribution of marketable wealth (adults aged 20 or over), 1999 
Category 0/ Population Percentage a/wealth owned 
Most wealthy 1 % 23% 
Most wealthy 5% 43% 
Most wealthy 10% 54% 
Most wealthy 25% 74% 
Most wealthy 50% 94% 
Source: adapted from Social Trends, 2002, as cited in Coxall et al. 2003, p. 25 
Pronouncing the death of class is premature. Politicians' feel-good mood was 
definitely not shared by the postwar British general public with their self-assigned 
class as reflected in surveys and opinion polls. According to Marshall et aI's empirical 
survey conducted between I March and 3 July 1984, of a final sample of 1,770 people 
of working age they interviewed, 73 per cent of the respondents felt class to be an 
inevitable feature of modem society. "Sixty per cent of our sample claimed that they 
thought of themselves as belonging to one particular social class and well over 90 per 
cent could place themselves in a particular class category" (1988, p. 143). Within this 
90 per cent, 58 per cent claimed to be working class and 42 per cent middle class 
(1988, p. 144). One general conclusion was, in most respects, persuasive: "The 
growth of the service class and the contraction of the working class reflects the 
transformation in the occupational division of labor in Britain since the war-the 
decline of manufacturing and manual laboring together with the expansion in the 
services sector and of professional, administrative, and managerial jobs-it does not 
signify a reduction in the inequalities of class life-chances. More 'room at the top' has 
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not been accompanied by greater equality in the opportunities offered to get there." 
(Marshall et aI., 1988, pp. 137-138) 
The British Social Attitudes survey included a self-assignment question on 
social class every year between 1983 and 1991. In each year about 98 per cent of 
respondents answered the question, among which around two-thirds placing 
themselves as upper working or working class, and around a quarter classifying 
themselves as middle class. A vast majority of them (about 82 per cent) did not think 
they had crossed the boundary between working and middle classes. And 58 per cent 
of respondents acknowledged "feeling very or fairly close to other people of the same 
class background." Between two-thirds and three-quarters each year claimed to the 
extent of "a great deal" or "quite a lot" that their class affects their opportunities. The 
highest perception of class disadvantage was in 1991, with but 3 per cent claiming 
"not at all" and 21 per cent "not very much." (Reid, 1998, pp. 32-33) 
In a MORI poll in 2002 based on interviews with 1,875 people, 68 per cent 
agreed with the sentiment: "At the end of the day, I'm working class and proud of it," 
compared with 52 per cent backing the statement in a similar poll in 1999. Fifty-five 
per cent of those who would normally be categorized as middle-class by occupation, 
claimed to have "working-class feelings." (Hickley, 2002) More media surveys in the 
2000s confirmed that quite some people with good income still claim to be working 
class. 
With decades of social progress and improvement, it is nevertheless quite 
surprising that so many people describe themselves as "working class," particularly 
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for those who should be counted as middle class according to economic criteria. 
Why politicians' optimism was not shared by the general public? Professor 
Ringen argues in 1997 that "[ w ]hat is peculiar in Britain is not the reality of the class 
system and its continuing existence, but class psychology: the preoccupation with 
class, the belief in class, and the symbols of class in manners, dress and language" (as 
cited in Mount, 2004, pp. 49-50). There are some obvious or possible reasons for this. 
Firstly, some people who have got middle class jobs but with working class 
origin can't wholeheartedly feel middle class. Andy Medhurst takes his own 
experience as an example: "although I am paid a middle-class salary to do 
middle-class things, I never think of myself as an entirely middle-class person. I 
simply do not feel middle-class." He explains that "class is not just an objective entity, 
but also (and mostly?) a question of identifications, perceptions, feelings." Yet 
equally he cannot pretend to be working-class any more. So he feels living in a space 
between and his sense of class identity is "uncertain, torn and oscillating--caught on a 
cultural cusp." (2000, p. 20) This mixed feeling is nothing new. Richard Hoggart 
illustrates in The Uses of Literacy, "Almost every working-class boy who goes 
through the process of further education finds himself chafing against his environment 
during adolescence. He is at the friction point of two cultures ... " (1998, p. 225). 
Besides, some of such people prefer to be seen that they had resisted the charms of 
embourgeoisement and still stand shoulder to shoulder with the fellows of working 
class they originated from. In such cases, it is a "downward mobility of the mind" 
with an "endearing moral gesture" (Mount, 2004, p. 102). 
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Secondly, it is a high possibility that, public perception of the concept of class 
has undergone changes. Many people are using "class" in a very different way in 
defiance of the traditional connotations of class categories. In post-manufacturing 
capitalism with more jobs shifted from manufacturing to service sector, many 
white-collar work force might be categorized as in middle-class occupation, but have 
been proletarianized in income, a situation particularly true with jobs occupied by 
women. Braverman in developing his neo-Marxist thesis challenged the view that the 
routine non-manual worker is a member of the middle class in monopoly capitalism 
as "a drastic misconception of modern society" (as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 67). 
Thirdly, people feel less secure in the present post-modern world characterized 
by growing number of temporary or part-time jobs. This deepening insecurities 
around long-term employment and property ownership have led people to recognize 
that whatever their occupation is, "economically they are 'working-class'" (Bromley, 
2000, p. 53). 
Fourthly, Sayer (2001) holds that "in evading acknowledgement of their social 
position, people want to be 'ordinary' without being read as superior because they do 
not want to be held as responsible for perpetuating or agreeing with inequality." This 
is why so many concepts, such as mobility, reflexivity and individualization, are 
developed by academics to enable mis-recognition and evade responsibility for their 
privilege and position. (Skeggs, 2004. p. 116) 
Having put elite view of Britain as a classless society and the public view of 
Britain as a class-bound society in binary opposition, it is now sensible to review the 
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criteria with which a classless society should be. 
Edgell (1993) lists three main conceptions of classlessness widely 
acknowledged by sociologists: total classlessness, one-class classlessness, and 
multi-class classlessness. Total classlessness is an extreme form, such as Marx's 
prediction of a communist equality. One-class classlessness refers to 
embourgeoisement; with declining class differences and class conflicts, everybody is 
middle class. Multi-class classlessness refers to societies where "civic equality 
co-exists with the progressive fragmentation of the class structure and class 
consciousness" involving "the equal opportunity to be unequal." (pp. 118-120) 
Multi-class classlessness has been called "non-egalitarian classlessness" by Ossowski, 
who views it as carrying political importance in "legitimizing social differentiation" 
based on individual ability (Edgell, 1993, pp. 120-121). Mount also lists three kinds 
of classlessness: equality of income, equality of one lifestyle (convergence of lifestyle) 
and equality of opportunity (2004, p. 45). Mount's equality of opportunity equals to 
Edgell's multi-class classlessness. Both of them see their last point as the one that 
really counts. Equality of opportunity has been the declared goal of most British 
politicians since the war, Tory or Labor. 
Essential to this "equality-of-opportunity" classlessness is free social mobility. 
During his campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party and the country, 
John Major stated that "I think we need a classless society, and I think we need to 
have what I refer to as social mobility. And what I mean by social mobility is the 
capacity of everybody to have the help necessary to achieve the maximum for their 
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ability" (Guardian, 28 November 1990; as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 235). Free social 
mobility symbolizes a fair or "meritocratic" society in which the social and economic 
status of individuals would not be inherited, but depend on their own talents and 
efforts. Political intervention would be necessary to monitor the practice and remove 
the inequalities of conditions. Equality of opportunity is the concept that is mostly 
used by politicians and academics concerning class. 
Mobility can be divided into absolute mobility and relative mobility. Relative 
mobility equals to social fluidity which refers to the degree of openness in a society 
"in the sense of how equal are chances of access to different class situations for 
individuals for different class origins" (Goldthorpe, 1987, p. 305). According to John 
Goldthorpe, the issue of class formation is best analyzed using absolute mobility data, 
whereas the issue of openness is best considered using relative mobility data. 
Goldthorpe undertook a large-scale survey of male mobility (male's occupation 
in comparison with their father's) in Britain in 1972 and updated it in 1983. His 
findings revealed that there had been an increase in the rate of absolute mobility, but 
no improvement in relative mobility chances. He even found that "the return of mass 
unemployment has created a serious new risk of what can only be regarded as 
downward mobility-and that this risk is much greater for men in working class 
positions" (1987, p. 269). Goldthorpe came to the conclusion that, despite economic 
growth and a political strategy of egalitarian reform, "no significant reduction in class 
inequalities was in fact achieved" (1987, p. 328). He added that economic growth and 
the increase in absolute mobility had "served effectively to distract attention away 
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fonn the issue of whether at the same time any equalization of relative mobility 
chances was being achieved" (1987, pp. 328-9). 
A comparison of Goldthorpe's 1972 survey with the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) of samples born in 1958 surveyed in 1991 when they 
were aged 33 is informative and enlightening here. Fourteen per cent of the 
Goldthorpe fathers had middle-class jobs compared with 27 per cent of the sons; in 
the 1991 NCDS survey, 36 per cent of the males held middle-class jobs. The size of 
working class shrank from 55 per cent to 44 per cent of the male population between 
the Goldthorpe generations and remained at 43 per cent of the NCDS sample. 
(Roberts, 200 I, p. \98) Besides, 16 per cent of the Goldthorpe working class sons had 
reached the middle class by 1972, compared with 26 per cent ofNCDS working-class 
males climbing up into the middle class (Roberts, 2001, p. 199). From this, we see 
evidences of absolute mobility and growth in middle class population, but the 
long-term numerical reduction of the male working class seemed to be ending. With 
regard to relative mobility, 16 per cent of the Goldthorpe working class sons had risen 
to the middle class by 1972, yet of those from middle-class families 59 per cent had 
remained there. Fifty-seven per cent of the Goldthorpe sample who were born into the 
working class had remained there whereas only 15 per cent of those who had begun 
life in the middle class had descended that far. (Roberts, 2001, p. 199) And NCDS 
shows that 61 per cent of those who began life in the middle class had remained there 
(Roberts, 2001, p. 201). So the middle class children are much more likely to become 
middle-class adults. Working class upward mobility was not due to any equalization 
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of life-chances. As Goldthorpe concluded, the change in mobility patterns is not a 
reflection of a more "open" society, but the number of middle-class jobs has 
outstripped the capacity ofthe middle class itself to fill them. 
Social Trends have identified the advent of "the super-rich" and the growth in 
the numbers of "the poor," defined by the EU as those on less than 60 per cent of 
median national income. The figure for "the poor" had been fairly steady in the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s, "fluctuating between 10 and 15 per cent, then it rose steeply 
from 1985 (the 'Thatcher effect' with a vengeance) to a peak of 21 percent in 1992. 
From the mid-1990s onwards it stuck at around 18 per cent, whereas it was at 16 per 
cent in France and Germany." (Marwick, 2005, p. 88) 
Educational reform has widened the opportunities for working-class children. 
Education is widely seen by the working class as a way to escape. However, the 
middle class has taken full advantage of all postwar educational reforms and benefited 
as much as the working class from the expansion of higher education, which has 
"mostly enabled the not-so-brilliant children of the middle class to attend university" 
(Mount, 2004, p. 50). Mount attacked that with the New Labor's policies in "the 
post-comprehensive era" as compared with the Old Labor's promotion of 
comprehensive schools in the 1960s--the Department of Education has simply 
"confirmed the Downers in their down-ness" ( Mount, 2004, p. 278). 
So, as Field comments in Unequal Britain (1973), "Despite the growth in 
national wealth the age-old inequalities remain. The position of the poor has improved. 
But so, too, has that of the rich." (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 240) Reid sees classes in 
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the Britain of the 1990s experience "not only differing life-styles" (quality of life) 
"but also differing life-chances" (quantity of life) (1998, p. 234). On the whole, 
middle-class expansion has shed significant influence and the class structure has been 
much less rigid and much more difficult to map. The working class, instead of having 
died, has simply been driven into new habitats and acquired new forms and 
boundaries, displaying very different characteristics from the working class of the 
1950s and 1960s, or of the 1970s, which was coined by Rowbotham and Beynon as a 
new "working class in-the-making" (2001, p. 3). Relative deprivation and the 
"underclass" are now more serious social and political problems challenging 
po I icymakers. 
To conclude, after the Second World War, while some people dismiss social 
class completely, many others believe that it remains a vital ingredient of British 
society. Both Class in Britain by Reid and Class in Modern Britain by Roberts use 
sufficient statistics to prove that Britain remains a profoundly unequal society. In 
social surveys and opinion polls working-class people still refuse to see themselves as 
middle-class and many in white-collar occupations deny middle-class status imposed 
on them. Hence, we can come to the conclusion that classless Britain is more illusion 
than hard reality. R. Hoggart in his 1995 book The Way We Live Now described the 
claim that we are all classless now which has been said for at least half a century as 
"one of the most commonly voiced misconceptions" (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 236). 
Edgell believes "the 'withering away' of class" is "a sociological fantasy" (1993, p. 
115). The argument is that the changes in themselves have been "insufficient to cause 
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even the decline, let alone the death of class" (Roberts, 2001, p. 13). Gareth S. Jones 
simply sees class as a "life-sentence" (as cited in Dave, 2006, p. 104). 
As far as the nature of British class society is concerned, Storry and Childs 
conclude that "it is still possible to divide British society into three broad 
classes-upper, middle, and working", though the nature and composition of each 
class have undergone change (2002, p. 179). Mount prefers "The Uppers" and the 
"Downers" binary opposition, which he develops from the concept of "two nations" 
in Disraeli's Sybil (1845), in which the Queen is said to reigns over "Two 
nations"-"THE RICH AND THE POOR" 4 (Mount, 2004, p. 115). David 
Cannadine's Class in Britain, in accounting for the dominant perceptions of class in 
Britain from the early 18th century to the present, claims three enduring, overlapping 
but differently structured models: the hierarchical which views society as "a seamless 
hierarchy of individual social relations" (editor, Cannadine, 1998, front cover 2), the 
triadic which saw class as "upper," "middle" and "lower," and the dichotomous which 
saw society as polarized between the two extremes of "us" and "them." Cannadine 
argues that it is the hierarchical vision of British society which "has had the widest, 
most powerful and most abiding appeal" (1998, p. 22) or "has been the most 
pervasive and persuasive" (1998, p. 167). Furthermore, in analyzing the serious 
impact of Margaret Thatcher's attempt "to change the way we look at things" and 
John Major's vision of a "classless society," Cannadine leads readers' attention to the 
4 In Sybil (1845), Disraeli wntes of a "younger stranger" suggesting the Queen reigns over "Two nations"-"THE RICH AND THE 
POOR"-"between who there IS no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thought and feelings, as if they were 
dweJ1ers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are fanned by a dIfferent breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by 
different manners, and are not governed by the same laws" (Mount, 2004, P 115) 
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role of politicians in shaping social identities in modem democratic Britain, 
illustrating class as "social description, social perception, social identities and political 
creation" (1998, p. 171). 
Since the 1 990s, social class differences and inequalities have become less 
central concerns politically, socially, and culturally, due to shifting concerns to gender 
and ethnicity. However, social class remains the most fundamental form of social 
stratification as most of the vital social differences can be seen to have an economic 
base. Reid's view that "being Black, female or elderly and middle class is different 
from being Black, female or elderly and working class" (1998, p. 238) is widely 
shared, and this dissertation takes the same view. Class difference will continue to 
feature prominently, along with those of gender, ethnicity and age, in the 21 st century. 
The Rise and Decline of British Working Class 
British working class experienced drastic changes in the 20th century. The 
suffrage movement, working-class co-op, trade unionism, the Labor Party politics, 
and etc. all to great extent empowered the working people. Changes since the Second 
World War have been enormous. With the working classes' entitlement to welfare, 
health, full employment and education, a sense of positive social identity for 
working-class people was formed which "destroy[ed] the Victorian imaginary of the 
lumpen, threatening masses who lurked on the edges of British society like a savage 
breed" (Munt, 2000, p. 1). The postwar economic and political changes greatly 
contributed to changes in social ideology and people's mentality. However, the later 
post-industrial occupational restructuring transformed the pattern of labor force, and 
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greatly weakened the traditional manual workers, leading to Hopkins' conclusion that 
"there was a rise up to the seventies, and a decline thereafter" (1991, p. 265). Three 
interrelated trends made a particular impact on the working classes between 1980 and 
1997: first, the transformation in the country's industrial relations; second, a resulting 
decline in the power, influence and size of organized manual working class; third, 
greater division between people with work and without work and hence the shaping of 
the underclass. 
The rise and decline of working-class politics. 
Britain had a strong correlation between class and political behavior. British 
trade unions and the Labor Party were two institutions that appealed for solidarity on 
the basis of class position and class interests, representing the special strength of the 
British working class. Trade unionism was strong until the 1980s and the Labor Party 
was deeply rooted in working-class political culture via numerous Labor clubs in 
working-class areas until the 1990s. However, it is paradoxical that, as Marwick 
lamented, "Britain, with the most clearly defined class structure and highest degree of 
class consciousness, yielded the least in the way of class-related violence" (1990, p. 
204), or "Britain, with the most developed class structure, was the most stable and 
cohesive society" (1990, p. 205). George Orwell traced post-war working-class 
inactiveness to the fact that the availability of cheap luxuries made life more bearable 
(Hopkins, 1991, p. 37). Industrial actions were generally reformative rather than 
revolutionary in nature and the Labor Party has transformed into a "catch-all" party 
aiming to seek the support of the great majority of citizens. 
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Trade unions and industrial actions. 
Trade Union movement has a long history in Britain and has played a forceful 
role in industrial relations. The 1860s saw the establishment of a more 
institutionalized trade union movement with legal status and the setting up of a central 
organization the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1867. In the Victorian period only a 
minority of the best-paid and most skilled workers--around 10 per cent of the work 
force--belonged to unions. Yet from the 1880s onwards, membership extended to 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. By the First World War, all the main industries 
and manual occupations had trade unions and membership rose from only 2 million in 
1910 to the peak of over 8 million in 1920, at which point nearly half the workforce 
was unionized, though membership collapsed to just over 4 million in 1933 due to 
unsuccessful strikes in the 1920s and high unemployment caused by the Great 
Depression. (Savage, 1994, p. 55) Taking into consideration that the working class 
amounted to three-quarters of the population at that time, the union influence was 
enormous. 
The second half of the century was divided into three distinct phases in union 
development. Between 1945 and 1969, union density remained very stable at a little 
above 40 per cent, with membership increasing slowly, but only to the extent of 
keeping up with an ever-larger work-force. Between 1969 to 1979, membership and 
density grew significantly, rising from over 9 million and 45 per cent union density in 
1969 to a peak of 13,289,000 members and 54 per cent in 1979 (Abercrombie & 
Warde, 2002, pp.86-7; Gallie, 2000, p. 309). According to Marwick, since 
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membership covers both middle-class as well as working-class occupations, it can be 
seen that "union membership among working-class males must have been a good 80 
percent throughout this entire period" (2005 , p. 83). Since 1979, with the 
parliamentary acts of Conservative governments to curb union influence, there has 
been an annual fall in membership. By 1989 the number had fallen to just over 9 
million. In the 1990s, membership was lower than at any time since 1945: in 1995, 
membership was as low as 8,089,000 and union density was down to only 33 per cent 
(Gall ie, 2000, p. 309); in 1997, 7.9 million, or 30 per cent of employees (Abercrombie 
& Warde, 2002, p. 84); in 2000, there were 76 unions representing only 6.8 million 
workers (Storry & Childs, 2002, p. 189). So the trade union movement did not cover 
the majority of UK employees until the 1970s since when membership has declined. 
The changing trend in union density is shown in more detail in the figure below: 
Figure 1 Trade union density, UK, 1900-95 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 310) 
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Another important change in the trade union development was the occupational 
composition of membership represented by an expansion among white-collar workers 
in the last 3 decades of the 20th century, suggesting a weakening of the traditional 
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individualism among non-manual employees. Between 1971 and 1979, while manual 
worker membership increased by 602,300, white-collar membership rose by 
1,379,000 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 310). And since 1980, the decline of membership has 
mainly involved manual workers. This shift reflected the post-industrial changing 
occupational structure and the collapse of the manual traditional manufactory 
industries such as steel, coal, textiles and vehicles in which the union used to be 
strong. So, by the end of the century, manual workers made up a minority of the total 
union membership. The archetypal trade union membership was now "a professional 
university graduate in a relatively well-paid and secure white-collar job in the public 
sector" and only one in five private sector industrial workers were any longer in 
unions (Taylor, 2005, p. 383). Under such circumstance, it is fair to conclude that the 
present-day trade union movement is no longer rooted in the working class. 
With regard to industrial actions, the working class faced major periods of 
conflict in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Strikes were frequent in the 1920s, 
cumulating into the General Strike of 1926 called by the Tue and lasted 9 days. After 
the Second World War, the unions played a more prominent role in national politics. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Tue was routinely consulted about economic and social 
policy and was for a time responsible for delivering wage restraint in exchange. At the 
same time, individual unions had used industrial actions to influence government 
policy. For example, in the 1960s boom, especially in the South East and Midlands 
where investment in cars and engineering was heavy, the labor movement was able to 
take successful industrial actions to push up wages. The strikes were largely due to the 
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impact of new technologies, new management strategies, and etc. Conflict was firmly 
related to wages and conditions and there is little evidence of any ambitions for 
revolutionary change. And strikes were always the resort of desperate workers. Even 
in its heyday, strikers found it difficult to mobilize and expect the automatic 
sympathetic solidarity of the entire working class. Besides, one worker's wage 
increase tended to be another's price rise. 
In the mid-l 960s, the economy under the Wilson Labor government was 
worsened by the balance of payment deficit and large numbers of strikes, e.g. the 
dockers' strike in May 1966. Wilson's attempt to reform trade unions and curb 
unofficial strikes through introducing a bill faced strong opposition within the Labor 
party and from the TUC, and therefore failed. 
In the 1970s, trade unions were seen as having the power to bring down 
governments. The Industrial Relations Act (1971) reformed trade union law in an 
attempt to cut down strikes and curb extremists. It set up a National Industrial 
Relations Court and introduced a "cooling-off period" and ballot for strikes. Although 
it was relatively a moderate and sensible measure, the unions opposed it with a wave 
of strikes, the most serious of which being the miners' strike in 1974, which put the 
whole of British industry on a three-day working week due to the shortage of 
electricity resulting from not enough coal. Huge anger and complaint was aroused 
from the general public as candle-light was even used at home. The Conservative 
Heath government resigned as a result. In 1978-79, the local authority trade unions 
caused the largest stoppage of labor since the 1926 General Strike, which is called the 
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"winter of discontent" by the media, demanding larger pay rises against Callaghan's 
government's Social Contract, which developed from an understanding between the 
Labor Party and the TUC and involved voluntary wage restraint in return for more 
employment in order to curb the record-high inflation rate of the time. Unions of 
public service workers refused to accept Callaghan's proposal to extend the Social 
Contract for a further period by keeping pay rises below 5 percent. Again public 
resentment was aroused as services at hospitals, in refuse collection and in public 
transport were all influenced. Prof. Eric Hobsbawm in his 1978 Marx Memorial 
Lecture noted: "We now see a growing division of workers into sections and groups, 
each pursuing its own economic interest irrespective of the rest ... The strength of a 
group lies not in the amount of loss they can cause to the employer but in the 
inconvenience they can cause to the public." (Taylor, 2005, p. 381) The Labor 
government's inability to contain the strikes contributed to Margaret Thatcher's 
Conservative victory in the 1979 general election and facilitated forthcoming 
legislations to curb the trade unions. 
Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 strived hard to alter the 
balance of political and industrial power in favor of the capital and employers. Mrs 
Thatcher viewed the trade unions her prime political villains, whose commitment to 
collective rights and blanket protections stood in direct conflict with her strong belief 
in free market and individual effort. The union's inflationary wage claims and 
destructive strikes in the late 1970s provided Thatcher with good excuses to take 
radical actions to restrain union power. Between 1980 and 1993, eight major Acts of 
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Parliament were passed to weaken and marginalize trade unions step by step, e.g. the 
Employment Act (1982) and the Trade Union Act (1984) which restricted the 
operation of closed shops and made trade unions more accountable for their actions. 
In short, the Acts outlawed the closed shop, curbed picketing, banned sympathetic 
solidarity strikes and secondary picketing, imposed the use of secret ballots for the 
election of union leaders and of postal ballets for the approval of strikes, and required 
trade union officials to be elected periodically. The highly unionized public sector 
was attacked, with such policies as the privatization of nationalized industries, the 
closure of coal mines, and the restructuring of welfare services like the National 
Health Service, which indirectly undermined traditional systems of collective 
bargaining. (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 85; Taylor, 2005, p. 383; Roberts, 2001, 
p. 102) 
The bitter, year-long, coal-miners' strike of 1984-5 resulted from the decision 
of the National Coal Board to close 20 mines leading to 20,000 miners losing their 
jobs. The strike split the National Union of Mineworkers and ended in total failure for 
the miners. The strikers could not mobilize effective support in other sections of the 
working class due to the ban of sympathetic actions. Mrs Thatcher responded with 
saving substantial coal beforehand, importing much coal and oil, and subsidizing 
other energy. She won the nation's admiration for her toughness in confronting and 
defeating the left-wing, uncompromising, and militant miners' union leader Arthur 
Scargill. The event, added with a rise in unemployment in the declining 
manufacturing industries, led to a loss of about one-fourth of the country's union 
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membership. Thus, the union power was profoundly reduced and organized labor was 
weakened. Strikes became rare ever after and, when attempted, were usually 
unsuccessful. In 1997 only 235,000 working days were lost, more than a hundred 
times fewer than in 1984 (Abercromie & Warde, 2000, p. 94). 
The unions' damaging defeats such as the 1984 miners' strike and The Times 
dispute at Wapping (1986) facilitated unions to make adjustments by adopting 
conciliatory policies to bargain with employers for the best possible deal, offering 
no-strike agreements and accepting arbitration. 
The Labor party. 
The Labor Party was originally a party for the working class. Its rise was 
largely indebted to the enfranchisement to large number of working class people and 
to trade union support and sponsorship. 
The Chartist Movement of the 1830s and 1840s paved the way for universal 
manhood suffrage. Before 1832 the overwhelming majority of the general public were 
denied the vote for being poor. The Reform Acts 1932 and 1867 ensured manhood 
suffrage to about 60 percent of adult males in towns, with men only entitled to vote if 
they had some form of property. This right was extended to male workers in the 
countryside with the Representation of the People Act 1884, which amended the 
Reform Act 1867. The Representation of the People Act 1919 gave universal suffrage 
to women of 30 years old or over with property restrictions; at the same time it 
widened the male franchise by lifting the property restrictions, so that all adult males 
of 21 years old and over were now given the vote. The Representation of the People 
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Act 1928 made women's voting rights all equal with men, lowering the age to 21 and 
over with no property restrictions. The Representation of the People Act 1969 
extended the suffrage to all people of 18 and over. 
The Labor Party was established in 1900 (then named the Labor Representation 
Committee, changed to the Labor Party in 1906) principally by the trade unions, 
which had already learnt the limitations of industrial actions and sought political 
representation to gain legal protections. Trade unions were connected to the Labor 
Party directly through affiliation of members and indirectly through the Trade Union 
Congress. Throughout the 20th century, the trade unions were the Labor Party's main 
source of financial support. 
The rise of the Labor Party was aided by the two world wars, the 1920s 
depression and the Liberal Party splits after the First World War. The Party increased 
its number ofMPs from 36 in 1914 to 57 in 1918, of whom 25 were members of the 
Miners Federation of Great Britain (Hopkins, 1991, p. 8). Then it grew extremely fast 
in the I 920s, coming in second place to the Conservative Party in 1922 election, 
forming minority governments in 1924 and in 1929 when it obtained 287 seats 
(Savage, 1994, p. 84), though both short-lived. It was not until 1945 that the Labor 
formed its first majority government. Socialism in the 1918 constitution of the Labor 
Party embodied a willingness to use any means including nationalization to attack 
poverty. The 1945 Labor victory consolidated the gains of the working class with 
welfare state, nationalization of key industries, and etc. On working-class gains, a 
leader ofthe Transport and General Workers Union declared in 1949: "Let there be no 
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mistake about it, we have made substantial progress in working-class conditions 
during the life-time of this government" (Marwick, 2005, p. 82). 
Yet, of the 53 years from 1945 to 1997, Labor was only in office for 17 years: 
1945-1951 (Clement Attlee), 1964-1970 (Harold Wilson), 1974-1976 (Harold Wilson), 
and 1976-1979 (James Callaghan). And at no time in the 20th century did a Labor gov-
ernment serve two full terms in office. The Conservative Party had two extremely 
long continuous periods of governance, one from 1951 to 1964, the other from 1979 
to 1997. Since 1979, there has been a decline in the political and economic power 
exercised by working-class agencies, for after 1979 the Labor Party was out of office 
for 18 years. 
It was only after the drastic reforms of the New Labor that the Labor Party was 
reelected and in office for 13 years: 1997-2007 (Tony Blair) and 2007-2010 (Gordon 
Brown). Unlike the trade union-influenced, deal-making, socialist-flavored old Labor, 
Tony Blair set out to forge New Labor as a democratic, market-oriented, 
efficiency-conscious, inclusive party of the radical center. New Labor's philosophy 
was summed up as a "Third Way" between unrestricted free market capitalism 
(associated with Margaret Thatcher) and centralized state socialism (associated with 
"old" Labor). Unlike Thatcherism, the Third Way saw a large role for government; 
unlike social democracy, the Third Way stressed the responsibilities of individuals for 
their own welfare and the welfare of their families. The New Labor revised the party's 
old constitution by getting rid of Clause Four, concerning the "common ownership of 
the means of production", and ended trade union direct sponsorship of Members of 
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Parliament. It was also anxious not to identifY too closely with the aspirations of its 
core working class voters. These measures suggest that Labor has become a 
"catch-all" party, aiming to sweep as many as possible into Blair's "big tent". 
However, Blairism has also been criticized as functioning "in Conservative coat", its 
policies not much different from those of Mrs Thatcher. The Job Seekers' Allowance 
and government Welfare-to-Work measures have pressured the unemployed to take 
part-time and temporary positions. 
The Labor Party for a long time attracted most support from the working class. 
The association between Labor and the industrial working-class towns has been close 
and important, with the party more identified with municipal services and state 
intervention. However, the assumption about the natural relationship between class 
and vote was challenged during the 1970s and 1980s by class dealignment theorists. 
Labor's working-class support was by no means either solid or universal. Trade union 
membership does not correlate with voting Labor. 
Working-class class awareness has always been strong, yet involvement in 
Labor politics has certainly declined. Many simply stopped participating, except in 
voting. The reduced energy of trade unions and the ethos of the "New Labor," which 
neither proclaims nor prioritizes working-class interests, mean that one previous 
source of a sense of solidarity has declined. And revival seems very unlikely. 
To conclude, the working class have lost the trade unions in the sense that most 
manual workers are no longer members, and they are no longer the section of the 
workforce that is most likely to be unionized. The working class have also lost the 
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Labor party in the 1990s, for the leadership of the New Labor made it clear that "it did 
not wish to be associated with any particular class," and that "it valued its links with 
employers as much as its relationship with organized labor" (Roberts, 2001, p. 109). 
Transformation in working and living conditions. 
Work and employment. 
In the course of the 20th century, there was a huge shift of structures of 
occupation and patterns of employment. 
In the early decades of the century, the core industries were manufacturing, 
trade and transport. In 1901, a good third of the labor force were engaged in 
manufacturing industry, and if those employed in mining and construction were taken 
into account and added to the figure, then the proportion rose to about 46 per cent. 
Trade and transport took another 22 per cent. A further 22 per cent belonged to 
service industries. Lastly, agriculture employed 9 per cent. (Hopkins, 1991, p. 2) In 
the later decades, there were the expansion and diversification of manufacturing 
industries and the sharp decline of coal mining. However, employment in manufacture 
experienced decline which was relative after 1951, absolute after 1968 and disastrous 
after 1979 (Beynon, 2001, p. 32). With restructuring and contraction in the 1970s, 
closure of plants and mass redundancies greatly weakened organized manual labor in 
coal, iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding, textiles and auto production. Take 
coal-mining for example, it had 740,000 miners in 1947, but the number had declined 
to 230,000 by 1983 and to just 12,000 by the end of the century (Beynon, 2001, p. 27). 
The British car industry was also especially badly hit by rounds of take-overs and 
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mergers. Between June 1979 and January 1981, Mrs. Thatcher's first 3 years, 23 per 
cent of all manufacturing jobs were lost, with only 5.4 million remaining in 1981. 
Overall, between 1979 and early 1991, manufacturing employment fell by more than 
2 million. (Hill, 1999, p. 6) By the 1990s, employment in the manufacture, 
construction and mining made up no more than a quarter of the country's jobs 
(Beynon, 2001, p. 32). Mrs Thatcher's privatization reform led to roughly 2 million 
jobs being shifted from the public to the private sector (Roberts, 2001, p. 103). Train 
drivers are now among the country's best-paid manual workers. 
With the shift from Fordist (mass production of standardized products, 
intensification of management) to post-Fordist production (disorganized capitalism, 
flexible specialization) and the ever-increasing importance of service industries, the 
second half of the century saw a massive increase of the clerical as well as 
professional and managerial occupations. "Between 1911 and 1981 white-collar 
workers (i.e. professional, managerial, supervisory and clerical) increased from under 
14 per cent of the occupied population to over 43 per cent" (Edgell, 1993, p. 66). By 
the 1990s, services provided over 15 million jobs and 70 per cent of total employment 
(Beynon, 2001, p. 32). Accompanying this change, there has been a substantial 
growth of new and more diversified types of employment, e.g. part-time work, 
temporary work (either in casual jobs or on short-term contract), self-employment 
(especially in the 1980s), and flexible work, which are termed by Roberts as 
"sub-employment" (2001, p. 114) and "Mickey Mouse jobs" (2001, p. 104), 
employees of which are termed sarcastically by Huw Beynon as "hyphenated 
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workers" (2001, p. 34). In the hotel industry, part-time employment made up 26 per 
cent of all jobs in 1971 (21 per cent for women and 5 per cent for men); by 1991, the 
percentage flied to 44 percent of all jobs in the industry (33 per cent for women and 
II per cent for men) (Beynon, 2001, pp. 35-36). And employment growth in the 
1980s and 1990s mainly lay in the sphere of part-time jobs. This post-Fordist change 
signifies the end of secure full-time long-term employment for a large section of the 
labor force creating a pool of long-term unemployed; yet it has boosted female 
employment in the job market, though many are in vulnerable positions. In the first 
half of the century, women formed only 30 per cent of the workforce; but from the 
mid-century the percentage rose continuously and reached 44 per cent in 1997 (GaBie, 
2000, p. 318). A natural consequence of all these changes is the drastic reduction of 
the size of the manual workers and its percentage in the general work force. The 
census reported that in 1951, there were 15.6 million manual workers, constituting 72 
per cent of the workforce, but by 1991, the figure was only 9.8 million, representing 
42 per cent (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 152). In 2001, they made up only 27 per 
cent of workers (Storry & Childs, 2002, p. 191). 
With regard to unemployment, while there were one million unemployed in 
1924, the figure rose to 2.5 million in 1931 (Lowe, 1989, p. 450, 477) pressed with 
the world economic crisis in 1930-1. The problem was greatly relieved with post-war 
relative full-time employment, so in 1954, the registered unemployed was only 
260,000 (Kirk, 2003, p. 78). But the long-term relative economic decline and the oil 
crisis pushed unemployment in the 1970s towards two million (Roberts, 200 I, p. 96). 
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Then with Mrs Thatcher ' s curbing inflation at the expense of mass unemployment, 
between 1979 and 1982, the figure more than doubled and stayed at over 3 million 
from 1982 until 19865 (more than 10 per cent of the work force), then dropped to 
over 2 million in 1991 (Hill, 1999, p. 6). In 1982, 40 per cent of all male workers in 
Liverpool were jobless (Kirk, 2003 , pp. 78-79). The most vulnerable groups were the 
craft, operative and non-skilled workers. Unemployment situation in the whole 20th 
century can be explicitly shown with the following maps. 
Figure 2: Unemployment rates, UK, 1900-96 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 314) 
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Figure 3: Numbers unemployed, UK, 1900-96 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 314) 
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5 The more specifi c figure fo r unem ployment in 1982 was 3,400,000 and unofficial estimates put the tota l at four milli on (Kirk, 
2003, p. 78) 
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Roberts accurately summarized main changing trends as "a shift of manual 
employment from extractive and manufacturing industries to services, from large to 
small establishments, from city-center locations and older industrial estates to 
out-of-town Greenfield sites, and increases in the proportion of women and ethnic 
minorities in the manual (as in the non-manual) workforce" (2001, pp. 100-101). The 
working class is more fragmented now than in the past. 
Life experiences. 
The work for the working class in the 19th century was usually arduous and 
often dangerous; workers needed to cooperate and depend on each other for physical 
safety and mutual support. Thus came the working-class comradeship, or mateyness, 
and the "us-them" frame of mind. At the same time, the families had to live close 
together to where the workers were employed. Working-men's clubs, pubs, football, 
chapel, brass bands, etc. were developed and became the foundations of 
working-men's leisure and working-class community. Material hardship could hardly 
be coped without family and community support. So, cooperative movement was 
developed during the 19th century, which played a major educational, social and 
political role. The most successful type was the consumers' cooperative: stores owned 
by shoppers, and therefore able to pass-on any profits to ordinary members. 
By the 1890s, a distinctive working-class culture had emerged, based upon a 
sense of neighborhood and mutual support. And soon a labor movement consisting of 
co-operative societies, trade unions and the Labor Party became a unirying force. 
These values were called "populist", involving a pride in work and in mutual support 
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in combating poverty, a delight in having a good time, a derision of privilege, which 
were all celebrated by Richard Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy (1957). 
The state intervened in working-class life, making limited and slow progress in 
all aspects. Workers' welfare started to be built before the First World War. The first 
National Insurance Act of 1911 compulsorily insured all workers against ill-health 
and introduced an insurance scheme against unemployment for workers most subject 
to unemployment; an old age pension scheme was also introduced in 1908 (Hopkins, 
1991, pp. 25-26). After 1918, municipal activity increased extensively in the 
provision of hospitals, education and housing. The Labor became a party increasingly 
identified with the provision of urban public services. The establishment of the state 
welfare system during the first Labor majority government immediately after the 
Second World War marked the historical high of Labor achievements. In addition, 
working hours were much reduced. Starting with The Coal Mines Act (1908) 
introducing a maximum eight-hour working day for miners, the 54-hour common 
week before 1919 was reduced to 48 hours in many industries in the year. The 1930s 
saw a noticeable spread of the five-day week. The Holidays with Pay Act (1938) 
benefited about half of the manual workers in the country. (Hopkins, 1991, pp. 16-17) 
Elementary education became first compulsory in 1880, and then free in 1891 
(Hopkins, 1991, p. 2) and secondary education was made compulsory and free in 
1944. General improvement in physical safety at work was achieved with dramatic 
fall over the century in the number of people who were killed at work. With the 
postwar apparent job security, national welfare system, rising real wages and the 
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arrival of paid holidays, Britain's working class were said to "have come into their 
own;" and for the first time in history, "they were at least no longer on the defensive" 
(Taylor, 2005, p. 374). 
So, in the 1950s, there was a traditional picture of typical, usually male, 
members of the working class. They left secondary school to easily get a job as a 
manual worker. They spoke with a regional accent and lived in a close-knit 
community of terraced houses. They enjoyed a pint down the local pub, a bet, a trip to 
the football match and a tour to a scenic spot such as a beach. They joined trade 
unions and always voted Labor and enjoyed a shared experience. They also 
passionately got involved in popular culture. According to Hoggart's account, the 
main threat was not from bulldozers and urban redevelopment so much as the mass 
media-the press, radio, the cinema, and especially television. Moreover, the 
imported American culture was seen as destroying traditional working-class culture 
and replacing it with something more shallow and less authentic. 
In the 1960s, the working class continued to benefit tremendously from the new 
way of life brought over by general affluence. Their living standard further rose with 
continuing wage increase, better housing, better health, more equal education from the 
practice of comprehensive secondary schools by the Labor government and the 
expansion in higher education, more consumer durables and longer holidays. Goods 
and services formerly associated with the middle classes, such as soft home 
furnishings, television sets, washing machines, motor cars and holidays abroad, were 
now being enjoyed by more and more working-class families. All this brought 
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positive and lasting gains to the working class and particularly to women, who 
benefited substantially from the labor-saving washing machine, fridge, and car as well 
as from mass advertising. Working class popular culture, like fashion, rock music, 
subculture style, the glossy magazines, all flourished. The working class "as a whole 
attained unprecedented visibility" (Marwick, 2005, p. 83). Meanwhile, social moral 
standards became much more tolerant, leading to the terming of the decade as the 
permissive "swinging" sixties. Along with security of employment and the 
permissiveness of the society came the significant increase in individual liberty. All 
this seemed to indicate "the dawning of a new age for the working classes" (Hopkins, 
1991, p. 268). Sociologists much talked about the homogenization of incomes and 
living standards of skilled workers and white-collar workers. 
The rise in living standard tended to encourage working-class families to tum 
themselves inwards. Academic such as Zweig drew attention to how affluence made 
nuclear families less dependent on kin and neighbors, thus weakening one of the roots 
of traditional working-class culture (Roberts, 2001, p. 90). The spread of 
consumerism, the explosion of material and cultural goods like the telly, glossy 
magazines, cinema, fashion and etc. were seen to represent "progress" (affluence) and, 
conversely, "decline" (erosion of traditional values). Many Labor leading members 
began to criticize the working class for pursuing a guiltless materialism and a more 
individualistic attitude toward life. The belief that the British proletariat could be 
expected to play the revolutionary historical role of launching a class war became 
shattered. The working class were gradually being shifted from producers to 
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consumers and even trendsetters. Their collectivism based on sectional self-interest 
also undermined the general worker solidarity. More public spending on welfare, 
health and education also led to rise in taxation and statutory and compulsory wage 
restraint. Upward social mobility certainly increased but the extent of 
embourgeoisement was still only relative and limited, according to the Luton 
investigation report. 
In the 1970s, working class suffered from economic crisis and industrial 
restructuring. The decade witnessed more industrial disputes and strikes, some big 
events caused great inconvenience to people's daily life and ignited their anger. The 
media was full of sensational negative coverage of strikers. So the miners simply had 
to be defeated with whatever means and "the 'nation' had to be mobilized against the 
miners by projecting the crisis right into the heart of every British family" (Hall, 1988, 
p. 20). The happenings were made full use of by Mrs Thatcher in her later tough 
stance in curbing trade unions. After the mid-1970s, the working class were faced 
with mass unemployment and more unstable part-time jobs. There was obvious 
division between those who remained in work and those who were either out of work 
or in low-paid jobs. However, women in the decade harvested a lot, especially with 
the emancipating acts. The Equal Pay Act 1970 stipulated. equal pay for equal work 
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 1986 legally ended discrimination against 
women in employment, education, housing, as well as in other service areas. More 
married women went out to work. Yet as married women earners were more likely to 
be found in families where their spouses were working than where the spouses were 
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unemployed, the income gap widened between families with jobs and without. 
In the 1980s, working-class life was much influenced by privatization, 
deindustrialization, the record-high mass unemployment, Mrs Thatcher's notion of 
enterprise culture and individualism. In 1989 Alan Sinfield observed that 
unemployment in Britain was not just a consequence of recession, but "40 to 50 per 
cent has been variously estimated as due to government policies" (1989, p. 254). Tom 
Narin in The Breakup of Britain suggested that economic policy - what he termed 
Mrs Thatcher's experiment - was "no more than an attempt to utilize the recession to 
hasten and complete the dominance of financial capital. The apotheosis of 'Freedom' 
is de-industrialization: southern hegemony permanently liberated from the archaic 
burden of the Industrial Revolution's relies, the subsidies that prop them up, and the 
trade unions that agitate for them." (as cited in Kirk, 2003, p. 78) The steepest decline 
was in the skilled manual jobs in manufacturing and extractive industries, replaced by 
industries of service, finance and information technology. 
Poverty increased with high unemployment and the cut in welfare and public 
spending by the Thatcher government. The post-war trend of convergence of social 
classes was stopped and reversed as inequalities widened on a significant scale. An 
underclass was seen to be emerging whose deprivations are many and severe. But on 
the other hand, the living standards of people with jobs continue to improve, 
especially for those with jobs in those rising professions. 
Home ownership was promoted with the sale of council houses at discount 
prices. So was the ownership of shares, especially in the newly privatized industries 
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of gas, water and electricity; the first issues of shares in these industries were very 
heavily publicized. "In 1987, 25 per cent of all men owned shares: among skilled 
manual workers, the figure was 17 per cent, among the semi-skilled 13 per cent, and 
among the unskilled, 9 per cent" (Hopkins, 1991, p. 273). Working class voters, the 
aspiring and respectable in the working class in particular, were found to ally more 
with conservative neo-liberal values of personal choice and individual freedom than 
with those of Labor, which were turning more toward the Left. Thus, "working class 
individualism" was seen in rise (Taylor, 2005, p. 382). 
In the 1990s, much of the Thatcherite ideologies and policies were followed. 
Working-class house ownership continued to grow. "In 1996, 77 percent of skilled 
manual households, 56 per cent of semi-skilled and 38 per cent of unskilled either 
owned outright the house in which they were living in or were in the process of 
purchasing it on a mortgage" (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, pp. 157-158). While life 
was easy for a new aristocracy of labor (of technicians and technologists) and the 
affluent workers, the overall condition of the low-paid appeared to have deteriorated, 
their life being marked by a loss of basic dignity and respect as well as limited 
self-worth. With lack of companionship and the anxiety about the security of 
employment and its low pay, people did not feel attached to a future, living in 
miserable hopelessness. New Labor introduced in 1999 a national minimum wage and 
a ceiling on compulsory working time, which were welcomed, but also viewed by 
Roberts as reluctant and half-hearted measures as the minimum pay is extremely low, 
and the ceiling on working time can be easily breached (2001, p. 102). The publicly 
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funded-welfare to work scheme to eradicate long-term unemployment was 
commented as pressing the unemployed to take whatever poor jobs offered. Some old 
culture and values survived, such as the brass bands which were still playing, but the 
problem for the faithful was that "the old roots have gone" and working-class power 
have waned (Roberts, 2001, p. 89). 
On the whole, manual workers work longer hours. In 1998, the average 
working week for a male manual worker was 44.1 hours; for non-manuals, 38.1 hours 
(Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 153). Manual workers have far less attractive 
prospect of promotion and suffer from greater insecurity of employment. As Reid 
comments, "It is difficult to see that political activity and social change in the 1980s 
and 1990s has done much other than to sustain, or even increase, existing class 
differences" (1998, p. 239). 
The "Underclass" and Devaluation 
Since the 1980s, the major division within British society has been between 
those with work and those without. A new underclass is seen to have developed and to 
be expanding. The term "underclass" was only used in a very limited sense in the 
1970s by a few sociologists.6 In the early 1980s, Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out the 
increasing size of an "underclass" caused by mass unemployment and the devaluation 
of wage work, and its threat to British society and thus made the word better known. 
In the New Right political discourse of the early 1990s, the term "underclass" came 
6 For example, A. Giddens in The Class Slnu.:ture or the Advanced Societies (1973) and 1. Rex and S. Tomlinson, Colonial 
ImmIgrants in a British Clly (1979) 
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into wider use, with the promotion by Charles Murra/, to refer to the section of 
the working class whose existence is characterized by a combination of "illegitimacy, 
violent crime" and "the tendency to drop-out from the labor force" (Murray, 1996, p. 
25). 
The "underclass," according to Roberts (2001), refers to "excluded 
groups"-people "who are left out and deemed beneath the working class" (p. 110). 
It includes the following types of people: those who are very poor (welfare-dependent 
or single parent family); those who suffer chronic unemployment (either long-term or 
recurrent); those who are persistent criminal offenders; those with serious alcohol or 
drug dependency problems; those with serious physical mental or psychological 
disabilities (pp. 110-111). Roberts holds that an underclass has not been a reality yet, 
though "a real future possibility" (p. 117) if the level of unemployment persists. 
What must be stressed here is that the term "underclass" does not refer to "the 
poorest of the poor," but is highly ideological in the sense that it is not a "degree" of 
poverty, but a "type" of poverty. It covers "those who no longer share the norms and 
aspirations of the rest of society, who have never known the traditional two parent 
family, who are prone to abuse drugs and alcohol at the earliest opportunity, who do 
poorly at school and who are quick to resort to disorderly behavior and crime." 
(Sunday Times, 23 May 1995, as cited in Haylett, 2000, p. 71). Thus, the underclass is 
seen to be characterized not so much by its lack of work and poverty as by its 
7 Charles Murray is an Amencan neo-conservatlve SOCial scientist, pioneer of "Wlderclass" theory. He was invited by the right-wing Sunday Times 
and the Institute of Economic AffaIrS to consider whether an underclass simIlar to the one he had discovered in America existed m Britain. He 
assessed in 1990 that a British underclass was "emergmg" and in 1994 that the crisis was "deepening" Murray CIted the persistent unemployment 
among able-bodied yOlmg men, rise in violent CrIme, high rates of single mother, etc. as eVidences of the existence of tmderclass in Britain 
(Roberts, 2001, P 112) 
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attitudes and lifestyles. The underclass involves the most disadvantageous sections of 
a generally disorganized working class: excluded and detached, cut off from the 
consumer society and the normal, respectable working-class way of life, and 
politically apathetic. This group "makes up about 10 per cent of the population, 
having doubled from 5 per cent in 1979" (Haylett, 2000, p. 81). 
The underclass debate was drawn into social policy debates as Murray took the 
"over-generous" welfare as the original cause of the formation of a British underclass. 
While the Left held that the underclass phenomenon was caused by unemployment, 
poverty and inadequate welfare leading to social exclusion, the Right emphasized the 
lack of qualification, skills, motivation and appropriate attitudes as primary reasons. 
The tendency is obvious of the privileged to blame the victims for their poverty or at 
least to try to distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving poor: the 
Victorian notion of the "deserving poor"--the good poor, who are industrious and 
know their place, as opposed to the underclass--the bad poor, the 
"working-class-gone-wrong" (Munt, 2000, p. 8), those "workshy scroungers" or "idle 
thieving bastards" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 112), who deserve nothing. Murray's underclass 
theory is in some ways "comforting for the already comfortable" (Roberts, 2001, p. 
113). It assures them that they are not to blame, and that spending more of their taxes 
on welfare will actually do harm to the recipients. Generally, the underclass concept 
conceals the systematically destructive effects of capitalism on particular sections of 
the working class, e.g. the young, single mothers, ethnic minorities and the 
unemployed. It does this by moralizing these same effects in terms of individual and 
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cultural failings. On the other hand, it locates the source of value in society outside 
the working class. In its political discourse, the New Labor government addressed the 
issue of under class as "social exclusion," and proposed to solve it by providing "equal 
opportunities" through education and training, especially for the young unemployed. 
By equalizing the underclass as simply social exclusion, the New Labor stance is 
thought to be too neutral for lack of sympathy. 
This out-of-work underclass is divided from those in work. Sociologists are 
uncertain whether it is included or excluded from the working class. Roberts holds a 
mixed attitude. In his Class in Modern Britain, the ONS category 5, 6 and 7 is termed 
as "working class" and category 8 as "underclass" (2001, p. 25), and he writes "but a 
series of' excluded groups' have been separated from the working class proper" (2001, 
p. 118). But he identifies that though this disadvantaged group differs from the 
"respectable" section of working class, a close look from the aspects of their work and 
market situations, characteristic life chances and especially class consciousness 
proves that the underclass should not be separated from working class. The self 
definition of excluded groups always remains working class. (2001, pp. 1l3-116) 
Stephen EdgeJl in Class: Key ideas argues that it is more useful "to regard the 
underclass as the underemployed and unemployed fraction of the working 
class ... distinctive in its poverty" rather than as a separate social grouping (1993, p. 
80). 
In conclusion, there is no convincing evidence to prove that class differentiation 
has withered away in contemporary Britain. In the 20th century, much has altered in 
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working-class work and life with occupational restructuring and labor reorganization 
and the configuration of daily life. The traditional working class and manual workers 
is shrinking or in long-term numerical decline. Their community is lost. Manual 
workers become more mixed in gender and ethnicity. Higher absolute rates of upward 
mobility coexist with unemployment and precarious jobs. Resulting from the 
structural changes as well as the legislative restrictions since the 1980s, the trade 
unions have been greatly weakened. 
At the same time, working-class living and consumption patterns have changed. 
There is no doubt that working class living standard greatly improved with the 
increase in productivity, shorter working hours and paid holidays, rise in real wages 
and larger choice in consumer products. New modern housing has replaced the old 
ones, though the relocation of which is thought to have destroyed working-class 
communities. Television and motor cars brought people more family-centered. 
Continuing education has become more general. Though for the long-term 
unemployed the story is different. Family instability has been a headache for society, 
especially with underclass single-parent. 
Working class has become more heterogeneous within itself. Those in skilled 
and rare trades, such as plumbers and electricians, are earning good middle-class 
salaries. Train drivers and firefighters perceive themselves as "professionals" and 
reject what they claim as "manual workers' wages". At the bottom is the "underclass" 
of the unfortunate, welfare-dependents, causal and miserably paid workers-more 
generally known as "the poor." (Marwick, 2005, pp. 84-85) Class structure becomes 
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more blurred and complicated to define and classifY. Attention also needs to be paid to 
the different situation of women, youth and ethnic minorities. The expansion in 
private service jobs and public services provided women with more opportunities for 
advance than was possibly for men. Women's wages have become an essential part of 
household income. Women have become more independent, attending increasing 
all-female social activities outside home, an extreme example being the popular male 
striptease performance by the most famous Chippendales, who were viewed by 
women as sex objects. But women without skills suffer from boring low-paid 
part-time jobs or joblessness. Ethnic minorities experience an "ethnic penalty" 
(Roberts, 200 I, p. 211). Their occupational achievements are lower, their risks of 
unemployment are higher, and they live in run-down inner-city areas. Youth are more 
fragile in the labor market, haunted with crisis of masculinity as they are unable to 
obtain men's jobs and cannot shoulder family duties. 
So Britain's working class today has been transformed and fragmented. In this 
process, it has been disempowered, devaluated and marginalized. For 
disempowerment, it has lost the trade unions8 in the 1980s and the Labor Party in the 
I 990s; the co-op has become just another retailer; working men's clubs and 
community bonds have been largely replaced by television and commercial leisure. 
This results, in a disorganized working class which has lost its capacity for collective 
actions. There is little hope for "the poor" to remedy their inferiority; protest is 
useless. For devaluation, it is now very difficult to develop shared knowledge of its 
8 The trade umons have changed their names to less confrontational, more winsome and more technical-soundmg titles, e.g Amicus and Unison. 
The Mineworkers became the Mine Technicians; ·'worker" became a ·'taboo word" (Mount, 2004, pp 60-61) 
123 
interests and common inspirations. "Identifying with the working class is no longer 
associating oneself with a powerful group, or a way of life with features that others 
should envy" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 109). Beverley Skeggs' (1997) ethnographic study of 
83 young working-class women in an industrial town in north-west England for over 
12 years found that "working-classness was treated as a stigma" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 
109). For marginalization, few spoke any longer of or on behalf of the working class. 
The country is "now dominated overwhelmingly by the broad, diverse and ill-defined 
middle classes" and ''the very term-class-is now often frowned upon and even 
derided as obsolete for our understanding of the post-industrial age" (Taylor, 2005, p. 
386). The advice of governments to working-class parents and their children favor 
individual escape-"get qualified and get out" (Roberts, 2001, p. 109). Unfortunately, 
in a society where over a third of all jobs are still working-class, the dream is not so 
easy to come true. 
Working class images in social realism films have recorded vividly the past and 
present, or rise and fall, of British working class. The following chapters will explore 
the films representations, study the changing identity of British working class on 
screen in different periods of time, and analyze ideology and resistance in cinematic 
portrayal of working class fate. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WORKING CLASS IDENTITY IN NEW WAVE FILMS 
British working-class screen identity before the Second World War was far from 
fair. Paul Rotha pointed out in 1936 that working-class people were often depicted 
"either as creatures of fun, Cockney types or rustic half-wits, or as dishonest rogues, 
tramps and pick pockets" (as cited in Rowbotham & Beynon, 2001, p. 2). The 
Grierson Documentary Film Movement in the 1930s, which started the British social 
realism tradition, offered some counter-balance. For Rotha, it "represented the first 
attempt to portray the working class in Britain as a human, vital factor in present day 
existence" (as cited in Higson, 1995, p. 197). The Second World War further 
cemented social realism as the preferred mode for British films. In critics' calling for 
realism of setting, content and character, the working class, within limits, was ''treated 
seriously for the first time in the mainstream cinema" (Richards, 1988, p. 59). Then 
the Free Cinema Movement between 1956 and 1959 helped to train some young 
directors who soon became famous directors of the British New Wave films. 
The New Wave films are landmark social realist films, directed by young 
talents like Tony Richardson, Lindsay Anderson, Karel Reisz, along with Jack 
Clayton and John Schlesinger. They are usually seen as typically represented by Room 
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at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959), Look Back in Anger (Tony Richardson, 1959), 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), A Taste of Honey (Tony 
Richardson, 1961), A Kind of Loving (John Schlesinger, 1962), The Loneliness of the 
Long Distance Runner (Tony Richardson, 1962), This Sporting Life (Lindsay 
Anderson, 1963). With industrial working-class characters placed at the center of their 
narratives, the films portray the working class at a key moment of economic and 
social change, displaying working class identity to full extent. 
This chapter aims to look at working-class identity in British New Wave films. 
It will firstly briefly survey the working-class representation in the Grierson 
Documentary Movement, the Second World War films, the Free Cinema Movement 
for social realism tradition, and then focus on two New Wave films-Room at the Top 
and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, which are all popular, influential and 
representative of the New Wave, as case studies. It argues that the New Wave films 
successfully presented the lifestyle and aspirations of an emerging new working class, 
displaying to full extent their masculine energy and sexuality, class pride, youthful 
discontents and rebellion, greater individuality, desire for social mobility, confidence 
in change for the better, and resistance as well as conformity to consumerism. The 
protagonists are alienated working class male who aspires to find a role for himself in 
a fast changing affluent and materialistic world, yet often trapped by the high cost or 
compromise he has to bear. 
From the Grierson Documentary Movement to the New Wave 
The documentary tradition. 
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The Grierson Documentary Film Movement 9 is taken as Britain's "most 
important contribution to cinema as a whole" (Dodd & Dodd, 1996, p. 38). The 
Movement envisioned film as being "a serious, committed, engaged cinema," with 
primarily a social responsibility, unlike Hollywood movies, which functioned 
essentially as escapist entertainment (Higson, 1986, p. 74). In Grierson's own phrase, 
the documentary film is for "national education" (as cited in Murphy, 2000b, p. 125) 
and must "put the working man on the screen" (as cited in Aitken, 2009, p. 179). For 
the movement's young directors such as Anstey, "the working man can only be a 
heroic figure" (as cited in Hood, 1983, p. 107), as they believed that providing 
positive images of working-class individuals and communities could playa role in the 
betterment of society and national cohesion. This attitude reflected the interest in and 
idealization of the working class, common among middle-class intellectuals in the 
1930s and Grierson's team were overwhelmingly middle-class and mostly Oxbridge 
graduates. Hence, the documentary vision was seen as a vision from above and 
outside, mainly based on second-hand stereotypes rather than on first hand 
observation. 
The film-makers of the Movement were all kind of "sociologists." Taking 
documentary as a sociological device, they made many films on issues such as 
9 "BrItlsh Documentary Movement" refers to a group of film-makers and the body of films and writings they crafted during the late 19205 and the 
mid-1940s John Gnerson (1898-1972) IS regarded as the founder as well as the central figure of the movement for he was first to envisage that the 
cruCIal socml role for cinema was to provide effective medium of communication between the state and the public, and to put his idea of 
documentary IOta practIce with the film Drifters (1929). Following the success of Dnfters, he established Empire Marketing Board Film Unit 
(EM B). When EMB was abolished by the Act of Parliament in 1933, the film unit was re·establlshed as General Post Office (GPO) Film Unit 
(1933-1939). During World War Two GPO FIlm Unit was transferred to the Ministry of Information and put to work In the war effort as the Crown 
Film Unit The movement's unportance diminished after the war and the Crown Film Unit was abolished in the early 19505. 
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poverty, pollution, housing policy, nutrition, education, unemployment, and dealt with 
the desires of the multitude of working people instead of an individual 
hero-protagonist. The documentaries dealt with working-class life in all aspects, 
presenting the dignity and heroism of labor. 
Drifters (1929) is a film about the work of herring fishermen in the North Sea. 
Hard, honest labor is exalted with many sequences displaying the skills and 
techniques of fishing. Through the portrayal of heroic work on the boats and in the 
harbor, traditional working class masculinity, dignity and community are celebrated. 
Industrial Britain (1933) deals with the socially useful labor of Britain's craftsmen 
and the proud tradition of craftsmanship, showing the ardor and bravery of common 
labor. Night Mail (1936) is concerned with one aspect of the work ofthe General Post 
Office (a public institution) --the night mail from London to Scotland. Coalface (1935) 
furnishes general information about coal production, while dwelling in more detail on 
harsh working conditions within the mine and on the individual experience of miners. 
Today We Live (1937) touches on the social hardship caused by unemployment in a 
Welsh mining community. Housing Problems (1935) deals with slum housing and 
presents the form of model council estate as an alternative. The film, for the first time 
in British cinema, made working-class people actually speak on screen as opposed to 
being spoken over. Enough to Eat (1936) deals with poor nutrition. Spare Time (1939) 
maps the leisure of the working class. 
The Grierson documentaries tend to deal with the work of a particular "public" 
institution that can be broadly perceived as social (such as the General Post Office) 
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and concentrate on a multitude of workers instead of the desires of just one individual 
hero-protagonist. In order to construct the idea of a common public sphere, labor is 
taken out of the context of capitalist economic class relations; the interests of the 
capitalist class are transformed into the public interest. Similarly, the party political 
government becomes "subsumed into the idea of the benevolent state, above divisive 
politics" and the audience is addressed as "a citizen of the nation, not as a subject of 
one or another antagonistic class, race or sex" (Higson, 1986, p. 77). Thus Housing 
Problems, sponsored by the British Commercial Gas Association and the London 
County Council (LCC), was made to publicize the role of the gas companies in aiding 
slum clearances and the effectiveness of LCC in dealing with the problem of slum 
poverty. However, the detailed stories of poor health and child mortality that were told 
by people living in slums instead of being told by voice-over were still powerful 
enough to reduce the working class as social victims who could not help themselves 
and needed aid from the state and sympathy from society. Enough to Eat recognizes it 
as the duty of the state to provide the material means for better nutrition and the 
citizen's duty to eat better. These social problems are "removed from the arena of 
antagonistic power relations and depoliticized, and the films effectively construct the 
working class as victims deserving of 'our' (Le., the public's) sympathy" (Higson, 
1986, p. 78). Montage editing is mobilized to strengthen a sense of unity and 
harmony rather than of conflict and contradiction. Dodd & Dodd acknowledge the 
"victim" portrayal of the working class, but see more of a counter-representation of 
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male working "hero" --the fetishising of the working class male body engaged in hard, 
honest labor through countless close-ups (1996, p. 43). 
The Second World War films. 
The war films' attachment to realist methods and a socially progressive outlook 
derived from general feeling that it was right and necessary to show people from all 
walks of life pulling together for the common good. So the war promoted 
"democratization and documentarization" (Richards, 1988, p. 59) of British films. 
Many of the Grierson group worked during the war for the Crown Film Unit set up by 
the Ministry of Information. Class inequalities and cultural differences that had 
preoccupied the documentary movement were somewhat flattened out. As George 
Orwell observed, "class feeling slipped into the background, only reappearing when 
the immediate danger had passed" (as cited in Richards, 1988, p. 60). And the British 
wartime films also evoked specific values - bravery, loyalty, self-sacrifice, social 
harmony, unselfish pulling together for the common good. 
The Documentary Movement was continued with the short documentaries such 
as London Can Take It (1940) and Listen to Britain (1941). But the Documentary 
Movement's influence was more reflected in feature films embracing documentary 
elements. A large number of war films became story documentaries-hybrid of 
documentary and feature films. The Lion Has Wings (1939), the first feature-length 
film of the war, was a propaganda film intended to reassure the public of the might of 
the Royal Air Force (RAF). Target/or Tonight (1941) is about a squadron of bombers 
on a night bombing raid over Germany which shows the RAF successfully fighting 
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back in the heart of Germany. It was commissioned by RAF Bomber Command, 
produced by the Crown Film Unit, and played by RAF personnel. In Which We Serve 
(1942) was inspired by and based on the true incident of Lord Mountbatten's battle 
ship, HMS Kelly. The ship equals to the country, in which all Britons serve. In this 
film, the working, middle and upper-classes were clearly defined. The 
documentary-style photography presents a convincing picture of the prevailing mood 
of all classes pulling together for Britain through quiet heroism and the stiff upper lip. 
Fires Were Started (1943), acted by real firemen, was about fire fighting and London 
during the Blitz. Millions Like Us (1943) tells the story of a young daughter who is 
separated from her family and called up to work in a huge aircraft components factory 
and finds love with an RAF pilot. It touches upon the egalitarian concept of people's 
war and harmonizes class discord. Women were directly addressed in order to 
encourage them to contribute to the war effort. The Way Ahead (1944) again glorifies 
the concept of people's war and wartime populism through telling the story of seven 
civilians who are called up to the Army and take part in the North African invasion. 
Western Approaches (1944), paying tribute to the Merchant Navy, deals with the 
effort to defend the essential trade routes between Britain and America through the 
convoy system. The players are serving officers and men of Allied Navies and 
Merchant Fleets. 
Some wartime features are not directly about war effort, but about harsh 
working class life and their expectation for new economic and social order after the 
war, giving voice to the emerging political consciousness. The best examples include 
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Love on the Dole (1941), The Proud Valley (1940), and The Stars Look Down (1940). 
There was a feeling that the past had to be acknowledged and a determination that 
unemployment, poverty, class conflict, injustice should not be repeated. John Baxter's 
Love on the Dole tells the story a young brother and sister in 1930s Salford, both of 
whom fall victim to poverty and unemployment and have to make difficult decisions 
to survive. The problems it deals with are the Depression, mass unemployment, 
poverty, pre-marital pregnancy, riots and prostitution. The sentiments for change into 
a new, better and cooperative world are expressed by a postscript caption at the film's 
end, signed by A. V. Alexander, the Labor MP and First Lord of the Admiralty, that 
read: "Our working men and women have responded magnificently to any and every 
call made upon them. Their reward must be a New Britain. Never again must the 
unemployed become forgotten men of peace." (Aldgate & Richards, 1986, p. 14). On 
the other hand, the film reinforces the view that the British working classes who had 
survived such hardships would survive others in defense of the liberal democracy now 
under threat. Love on the Dole is praised for constituting an argument that poverty of 
the previous decade should be banished, replaced by a new start or a better and 
cooperative future. The Proud Valley gives a remarkably authentic portrait of a Welsh 
mining village, displaying the truly heroic image of the working class, proud in song 
and ready in danger and self-sacrifice. The film not only deals directly with 
opposition of the miners to a pit closure but also stars Paul Robeson, a well-known 
socialist activist. The Stars Look Down is about injustices in a coal mining community 
in Northeast England. It shows people's different choices of escape, facing the 
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industrial action's failure in dealing with safety issue: one has gained political 
consciousness and supports nationalization; one chooses to be businessman. Yet the 
protagonists' attempt to escape always ends tragically. In Love on the Dole, the girl 
has to be the bookie's tart to support her family; in The Stars Looks Down, Davy's call 
for nationalization or union's official support on saving the miners from working on 
the dangerous Scupper Flats seems all in vain. The film ends with the tragedy of 
inevitable coalface detonation and gas explosion. The working class figures are more 
represented as victims of the existing system, a system which deserves at least moral 
critique for producing hardship that the working class can hardly escape, if not a 
system that needs radical change or even revolution to alter it. Compared with the 
blind optimism of the 1930s, this is an improvement. 
The Free Cinema movement. 
The Free Cinema Movement is a documentary film movement represented by a 
series of six programs of shorts and documentaries presented at the National Film 
Theatre between 1956 and 1959, depicting the English working class on specific 
aspects of contemporary British social life. The word "Free" implies "an aspiration 
towards a cinema whose tone is neither 'commercial' nor 'sponsored'" (Durgnat, 
1970, p. 126). Filmmakers were free to choose the subjects that interested them as 
artists. The significance of the Movement lay in 2 aspects. Firstly, it helped to train 
three young directors-Tony Richardson, Karel Reisz and Lindsay Anderson-who 
went on to become famous directors of the British New Wave films. Secondly, the 
Free Cinema documentary and New Wave representation was seen to be from the 
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inside, as the directors were of working-class background, though grammar school 
beneficiaries of Butler's 1944 Education Act and university-educated. The movement 
resembled the Grierson team of the 1930s with the same commitment to a realist 
aesthetic, the same middle-class romanticization of the working class, the same belief 
in location-shooting and rejection of studio artifice, but developed new concerns as 
summarized by Alan Lovell: "a sympathetic interest in communities, whether they 
were the traditional industrial one ... or the new, improvised one of the jazz club ... ; 
fascination with the newly emerging youth culture ... ; unease about the quality of 
leisure in an urban society ... ; and respect for the traditional working class ... " (as cited 
in Murphy, 1992, p. II). 
Anderson's Every Day Except Christmas (1957) is about market life and the 
workers at the Covent Garden Market. It follows the loading, transport and delivery of 
goods to the Market, the sale of the goods and the aftermath. As Industrial Britain in 
the 1930s, the film looks at working-class faces with respect and continues the liberal 
humanist tradition of representing working people as dignified and heroic: "rough 
diamonds, you know, but jolly good fellows, and damned hard working." And the 
emphasis is shifted from work as a process to work as fulfillment or even vocation. 
Apart from the general dignity of labor, the film also emphasizes local and national 
community. Reisz's We are the Lambeth Boys (1959) tries to deliver sympathetically 
a positive portrait of the lives of ordinary teenagers, instead of the widespread violent 
youth delinquent images. Shot in a youth club in Kennington, South London, it 
follows a group of teenagers at work, at home and in their leisure time, and shows 
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much club activities. Young people are given space to express their frustrations and 
aspirations. The film lets the camera move around the youth or uses close-ups to 
capture their faces. Richard Hoggart praised the film in Sight and Sound that it sets 
out to show "not the whole truth, but some aspects of the truth, wholly" and 
succeeded in embodying "the strength and variety of these young people's vitality, 
their lively, tolerant and complex sense of community" (We are the Lambeth Boys, 
BFI screenonline). 
Soon the Free Cinema directors began to make New Wave feature films with 
working-class heroes based on the materials of working-class northern novelists. Due 
to the interest in the emergent youth culture and the respect for an authentic traditional 
working-class which was endangered by consumerism, the representations of working 
class people were more energetic and vibrant. 
The New Wave films. 
The British New Wave films, also called "Angry Young Man" films, "kitchen 
sink,,10 realistic films, was a further development of the Grierson Documentary 
tradition, and drew from 3 contemporary sources. Firstly, it drew on Free Cinema 
Movement documentaries, as illustrated above. Secondly, its formal and stylistic 
characteristics were heavily indebted to the French New Wave. Thirdly, its literary 
sources came substantially from the revolting Angry Young Man literature and theatre 
10 "Kitchen smk" was originally used to describe realist painters who chose to paint ordinary objects, but with Look Back in Anger it began to 
apply to the depiction of the ordinary, everyday life of the working class on screen 
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productions 11, which determined its principal mood as one of discontent and 
dissatisfaction. 
The New Wave films were born in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a time of full 
employment, especially of young people, and relative affluence of social development. 
Out of the affluence came the increased importance of the market and consumption 
and youth-oriented leisure industry. Mark Abrams in 1959 published his famous 
survey The Teenage Consumer, revealing teenage consumption as the most distinctive 
product of these changes. Youth became the prime beneficiaries of the new affluence, 
as their real earnings had increased by 50% since 1938, which is double the rate of 
expansion for adults, and their real "discretionary" spending has probably risen by 
100% (Abrams, 1959, p. 9). More and more women went out to work, including many 
married women. Affluence, embourgeoisement and political consensus became key 
popular terms in political debates of the period which tended to ignore those 
unpleasant social and economic class inequalities that continued to exist. Working 
class consciousness underwent changes concerning attitudes towards consumerism, 
sense of community and solidarity, and etc. 
The New Wave films took an honest look at the people who lived in the grimy 
industrial communities in the Midlands and North of England. They were marked for 
their commitment to address contemporary social realities and, more importantly, to 
11 Angry Young Man refers to the literary movement of the 19505 involvmg many new novelists and playwrights such as John Wain (Hurry on 
Down, 1953), Kmgsley AmlS (/Alck ,11m, 1954), John Osborne (Look Back in Anger, 1956), John Brain (Room at the l()p, 1957), Alan Slliitoe 
(Saturday Night and Sunday MornmK, 1958) Their writings expressed their anger and frustration as the postwar reforms failed to meet their 
demand for genume social change TheIr anger was toward the ineffectIveness of the government in eliminating poverty and inequality and toward 
the dommant political consensus that left the workmg class WIth the "loss of politics '" Their protagonists are often proud and rebellious 
workmg-class figures 
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"a politically serious representation of working-class experiences" (Hill, 1986, p. I). 
They enriched British cinema with "an enhanced and expanded version of 
contemporary reality" (Lay, 2002, p. 59) through introducing new themes into the 
British cinema. They challenged wartime idealization of consensus and community, 
captured the new individualism in British culture, and delivered more energetic and 
vibrant representations of working class "authentic" experiences. Focusing on 
working class male protagonists, the films displayed to full extent their class 
confidence, masculine energy and sexuality, anger and rebellion, and mixed feeling 
toward mobility and consumerism. 
Stylistically, the films set the stories in provincial, grey northern towns with 
natural surroundings of small terraced houses, factories and pubs. They used unknown 
regional stage actors mainly from the North in ensemble casts, whose fresh faces, 
vernacular accents and rebellious spirit helped immeasurably in strengthening the 
realistic mood. Typical example was Albert Finney in Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning. His sudden stardom proved that "it was no longer necessary for passion, 
appetite, and enjoyment to be held in check," and "the camera was no longer afraid of 
robustness and charisma" (Stead, 1989, p. 198). Besides, black-and-white 
photography and location shooting carry a decidedly authentic, documentary-like 
quality. So we see shots of cobbled streets, chimneys, factories, canals, pubs, the 
fairground, the bus journey, and the visit to the nearby countryside. The industrial 
landscapes and townscape shots, especially "That Long Shot of Our Town From That 
Hill" (Higson, 1984, p. 17), had an almost exotic lure. 
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New Wave realism was seen by many critics as characterized by "poetic 
realism." For Higson, poetic realism involves a more perfect conjunction of surface 
realism, which is "the 'authenticity' of place and character" involving "a fetishization 
of certain iconographic details," and moral realism, which is a moral commitment to 
the representation of "ordinary people," involving "a particular construction of the 
social in terms of 'universal human values'" for which "films should show the dignity 
of the working man" (Higson, 1984, p. 4). It is a conjunction "which in fact. 
transcends ordinariness, which makes the ordinary strange, beautiful-poetic" 
(Higson, 1984, p. 5). Stylistic techniques often used to create this poetic realism 
include the use of sequences of establishing shots to give a sense of place, long and 
wide-angled urban landscape and townscape shots, particularly "That Long Shot of 
Our Town From That Hill" termed and explored in detail by Higson (1984), which 
lures the eye across the vast empty space of a townscape. Critic Roger Manvell called 
this "industrial romanticism" (as cited in Higson, 1995, p. 192), which seeks a kind of 
beautiful ugliness, transforming scarred images of cities and poverty into images of 
"comfortable contemplation" or "bringing beauty out of squalor" (Hill, 1986, p. 136). 
Poetic realism is intended "to psychologize rather than historicize the space" (Higson, 
1984, p. 8) and to elicit sympathy from the morally committed audience for the 
working class protagonists as victims of the city. 
As the major directors of the New Wave films are scholarship boys--working 
class males who benefited from free grammar school and university education and 
moved upward, Terry Lovell identifies that poetic realism represents a perspective of 
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Hoggart's scholarship boy "looking back with nostalgia at a remembered childhood 
landscape" (1990, p. 370). It is only from a class position "outside and above the city" 
that the city can appear beautiful (Higson, 1984, p. 18). In essence, it is a combination 
of both insider and outsider's view from someone who experienced the life and 
moved outside with considerable sense of loss and who identified in the young, 
sexually active male protagonist "a fantasy projection of the self he might have 
become had he remained" (Lovell, 1990, p. 370). 
In a negative way, the aesthetic and the psychological of poetic realism "block 
access to the social and the historical" (Higson, 1984, p. II). Often typical shots of a 
place or locale are presented without any particular narrative function. Hill criticizes 
such poetic shots and montages of the northern industrial landscape as being "visual 
abstractions ... emptied of socio-economic content" (Hill, 1986, p. 136) which 
undermine the social messages. 
The following part will do identity analysis, focusing on two films, which are 
all popular, influential and representative of the New Wave. Room at the Top is 
considered the first of the British New Wave of realistic and gritty film dramas. It won 
American Academy Awards (1960) for Best Actress in a Leading Role (Simone 
Signoret) and Best Writing Screenplay Based on Material from Another Medium and 
was nominated for 4 other Academy Awards (Best Picture, Best Actor in a Leading 
Role, Best Actress in a Supporting Role, Best Director). It also won three British 
Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) Awards. The film also earned an 
award at Cannes. Saturday Night and Sunday Morning took British Academy Awards 
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for Best Picture and Best Actor and won very good box office. 
Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) 
Room at the Top is Jack Clayton's film of John Braine's novel of the same title, 
telling the story of a young man who uses his good looks to gain mobility in a 
class-bound society. 
Joe Lampton (Laurence Harvey) is a working-class lad determined to escape his 
working-class background and climb the social ladder through the shortcut of 
marrying Susan Brown ((Heather Sears), the daughter of a rich local industrialist. Joe 
has high ambitions. He has improved himself through education and has found a 
decent job as a clerk in the Treasury Department of the local government of Warnley, 
a town which is more prosperous than his grim northern industrial town of Dufton. He 
aspires to marrying out of his working-class background and soon sets his target on 
Susan Brown, for whom he joins the drama club of which Susan is a member. During 
the slow progress towards his goal, he is unexpectedly drawn into a fulfilling love 
affair with an older woman, penniless Alice Aisgill (Simone Signoret) who is also a 
member of the drama club. She is French and unhappily married. However, when he 
feels his relationship with Susan seems impossible and his heart strongly connected to 
Alice, Mr Brown presses him into marriage with Susan as Susan has been made 
pregnant by him. Joe is promoted to a comfortable position in Brown's company. As a 
precondition, Joe must also abandon Alice, which leads to her suicide by 
drink-driving her car off the cliff. Joe realizes his goal, but his pursuit of upward 
mobility is achieved at high emotional and spiritual costs of suppressing the real 
140 
feeling-he does not really love Susan and his true love Alice dies and the wedding is 
shaded with regret. 
Numerous critics have commented on the themes of Room at the Top as notable 
for "its comparative sexual candor and open acceptance of the go-getting hero's 
greedy aspirations" (Brown, 1986, p. 160), for "class and the struggle for material 
success" (Leese, 2006, p. 59) or for "class power, class rigidities and the possibility of 
social mobility; and sex, frankly presented and still more frankly discussed" (Marwick, 
1991, p. 74). For me, the film's explicit and weighty emphasis on class and sex needs 
to be firstly acknowledged, at the same time I would like to lay stress on Joe 
Lampton's identity as an ambitious and confident working class "scholarship boy" 
who claims eligible to the new affluence and classlessness. Joe Lampton simply 
signifies the arrival of a new kind of working-class lad targeting big in times of 
change. 
Class obviously is a key theme, which can be subdivided into class difference, 
class mobility and class confidence. 
Class difference is firstly an explicit physical existence. When Joe arrives to 
report to the Treasury of Town Hall, Mr. Hoylake assures him that he'll "find big 
differences" in Warnley, not only work, but also "a different class of people" who 
pride themselves on "being civilized here in Warnley.,,12 Although Joe tries to defend 
his hometown in front ofMr Hoylake that "Dufton is not much of a place but ... we're 
not exactly savages there," deep in his heart, he sees it as a hopeless place as he later 
12 Quotations in this chapter WIth no cltatlOns are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films 
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mentions it to his colleague: "Nobody ever goes to Dufton, they just pass through it;" 
Dufton seems like "a lifetime sentence." To his uncle and aunt he also speaks high of 
his new town that "Warn ley is a different kind of a town" with "a different sort of 
people." Brown's family property forms a sharp contrast to working class existence. 
Their house is like a castle, with a swimming pool. Susan's clothing, car and 
boyfriend all display a world of affluence. The two richest families of the town, the 
Brown's and the Wales's, are "worth more brass than the rest of Warnley rolls 
together. " 
Class difference and class barrier is marked deep in people's mind and attitude. 
When Joe declares his ambition to have the lot that Mr Brown now has, Charles 
simply laughs: "No you're not! Not in local government ... In 20 years time, you 
could be sitting in Hoylake's chair, and that is as high as you can go. And that means, 
a 1000 a year, a semi-detached downtown, a 2nd_hand Austin, and a wife to match if 
you know what I mean." When Joe shows great interest in Susan after knowing she is 
the millionaire's daughter, his colleagues keep warning him not to waste his time as 
Susan is "way up in the top drawer" and out of his reach. Joe's immediate superior Mr 
Hoylake persuades him to give up Susan as Mr Brown "is a powerful man" with the 
biggest engineering works in Warnley and Joe had better find a girl of his own class 
(he technically uses the word "background"). Joe's uncle also firmly believes that 
"Money marries money" and advises him to "Stick to your own people Joe." 
The way Mr and Mrs Brown deals with Susan's love relationship with Joe 
vividly reveals class antagonism. When Mrs Brown first hears Joe's name mentioned 
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by her daughter, her first response is "But we don't know him, do we? Socially I 
mean." Knowing that Joe is only a clerk, naturally she doesn't think he's "suitable." 
The couple uses every means to break the relationship. Firstly, Mr Brown phones 
Joe's superior Mr Hoylake to talk to Joe into giving up Susan with persuasion as well 
as threat of "no promotion." Then he purposefully highly recommends Joe to a firm in 
his hometown so as to send him away from Susan. He humiliates Joe with his 
condescending warning: "You want to improve yourself, you want to get in among the 
money. Alright, I don't blame you for that. But you're not getting my brass through 
Susan." After Susan is pregnant, Mr Brown presses Joe into marrying her as soon as 
possible and settles everything (quitting the Town Hall job, breaking with Alice) for 
him without consulting him first. 
Talking about the Brown's, Joe is full of envy and hatred: "They've got just 
about everything, haven't they?" With Mr Brown trying to arrange everything of his 
future before the marriage, he does not hide his resentment: "You can fix just about 
anything, can't you?" He is particularly angry about the sense of superiority of Jack 
Wales, Susan's suitor who shows contempt for Joe in every way: "That type they 
make me mad. The boys with the big mouths and a silver spoon stuck in them. But 
they think they can take everything worth having by sort of divine rights." 
Alexander Walker complains that "what one feels most strongly in Room At the 
Top isn't anger--but envy--the envy of a have-not for what he wants to acquire" (1974, 
p. 45). But Murphy thinks this is "misleading" as John Braine is very specific about 
Joe's attitude: "I tasted the sourness of envy. Then I rejected it. Not on moral grounds, 
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but because I felt then, and still do, that envy's a small and squalid vice ... This didn't 
abate the fierceness of my longing. I wanted an Aston-Martin, I wanted a three-guinea 
linen shirt, I wanted a girl with a Riviera suntan-these were my rights. I felt, a 
signed and sealed legacy." (Murphy, 1992, pp. 13-14) To me, what makes Joe a 
typical representative of new working-class lads is his strong sense or class 
confidence that he has a right to the good things in life, a feeling that transcends envy. 
He never tries to hide his hunger for a better life. When Charles Soames notices his 
gaze at Susan and challenges him "Is that what you really want? A clerk's dream; a 
girl with a Riviera tan and a Lagonda?" Joe directly responds: "That's what I'm going 
to have." When he sees Mr Brown's huge "castle" mansion, he reasserts that "I'll 
have one of those. I'm going to have the lot." When Charles Soames points out to him 
the limit of his promotion in 20 years time, he once again insists "That's why I'm 
going to have the lot." 
Joe's desire for upward mobility or "escape" is strong and unambiguous. Of 
working class origin, he has already improved to a white-collar job through his 
intelligence and grammar school education and is ambitious to go further. The film 
begins with a journey that defines Joe's working-class status from the start and his 
eagerness to move up. Joe is leaving his grim industrial hometown to take his job in 
Warnley. He sits in a railway carriage, smoking and reading a Nottingham local 
newspaper with his shoe less feet high on the table. He is dressed in decent suit. Upon 
arrival, he changes into a pair of new leather shoes, a symbolic gesture to show his 
need for respect from others, and takes a taxi to the town hall. As he expects, he 
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attracts the attention of every secretary in the outer office of the Treasury Department 
and then meets privately with his boss, who teaches him on class difference. Coming 
out of the boss's office, he sets his eye outside an office window on the wealthy Susan 
Brown in luxurious dress and car in the street. His colleague, Charles Soames (Donald 
Houston), follows his gaze and warns "That's not for you, lad," to which Joe retorts: 
"That's what I'm going to have." 
Joe understands that an easy way to move up quickly is through marriage with a 
rich girl, who is a kind of quarry he is highly motivated to hunt for. He quickly sets 
his target on Susan after he knows that Susan's father is a millionaire and owns most 
of Warn ley. According to very practical criteria of grading women-- "partly money, 
partly background and partly J. Lampton's instinct" -- Susan is grade one on every 
account and is "so wholesome." So Joe joins the drama club so as to be close to Susan 
and tells Susan directly that "J only joined the club because of you." He does not 
"beat about the bush" in praising her beauty in great detail. As Charles Soames 
observes clearly, Joe's feeling for Susan is "lust after her" for her family wealth. "I'm 
going to marry to Susan" is priority of priority for Joe. Talking to his uncle and aunt 
about Susan, he is not ashamed of stressing Susan's family wealth and status: "Her 
father owns a factory. He's on the council, Warn ley council. .. He's rolling in money." 
He takes uncle's warning of sticking to his own people as "old fashioned" class stuff 
and believes that things have changed since the war. So he feels nothing wrong in 
wanting both the girl and the money since he is "entitled to be in love with any girl." 
So, he confidently claims that "If I want her, I'll have her." His final success in 
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marrying Susan is sincerely congratulated upon by his colleagues, which shows wide 
public approval for working-class entitlement for betterment. 
However, Joe's rise from working-class origin to lower middle-class clerk and to 
foreseeable eventual career success largely builds on an unloving marriage to a rich 
man's daughter and the dumping of and the death of a woman who truly understands 
him and whom he actually loves. The story implies vividly that working class can 
only rise at high costs, in Joe's case, the cost being the sacrifice of personal happiness 
as well as honesty and integrity; or in Stead's word, "the emasculation of personality" 
(Stead, 1989, p. 189M), and in Shafer's words, spiritual death and the loss of his 
"own values and independence" (Shafer, 2001, p. 6). 
As a representative of the rising working class, Joe is aggressive and very 
sensitive in defending his class dignity and pride. When he is rehearsing in the theatre 
and pronounces the word "Brazier" wrongly, which is heartily laughed at by 
everybody watching and commented by Alice as "Erotic vise among the working 
class," he feels deeply hurt and loudly proclaims that "Let me tell you, I am working 
class .... Working class and proud of it!" When Alice asks him if he can drive, he 
retorts "My father didn't know engineering works or a mill. He never even owned his 
own house. But that doesn't mean that I can't drive a car or pronounce brazier." 
However, while he has full courage and confidence in claiming the eligibility of the 
best things for him, his sense of pride is somewhat shaded with diffidence. Though 
Joe refuses to admit, Alice sharply points out that "Your trouble is you don't believe 
enough in yourself." And it is ironic that he only feels to be "the proudest man in the 
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world" when he is with Alice, a penniless lover. So Alice honestly advises that 
"You've got so much Joe ... Everything. You don't ever have to pretend. Just have to 
be yourself." But Joe is extraordinarily brave and dignified in turning down Mr 
Brown when the latter tries to buy him off with alluring terms for him to leave Susan 
forever. 
Room at the Top is also about sex and love and the story develops along two 
lines, that with Susan and that with Alice. Joe's value concerning love and marriage is 
perplexed yet practical, which worries his colleague Charles Soames, who timely 
warns him, "you can't do it, you know you can't woo two women. Not in a town this 
size." Joe is attracted by Susan's wealth and beauty and at the same time by Alice's 
understanding and serenity. As the relationships develop, he is drawn closer and closer 
to Alice. With Alice, he is relaxed and can be himself. Alice's love and sexual passion 
makes him feel he is "the proudest man in the world." Alice's alertness and 
understanding for his moods and feelings and subsequent consolation relieves his 
stress and aggressiveness. Emotionally, he wants to stay with her and they even 
discuss about Alice's divorce so as to be together. Yet the following external 
circumstances press him to break off the relationship. Alice's husband refuses to 
divorce her and threatens to rid Joe of his precious job and even sue him for 
enticement. Susan is made pregnant by him and her father makes a generous offer he 
cannot refuse. So out of selfish calculation, Alice is sacrificed for Joe's upward 
mobility. Her resulting horrible death fills Joe with deep regret: "I've murdered her ... I 
killed her ... Everybody knows I killed her. I wasn't planning but I killed her." Joe's 
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relationship with Susan is much simpler. He is simply taking advantage of her to 
realize his greedy ambition and to compensate for his frustrations in the hierarchical 
society. 
In Room at the Top, women are treated seriously with the only exception of Mrs 
Brown, whose disgusting snobbishness invites our loath and contempt. Alice can be 
herself in whatever situations. When scolded by Joe for being frivolous in having 
been a nude model once, she does not abandon her independence in exchange for 
Joe's favor, as she declares, "Now listen, I own my own body and I'm not ashamed of 
it. And I'm not ashamed of anything I've ever done." Unlike Joe, she does not envy 
the wealth of the Brown's as she tells Joe "Who cares?" She is honest and passionate 
about love and sex. Joe praises her heartily that "You're such an honest person. Why 
the hell do you have to be so honest? Darling I'm glad you're honest. I love you for 
it." More significantly, Alice functions as "the moral force of the film" (Street, 1997, 
p. 82) and a spiritual guide to Joe. In two scenes she teaches Joe philosophically to be 
himself and to be proud of himself, one during their love-making outing (scene 1), the 
other during their final break-up talk (scene 2), both of which are crucial for our 
deeper understand of Joe's identity: 
Scene I: 
Alice: You're stronger now. More sure of yourself. I was so angry with you at first when 
you wanted Susan. Seemed to want things for all the wrong reasons. And you didn't see 
how you were damaging yourself as a person. You weren't proud to be you, just to be 
yourself. But you're proud now, aren't you? 
Joe: Oh, yes, now I am the proudest man in the world. 
Alice: You've got so much Joe ... Everything. You don't ever have to pretend. Just have to 
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be yourself. 
Scene 2: 
Alice: You've done very well for yourself Joe. Finally, you've got everything you wanted, 
haven't you? There's something you have never understood, Joe. These people are the top. 
They are the same as anybody else, but you had it inside of you, to be so much bigger 
than any of them. You just had to be yourself, that was all. With me you were yourself, 
only with me. 
Joe: I never loved anyone else. But there just isn't any future for us together. 
Susan is rich, but not snobbish. She is warm, lovely, yet a bit too simple, for she feels 
Joe's absent-mindedness and strangeness but cannot see through the truth. Both Susan 
and Alice seem to have been made use of by Joe; Susan is put into a loveless marriage 
and Alice is punished to death. Such a fate reveals a misogynist tendency, although 
the two women are treated with sympathy. 
Room at the Top was widely acknowledged for its honest treatment of adult 
sexuality. The immediate popular reaction was to its sexual content, which was seen 
as "savagely frank and brutally truthful" (Lowenstein, 2000, p. 224X1) and for which 
the film was advertised as "A Savage Story of Lust and Ambition" (Aldgate, 2005, p. 
108). The sex scenes were shot with a frankness, sensuality as well as sincerity never 
tried before. The British Board of Film Censors (BBFC) offered the film an "X" 
certificate for its "good adult entertainment" (Aldgate, 2005, p. 106) which was 
"made with sincerity" (Aldgate, 2005, p. Ill). BBFC Secretary John Trevelyan 
viewed the film as "a milestone in the history of British films" as well as "the history 
of British film censorship" (as cited in Aldgate, 2005, p. 105). Critic Frank Jackson 
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commented in 1959, "At long last a British film which is truly adult. Room at the Top 
has an 'X' certificate and deserves it - not for any cheap sensationalism but because it 
is an unblushingly frank portrayal of intimate human relationships" (as cited in 
Aldgate, 2005, p. 111). 
Room at the Top ends with the news of Alice's horrible death and Joe's wedding 
with Susan. Joe is congratulated on achieving his ambitions. His tears of deep regret 
and self-accusation on his wedding day is mistaken by his wife Susan for tears of 
happiness and sentimental personality. 
Stylistically, Room at the Top is more conventionally made than later New 
Wave films. Its casting is more orthodox, except that it uses a glamorous French 
actress, Simone Signoret, to play the sexually experienced Alice. Murphy argues that, 
by making Alice a foreigner, the filmmakers "put her outside the English class system 
and change her into a symbol of honesty and true love" (1992, p. 14). 
In conclusion, Room at the Top inaugurated the New Wave. Its significance lies 
in "taking its hero's self-interested aspirations seriously" and in "its emotional and 
sexual candour" (McFarlane, 1986, p. 137). Though it is honesty about sex which 
attracted more media and censorship attention, it is honesty about class aspirations 
which is more thought-provoking. As John Braine, author ofthe original novel, put it: 
"The new dimension of the film was in presenting a boy from the working classes not 
as a downtrodden victim, but as he really was. It wasn't important that Joe Lampton 
was honest about sex, what was important was that Joe was honest about the whole 
business of class. Most ambitious working-class boys want to get the hell out of the 
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working class. That was a simple truth that had never been stated before." (as cited in 
Richards, 1992, p. 221) 
Peter Hutchings views the film as "an old-fashioned morality story in which the 
desire for material possessions leads inevitably to unhappiness" (2009, p. 305). I take 
the film as meaning much more than that. Joe's upward mobility serves as a facilitator 
for people to think about the identity of the rising working class and the nature of the 
old British class system. Joe's seeming success is in reality a tragedy which expressed 
the resentment of the first generation of working-class children who benefited from 
the 1944 Education Act but were still trapped in a society far from the classless, 
populist utopia the consensus politics had promised. Though Joe's acceptance and 
merge into a higher class breaks the class rigidity, indicating some social progress, his 
success can only be a tragic one and can hardly be reproduced or popularized to the 
vast working class still stifled by socioeconomic restrictions and class barriers. 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960) 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning is a 1960 production directed by Karel 
Reisz adapted from the novel of the same name by Alan Sillitoe. It portrays the life of 
Arthur Seaton (Albert Finney), an affluent, talented, and rebellious young factory 
worker in Nottingham, who spares no effort in seeking pleasure from life until finally 
trapped into conformity and marriage on a new housing estate. 
Arthur is depicted as "an archetypal angry young man" (Lay, 2002, p. 71) 
rebelling instinctively against the society. He hates the tedium and restrictions of his 
work and domestic life. At work, he stands all day in a noisy workshop, matching his 
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activities to an unrelenting machine tool's movements and reciting his credo, "What 
I'm out for is a good time. All the rest is propaganda." After work, he drinks and 
brawls hard and has an affair with Brenda (Rachel Roberts), the wife of his older 
work-mate, Jack. He also has a young and beautiful girlfriend, Doreen (Shirley Anne 
Field), who works in a hairnet factory. When Brenda gets pregnant and Jack discovers 
the affair, Jack's brother and brother's friend, two angry soldiers, give Arthur a 
vicious beating. After recovering, Arthur returns to work, and the film ends with 
Arthur and Doreen discussing marriage and the future new house, suggesting Arthur 
being trapped into marriage and a life of consumerism on a new housing estate. 
By discovering Arthur, a new folk hero, British cinema made its most powerful 
statement about the working class. The Daily Worker's Nina Hibbin complimented on 
the film: "Most of us know someone like Arthur;" "it is the best, most accurate and 
profoundest film that has yet been made in England-here at last" about working 
class lads and it "is a film which, not only in the contemporary fashion, is about the 
working class, but also of and for the working class" (as cited in Stead, 1989, pp. 
193-194). The film's strengths were those of social realism, with vivid realist 
depiction of Arthur as a typical factory worker of the period. Isabel Quigly also spoke 
highly of the film as "the first British feature film in which today's working-class 
world has appeared ... people today with today's attitudes and outlook and today's 
money" (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 123). Arthur Seaton, with his masculine energy, 
confidence and sexual arrogance, signified the emergence in British post-war 
affluence of a new breed of British working men, who earned high wages but 
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distained for being told what to do, who enjoyed hedonistic freedom and were 
irresponsible as long as they could get away with it, yet who were still pressed to 
confirm. The title Saturday Night refers to the hedonistic enjoyment of Arthur 
(drinking, fighting, womanizing) and Sunday Morning refers to his settling down 
through acceptance of marriage and conformity to conventions. The film portrayed a 
working-class rebel with sympathy. 
A close text analysis distinguishes Arthur's character in the following aspects. 
First of all, Arthur is an efficient, yet alienated worker. He works as a 
lathe-operator and is conscious and proud of his efficiency and good piece-work wage 
(instructed by his foreman not to leak how much he's earning to others). He is first 
located in and identified in relation to his work place. The film opens with an 
authentic presentation of a busy and noisy industrial community of the Raleigh 
bicycle factory and with Arthur toiling at his lathe expressing in voice-over details of 
his job, its piece-work payment system, as well as his attitude toward his work and his 
workmates. He is fed up with the job in which men are treated like a part of the 
machine: "Nine hundred and fifty four, nine hundred and fifty bloody five. Another 
few more and that's the lot for a Friday." Yet he flaunts his pride in his own ability to 
be an efficient worker and a high earner: "I could get through it in half the time if 1 
worked like a bull, but they'd only slash my wages so they can get stuffed!" When 
Doreen notices his generous spending on clothes, he explains "I get good wages." He 
sees no hope for factory work as it is boring hard labor and causing physical pain (bad 
back): "work next week. I'll be hard at it, sweating me guts out at that lathe. It's a 
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hard life if you don't weaken." "Work next week" or "work tomorrow" is murmured 
several times with knitted brows and in bewilderment. So Arthur does not look 
forward to his work, and he is not going to work hard: "I'll have a fag in a bit, no use 
working every minute God sends." He does not want to get on. He views Jack with 
sheer contempt for his wish to get on and for his obedience to the foreman Mr Robboe. 
He also despises the workmates of the older generation, who "got ground down before 
the war and never got over it." As the film title suggests, the film is more about leisure 
than work. Clarke et a\. see leisure as a significant life-area for the class, as Marx 
observed, " ... The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his 
work feels outside himself. .. His labor is therefore not voluntary but coerced; it is 
forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely the means to 
satisfy needs external to it." (as cited in Clarke et a\., 1976, p. 50) So the workplace is 
only briefly shown for four times and merely acts as the source of income to pay for 
Arthur's relatively affluent, hedonistic lifestyle, helping to keep male dignity. 
Secondly, Arthur is a "playboy." He is tied to a factory lathe throughout the 
week, but tries hard to make up for it at the weekends. On Saturday night, he selects 
his flash suit, carefully does his hair style, and goes out for an evening in the pub, 
which is a popular working class culture. He enjoys boozing match and once has more 
than eight pints, obviously "having a good time" as commented by an old lady 
watching, after which he falls downstairs smiling. He enjoys betting, which for 
Doreen, is a waste of money. He does not want to be bound by marriage. For Arthur, 
people "must've been drunk to get married" and it "costs too much" to get married. 
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As unmarried girls would expect engagement and marriage with kisses and sex, he 
plays with Brenda, a married woman. Nothing seems to worry him: "I never worry, 
you know that," as he told Aunt Ada. When having sex with Brenda, he never takes 
care, just doesn't bother about the result, which results in Brenda's craziness about 
pregnancy by him and they have to consult Aunt Ada for abortion. For Aunt Ada, 
"That's a daft thing to do" and Arthur is a "brainless loon" and "ought to have more 
bloody sense." Even then he is worried for only a short period. Arthur's attitude 
toward Brenda suggests that he somewhat sees woman as objects, to be possessed, 
enjoyed and then cast aside for a better choice. He is a "fast worker" in his relation 
with Doreen, inviting her to a date in the cinema after knowing her for just a few 
minutes. He seeks to enjoy life every minute and doesn't want to settle down: "You 
see people settle down and before they know where they are they've kicked the 
bucket." Both Brenda and his cousin Bert feel that Arthur needs to "better come down 
to earth" or "keep [his] feet on the ground." But Arthur's hedonism is finally 
constrained. He is punished with Brenda's pregnancy and the beating by the soldiers 
and contained by the marriage to Doreen. 
Thirdly, Arthur is rebellious. His philosophy is best summed up in the phrase 
"Don't let the bastards grind you down!" and he warns "I'd like to see anybody grind 
me down." He exercises rebellious individualism in rejecting tight social moral codes 
in his macho search for pleasure. As he explores his inner heart, "I'm not barmy, I'm 
a fighting pit prop that wants a pint of beer, that's me. But if any knowing bastard 
says that's me I'll tell them I'm a dynamite dealer waiting to blow the factory to 
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Kingdom Come. I'm me and nobody else. Whatever people say I am, that's what I'm 
not because they don't know a bloody thing about me! God knows what T am." This 
rugged individualism leads Arthur to have contempt for his newly-found affluence, 
which is mostly spent on alcohol, women, and fishing. 
On the whole he rebels blindly against social restrictions and conventions 
instead of having any clear political aims. He fights to seek freedom from or 
independence of society, employer, and marriage. For him, laws are things "to be 
broken by blokes like us." So we see Arthur in the film fighting in all directions. He 
voted for Communist Party in the last election using father's ballot ticket as he was 
not old enough. He is against the tedium and conventions of life and work, for which 
he keeps alienated from his working-class neighborhood community, and is different 
from his fellow workers, whom he thinks have "got ground down." He hates the 
foreman in the factory, and plays an annoying trick on a female worker by placing a 
mouse on the work desk and enjoys the subsequent screaming, for which he is called 
"a bit of a Red" by the foreman for his trouble-making tendency. To revenge on the 
"nosy parker" Mrs Bull for spreading news about his affair with married woman and 
for her lack of sympathy for the unfortunate, he shoots her from his home window 
with an air gun, hitting her backside. He is stubborn even after being seriously beaten 
by the soldiers: "They'd busted me ... Still, I'd had my bit of fun. It ain't the first time 
I've been in a losing fight. It won't be the last, either. . .I' d have flattened them if it 
had been one at a time." When his relationship with Doreen is found out by Brenda, 
who accuses him of not knowing "the difference between right and wrong" and will 
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never know, he retorts that "Maybe I won't, but I don't want anybody to teach me, 
either." And when scolded by Jack for causing too much trouble between him and his 
wife, he reaffirms that "You don't have to tell me what's right and what's not." To 
sum up, Arthur is an energetic fighter, taking great pride in still having got some fight 
left in him, not like most people. When Bert challenges him "where does all this 
fighting get you?" he simply retorts, "ever seen what not fighting's got you?" In 
Jack's view, Arthur is "too much of a troublemaker" and "should take things as they 
come and enjoy life." His aggressive attitude alienates him from people around him. 
In the film, we see different sectors of the working class in confrontation 
largely due to different attitudes toward affluence and consumerism. 
Arthur in the film is set as alienated from the rest of the working class. Firstly, 
the parents' generation has been beaten down into total acceptance of consumerism. 
When Bert asks him: "What do you have got to be so angry?" Arthur then talks about 
his own parents. They have got TV, but are "both dead from the neck up" and unable 
to think. Society pushes them like "a lot of sheep." He scorns his parents' gratitude for 
a few, small material advances and believes that he's got "a lot more life" in him than 
his mum and dad, the older generation who got "ground down" before the war and 
never recovered. Arthur's contempt and anger for his father's indulgence in TV 
program is clearly shown in an early scene of the film in which Arthur comes home 
and find his father in front of the TV set, not wishing to participate in a conversation 
with him. The father even fails to respond to Arthur's bitter joke about a man who lost 
the eye sight of one eye through "watching telly day after day." The scene has a series 
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of close-up shots revealing Arthur's scornful eye sight when he tells the joke. Under 
such situation, Arthur stops only long enough to have his tea and change his clothes. 
Secondly, the elder workmate, Jack, is ground down and "wants to get on." Arthur 
warns that the firm's tea might lead to stomach trouble, but Jack wouldn't mind 
drinking it, as "if it's good enough for the others it's good enough for me." Jack 
chooses to work on nights in order to earn more to afford a television, while Arthur 
feels night shift is "a dog's life." Although Arthur finally admits that Jack is "not a 
bad bloke really," he is still "a bit of a dope," who is steady but dull, unable to satisfy 
his wife sexually and emotionally. For Arthur, Jack will "squeal like a stuck pig" until 
he "get[s] bashed in the face." Thirdly, women as represented by Doreen and her 
mother are materialistic and snobbish. Arthur and Bert are coldly greeted in Doreen's 
house, which is a new one on the edge of the city, by Doreen's more better-off mother, 
who thinks of Arthur as too rough for her daughter. In frustration and anger, Arthur 
invites Doreen to visit his family: "You can always drop into our house, you'll be 
welcome there" as happens subsequently. At the end of the film, this contrast is 
reemphasized by Doreen's aspiration to save money and buy a new house "with a 
bathroom and everything" while Arthur wouldn't mind living in old houses. 
Compared with the above attitudes, Arthur's casual attitude toward spending money 
can be seen as sort of non-materialistic. Arthur's contempt for his workmates and his 
father is all clearly shown in close-up of facial expressions at the beginning of the 
film in the workshop scene and later the home scene. 
About working-class consciousness, unlike Look Back in Anger, class 
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difference and class hatred is not the main theme of this film. Arthur embraces no 
political beliefs or ideology and is shown simply as alienated from people around him. 
The class anger is blindly targeted toward society as a whole and toward other 
members of the working class. Only at one place does Arthur deliver his political 
protest vaguely: "They rob you right, left and center. After they've skinned you dry, 
you get called up to the army and get shot to death." In contrast, Bert can take this 
peacefully as "That's how things are" and one can only hope that some day something 
good will tum up. Lay holds that in terms of class consciousness, the film offers 
"neither solutions nor enlightenment" as its focus on a rugged individual Angry 
Young Man figure, Arthur, "excludes the possibilities of unified class action" (Lay, 
2002, p. 73). Andrew Higson notes that Arthur's anger works to obscure class 
tensions, displacing them onto generational differences (Lay, 2002, p. 73). Much of 
Arthur's attack and disrespect is directed towards his parents' generation and older 
co-workers. Though lacking distinct expressions of class consciousness, the film 
displays convincingly that there is little real possibility of escape for the working class. 
Being born into the working class is "a life sentence," even if the sentence is served 
out "in fine suits and at pubs and discos" (Marwick, 1990, p. 299). 
Upward mobility is beyond expectation and working-class boys can only marry 
working-class girls. For a bright and good-looking lad as Arthur, he sees no 
meaningful future. So throughout, Arthur is an angry man, angry with society, work, 
neighbor, parents, mates, and even himself. On the whole, he doesn't find it easy to 
live with himself. Elements of working-class community solidarity and friendship are 
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also revealed in certain scenes, e.g. Arthur's father helps the son to cheat the police, 
and Arthur and Bert (the coal miner, a safe person) often kill time together, going 
fishing, drinking in pubs and walking through the city at night. The film doesn't 
glamorize working class. When Aunt Ada talks about the difficulty in bringing up 
children before the war when "it was rotten days," Arthur is confident that "It won't 
happen again." 
The ending of the film is very thought-provoking and has attracted a good deal 
of critical comment. In spite of his voice-over's insistence that he won't be ground 
down by the bosses or women, Arthur seems trapped to give in to the system. His 
affair with Brenda is messily concluded and his working class marriage with Doreen 
is quickly settled. The final scene sets on a hillside behind a new housing estate on the 
outskirts of Nottingham. Arthur stands on the hill with Doreen looking down towards 
the new houses being built. In frustration, he throws a stone at the building site, while 
Doreen mildly chi Ides him "You shouldn't throw things like that," and reminds him 
that one of them might well be their future home. Arthur responds "It won't be the 
last one I throw." This final act of Arthur indicates "an unresolved ending" which has 
been variously interpreted as "deliberate ambiguity, unintended confusion and the 
product of a conflict of view between author and director" (Laing, 1968, p. 120). Lay 
summarizes that this can be read in a number of ways: "as a sign of Arthur's 
continuing struggle against settling down and mediocrity (Sillitoe's preferred 
interpretation), as a sign of his frustration at the futility of his struggle against work 
and domesticity (Reisz's view), or as the act of a boy resisting manhood who needs to 
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be told off for throwing stones by his mother/fiancee" (Murphy's view) (Lay, 2002, p. 
71). For McFarlane, the remark "epitomizes the note of real resilience Karel Reisz has 
found in Arthur's proletarian assertiveness" (1986, p. 138). Has Arthur been tamed? 
Lay is sure that he has for that's the way of life. Conformity is certain, but it may not 
be "passive acceptance of his fate" (Lay, 2002, p. 73). It is true that near the end of the 
story, Arthur is already a bit tired of fighting as he tells Doreen after being beaten by 
the soldiers: "You're a nice girl Dorren, I like you a lot. I reckon you oughta stay with 
me for good so's that I don't get knocked down by any more horses. Trouble with me 
is I'm always bumping into things, it's not much of a paying game." For me, the 
hurling of a defiant stone epitomizes his frustration and puzzlement of his temporary 
lost battle in keeping his difference. Yet although he is pressed by the system to accept 
certain things which he has derided, Arthur's rebellious spirit will continue to function 
and he will continue his independent lifestyle as that is his nature. 
To sum up, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning provided uninhibited display 
of masculine energy and sexuality. Arthur Seaton is individualistic, anti-authoritarian, 
hedonistic, sexually active and misogynistic. He is aggressive, crudely courageous 
and heroic in the face of a suppressive system, remaining defiant of social restrictions. 
He represents the group of working class emphatically refuting the assumption that 
affluence had led to social conformity and embourgeoisement. The social significance 
of such a hero is that he is widely acknowledged as a typical representative of the 
ordinary hardworking young workers of the time, confident, dignified, and full of 
bravado. As Stead comments, "We accept him as a genuine worker" and "can 
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appreciate fully why he was so much better than the rest of his mates and why 
inevitably he must move away from them" (1989, p. 194). 
Working-class Identity in New Wave Films: Theme Analysis 
With full employment, general affluence and embourgeoisement of the 1950s 
and 1960s, hardship, misery, poverty were no longer dominant themes of working 
class films, though still existing. Upward mobility, masculine pride and sexuality, and 
youthful rebellion came in their place. The New Wave films centered almost 
exclusively on the pride and discontents of the young urban working-class male in the 
Northern industrial towns of England, tackling the lifestyle and aspirations in a fresh 
un patronizing way. The protagonists seek freedom and rebel against restriction and 
repression imposed by the combination of the class system, traditional Victorian 
morality and social convention. 
Affluence, upward mobility and working-class dignity. 
In New Wave films, the protagonists are generally benefiting from the affluence 
of the time. They all have a job or can easily have one but choose not to take. Arthur 
Seaton in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning earns a decent income, buys loads of 
decent suits and spends much on drinks. Colin Smith in The Loneliness of the Long 
Distance Runner refuses the job offered to him by his father's firm so as not to be 
exploited by capitalists. The coalminer Frank in This Sporting Life wins simultaneous 
temporary prosperity once signed with a professional rugby team. The exaggeratedly 
fast speed and the dazzling white color of the new large car he buys mark it as a 
deliberate statement of personal success. 
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Upward social mobility is explicitly shown and for good reasons. Both Joe in 
Room at the Top and Vic Brown (Alan Bates) in This Kind of Loving have climbed out 
of rough working class background and now hold decent white collar jobs. Frank in 
This Sporting Life has won fame and money through his athletic talent and 
aggressiveness. Because working class formed the majority of the cinema-goers, 
filmmakers tried to appeal them with daydream and wish fulfillment which are more 
easily satisfied by "identification upwards." As Paul Swann observes, "Films were 
regarded, in the words of Leavis and Thompson, as 'substitute living,' a seductive 
form of shallow but unsatisfying escape which they felt had come to dominate 
industrial culture ... " (as cited in Gillett, 2003, p. 188). However, this wish fulfillment 
is weakened by the fact that though Joe's change for a better job as a clerk contributes 
to his climbing up the social ladder, a central facilitator for his mobility is the 
seduction of and marriage to Susan from a higher social class. In films where the hero 
remains within his class (e.g. Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, A Kind of Loving), 
we see a difference between the "rough" and "respectable" working class with the 
man marrying the woman who represents "a social refinement or 'classiness' desired 
by the male hero" (Hill, 1983, p. 305). It is also a common feature for New Wave 
films to make the desire for escape to prove "impossible" (e.g. Colin), or to be 
demanded at "too high a cost" (e.g. Joe passively marries Susan and Frank loses his 
lover, who dies). As a result, the protagonists have to "accommodate themselves to 
compromise and an eschewal of fantasy" (Hill, 1999, p. 179) despite his yearnings to 
transcend the confinement of their class position. Besides, escape as collective class 
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action is impossible, only as individual is feasible. While escape from class is hardly 
an option, temporary outing to a nearby rural or coastal resort briefly as an escape 
away from the urban drudgery and restraints to relax and enjoy sex is a routine 
happening (for detail, see Higson, 1984, pp. 12-16). 
Representing the rising postwar new working class, the New Wave protagonists 
are confident about the social change for betterment and proud or dignified about their 
class background despite the frustrations they experience. Joe in Room at the Top 
claims "1 am working class ... and proud of it!" Jimmy Porter in Look Back in Anger is 
a university graduate but chooses to run a market stall to show solidarity with the 
working class. 
Youthful energy, sexuality and masculine pride. 
The New Wave films are overwhelmingly preoccupied with working class 
males, obviously providing an "uninhibited display of masculine energy" (Stead, 1989, 
p. 190) and sexuality, represented perhaps most prominently in Arthur Seaton's 
forceful, muscular physique in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. Arthur is strong, 
confident, arrogant and rebellious. Joe is actively manipulating his life rather than 
living passively. Colin is talented in running, stubborn and rebellious. Frank is 
extraordinarily aggressive in order to distinguish himself in a violent sport and spend 
much money to impress others. They can earn good money, have good time once 
work ends, engage in irresponsible sex, or cheat system in some respects. Nothing 
seems to worry them much. 
The New Wave film IS noted for its honest treatment of adult sexuality or 
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"sexual frankness" (Richards, 1992, p. 226) with the willingness to acknowledge and 
depict sexuality in a brave way never tried before, for which Hill named his book Sex, 
Class and Realism. Lovell sees New Wave realism as defined in terms of "its 
working-class subject, and a more open treatment of sexuality, as well as its aesthetic 
form" (1990, p. 367). Room at the Top and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning all 
tell people that sex can be enjoyed for its own sake. Important here, Hill draws our 
attention that the image of active sexuality which provided "a resistance to refinement 
and repression" is primarily a masculine sexuality, suggesting "the triumph of male 
'virility'" and "the reaffirmation of sexual hierarchy" (1986, p. 163). In a sense, the 
lower social status of working-class or "rough" working-class heroes is compensated 
by their strength of masculine sexuality for enjoying a "good time." Female sexuality 
is treated as more complicated-bold, passive and conservative. Some heroines 
answer the sexual desire of the heroes with "an equal and equally raunchy desire" 
(Lovell, 1990, p. 370) and enjoyment of their own (e.g. Brenda and Alice). Audrey in 
The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner responds shyly. More others draw the 
hero into marriage and conformity after sexual relationship and especially pregnancy 
(e.g. Doreen and Ingrid), thus repressing the more radical emancipatory sexual 
impulses of the hero. However, despite their reputation at the time for sexual content, 
the films' handling of sexuality is only relatively progressive, termed by Hill as a 
"pseudo-liberation"-"ostensibly liberating but actually repressive" as the films tend 
to favor conservative resolutions which reproduce an ideology of marital and 
procreative sexuality (1983, pp. 309-310). Extra-marital sex very probably leads to 
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pregnancy and pregnancy always leads to marriage and conformity as in Room at the 
Top and A Kind of Loving. 
Youthful anger and rebelliousness. 
The New Wave films reveal the protagonists' "frustrated or compromised 
search for freedom from interfering authorities ... , for material success, for a better 
life" (Leese, 2006. p. 98). A principal mood was one of discontent and anger. Most 
protagonists are Angry Young Men and rebellious. Their anger is political as well as 
cultural. 
Politically, the anger is directed towards authority or establishments, generated 
by a sense of loss of politics and continuing social injustice. In Look Back in Anger, 
Jimmy Porter complains about the absence of "good, brave cause," as "when we shop 
around for an outlet, we find there is nothing on stock, no Spain, no Fascism, no mass 
unemployment." Being leftist in politics and strongly tied to his working class 
background, he greatly resents the ruling class for the unfairness and poverty they 
produce, and resents the society for not having changed enough for the better as 
promised. He is more representative of the scholarship boys who were disappointed 
with the society in which deep-rooted class barrier prevented the true meritocracy 
from becoming fully actualized. And he is frustrated about finding the right way to 
fight. All he can do is just to stay with his class and refuse to seek acceptance by the 
middle class though university-educated. 
In Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, the film opens with Arthur toiling at 
his lathe in a busy, noisy factory expressing in voice-over his rebellious attitude to 
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work and the world at large: "No use working every minute God sends, that's my 
motto. Don't let the bastards grind you down. That's one thing I've learned .. .I'd like 
to see anybody try to grind me down. That'd be the day. What T want is a good time. 
All the rest is propaganda." He revolts individually against all authorities through 
breaking the rules of election, despising his work mates who defer to the management 
and is sensitive to capitalist exploitation. Yet there is little for him to do to change the 
reality. 
Colin in The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner exerts more profound 
anger and rebels more intensely against the system. Identifying with his father who is 
an active strike leader, he is conscious of working-class suffering and capitalist 
exploitation which is seen as the cause of his father's early death after years of toil in 
a local factory, as he says: "I'm beginning to see that it should be altered." Hence, his 
attitude toward job is that there would be no point in getting a job simply to increase 
the bosses' profits. He tells his girl friend, "It's not that I don't like work, it's that I 
don't like the idea of slaving my good self so the bosses can get all the profit. It seems 
all wrong to me. Myoid man used to say that the workers should get the 
profits .... Thing is, I don't know where to start, though." So Colin rebels by declining 
the job opportunity offered to him by his father's factory after the father's death. The 
politician's TV speech about people now "all enjoying greater luxury than ever 
before" is met with derisive snorts and sarcasm from Colin and his mate as it is a 
manifestation of everything their lives are not. Finally, when the borstal authority 
places high hope on Colin for winning a five-mile long distance race for the borstal 
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against a local public school, Colin tricks the governor into believing that he is willing 
to comply, but in the end rebels by deliberately losing a certain victory in the race to 
show his contempt for the authority, even though he knows he is giving up an 
opportunity to improve his circumstances. 
However, the revolt of New Wave protagonists is somewhat blind and aimless. 
Colin Smith wants to line up the Establishment and shoot them; Arthur Seaton 
denounces capitalists, foreman and the system. But what the New Wave heroes want 
in its place is really vague, as Jimmy Porter says "Everything ... nothing." 
Anger and revolt stimulated from cultural aspects is more emphasized in New 
Wave films, involving the concern over working-class corruption by the new mass 
culture of consumption and materialism and the resulting spiritual "dry-out," which I 
have analyzed in great detail in the previous 2 case studies. In The Loneliness of the 
Long Distance Runner, like Arthur, Colin is hostile to consumerism as well. He 
watches with disdain as his mother spends the five hundred pounds of insurance 
money (the company compensation money for the father's death) on clothes, a 
television set and new furniture. 
The anxiety about the decline of traditional working class. 
Richards holds that respect for the traditional pattern and texture of 
working-class life as it was lived - "the seaside holiday, the pub, the football match, 
the dance, the family party" is the positive side as well as integral part of the New 
W ave films (Richards, 1992, p. 226) and part of the Hoggartian nostalgia for a warm 
old working-class culture of communality. But it was a world that was vanishing even 
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as it was being filmed. With television, private cars, and enthusiasm for all kinds of 
leisure activities, society was becoming steadily more privatized, eclipsing and 
fragmenting the working class communal traditions. 
The post-war explosion of material and cultural goods, while representing 
social progress (affluence), led to the erosion of traditional values and therefore 
aroused concern about the decline or demise of the traditional working class 
associated with work, community and an attachment to place and anxiety about the 
growing "corruption" of the working class by consumerism, mass culture and 
suburbanization. While the political right were concerned with the perceived social 
and sexual amorality of the working class (especially youth), the political left were 
more worried about what they perceived to be a threat to traditional working class 
culture. 
In New Wave films, traditional working class morality, community and 
masculinity are all threatened by the mass consumption culture, only to be respected 
in a sense of nostalgia. For example, the older workers in Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning recall the "good old days;" Colin's father, a socialist union fighter, is facing 
death in The Loneliness o/the Long Distance Runner. In Look Back in Anger, Jimmy 
Porter denounces the Americanization of culture and celebrates the dying indigenous 
art of the music hall. In A Kind 0/ Loving, the traditional working-class culture of the 
brass band is contrasted with and seen lost to the new, superficial mass culture 
represented by television. Vic's wish to attend the brass band concert (at which his 
father is playing) is rejected by his wife Ingrid and her mother for being "a bit 
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old-fashioned." Hill sees the sequence of shots from the concert to the three of them 
all at home watching TV quiz as crucial in the film's construction of gender positions, 
with older working-class world (the brass band) male dominated and the new world of 
affluence (TV) associated with women (1983, p. 308). John Kirk described the whole 
concern as the New Wave films' "affiuence-as-culture-deficit paradigm" (2003, p. 69). 
Only in Room at the Top, the traditional working class is not seen to be eclipsed by 
consumerism. It is Joe's uncle and aunt who challenge his desire for "brass" as the 
aunt states: "I asked you about the girl and all you tell me is about her father and his 
brass. Joe you wouldn't sell yourself for a handful of silver." 
In all these films, as I have explored in great detail in the three case studies, the 
male protagonists are all against consumption; consumerism is always associated with 
women, who are perceived as threats to masculinity in pressing their conformity. The 
films reveal a degree of sympathy towards the virile, working-class male who seeks to 
resist the pressures towards mass consumerism and social conformity. 
The demise of traditional working class is also displayed through "the absence 
or weakness of fathers" (Hill, 1983, p. 305) or a "decline in the status of the father" 
(Hill, 1986, p. 162). The New Wave films is marked by a lack of masculine head of 
household pointed out by John Hill. For example, Joe Lampton's parents are dead in 
Room at the Top; Colin Smith sees his father dying in The Loneliness of the Long 
Distance Runner; Doreen in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning and Ingrid in A 
Kind of Loving have no father. Arthur's father, the representative of the traditional 
working class male, has been "lulled into a television-induced coma" (Lay, 2002, p. 
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72). He is not seen at work, but only at home, sitting in front of the TV set. 
The de-politicization of the working class and the shift from the public to 
the personal. 
The traditional working class as an occupational community separated 
themselves by production activity through which they grew their "proletarian 
consciousness" and established their cultural identity. This is obvious in films of the 
1930s and 1940s. But the New Wave films shifted the emphasis from work and 
production to leisure and consumption in order to better define the new affluent 
working class. The individualism of the New Wave films was also in sharp contrast 
with the communality of the Documentary and war films. As Hill comments, in the 
face of affluence and mass culture, the focus on cultural aspects tended to preclude 
work and the "focus on the discontented male hero involved a downplaying of 
collective conditions and actions" (2000b, p. 251). 
This tendency demonstrated the depoliticization of the working class, with 
work, industrial conflicts and collective action all missing in the representation. New 
Wave films seldom showed their characters at work, although it is work and the 
workplace which define the working class as a class. Instead, the focus was on the 
characters' personal lives, enjoyed during leisure. Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning prioritizes Arthur's consumption on fancy suits, drinking and womanizing 
rather than production, with only 4 short workshop scenes of Arthur working at the 
lathe in factory. Work is almost invisible in Room at the Top. Capitalist exploitation is 
only slightly touched upon in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning through Arthur's 
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determination not to work "every minutes God sends" as the capitalists would "only 
slash my wages so they can get stuffed!" and in The Loneliness a/the Long Distance 
Runner through Colin's attitude toward work--"I don't like the idea of slaving me 
good self so the bosses can get all the profit." The prospect of workers' strike looks 
dim as Colin's father, a hard-line trade unionist and strike-leader, is dead, and Arthur 
simply does not favor such a solution so as we know from his talk in the traditional 
working man's club. I'm All Right Jack, a right-wing film not taken as core New 
Wave representative, even makes vicious political satire on a card-playing 
"pig-headed, work-shy working class" (Marwick, 1990, p. 294) regularly taken out on 
strike by their union, and mocks the communist trade union shop steward Kite. 
Working-class collective fighting spirit is made fun of when Colin shouts "Share and 
share alike" and "All for one and one for all, united we stand, divided we fall" to ask 
Mike to divide the money they steal from a gambling machine. 
The revolts of protagonists are on the whole blind in essence with no clear 
political or social ideology. The conflicts represented in Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning are not between the trade union and the factory owners (the "haves" and the 
"have nots") but between old and new generations of working class. And the film 
does not provide sufficient account of why the elder generation, who have been 
"ground down," "have been so reduced (e.g. predatory capitalism, alienating labor)" 
(Hill, 1986, p. 139). In this way, class inequalities and industrial conflicts were placed 
down. Class was presented as "primarily an individual, rather than collective, 
experience, a moral, rather than socially and economically structured, condition" (Hill, 
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1986, p. 57). 
The working class was figured in terms of the politics of the personal. Higson 
notes that the documentary's "distanced public gaze at 'universalized' social process 
and people" was soon replaced by "the individuated private looks of the fictional 
protagonists" of the New Wave (1986, p. 83). The narratives were organized around 
the exploration of the individual desires and fate of a single central protagonist, and 
no longer required a mUltiplicity of plot lines. 
By centering on male individual protagonist's own experience and struggles, 
"[s]ocial issues are reduced to the micro level of character, rather than explored at the 
macro level of the social" (Lay, 2002, p. 65). Thus, in The Loneliness of the Long 
Distance Runner, it is the unfavorable environment in which Colin lives (e.g. the 
absent father, disinterested mother) and Colin's own stubborn character that are 
explored to explain his downfall, not social stratification and its subsequent social 
inequalities (Lay, 2002, p. 65). This tendency encourages the spectator to see people 
as individual beings rather than as members of distinct class. As Alan Sillitoe, who 
wrote the screenplay Saturday Night and Sunday Morning based on his own novel, 
suggested: "Those who see Arthur Seaton as a symbol of the working man and not an 
individual are mistaken. I wrote about him as a person, and not as a typical man who 
works a lathe. I try to see every person as an individual and not as a class symbol, 
which is the only condition in which I can write as a worker" (Daily Worker, 28 Jan., 
1961). Such an approach promotes only individual consciousness and solutions at a 
film's end, with the central character either escaping out of society or adapting and 
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adjusting to its demands, rather than collective consciousness and actions leading to 
social and political change. As John Hill points out, this emphasis of individual 
fulfillment rather than social change tends to make the films more conservative than 
radical (1986, p. 174). 
Marginalization of women and misogynist tendency. 
Women in New Wave films are put in subordinate and marginal position. With 
A Taste of Honey (Tony Richardson, 1961) being the only exceptional female-centered 
film, the protagonists are always young men. But narratives largely develop in terms 
of their relations with the other sex. 
Hill holds that New Wave films produce a representation of women and female 
sexuality which "works against and ultimately undercuts their claims to be 
'progressive'" (1983, p. 304). He condemns the New Wave for its misogynist attitude 
towards women: "misogyny is not only 'simmering under the surface', but is 
embedded in the very structures of the films themselves" (1983, 304). He criticizes 
the British New Wave for being too often "content to abandon their female characters 
to the confinement of familiar domestic and marital roles and even inflict a 
'punishment' on those to stray beyond" (1986, p. 174). He even goes a bit to extreme 
in claiming that the real subject of Look Back in Anger "was neither social injustice 
nor hypocrisy but the debasement and degradation of women" (1986, p. 25). While 
acknowledging Hill's certain stance, Murphy argues that this last statement of Hill is 
too "bold" a judgment, which "ignores the historical context" (1992, p. 29), and in 
general, what Hill misses, is the fact that the women portrayed in New Wave films 
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have "a seriousness, an emotional weight, altogether lacking in the pathetically trivial 
roles women had to play in most 1950s British films" (1992, p. 33). 
On the whole, women's screen image has been pretty negative. The status and 
progress of working-class male protagonists in narrative is dependent upon using 
and/or abusing women. Women often function as elusive objects of male sexual desire 
(e.g. Brenda, Alice, Ingrid), targets for the vitriolic attacks (e.g. Alison), or a threat to 
authentic working-class masculinity-"through their obsession with marriage, 
motherhood and 'settling down '-or else as agents of consumption" (Lay, 2002, p. 16) 
(e.g. Susan, Doreen, Ingrid). So we assume Joe Lampton will "forfei[t] his potential 
for manhood" and "knuckle under" after marrying the magnate's daughter (McFarlane, 
1986, p. 138). Consumerism is mostly associated with women, who are partially to 
blame for the demise of traditional working class culture. Colin's mother is depicted 
as a senseless consumerist and immoral woman of perpetual infidelity. Narratives are 
centered on the "devaluation and punishment" of women (Hill, 1983, p. 305). Female 
independence is curtailed by pregnancy. The adulterous Alice and Brenda are rejected, 
while the heroes enter into marriage. Brenda becomes pregnant by Arthur, suffers the 
anxiety, has an unsuccessful back-street abortion (required by the film censor) and is 
"punished" by having to return to a loveless marriage. So, women in the New Wave 
films suffer long-lastingly. 
In addition, as Terry Lovell notes, there are clear gender divisions in the way 
place, space and setting are used in the films (1990, p. 374). Women are strongly 
associated with domestic space while men command public space and actively resist 
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confinement to the domestic sphere, reinforcing the patriarchal system. But we can 
also see more women at work due to full employment. In A Kind of Loving, the 
contradiction between Vic and Ingrid's mother is solved through the young couple 
moving out of the mother's house to less comfortable conditions. Hill reads this as a 
reassertion of the "normality and naturalness of the patriarchal family" (1983, p. 309) 
and Laing sees it as symbolizing the victory of the husband's rights over the mother's 
and a rejection of the shallowness of the new affluence (1968, p. 132). 
However, some positive depiction can also be found. Brenda is positively seen 
as having the courage to shoulder the awkwardness and difficulty of pregnancy: "I've 
decided to have it and face whatever comes of it." The key figures in persuading Vic 
to compromise with Ingrid through mutual understanding and tolerance again are his 
sister and mother. And we don't see much misogyny in The Loneliness of the Long 
Distance Runner. As Claydon observes, "Colin and Mike do not use Audrey and 
Gladys in the same way Arthur and Jimmy clearly use the women in their lives" 
(2005, p. 137). Audrey is almost a minder to Colin, depicted with seriousness and 
warmth. She appears as an attentive listener to whom Colin is willing to tell about his 
thoughts, frustrations and hopes. She seems to be able to share Colin's concerns 
though she is less rebellious and unsure how to act upon her own discontent. Colin's 
seriousness and authenticity are further consolidated by Audrey's "But why?" 
questions. Audrey seems to represent "that basic level of human fulfillment denied to 
Colin by his environment" (Laing, 1968, p. 129). 
In this chapter, I have explored and analyzed British working class identity in 
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the New Wave films, especially represented by Room at the Top and Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning. The young working-class protagonists display vigorously 
working-class confidence, masculine pride, youthful rebelliousness, and high 
individualism in consciousness and behavior, an identity which continues the 
documentary and war film respect for the dignity of labor and masculinity and 
challenges the older, wartime idealization of consensus and community. In the 
following chapter, I am going to look at British working-class identity in the serious 
social criticism films of Mike Leigh, Stephen Frears and Ken Loach. 
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CHAPTER V 
WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY IN FILMS OF LOACH, LEIGH AND FREARS 
British working class in the 1980s and 1990s underwent severe fragmentation. 
A few top skilled became new Tories and the vast majority were in general decline, 
with the collapse of traditional heavy industries and larger division of the rich and the 
poor. The harsh reality facilitated a return to social realism in artistic expressions. 
Working-class films of the decades can be easily defined by its 
anti-Thatcherism, with the focus on the exploration of the damage brought by 
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, severe cuts in welfare benefits 
and services typical of the Thatcher years (1979-90), leading to the statement that 
"some of the most potent political opposition to the Thatcher government, therefore, 
appeared in the movie theatres rather than in the House of Commons" (Friedman, 
1993, p. xix). 
This chapter only discusses works of three independent filmmakers--Mike 
Leigh, Ken Loach, and Stephen Frears, whose works resist the temptation of 
commercialization and offer serious social criticism, showing life as a difficult 
struggle in a society dominated by social injustice, greed and racism. In the words of 
Peter Wollen, "independent filmmakers of the eighties reacted strongly against the 
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effects of Thatcherism" (1993, p. 35). They work within the orbit of leftist critical 
theory. Leigh and Loach identify themselves as a socialist and have managed to 
remain within the realist tradition for four decades (1970s-2000s). Their works have 
been well received in Europe. "Leigh is funny; Loach is angry; but neither offers us 
any illusions," as Mount comments (2004, p. 98). Leigh is interested in family life 
whereas Loach is more concerned about social and political issues articulated through 
characters. 
The 1980s witnessed the polarizations along lines of gender, ethnicity, and 
sexual orientation, apart from class. More working-class women, gays, blacks, and 
Asians began to occupy central focus in films. Britain in the 1990s witnessed the 
development of an embittered, visible "underclass," which for Claire Monk, denotes a 
subordinate social class, "a post-working class" in a post-industrial context that "owes 
its existence to the economic and social damage wrought by globalization, local 
industrial decline, the restructuring of the labor market and other legacies of the 
Thatcher era" (2000b, p. 274). So, the 1990s sowed a renewed interest in portraying 
working-class life, with a group of films about underclass aiming at minority or 
mainstream audiences. Similar to the New Wave but different from the 80s, the 1990s 
films were more characteristically "men's films" with an obsessive focus on white, 
non-working masculinity, projecting images of alienation and masculine anxiety. The 
issue of unemployment and its effects is, however, treated very differently from film 
to film. 
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Three films are chosen for analysis in this chapter: High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 
1988) is chosen for its anti-Thatcherism, My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 
1985) for race and class, and Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) for its concern on 
underclass youth. The films represented a cultural model of film-making targeting 
minority audience and were generally exhibited in an art-house context. The 1990s 
commercial comedies of working class representation will be dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
Thatcherism and the Working Class 
The 1980s were very much the Thatcher years. With her radical reform to solve 
the problems of 1970s, such as low growth rate, high inflation, deterioration in 
industrial relations, Mrs Thatcher completely broke with the post-WWII social 
democratic consensus. Thatcher's administration was characterized by laissez-faire 
economic strategy plus repressive, backward-looking social policies. Peter Wollen 
sums up Thatcherism as comprised of three distinct elements: an economic 
neo-liberalism with minimum state intervention, a political neo-conservative 
authoritarianism, and a social "two nations" project dividing the nation between the 
poorer, industrial North, and the affluent, metropolitan South (1993, p. 35). 
Thatcherism was marked by tight control of monetary supply, privatization of 
nationalized public corporations (e.g. telephone, gas, electricity, water, rail transport), 
reduction of taxation, the curbing of trades unions through legislative restrictions and 
mass unemployment at record high (4 million at its peak by 1984). For many, this 
mass unemployment was "the deliberate creation" of the Conservative government to 
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break working class solidarity. 
In the Thatcher era, economic growth was smooth and faster. Hugo Young notes 
that economy in 1988 was "still growing at 4 percent after seven years' continuous 
expansion" (as cited in Quart, 1993, p. 21), although the trend stopped in the 1990-91 
economic recession. Inflation was curbed, from 18 per cent in 1980 to 3.4 per cent in 
1986, though it rose again afterwards to 10.9 per cent in her year of departure (Hill, 
1999, p. 5). Business enterprises were pressed to seek efficiency in more fierce 
competitions. Favorable environments were cultivated and attracted more foreign 
investment. Yet the results were very much mixed, the growth in productivity was at 
the expense of dramatic rise in unemployment, a decline in British manufacturing and 
hence bigger division of the rich and the pOof. More significantly, there was evidence 
that unemployment was "being inherited." 
The Conservative tax reform also led to the widening gap between the rich and 
the poor. Cuts in direct taxation contributed greatly to their repeated electoral 
successes. "The basic rate of income tax was dropped, in stages, from 33 per cent to 
25 per cent and the top rates from 83 per cent to 40 per cent" (Hill, 1999, p. 6). Yet 
this was accompanied by increases in indirect taxation (e.g. national insurance, VAT, 
poll tax). So the rich benefited more, contributing to greater inequality. 
Politically, the Conservative government took the unionism as its major enemy 
and spared no effort in reducing its power. After the greatest confrontation with the 
unions - the 1984-85 National Miners Strike, in which the union eventually had to 
concede to the well-prepared government, the working class was fatally 
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de-politicized. 
Ideologically, In promoting consumption, competitive individualism and 
traditional family values, Thatcherism initiated a moral and legal crusade to punish 
the "workshy" and to "outlaw" those lifestyles and pursuits which contradicted 
Thatcherite conservatism (homosexuals, single mothers, ravers and demonstrators). 
Aggressive self-interest also thrived as a result. 
In brief, tax reductions, cuts in public spending, privatization of social services 
led to the growth of a visible, embittered underclass-"20 percent of the people living 
under the poverty line." Britain was turned into "a more morally callous, crude, and 
desperate society where a falling quality of life was covered over by a rising standard 
of living" and where "the ethic of social responsibility began to unravel." (Quart, 
1994, p. 241) While the majority of skilled workers voted Conservative, the majority 
of the semi-skilled and unskilled working class continued to support Labor in the 
1983 and 1987 elections (Hill, 1999, p. 14). Support for Thatcher came mainly from 
the south of England. 
Thatcherism has stirred considerable resentment, but during her reign, the 
English Left was both divided and self-destructive. The Labor Party leadership was 
split, the unions were crushed and a large section of the skilled working class was 
bought over into the Tory camp. Liberals and Social Democrats were neutralized. The 
Labor Party, in order to win election after consecutive defeats, was forced to 
transform itself into "a centrist, European-style Social Democratic party" (Quart, 1993, 
p. 21). It became a "catch-all" party appealing to the middle, faced with a diminishing 
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industrial working class. Under the leadership of Tony Blair, it became the New Labor, 
which largely followed Thatcherite neo-liberalism, for which it was criticized as "in 
Conservative clothes." This compromise to the market principles of neo-liberal 
capitalism has been seen to be the most enduring achievement of Thatcherism. 
However, the New Labor and its Third Way politics tried hard to balance between 
efficiency and fairness. The Blair government lowered enterprise tax, especially for 
middle and small enterprises, to boost their development. The "unemployment 
benefit" was changed into 'job-seeker's allowance" to emphasize re-employment 
training and the active seeking for jobs. Blair introduced national minimum wage 
system to protect the basic interests of low-incomers; promoted reforms in social 
welfare and education leading to considerable increase in health service fund and 
education budget. Yet the measures were criticized as half-hearted and lacking 
strength. 
In film, three famous independent directors, Stephen Frears, Mike Leigh, and 
Ken Loach, all responded to Thatcherism with films of angry criticism and savage 
satire of the Thatcherite ideology of self-interest and materialism. 
Mike Leigh and High Hopes (1988) 
Leigh and his films. 
Mike Leigh is a prolific as well as award-honored director. From 1971 to the 
present, he has made nineteen full-length films, eight of which are for television, of 
which High Hopes (1988), Life is Sweet (1990), Naked (1993), Secrets and Lies (1996) 
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and Vera Drake (2004) bring him awards and honor.13 Mike Leigh worked In 
television through the 1970s and later revived his career as a cinema director. 
Leigh was born in 1943 into a middle-class family; his father was a doctor. But 
he grew up in a very working-class area of North Salford, Lancashire. He went to 
local working-class schools and has actually lived in working-class territories 
throughout his entire life. Therefore, as a middle-class kid growing up in a 
working-class environment, Leigh claims himself "an insider and an outsider, all at 
once" with "an awareness of and sensitivity to both those worlds" (as cited in Watson, 
2004, p. 50). 
On thematic concerns, Watson holds that Leigh's work is obviously driven by 
"a pursuit of the real" and "[t]here cannot be many artists who have taken such pains 
to capture 'the texture of real life'" (2004, p. 27). Leigh's pursuit of the real centers on 
ordinary people, or the day-to-day experience of ordinary people. As he explains 
himself: "For most people in the world ... life is hard work; it's tough ... It's about 
coping. Most movies are about extraordinary or charmed lifestyles. For me what's 
exciting is finding ... the extraordinary in the ordinary - what happens to ordinary 
people ... " (as cited in Carney, 2000, p. 14). Leigh's protagonists are all ordinary with 
diverse jobs, e.g. chef and shop assistant in Life is Sweet, motorbike messenger in 
High Hopes, a self-employed photographer, an optometrist and a street cleaner in 
Secrets and Lies, two taxi-drivers, a cashier, a cleaner, a waitress in All or Nothing. 
13 Naked (1993) and Secrets and Ues (1996) are the two films for which he is best-known internationally. At Cannes, Naked won both the Best 
DIrector and (with David Thewlis) the Best Actor awards in 1993 and Secrets and LieS both the Palme d'Or (Best PIcture) and (with Brenda 
Blethyn) the Best Actress awards in 1996 Vera Drake (2004) won the Golden Lion for Best Film at the Venice International Film Festival. 
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To be more specific, Leigh further explains that his films "are actually about 
things like work, surviving, having an aged parent or whether it's a good idea to have 
kids, the problems that everybody cares about" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 18). In 
this list, it is work that leads. Hence, naturally, class is a central focus in Leigh's films. 
The class-related real Leigh explores is often "the traumatic real" of broader scope 
(Watson, 2004, p. 12). As he affirms, "My sympathy for people transcends matters of 
class. I usually show people who are vulnerable, flawed, and imperfect, but ... I have 
made films where class identity is clearly important." (Quart, 2004, p. 37) 
E.P. Thompson did not see class as a "structure," nor even as a "category," but 
as "something which in fact happens ... in human relationships" (1963, p. 9). Leigh 
has distinguished himself in this aspect. Family is a key area of concern for Leigh. 
Focusing on "the domestic enclosures of class realities" (Dave, 2006, p. 162), Leigh's 
films generally deal with the successes and failures of communication and connection 
within families. High Hopes (1988) and Life is Sweet (1990), etc. can all be seen as 
works that celebrate marriage, family and the pursuit of happiness despite all the 
difficulties. What Leigh values in his films are "faith, trust, a positive spirit and 
'getting on with living and working'" (Watson, 2004, p. 104). In Leigh's films "the 
willingness to carryon" is a key virtue (Watson, 2004, p. 87). High Hopes (1988) and 
All or Nothing (2001), glorify working-class mutuality and endurance despite the 
deformations on society, culture and self wrought by neo-liberal governments. All or 
Nothing is about three families with all kinds of problems in making a living and are 
deeply unhappy. Expressions of care are made all the more touching by the ways in 
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which the film has deepened our awareness of essential human vulnerability and 
loneliness. Naked (1993) approaches more heavy social topics: the unemployed, the 
drifting homeless, the drugged, the sharpened social divide left by Thatcher's Britain. 
Politics in Leigh's films are mostly shaded in the background. High Hopes is more 
obviously political than most of Leigh's other films. The couple Cyril and Shirley 
may be politically confused, but are more conscious of what is going on in the world 
than the couple Wendy and Andy in Life is Sweet, who show little political awareness. 
Stylistically, in seeking to reflect the ordinary, Leigh's films are relatively 
"undramatic." They tend to focus on an extended range of characters. The plots are 
leisurely paced and concentrate much more on character and situation than action and 
event. Many of his films contain comic elements, e.g. Life is Sweet, Happy Go Lucky 
(2008). Andy Medhurst sees that the humor of Leigh's films is the only thing that 
keeps them "from being too wounding to bear" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 11). High 
Hopes has a satirical element especially in the portrayal of the upper-middle-class 
characters, which is rare in Leigh's films, as Leigh claims "Satire is not my natural 
tendency" (Watson, 2004, p. ix). His films are shot on location and his shots are often 
static and lengthy, permitting situations or conversations to evolve. Leigh's films are 
all low-budgeted due to tight funding. 
High Hopes (1988). 
The film is set in the King's Cross area of London and centers on the domestic 
life of three very different kinds of couples-Cyril and Shirley (Philip Davis and Ruth 
Sheen), Martin and Valerie Burke (Philip Jackson and Heather Tobias), and Laetitia 
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and Rupert Boothe-Braine (David Bamber and Lesley Manville), plus an old lady, 
Mrs Bender (Edna Dore), who is Cyril and Valerie's mother and Rupert and Laetitia's 
next-door neighbor. In line with Leigh's emphasis upon the domestic, their very dif-
ferent lifestyles are seen to be the most revealing aspect of class distinctions and class 
consciousness, through which the film attempts to "map out the contours of 
'Thatcher's Britain'" (Hill, 1999, p. 193). 
Cyril and Shirley are a sweet working-class couple in London and the most 
decent characters in the film. Cyril works as a motorbike dispatch rider (or messenger) 
and Shirley is seen planting trees (for the local council). They are "gauche, left-wing 
relics of an earlier era" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422). Cyril reads Marx and wants the 
whole world to be perfect. Valerie and Martin are Cyril's hysterical sister and her 
husband. Pretentious and philandering, they represent the ''vulgar nouveau riche" who 
"epitomize the new 'enterprise culture'" (Hill, 1999, p. 193). Martin is a self-made 
man who owns a second-hand car business and a Burger Bar. He despises Cyril's 
stubbornness in sticking to his high "principles" and advises him to form "a little 
company" so that "all the other wallies do the dirty work.,,14 Valerie impresses us 
with her snobbishness and low taste in clothes and house decoration. They are 
familiar Leigh stereotypes: "vulgar, boorish, offensively loud and have more money 
than sense" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422). Laetitia and Rupert are Thatcherite yuppies of 
upper-middle-class. Rupert works "in wine" and Laetitia is a rather "brainless 
socialite" (Hill, 1999, p. 193). They live in a well-decorated and well-furnished town 
14 QuotatIons In thIS chapter WIth no citations are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films. 
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house, spend weekend in the country, and go to the opera (despite Rupert's lack of 
understanding of it). They are also selfish and unkind, treating Mrs Bender coldly and 
condescendingly when she locks herself out of her house. Mrs Bender is the last 
council tenant in a newly gentrified street. Living alone in isolation, she is aging 
quickly and becoming forgetful. In High Hopes, Leigh seems to promote audience's 
emotional close identification with Cyril and Shirley and hostility to Laetitia and 
Rupert. 
The story starts with Cyril and Shirley treating Wayne, a stranger who cannot 
find his way to his sister's home, with great hospitality. It then develops around Cyril 
and Shirley, and Valerie visiting the mother separately, from which we know their 
difference in attitude and manner towards the mother. In the middle of the story, 
Cyril's mum, Mrs Bender, locks herself out and has to ask her neighbor for help. 
While she waits for her son/daughter to arrive with a spare key in the neighbor's 
kitchen, she is treated with reluctant hospitality from Laetitia and Rupert. Their 
impolite remarks towards Cyril, who comes to fetch his mother, almost ignite a 
quarrel. The climax comes when Cyril and Shirley visit Marx's tomb and on coming 
back invite Suzi to stay for the night, during which time they have a heated discussion 
about working class solidarity and struggle. Near the end, Valerie stages a surprise 
party for her mum's 70th birthday, which turns out to be a disaster for everybody. So 
finally Shirley holds things together. She takes Mrs Bender home. At the end of the 
story, Cyril gives up his opposition to Shirley's wish of having a baby, and in the 
morning Mrs Bender seems to have recovered from her misery. Standing on the roof 
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of their building and looking down on the railway station where her husband used to 
work, Mrs Bender exclaims: "It's the top of the world." 
In Leigh's films, the working class and the middle class are always put into 
binary opposition for sharp contrast; their different worlds are "forever colliding" 
(Watson, 2004, p. 52). In High Hopes, through exploring the 3 couples of different 
class background, this class divide and class consciousness are displayed to even an 
extreme extent, from which we can definitely say that the film is a political one. With 
working class identity represented by Cyril and Shirley, working-class consciousness, 
critique of Thatcherite politics, human kindness and positive spirit, plus the 
importance of family are key themes of representation. 
Working-class Consciousness. 
Cyril is left-wing and idealistic. Filled with emotions of class resentment, he 
hopes for a world in which everyone has "enough to eat." He reads Lenin for 
Beginners and shows admiration for Marx and his vision of society by visiting his 
tomb. Although he yearns for social change, he admits that he sits on his ass in 
despair because he just isn't sure what to do politically. He feels cut off. Cyril clearly 
knows that the society won't suddenly be transformed in accordance with the high 
political hopes he still holds in his head; so for him, pursuing Marx's vision of a 
classless society is now merely like "pissing in the wind." 
In the film, three scenes reflect his political consciousness: visiting the tomb, 
discussing with Suzi and exchange with Shirley in the end. On their visit to Highgate 
cemetery, in front of Marx's head sculpture, Cyril expresses his Marxist class 
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resentment about Industrial Revolution having forced people into the factories to be 
exploited. He then praises Marx for "[w]ithout Marx, there'd have been nothing ... no 
unions, no welfare state, no nationalized industries." Shirley reads out that "The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is 
to change it." To this, Cyril seems puzzled: "The thing is, change what? It's a different 
world now, innit?" His frustration about the possibility and feasibility to change leads 
to his such disillusioned conclusion that pursuing the road is like "Pissing in the 
wind." In this event, Shirley is casually looking around, speaking to herself. This is 
the only conversation that the couple do not seem to match, leading Cyril's challenge 
"You ain't interested, are you?" to which Shirley answers "Yes, I am. I care a lot." 
In discussing with Suzi (Cyril and Shirley's female friend), Cyril's 
revolutionary mind is degraded by Suzi's more radical and passionate belief in 
revolutionary socialism, seen as follows: 
Su: ... 1 mean, we're fighting, right, to hold onto rights we fought for years ago. She's 
already crippled the welfare state. And now she's gonna kill it off because the power isn't 
with the workers. 1 wanna go to Nicaragua in October, to help them pick the coffee beans. 
That's what we need here, see-a revolution. 
C: Here we go. 
Su: That'll put it back the power with the people. Where it belongs. 
C: What do you know about revolution? There won't be none here. 
Su: You can't say that. The situation's ripe for it. What, with the unemployment and poverty 
and that. We're heading towards a totalitarian state. But the people won't have it. They're 
gonna fight. She's taken away the basic right of the working class. I mean, you look at what 
she's doing to the unions. 
C: Yeah, Yeah, Yeah, I know about unions. 
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Su: You're not in a union, though, are you? 
C: Well, we ain't got no union. 
Su: Right, that's what you've got to do~rganise yourselves---Otherwise you won't have a 
voice. 
Su: It'd do you good to get out and do something, instead of sitting on you arse talking 
about it. 
In this conversation, Suzi's sensibleness is undermined by her passion to go to 
Nicaragua to help them pick the coffee beans, and further weakened by her plan to 
start a jewelry stall in the market to relieve from unemployment, an act mocked by 
Cyril as "going into business" to be "small time capitalist." When Cyril challenges 
about what she actually does at those political meetings, she answers that she and her 
comrades "discuss things" and "talk about things," which, for her, is "working 
towards the revolution." But for Cyril, "You are wasting your time" and he would "Sit 
on my arse." The high-sounding big talk, instead of inspiring Cyril, leads to his harsh 
sarcasm that Suzi talks "a load ofbollocks," to which Shirley completely agrees: "She 
always does." Suzi is deeply hurt by this. The conversation exchanges are all shot in 
close-ups. Suzi's enthusiasm forms a sharp contrast with Cyril's scornful face. In this 
scene, Leigh displays little use for leftist slogans or sentimentality. The scene 
impresses us that Marxist revolutionary cause is not practical and there is nothing that 
can be done except "sitting on the arse." A mood of pessimism is conveyed. Suzi's 
revolutionary ideas and her confidence in people fighting against unemployment and 
poverty are simply dismissed as naive. Her leftist rhetoric about changing the world 
and going to help the peasants in Nicaragua looks like someone whose politics 
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"function more as a psychological lifeline than as a thought-out commitment" (Quart, 
1993, p. 30). In this conversation, we get to know that Cyril is not even a member of 
the trade union. 
After that, Cyril and Shirley have a heart-to-heart talk. Cyril criticizes Shirley 
desire's for a baby as just another "bourgeois game:" "Get yourself into a nice house, 
couple of kids, dog ... garden with a greenhouse." When asked what he really wants, 
after thinking seriously, he says "T want everyone to have enough to eat, places to live, 
jobs." This is "a noble reaffirmation of socialist priorities in an age of postmodemism, 
post-Fordism, neo-Marxism, all of them seductively revisionist strategies devised to 
make liberals forget that" (Adair, 1989, p. 65). Cyril then expresses his frustration that 
he feels "cut off:" "I'm a dead loss. Don't do nothing. Just sit here moaning." Shirley 
consoles him that "The world ain't ever gonna be perfect." So Cyril's explicit 
working-class consciousness is constrained by his confusion about what to do 
politically, a confusion deepened by Mrs Thatcher's political actions. 
The working class are split. Mrs Bender is a working-class widow, yet from 
Cyril and Shirley's talk we know that she voted for the Conservative Party last year, 
an act taken by Cyril as "Working-class Tories stabbing themselves in the back." The 
working-class community is an absence. Hill noticed three evidences for lack of 
community in the film: firstly, Cyril "isn't actually a member of a trade union;" 
secondly, "while the film chides the lack of neighborliness shown by the 
Booth-Braines towards Mrs Bender, there is no evidence of any 'community' in the 
block of flats in which Cyril and Shirley live (where no neighbors are seen, or 
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identified, at all);" and thirdly, "Cyril and Shirley would appear to lack any clear 
sense of connection or involvement with a more broadly based social or political 
community and tradition" (Hill, 1999, pp. 196-197). Based on such observation, he 
argues that "it is a portrait of 'practical socialism' that only goes so far" (1999, p. 
196). 
Critique of Thatcherite politics. 
In the film, the three couples represent different classes and display different 
responses in attitude and behavior toward Thatcherite politics. 
Valerie and Martin represent the "new rich." They live in an overstuffed 
suburban detached house. They seem to have succeeded along Thatcherite lines of 
making money and acquiring material goods. Martin, a second-hand car-dealer and a 
burger bar owner, is "crassly entrepreneurial" (Adair, 1989, p. 64) and sensitive to 
market opportunities of Thatcherite Britain. He sees that business is booming and 
delivery boys are needed, so he seriously wants to give Cyril "a piece of professional 
advice" to form "a little company" of his own so that "the other wallies do the dirty 
work" and Cyril can "sit in Happy Valley collecting the dosh." Valerie is succumbed 
to shallow materialism. With the family wealth, she is seen spending loads of time 
exercising, consuming, and hungering for affection from her abusive husband. More 
than anything else, she is such a big social snob! She painfully tries to imitate 
Laetitia's yuppie dress and manner, e.g. the leopard-skin coat and the hat. She holds a 
birthday party in her house for her mother's 70th birthday to show off her detached 
house and decorations (the fireplace, chess). As Hill sharply observes, Valerie's 
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character is precisely "comic" because "she lacks 'good' dress sense, has suburban 
tastes (e.g. an imitation log-fire, ornamental brass fruit, a two-tier tea trolley) and is 
generally pretentious (proudly displaying a glass chess set in which the pieces are laid 
out wrongly)" (Hill, 1999, p. 195). 
Laetitia and Rupert represent the upper-middle class. Laetitia is extremely 
satisfied with her life and tells her husband that she thanks God every day that she has 
been blessed with such beautiful skin and no saggy neck. Leigh uses the snobbish 
Tory couple "as venomous comic caricatures to send up gentrification and Thatcherite 
social callousness" (Quart, 1993, p. 30). Laetitia conveys the brittle, harsh inhumanity 
ofThatcherism in her talk with Mrs Bender about the house while serving tea: 
L: But you can hardly justify having three bedrooms, though, can you? 
M: It's my home. 
L: It is at the moment, I grant you that. 
L: I'm not sure it wouldn't be better appreciated by a professional couple or even a family. 
M: I have always lived here. 
L: Yes, that's as may be, but times change. 
L: I think you'd be the first to agree you'd be far better off buying yourself a nice little 
modem granny flat. 
M: Where would I get the money from? 
L: If you were to put your house on the market, you'll find you've been sitting on a gold 
mine. 
M: It's not my house .... It belongs to the Council. 
L: Oh ... Well, mercifully, you people have the opportunity to purchase your council 
property nowadays. I'd snap it up, it I were you. Then, of course, one resells. 
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Apart from the sense on property-owning which is very Thatcherite, the 
conversation also suggests that, for Laetitia, Mrs Bender is only an embarrassing 
neighbor whose presence only lowers their street's property value. When Cyril takes 
his mother away, Rupert warns that "what made this country great is a place for 
everyone and everyone in his place. And this is my place." 
Conversely, Cyril and Shirley are like aliens in Thatcher's Britain. Cyril has no 
interest in money or status. He declines Martin's suggestion of setting up a small 
company based on his "principle," saying that "It ain't everybody's purpose in life to 
accumulate money." Cyril is also against his sister's wish to buy her mother's house 
so as to "sell it off later on" and "make a huge profit." Shirley grows a cactus plant 
and names it "Thatcher" because "it's pain in the arse. Prongs you every time you 
walk past it." The couple view with contempt that the street where Cyril's mum lives 
has been almost taken over by the middle class who buy for "capital investment" to 
sell for a fortune instead of simply as a home. While Laetitia's house is well furnished, 
Shirley pities that Cyril's mum's house gets no central heating. 
The film, through showing scorn to the other two couples, who adapt, in 
different ways, to the Thatcherite ethos, exerts critique to Thatcherism and all 
inhumanness it embodies. 
Human kindness and positive spirit. 
Leigh acknowledges that any "notion that there's a bias on [his] part in High 
Hopes and that, in some way, Cyril and Shirley are the goodies and Rupert and 
Laetitia and Valerie and Martin are the baddies is absolutely true" (Fuller, as cited in 
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Watson, 2004, p. 90). In High Hopes, it is Cyril and Shirley's "ordinary sense of 
goodness and concern" which stands in opposition to "the selfish temper of the times" 
and "gives a positive embodiment to traditional socialist values" (Hill, 1999, p. 196). 
This unmarried left-wing working-class couple are taken to stand for a more decent 
set of caring attitude and socially responsible values that Thatcherism is seen as 
attacking. Adair praises them as "one of the most poignantly loving couples ... that our 
national cinema has produced" and that "[t]heir responses to the needs of others recall 
those of Londoners in the Blitz" (1989, p. 65). In Hill's words, Cyril and Shirley shine 
by their "intuitive humanism" (1999, p. 197). Shirley's radiance and warmth make her 
seem beautiful at times, and she is connected to the world in a more concrete and 
knowing and less ideological way than Cyril (Quart, 1993, p. 30). 
At the film's beginning, the couple selflessly help Wayne (Jason Watkins), a 
stranger who asks the way. Cyril takes him home for a cup of tea and when Wayne 
fails to find his sister, they let him stay in their home for the night. Shirley treats him 
like mother, giving him the towel to dry hands and makes the bedding. Later they 
accompany Wayne to his sister's flat to check if she is back. When all efforts have 
failed, they send him back home on a coach. Near the end of the film, they are happy 
to give Suzi (Judith Scott) a bed for the night. Throughout the film, Shirley is shown 
to be kind to her mother-in-law, willing to stay longer to talk to her. At the birthday 
party at the end of the film, when she notices the old lady's troubled mentality due to 
loneliness, she takes her home to stay with them. When Cyril says "I'll have to go 
round there more often," Shirley states "She needs more than that. She needs looking 
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after." Cyril and Shirley show genuine concern towards the mother and can be trusted 
when they say they will give her more help in the future. 
In contrast, Valerie does not visit mum often, giving her a Christmas gift when it 
is already February. She holds the birthday party for her mother not out of kindness, 
but to show off her house. At the birthday party, she is rude to her mother, dragging 
her to move faster and forces her to drink soft drink instead of tea. The most notorious 
aspect is that, in order to call Cyril to take the mother home with the house key, she 
lies to Cyril that the old mum has had a serious accident. Valerie's beneficence 
towards her mother seems to have more to do with her own wants than those of Mrs 
Bender. 
Laetitia and Rupert, the upper-middle-class couple, are depicted as unkind and 
unwilling to help, treating Mrs Bender with "pained forbearance" (Adair, 1989, p. 64) 
and contemptuous cruelty. When Mrs Bender is locked outside her house and asks for 
help, Laetitia suggests seeing a policeman, a neighbor or phone children from a public 
booth before finally reluctantly invites her to come in '1ust for a moment." When Mrs 
Bender wants to go to the toilet with some urgency, Laetitia answers "Ah, the lavatory. 
I will show you where it is in a minute." 
While Mrs Bender was waiting for her children to take her home with the house 
key, Laetitia and Rupert "make her pay for the privilege of sitting in their kitchen by 
subjecting her to a barrage of questions about the run-down state of her house and 
garden" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422), all selfish questions showing no concern about Mrs 
Bender's economic situation. After knowing that she doesn't own the house to sell, 
197 
Rupert suggests: "how about getting outside with a brush and giving the front of your 
house a lick of paint? Smarten it up a little bit, eh?" The couple is half-hearted with 
charity, donating wine to "mentally-handicapped something-or-other." Murphy notes 
that in British films the rich tend to be shown "as cuddly eccentrics with hearts of 
gold" and sees that Laetitia and Rupert's callousness comes "as a shock" (2009b, p. 
422). Waston sees Leigh's representation as "a kind of political cartoon, one in which 
it is OK not just to dislike but even to hate the villain (or 'baddies:' the 
Booth-Braines)" (2004, p. 90 ). 
Leigh places high hopes on the positive spirit in his characters (especially 
women) who have faith, hope and trust, and who inculcate that in other people. In Life 
is Sweet, the husband Andy is depicted as a dreamer with a passion for the caravan he 
buys for his cooking business. The wife Wendy can fully understand his passion and 
delivers a long speech at the end of the film in which she scolds her daughter Nicola 
for having "given up," while she and her husband are "still out there, fighting." In 
High Hopes, the most striking evidence of "the willingness to carryon" is to be found 
in the reluctant Cyril's last-minute acceptance of Shirley's hope for having a child. In 
each case, we are made to understand that carrying on is not something that should be 
taken for granted--it takes faith and courage. 
Family and women. 
Family provides a key theme in High Hopes. In Leigh's many films, the social 
community is usually missing, placing family the only harbor to stick to. Cyril and 
Shirley are living together in partnership. Shirley wants to have a baby, but Cyril is 
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reluctant. His understanding of the family is only as far as "Two's company," not 
including children. He knows that Shirley must think of him as "being selfish," but 
does not want to compromise. The reason he offers is "Families fuck you up. That's 
the truth. They're out of date, families. They ain't no use any more" and "no one gives 
a shit what sort of world ... kids are ... born into." Cyril's view seems to be supported 
by the example of his own troubled family. In the touching scene of Mrs Bender's 
birthday party, we see the close-up shot of the forlorn face of Mrs Bender while 
hearing Cyril and Valerie quarrelling off-screen in the background, accusing each 
other of having "breakdowns." However, Hill has a point in suggesting that "if 
families are flawed, they seem, none the less, to be all that the characters have to hold 
on to, given that other forms of communality, extending beyond the family, are either 
inadequate or non-existent" (1999, p. 196). Watson takes this remark of Hill to be a 
criticism "not of the film but ofthe state of affairs that the film investigates" (2004, p. 
91). 
By the end of the film, Cyril agrees with Shirley and is prepared to have a baby. 
This decision is seen by Hill as investing the end of the film with "a degree of 
optimism (or 'high hopes ') about the future" (1999, p. 198). Yet Hill holds that "while 
the film may, in this way, succeed in expressing values of care and responsibility 
which cut across the prevailing ethos of Thatcherism, it only does so by partly 
reproducing conservative (and, indeed, Thatcherite) values regarding the family and 
women" (1999, p. 198). On this remark, Watson accuses Hill of "hav[ing] fallen 
victim to right-wing propaganda, which famously claims that it alone speaks for/is 
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concerned about 'family values.' Versions of the family long preceded 'Thatcherism' 
and, in a11 likelihood, they will long survive its demise" (2004, p. 94). Here I would 
agree with Watson's criticism since family cannot become Thatcher's patent simply 
because she stressed its importance. Hi11 also comments that "in celebrating the 
virtues of the privatized family as a kind of escape route from political impotence and 
passivity, the film, for all its apparent 'socialism,' appears to end up reinforcing the 
very scepticism about more co11ective (or 'socialist') forms of political action that was 
already such a feature of this era" (1999, p. 198). On this, Watson feels that Hill is 
mistaken here to assume that "the film is celebrating the family as a 'way out' or an 
'escape route. '" He reasonably views the celebration as surely more in the spirit of 
"At least this possibility still exists, at least there is still this to hold on to, or to try to 
make something of." He believes that "It seems unlikely to be able to satisfy Cyril's 
yearning for greater connection and purpose but it is something." (2004, p. 91) 
Women's representation is rather mixed in the film. On the one hand, Shirley is 
almost perfect with her warmth, kindness and positive spirit; on the other, misogynist 
tendency can be detected in negative depictions of a11 other women. Valerie is 
hysterious and not much respected by her husband Martin, who once even throws her 
onto the ground. Her drunken collapse is disgusting but pitiable. Martin's lover is 
divorced and is miserable in not being able to see her children. Shirley is teased by 
Martin, who claims that "Women! All the bleedin' same. Fucking losers." Laetitia is 
despised for lack of sympathy and concern. Hill notes a significant fact that all of the 
couples are childless in the film. He sees the case of the Gore-Booths and Burkes as 
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being "associated with the 'sterility' of the values they represent" and the case of Suzi, 
who has had an abortion, as "underscore[ing] the fruitlessness (and lack of 'humanity') 
of her politics" (1999, p. 198). In the film, women are not only despised for 
consumerism and social climbing, but also made "unwholesome" and "unfulfilled" by 
the "flawed" femininity of having no children (for whatever reasons). Suzi's 
mentioning that "you have a room, you can have a baby" is heart-breaking for people 
to hear. 
High Hopes provides us with a happy ending. The happy mood runs along three 
lines. Cyril isn't defeated; yet he feels "more serene" and "more willing" to come to 
terms with life's injustice and have a child with Shirley (Quart, 1993, p. 32). The 
decision of Cyril and Shirley to have a child, for Hill, "invests the end of the film with 
a degree of optimism (or 'high hopes') about the future" (1999, p. 198). Mrs Bender 
has a nice sleep and becomes less miserable the next morning. And above all, 
working-class culture is highlighted for appreciation. The film's final scene shows 
Cyril and Shirley taking Mrs Bender up on the roof of the building and looking down 
on the railway station where Cyril's father used to work, a nostalgic solute to the 
traditional working-class culture rooted in manual labor and a sense of place. Mrs 
Bender's final exclamation that "it is the top of the world," while illustrating the 
physical height, should also carry the metaphorical meaning of the superiority of 
working-class culture. 
High Hopes provides no political alternative to Thatcherism. Those grander 
high hopes of radical political change appear impractical, but the film suggests ways 
201 
to live more humanly despite social inequality. Cyril compensates his political 
disillusionment with the more modest hope of building a humane and caring life with 
Shirley. This is not very high on the scale of human happiness, but it is enough to 
imbue the film with optimism rather than despair. Adair holds that "Cyril and Shirley 
both have and are the high hopes of Leigh's title, which is absolutely not ironic; and 
theirs is a story of grace under pressure" (1989, p. 65). 
Leigh depicts Cyril and Shirley in a more naturalistic fashion. They are played 
without the exaggerated mannerisms that typify the playing of the Burkes and 
Gore-Booths. Their intimate behavior-talking, fighting, having sex-"feels utterly 
genuine" (Quart, 1993, p. 32). 
Class and Race in Stephen Frears' My Beautiful Laundrette (1985) 
Stephen Frears chose the feature film to attack Thatcherism, claiming that his 
film Sammy and Rosie Get Laid was "an attempt to bring Margaret Thatcher down" 
(Friedman & Stewart, 1994, p. 233). Both My Beautiful Laundrette (1985) and Sammy 
and Rosie Get Laid (1987) depict Thatcher's England as dominated by racism, greed, 
and social injustice. His attraction to the working and underclasses is consistent with 
his interest in the Pakistani community. According to Frears, My Beautiful Laundrette 
was his and screenwriter Hanif Kureishi's "ironic salutation to the entrepreneurial 
spirit in the eighties that Margaret Thatcher championed" (Barber, 1993, p. 221). 
Frears saw that Mrs Thatcher had divided the country" ... between the people who've 
got and the people who haven't" (Barber, 1993, p. 222) and her government 
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"transformed the postwar socialist state into a 'nation' courting and supported by 
private capitalistic enterprise" (Barber, 1993, p. 221). 
My Beautiful Laundrette was shot in 1985 and was an instant success. At its 
American debut in 1986, the New York Times acclaimed it as one of the 10 best films 
of 1986. The film is a highly innovative exploration of marginalized cultures in 
Thatcher-era London. Kirk summarized that the film "succeeded by knitting together 
the themes of race and class within a much wider concern with national identity, and 
the dynamics of history which constitute us all" (2003, p. 177). 
Set in a Pakistani community of South London in the 1980s, the film centers on 
a young Anglo-Pakistani, Omar (Gordon Warnecke), his white working class friend 
and lover, Johnny (Daniel Day Lewis), and Omar's family of successful, rapacious 
entrepreneurs. Omar is living with his leftist alcoholic father and is "on dole like 
everyone else in England." Then he is directed to work for his wealthy, entrepreneur 
uncle, Nasser (Saeed Jaffrey), who gives Omar a rundown launderette to run. Defying 
his father's wish that he should enter college, Omar wants to grab a share of Britain's 
wealth by "squeezing the tits of the system." He hires his school friend Johnny, a poor 
white working class youth and a former racist, and succeeds in renovating the 
launderette into a beautifully decorated and profitable business. Omar and Johnny also 
become homosexual lovers. Johnny's white working class fellows, Genghis (Richard 
Graham) and Moose (Stephen Marcus), belong to the National Front. They try hard to 
draw him back by warning him not to "cut yourself from your own people," but fail. 
Racial tension is serious. After Salim (Derrick Branche), also a wealthy Pakistani, 
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injures Moose with his car, they fight back by viciously beating Salim and even 
Johnny, who comes to Salim's help. The film ends with Omar helping Johnny clean 
up his wounds and the two splashing each other with water while topless. 
The film is definitely about race. As Kirk puts it, it is "concerned in important 
ways with the dialectic of race and class ... politics ofdifference ... post-colonial theory 
of hybridity" (2003, p. 170). Omar, his father and his uncle's family are of Pakistani 
origin making a scene in the multi-racial and multi-cultural metropolitan London. 
Racial prejudice and racial hatred are frequent happenings they have to come across. 
Yet the film is unique in that it is more about race, moving beyond the pitiable racial 
discrimination psyche. Both race and class are equally central and part of the 
construction of hybridity in the film and both get partly blurred in the New Right 
ideology. Kirk argues that, despite the emphasis on British Asian experience in the 
film, "race is a subordinate issue to a more subtle exploration of the workings of class 
inequalities and the power relations within them" (2003, p. 171). For me, the film, in 
its unique way of dealing with race through class, is more valuable to the analysis of 
class as a more determining factor of human existence. 
My Beautiful Laundrette addresses the class issue by contrasting the haves with 
the have-nots: professional businessman Nassar, rich Salim, ambitious Omar on the 
one hand, and jobless, homeless Johnny, Genghis and Moose on the other hand. The 
Pakistanis now form part of the privileged class in the 1980s. The once colonial 
Pakistanis now own big business and live well in large suburban homes and luxury 
flats. In contrast, their tormentors, lumpen white punks and skinheads are "confined 
204 
and constricted" to streets, own nothing and "have only the dole and gratuitous street 
violence to console themselves with" (Quart, 1994, p. 243). So, the whites are seen as 
the real victims of Thatcherism. The Pakistani nouveau riche reverses the traditional 
imperial and colonial hierarchy. This is demonstrated at the beginning of the film 
when Salim and some Jamaicans he employs throw out "squatters" Johnny and 
Genghis from a run-down building Salim has purchased, depriving them of their only 
home in a sort of "symbolic 'taking over' of the white characters' 'home'" (Hill, 1999, 
p. 211). A similar inversion of roles is also evident in the fact that Omar is treating 
Johnny "like a servant." It is also evident when Nassar's white working-class mistress 
responds to Nassar's daughter's accusation of living off her father by saying: "And 
you must understand, we're of different generations, different classes. Everything is 
waiting for you. The only thing that has ever waited for me is your father." 
Dispossession stands as the key state of the white underclass. Living on the 
streets with petty crimes (such as stealing) and sleeping anywhere possible, Johnny, 
Genghis and Moose (Stephen Marcus) belong to the expanding underclass--economic 
dropouts--ofthe society in the 1980s. And the scene is not a rarity, with the extremely 
high unemployment rate of the time taken into consideration. Kirk sees them as "quite 
pitiful characters" (despite their menacing racist activities), because despite their 
fervor to "belong" there is "something quite rootless" about them. Genghis pleads 
with Johnny, "Don't cut yourself off from your own people, everyone's got to 
belong." But it is ironic here that Genghis is "invoking a national identity which 
seems to have no place for him." (Kirk, 2003, p. 174) 
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Johnny is a complex and sympathetic figure in the film. He was Omar's friend 
at school, but joined the racist march. He is now "lower class" and "won't come in 
without being asked, unless he's doing a burglary." He sees working with Omar as a 
lifeline to escape from squatting and aimless wondering in the streets and to get 
self-respect. Responding to his white friends' warning of him not to cut off from his 
own people, he says "J want to do some work, instead of always hanging around." He 
still maintains some loyalty to the group of racist punks he once belonged to, but also 
helps Salim when he is beaten viciously. 
In short, working class has declined as a historical force. In the film, they are 
mostly negatively depicted as aggressive little-Englanders, right-wing and reactionary, 
"to be pitied at best, despised at worst" (Kirk, 2003, p. 178). For the Old Left like 
Omar's father (Roshan Seth), a former socialist journalist, he sees the "death" of 
socialism with his lamenting remark that "The working class is such a great 
disappointment to me," representing the declining confidence in the agency of the 
working class (Hill, 1999, p. 205). For the Pakistani new rich, they also show strong 
contempt for the white underclass, as Salim says to Omar, "Look at them. What a 
waste of life. They're filthy, ignorant. They don't respect people, especially our 
people." So, there seems to be no place for Johnny and Genghis in the Thatcherite 
entrepreneurial society. As Salim shouts in the film: "What the hell else is there left 
for you in this country now?" 
Then it becomes paradoxical that the successful and the favored are 
Asian-origin businessmen. Omar and his people are clearly benefiting from Mrs 
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Thatcher's enterprise culture of self effort. "The Pakistani ... but they are not put off, 
despite the racism, by Thatcher's England" (Quart, 1994, p. 243). Thatcher had 
applauded the Asian and Indian shopkeepers "as the nation's new 'meritocrats'" (Kirk, 
2003, p. 174). They know there is money in the Thatcherite market: "In this damn 
country, which we hate and love, you can get anything you want. It's all spread out 
and available ... Only you have to know how to squeeze the tits of the system." So, 
they embrace Thatcherism and regard enterprise culture as offering them 
opportunities for their success. As at a party, Nassar proposes to Omar, "We'll drink to 
Thatcher and your beautiful laundrette ... " In seeking success, they take whatever 
measures necessary, legal or illega\. 
Nassar has definitely benefited most from the entrepreneur culture promoted by 
Mrs. Thatcher. Committed to making big money, he has acquired a business empire 
by all means, evidently including exploiting others, white or black, and thus could 
afford to say that "I'm the law. I create the world" and "no one works without my 
permission." He owns garage, laundrette, slum housing for rent, and deals with 
porn-video cassettes, drugs, and a list of other businesses. 
Omar is quick to learn and is not adverse to illegal dealings. He sees Salim's 
drug game and immediately knows that's how he is going to finance the start of his 
laundrette. So, he soon funds the opening of the laundrette with money he gets from 
selling drugs he steals from Salim. He is also professionally ambitious. When Nassar 
hands over the laundrette to him, what he expects is to have the place cleaned by 
Omar and improved a little. But Omar declares that "I don't only want to sweep up ... 
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I want to be manager of this place. I think I can do it." The next thing we know is that 
Omar hires Johnny--"a bloke of astounding competence and strength of body and 
mind" in Omar's words--to do all the tough work. So one of Nassar's friends makes 
such comment: "Typically English, if I can say that." Omar's efficiency and 
leadership skill is appreciated and near the end he is given more laundrette to manage 
by his uncle's friend. 
When Omar's father asks: "How is it that scrubbing cars could make a son of 
mine look so ecstatic?" Omar simply responds that "It gets me out of the house," 
which projects a strong implication that enterprise culture is much enjoyed and 
approved by the young adults. 
In addition, the state of their living-Nasser's family home, Salim's and 
Cherry's luxurious flat, the apartment building which they own and rent out-all 
suggest that they have strived hard to "squeeze the tits of the system." 
Apart from Salim evicting Johnny and Genghis at the beginning of the film, 
Nassar later hires Johnny to evict a black poet from a property he wants to re-let. 
When challenged by Johnny that throwing out his own kind of people-the 
colored-"Doesn't look too good, does it?" Nassar simply answers, "I'm a 
professional businessman, not a professional Pakistani. And there is no question of 
race in the new enterprise culture." 
Yet race is forever the pain of the colored in Britain. In the film, though 
members of oppressed racial groups--the Pakistani--are capable of and occasionally 
even eager to engage in class-based exploitation, the most exploitative members of 
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the oppressed racial communities are themselves victims of brutal racist attacks. 
Genghis is against Johnny working for the Paki, claiming, "They came over here to 
work for us. That's why we brought them over." Salim's car is banged on just because 
the gangsters notice that it is the Pakistani who drives the car. Salim is tough to fight 
back. When meeting these hoodlums again in the street, he accelerates his car fast and 
drives at them and runs down Moose, who is badly injured. In a vicious circle, near 
the end of the film, Genghis and his white friends take their revenge on Salim, 
destroying his car and nearly beating him to death. Here, racial conflict is being put 
on the front stage. 
The occupations the Pakistanis carry on are manual or insidious ones. Nasser's 
garage, launderette, etc are low-status businesses; Salim takes a risk in drug-dealing; 
Omar operates a launderette named "Powder" which hints its source of 
financing-the profits from Salim's illegal drug business. They all make money in 
areas which do not command high respect. Omar regards the laundry as dirty work 
and hires Johnny to do it. Nasser and Salim can earn cash and property through efforts, 
but they cannot obtain their social standing in British society. One of the Pakistani 
claims: "What chance a racist Englishman has given us that we haven't taken it from 
him with our hands?" 
On the whole, the Pakistani characters are not depicted as figures of virtue. 
Represented as "drug dealers, sodomites and mad landlords" (Hill, 1999, p. 210), they 
are seen to be shrewd, greedy and tough. But as Kureishi points out, none of his Asian 
characters may be regarded as "victims" (Hill, 1999, p. 210). They are generally 
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successful businessmen, at ease with the Thatcherite enterprise culture. So, Hill points 
out that "a part of the film's strategy is to use the business success of the Asian 
characters to invert old imperial power relations" (1999, p. 210). As Boyd Tonkin 
suggests, the film may be viewed as a kind of "revenge film" in which a contrast is set 
up between an unemployed white "underclass," who aimlessly wander in the streets, 
and an Asian business class who have succeeded in becoming the new "masters" (Hill, 
1999,p.211). 
So, social hierarchies (based on the subordination of blacks) are overturned in 
the film, and "we are reminded of Fanon's argument that the colonized/subaltern 
perpetually yearns to take the place of the colonizer" (Kirk, 2003, p. 172). The 
Pakistanis passionately embrace the new enterprise culture as a way to "revenge" the 
racism they encounter. 
By saying "typically English" to refer to Omar's hiring Johnny, this friend is 
reminding of a history that Pakistanis used to be hired by the white to do all the 
manual work. But here, the stereotypical role is subverted. Though it is a love 
relationship between Johnny and Omar, Omar, the Pakistani, is obviously the 
dominating "boss man," benefiting from the reversed colonial order and treating 
Johnny as someone from the "lower class." As Nassar's daughter sees and tells 
Johnny, "Omar just runs you around everywhere, like a servant." 
When Johnny observes that Omar is "getting greedy," Omar's response is 
fuelled with a sense of "racial victimization and business ambition," or even of racial 
revenge: "I want big money. I'm not gonna be beat down by this country. When we 
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were at school, you and your lot kicked me all round the place. And what are you 
doing now? Washing my floor. That's how I like it." The Pakistanis are clearly aware 
"But we're nothing in England without money." 
The film is brave and impressive with its depiction of the gay relationship and 
love scenes. The relationship is not portrayed as a "problem" and the lovers are not 
shown as "victims" of homophobia. Kureishi explains that he wanted the gayness to 
be "taken for granted" rather than foregrounded as an issue. For Philip French, the 
film celebrates "a gay love affair" that "transcends race, class, upbringing and social 
chaos." (Hill, 1999, p. 213) Omar announces to Salim that, in his opinion, "much 
good can come from fucking." The inter-racial relationship suggests how sexual 
desires may permit the crossing of borders. 
The ending is sad for Nasser, a close up of him shows that he is melancholy and 
puzzled-"finished," he says-left by both his mistress and daughter; but happy for 
Omar and Johnny. At the end of the film, which is set in that little office at the back of 
the laundrette, Omar tenderly cleans up Johnny's wounds after his fights against his 
white mates to rescue Salim. The last scene shows Johnny and Omar splash water 
from the sink onto one another's bare chests. So, racial tension is solved by the 
homosexual love between Omar and Johnny, which crosses the barrier of race, class 
and gender, a utopian resolution more like a "wish-fulfillment." Frears explains that 
the film was given a happy ending because "it would be too depressing without it" 
and "It's only at the very end that there is this flicker of happiness." He thinks the film 
is "more cheerfully defiant." (Friedman & Stewart, 1994, pp. 227-228) 
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In conclusion, My Beautiful Laundrette is critical of Thatcherism and the 
materialism and selfishness which it generates in turning the society a cruel one with 
many young adults jobless and homeless; however, it also identifies that the enterprise 
culture provides opportunities for Asians to get through the barriers, make financial 
achievements and even change their social status. At the same time, it is also aware of 
how even the possession of money is not necessarily a defense against racism. 
Ken Loach and Sweet Sixteen (2002) 
Loach and his films. 
Ken Loach is a leading exponent of realism. He is born from a working-class 
family and is a critically admired director and "an unwavering, outspokenly 
committed socialist" (Turner, 1993, p. 50), who uses documentary realist strategies to 
explore the inequalities and conflicts in societies, establishing a reputation for 
political awareness in his films. He can be said to be the only current British 
film-maker using class in an explicit political sense. 
His continuous effort from his early television and film career in the 1960s right 
through four decades to the films of the 1990s and 2000s made him eligible for the 
claim that the continuing history of British social realism is inextricably linked to Ken 
Loach. Particularly, he provides something of a bridge between the New Wave films 
of the early 1960s and the films of the 1990s, almost "singlehandedly responsible for 
sustaining social realist texts" when British cinema was sacrificing social realism due 
to financial difficulties. In his 40-year directing career, the dominating aim to make 
"art in the service of the people" has remained consistent (Leigh, 2002, p. 178). 
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Loach's realism is "realism with a cause, and few other current directors share his 
passionate commitment" (Brown, 2009, p. 35). 
During the 1960s, he worked extensively in television and was noted for Cathy 
Come Home, which is about a homeless mother and was filmed for BBC2. Then he 
won high recognition for Kes (1970), a film which is set among a coal-mining 
community in Yorkshire, and looks sensitively at how a baby kestrel gives a young 
boy's life a sense of meaning. Since the 1980s his films have engaged more closely 
with politics and society. Looks and Smiles (1982) considers the desperate choices 
open to two young school-leavers at a time when employment opportunities are few. 
For greater authenticity Loach used all amateurs from local communities of Sheffield 
(the setting for the film) to cast the film. Yet in the 1980s Loach was much silenced 
by censorship with his documentaries as a voice of "outraged dissent against 
Thatcherism's onslaught on the trade unions and the impoverishment of the working 
class" (Fuller, 1998, p. 78). Aware of his own lack of success in the 1980s, Loach was 
eager to re-establish himself as a commercially viable filmmaker in the 1990s. He 
realized that he needed to adapt to some extent to a newly market-orientated British 
cinema or he would not be making films at all. So his later works more followed the 
mainstream traditions of narrative cinema. He added comic elements in some of his 
films to relieve the cruelty of misery and romance became a common plot seen to 
offer redemptive possibilities. His works in the 1990s reestablished Loach as a 
European filmmaker with a high international reputation and secured him relatively 
easy access to financial support. 
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Thematically, Loach's films are all politically charged and anti-capitalist. The 
struggle of the disadvantaged against an uninterested society is a theme common to 
many of his works, displaying a society split savagely into the "haves" and 
"have-nots." For Loach, "The subjects which have drawn me are those which relate 
personal and emotional life to a wider background--a class background and economic 
background" since "people's personal lives don't exist in a vacuum" (Hearse, as cited 
in Leigh, 2002, pp. 146-147). "It just grows ever more apparent," said Loach, "that 
there are two classes in society, that their interests are irreconcilable, and that one 
survives at the expense of the other" (Hayward, 2004, p. 266). His films in the 1990s 
are all much concerned with the underclass- casual workers, drunkard, single 
mothers, drug dealers, whose plight are seen as a heavy price unduly paid for the 
economic upheavals of the 1980s. Loach's works have always been pessimistic about 
the prospects of radical political change in Britain. The sense of political possibility is 
widely missing. 
In Riff RajJ (1990), Loach humorously depicts a group of building-site laborers 
and their work in converting a hospital into a block of luxury flats for the rich. The 
fear of unemployment and absence of trade union right have placed these casual 
laborers from Liverpool and Scotland in a disadvantaged and even dangerous position. 
They are at the mercy of the ruthless, cost-cutting employers who care nothing about 
the safety of working environment and simply want the job to be done as quickly and 
cheaply as possible. The builders work at their own risk and without insurance. One 
of them from Liverpool blames the Thatcher government, complains about work and 
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safety conditions and urges the men to organize. He is quickly sacked as a result. 
Following the death of a fellow worker who falls from inadequately secured 
scaffolding, the protagonist Stevie and another worker take revenge. They eventually 
burn down the apartments they are building, which is active resistance against the 
employers. The film ends bleakly with the two staring into a flaming abyss. The final 
violent direct attack is "less a considered political act than a desperate hitting out at a 
system that they lack the power to change" (Hill, 1998, p. 18), an action of "impotent 
despair" (Wilson, 1991, p. 61). Much of the humor in RifJ-RafJis "of a bitter and 
ironic nature" (Mather, 2006, p. 30). 
Raining Stones (1993) is a tragicomic story exploring the effects of 
unemployment on a Catholic family in Manchester with anti-Thatcher political 
message. The jobless Catholic father Bob runs into debt and danger after taking out a 
loan to buy his daughter a communion dress. Bob's obsessive determination to find 
money for the dress is shown as foolhardy as he has been warned many times that the 
expenditure is unnecessary and will lead him to debt. Yet his stubbornness is seen as 
understandable in a way as it symbolizes a desperate attempt of a father to "hold on to 
the last remnants of his sense of self-worth" (Hill, 1998, p. 20). Because of the debt 
(just a small sum), Bob is pressed and his wife and daughter are viciously threatened. 
He is finally driven into a violent attack on one uncaring loan shark, hitting his car 
and indirectly leading to the car-crash death of him. The action is taken by Hill as 
belonging to "individual acts of anger, rather than organized political activity, that 
now constitute resistance" (1998, p. 18). The film reveals the desperation of a 
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community whose people's pride and dignity has been ripped away along with their 
jobs. The beginning of Bob and Tommy kidnapping a lone sheep from a farmer's 
field to sell the meat for money is extremely humorous. The priest's decision to hide 
the truth about Bob's attack by destroying the evidences is extraordinarily warm and 
funny. 
Ladybird, Ladybird (1994) is based on a true story. It examines the plight of a 
Liverpudlian woman in London whose four children are all taken into custody by the 
social services following a house fire taking place in a women's refuge (where she is 
seeking protection with children from her abusive partner) while she is absent and 
leads to her eldest son seriously burnt. The heroine, Maggie, has suffered from a 
series of abusive relationships (for which she is blamed for not being careful enough 
in choosing partners). When Maggie starts a new life with Jorge, a mild political exile 
from Paraguay and a responsible man, and gives birth to their first child, the police 
and social workers come to investigate in the neighborhood and are told lies about 
Jorge beating Maggie. So they intervene and take the baby away. Their second child 
is taken away straight after the delivery, a scene extremely traumatic to watch. Quick 
to condemn, the social workers have no interest in Maggie's miserable past: she has 
an abusive father, violent partners and was sexually abused as a child. The social 
workers are depicted as constituting "a malign presence, cruelly interfering in the 
lives of others and adding to their misery" (Hill, 2000a, p. 182). Despite the showing 
of Maggie's roughness, the film "refuses to indict her as a bad mother and pinpoints 
how the obstacles to her achievement of happiness result from her lack of social and 
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economic power" (Hill, 2000a, p. 181). She is presented "as victim of her own 
emotional state, as much as of the state's interventionist methods" (Francke, 1994, p. 
47). 
My Name is Joe (1999) is a story of Joe's attempts to escape his alcoholic past 
and start a new life through his love affair with Sarah, a health worker. Joe used to be 
an alcoholic, but has quitted drinking and is developing a relationship with Sarah. His 
friend Liam, a member of the football team of unemployed men that Joe coaches, and 
his wife are in horrible debt due to drug taking and are severely threatened. To settle 
their debt, Joe agrees to do three drug runs for the local dealer. Sarah is outraged to 
discover the truth. Joe tries to explain, but finds their class differences too wide to 
unite them: "Ah'm really sorry, but you know I don't live in this nice, tidy, wee world 
of yours .... Some of us don't have a choice. I didnae have a fuckin' choice ... Every 
fuckin' choice stinks doon here." The film ends with Joe returning to drink after the 
breakup and Liam hangs himself and a sad funeral. Williamson sees the message of 
the film as "don't listen to middle-class do-gooders." Through Sarah, the film tells us 
"the limitations of what even the most well-meaning of social and healthcare 
professionals can achieve." (1998, p. 58) The film is dominated throughout by a sense 
of pessimism. Joe's decision is seen not simply as a matter of personal morality but 
one that has been forced upon him by the socio-economic situation. 
Loach continued into the 2000s with Sweet Sixteen (2002), which will be 
explored in the next part. 
Stylistically, Loach has tried to make films that are "emotionally engaging and 
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analytical" (Leigh, 2002, p. 177). For Loach, "the desire to depict reality on screen 
overrode almost anything" (Hayward, 2004, p. 4). Loach's cinematic style is 
documentary, marked by the strategy of observation rather than involvement. His 
films commonly use real-life locations that demonstrate the often grim actualities in 
which people live. They also employ a mix of professional and non-professional 
actors and actresses and Loach seeks to downplay the sense of an actor's performance 
through improvisation and even surprise (an actor is sometimes kept in the dark about 
developments in the script). Techniques such as the avoidance of dramatic lighting 
and compositional effects or the use of unbroken takes are employed to maintain a 
degree of distance from the characters they observe. Quite often, his protagonists 
speak with a very strong local accent (e.g. the accent of the Glaswegian teenager in 
Sweet Sixteen) that is hard to comprehend, so when shown abroad, his films were 
often dubbed or subtitled. Those on screen appeared so real that the truth Loach was 
telling through drama was a genuine threat to the established order (Hayward, 2004, p. 
3). 
On Loach's influence, it is worth noting that his commitment has not made 
much of an impact on British cinema audiences. Britain's film culture in the 1990s 
"tolerates Loach's spartan humanism, but does not endorse it" (Brown, 2000, p. 34). 
His films did not sell well in Britain, but won many top awards from European film 
festivals and did a lot better in European box-office. 
Loach has been a determined and persistent fighter for social justice and 
fairness. He has never lost faith in his belief that film can playa role in changing 
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attitudes and that ordinary people deserve fairer treatment. His work has helped to 
sustain a critical and committed film culture in Britain despite everything. He quotes 
Milan Kundera's phrase to define his fight as "the struggle of memory against 
forgetting" (Rowbotham, 2001, p. 87). Loach might seem to be naIve in his 
persistence, yet he is highly appreciated and widely admired throughout the world, 
which illustrates that maintaining his uncompromising political stand and independent 
filmmaking style had been a worthy effort, both for himself as well as for those who 
were not usually given a voice on screen. 
Winning awards and nominations at Cannes, Sweet Sixteen continues Ken 
Loach's devotion to social awareness. 
Sweet Sixteen (2002). 
Sweet Sixteen is a gritty film written by Paul Laverty and it is the fourth 
collaboration between him and Loach. The story is set in Greenock, a gray Scottish 
town down the Clyde River from Glasgow, a former shipbuilding center now 
depressed by unemployment and hopelessness. The strong political and cultural 
working-class community has disappeared. Gone with them was also the confident 
youth doing apprenticeships with money and disciple. Now, the jobs available were 
"crap"--like McDonald's, call centers or one-day contracts; "drugs are the 
currency--more readily available than jobs" (Hayward, 2004, p. 255). Laverty spent 
quite some time there talking to drug-selling kids before writing the first draft. 
Liam (Martin Compston) is a 15-year-old boy soon approaching his sixteenth 
birthday. He is waiting for the release of his drug-addicted mother, Jean (Michelle 
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Coulter), from prison where she is completing a prison term for a drug offence that 
her drug-dealing boyfriend, Stan (Gary McCormack), actually committed. In visiting 
his mother together with Stan and Liam's grandfather Rab (Tommy McKee), Liam is 
forced by them to pass drugs (hidden in his mouth) to his mother for sale to the other 
women in prison via hugging and kissing her. Liam refuses and is hence beaten by the 
two men. When Rab throws him out of the house, Liam goes to live with his sister 
Chantelle (Annmarie Fulton), a single mother with her own apartment and a toddler, 
Calum. He longs for a normal family life and wants to live together with his mother 
and sister, but Chantelle wants nothing to do with her irresponsible mother. On a 
joyride with his best friend Pinball (William Ruane), Liam spots a caravan in a field 
beside a lake, which he is attracted to buy for himself and his mother. To get quick 
money, Liam and Pinball steal Stan's heroin and deliver it around town. With the 
profit, Liam pays the first installment on the caravan. Later, when he offends the 
territory of a local gangster, Douglas (Jon Morrison), Liam is seriously beaten. But 
Douglas spots his enterprising spirit of mixing drug selling with pizza delivery and 
later hires him as a drug runner, but excludes Pinball, who feels hurt. Pinball steals 
Douglas' car, breaks it against a glass wall and also burns the caravan. When Liam 
finds what has happened to his dear caravan, he blames Stan. Douglas buys a pizza 
place for Liam to run as a guise for delivering drugs. He also offers him a flat for his 
mother. Pinball hurts himself by cutting on the face. Liam calls an ambulance. Jean is 
set free, and Liam surprises her with the new flat. He holds a house-warming party at 
which Chantelle reluctantly joins. The next morning, Jean returns to Stan. Chantelle 
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tells Liam that Jean doesn't love either of them. Realizing that Jean is controlled by 
Stan, Liam stabs him with a knife Douglas had given him. It's his 16th birthday. 
The film touches upon a lot of the problems posing the old industrial cities. I 
take the broken families and self-salvation through drug-dealing as two key themes 
for analysis, as I see that the film is more about the lack--of love, of care and of a 
long list of basic necessities for a child not yet 16. 
Brokenfamilies: The desperate needfor mother's love. 
Like Leigh, Loach's films since the 1990s has shown more concern about 
family, but his families are full of more serious troubles. Liam's family is marked by 
poverty, lack of care or love and by brutality. Liam has an abnormal and miserable 
childhood marked by neglect and violence. His mother has not shouldered the 
responsibility of taking due care of him and his sister. Liam has been put in children's 
home and has played truant often. At the start of the story, he's not been inside school 
for nine months. He's been selling stuff since he was seven. He now survives by 
peddling stolen cigarettes with his best friend and fellow truant, Pinball. Pinball 
shares similar background. His father is a junker. Later in the film, when 
sub-wrapping drug into small bags, Pinball asks Liam not to worry about his 
professionalism, as "I used to watch my dad do this sometimes. He was good at it." 
The mother's present boyfriend, Stan, is a villain. Liam's granddad is no better. 
When Liam refuses to cooperate in smuggling drugs into the prison and, on coming 
out, throws the gear away over the fence, the granddad and Stan even beat him 
together and threaten to break his legs next time so that he will "be walking like 
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Charlie Chaplin!" Actually, violence has been a long-time nightmare haunting Liam 
and Chantelle. As Chantelle cries near the end of the story when Liam intends to beat 
her: "Just like Granddad, like our fathers! Like Stan! Like all the other losers!. .. Like 
our mam! Be one of them because that's what you are!" 
Growing up in such a background, for every kick and punch he endures, Liam 
has to be violent to defend himself. While nursing his wounds, Chantelle tries to 
persuade him out of violence. She refers to his frequent fights against his tormentors 
at the children's home: "You didn't fight them because you were brave; you fought 
them because you didn't care what happened to you. That's what broke my 
heart .... How can you really care about us if you don't care for yourself, eh? ... All 
wee Calum's got in the whole world is me and you. Nobody else." 
Matthews argues that the mother's neglect seems to inspire greater emotional 
attachment from Liam towards her, so "her benign neglect spurs him on to ever 
greater possessiveness and need" (2002, p. 56). In the prison visit, Liam gets to know 
that his mother is this time in prison for something set up by Stan. Stan wants her to 
be in to pass drug to the prison women so that he can get fortune off their boyfriends. 
This is what he can no longer bear: "You took the rap once for that bastard. This isn't 
going on anymore. It's finished." Realizing that Stan's influence and control is vicious, 
Liam is determined to rescue his mother from having to go back to Stan when she is 
released. 
Determined to have a normal family life once his mother gets out of prison, 
Liam sets out to create a safe haven beyond their reach. But raising cash for his 
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caravan is no easy job for a teenager. Obviously the money he earns through selling 
stolen cigarettes in pubs with Pinball is far from enough for the down payment on the 
caravan, so he resorts to stealing gear (drugs) from Stan to fasten the speed at 
predictable risks. He also regularly sends his mum tape to cheer her up, telling her 
that he has a surprise for her when she gets out and keeps counting the days left: "Just 
61 days, Mam. The day before my birthday." He makes great effort in setting 
reconciliation between the alienated Chantelle and their mother. Yet Liam's longing 
to reconstitute a family life is seen only as a fantasy. The emphasis is "upon people 
striving for some form of agency--above all, struggling to break with a generational 
heritage of violence, poverty, and the lack oflove" (Bromley, 2003, para. 5). Pinball's 
destruction of the caravan, though too cruel for Liam to bear, is reasonable in the 
sense that it presents the painful longing of the powerless to belong (Bromley, 2003, 
para. 11), as he cries to Liam: "J would have done anything for you." 
The caravan stands as highly symbolic. For Matthews, it is "the street kid's 
version of an Arcadian idyll--plentiful fishing and plastic flowers on the doorway" as 
well as "the merest glimpse of freedom" (2002, p. 56), whose burnt destruction is to 
extinguish all hope. The caravan Liam spotted is with two bedrooms, telly, 
microwave, and beautiful lake view. Liam and Pinball picture a dream life here: 
"Imagine here at night with a clear sky. Wee fishing rod, couple of cans, couple of 
hens as well;" "No cunt telling you what to do;" "Paradise." When he later visits 
prison, he is eager to show the photo to his mother and emphasize the property 
ownership: "It's our caravan. Not the council's, not the bank's. It's ours, Mam. I've 
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bought it ... I've paid a deposit and a first installment ... Nobody to annoy us, no 
junkies, no polis. Just me and you. And Chantelle and Calum, if they want. .. It's in 
your name, Mam. It's yours." 
But paying is no easy job; Liam has to collect £4,500 to be payable by the 
30th of November. And he cheats his sister about the source of money, claiming 
getting money through selling vanloads of fags: "I'm a businessman." The hardship 
with the payment makes Pinball's burning destruction all the more pitiable, 
suggesting his crazy desperation. 
Liam is also making great effort to unite the whole family. After he is offered a 
flat by Douglas, he tries to persuade his sister to move in to live together with him and 
their mother and to give the mother one more chance. 
Chantell's attitude toward the mother is full of resentment. She hates her so 
much that she does not want to have anything to do with her. As she tells Liam: "she 
didnae want me. She didnae want you." When Liam tries to find excuse for his 
mother's past neglect of his sister, stating "She was only a wee lassie then," she 
confirms that "nothing's changed!" Chantelle warns Liam to keep a distance as well. 
To this, Liam accuses her: "Because you're not giving her a chance." She is "scared" 
at Liam's invitation of living together with mother and later reluctantly moves in for 
the housewarming night. When Liam knows the next morning that his mother is gone 
and enquires her, she answers with mocking anger: "Gone where she normally goes. 
The same 'usual' as always." She asks Liam to give her up: "Liam, let her go. She'll 
drive you mad." Then she utters the harshest attack on the mother's inability to care or 
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love: "It's not that she doesnae care, she cannae care! She's a fucking crazy lost wee 
soul and she's gonnae ruin you too!" But Liam wouldn't listen. He blames his sister 
for saying something nasty that drives the mother away. When the sister tries to stop 
him from looking for the mother by hiding one of his shoes, he even intends to play 
violence on Chantelle. 
Liam is simply desperate for parental love from Jean. He goes to Stan's place to 
look for Jean and asks her to leave with him so that "just me and you" stay together in 
the flat he has just got for "a fresh start." He even begs: "Can't you see that? I need 
you, Mam." But Mother refuses to go, saying "Liam, you don't understand." Stan 
mocks aside that "You can send one of your fucking tapes" with "Mummy, I love 
you" cry. He then rudely orders Liam to "Do as you're told. Leave." This greatly 
irritates Liam, who finally loses his sense and stabs Stan angrily. It all happens on 
Liam's sixteenth birthday. 
The title of the film is sarcastic. Life surely isn't sweet for Liam or his equally 
underloved mate Pinball. The mother in this film is even worse than the mother in 
Ladybird, Ladybird. Both have suffered from violent father and partners, but in 
Ladybird, Ladybird, Maggie's love for her children is never doubted. She is only 
deprived of the custody right due to her once serious neglect (causing her son to be 
burnt) and all the time she has been trying to win back the children. But here Liam's 
mother is simply not capable of loving her children. She is willing to stay in prison for 
something she did not do, though there must be some untold reasons behind, as she 
tells her son, "Liam, you don't understand." Jean is depicted as a typical loser mother 
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image. With the absence of the mother almost throughout the film, "what Liam has 
been deprived of is his image of his mother" (Rolinson, 2005, p. 253). 
The only sweetness comes from the sister. Chantelle is tender, loving, tough; 
"not just the stereotypical teenage, single parent but also the bearer of mothering and 
love throughout--a carrier of hope" (Bromley, 2003, para. 9). Time after time, like a 
battered boxer who refuses to give up, Liam returns to Chantelle, who "patches up his 
wounds and soothes the hurt" (Bromley, 2003, para. 9) She invites Liam to stay, but 
under strict pre-conditions of no swearing, no smoking, no farting, because "It's bad 
for Calum." Her sense of responsibility towards her son is clearly illustrated in her 
determination to protect him from what she has suffered: "What happened to us isn't 
going to happen to him [Calum]. Never. Over my dead body, and I swear it. I want 
peace in this house." It is also shown from the fact that she is enthusiastic to do 
anything available to feed his son. Her dream to secure a part-time job in a call center 
is warm but bitter to audience. She treats the night class for the 0800 call center work 
seriously and proudly declares that "I came first in my test" and is "dead chuffed" that 
"I've got myself a job in a call center." She even invites Liam to join the training. She 
shows deep worry and concern about Liam, "Liam, look at the state of you. Look at 
yourself. You gonna get yourself sorted out? .. Promise me." The sister is a kind of 
"substitute mother" (Rolinson, 2005, p. 253) to Liam, always there to care about him. 
But nothing can remedy Liam's desperate need for love from his mother. 
Self-salvation: drug-selling. 
Drug crime is a theme throughout the film. Yet what's unique here is that the 
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focus is more on what drug dealing/selling means for the dispossessed youth. 
Bromley argues that we seem to be told that, in a situation of deeply-structured 
inequality, "the only access to images of wealth and privilege for the 'underclass' is 
through theft or drug dealing--crime as the only career move possible" (2003, para. 4). 
When child poverty is a big issue, especially in Scotland, crime is seen as the only 
available option. Besides crime for profit, it can also be just for fun as resistance, e.g. 
Liam directs a driver into crushing a policeman's motorcycle and steals the helmet. 
And sarcastically, one needs to treasure the chance, as Douglas tells Liam, "Listen, an 
opportunity like this for someone like you only comes once." In Sweet Sixteen, 
Liam's drug-selling is taken as a kind of self-salvation. 
Desperate to try to build a proper family home, Liam needs money. In trying to 
acquire it, he displays wittiness and entrepreneurial skill that has little other outlet for 
him. 
After he is kicked out by Granddad, Liam and Pinball spot with a telescope that 
Stan hides drug under some boards in the yard protected by dogs. Liam reckons that 
cutting in on Stan's heroin business is the only feasible way for fast money. So he 
breaks into Stan's yard at night to get the gear despite the obvious risk. Pinball joins 
him on the condition of sharing the profits by "50-50," which is very business-like. 
When they get the stuff, Liam and Pimple tum themselves into drug sellers and they 
are quick to learn. Again with the telescope, they monitor that in one afternoon, 42 
people have come to Stan, and Liam decides to go short cut by cutting them off so 
that "we could do more business in an afternoon than we do in a week." Pinball is 
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afraid of the high danger, so Liam does it himself. But soon he is beaten to the ground 
by three guys with his gear snatched away. Then we see Liam rise up, chase, being 
beaten again, rise up again ... This repeats several times until Liam gets back his gear 
when Pinball comes to his help. His tough spirit tells us his determination of not 
losing a penny for the caravan. 
Their unregulated selling catches the attention of the local professional drug 
gangster Douglas and Tony (Martin McCardie). They catch them, check Liam's arm 
and find he's clean. "You may be a breath of fresh air, kid," said Douglas, hinting that 
he can be a reliable seller (can't be using and not selling). Pressed by the remaining 
mortgage, Liam now targets big and wants to win Douglas as a steady supplier. "If we 
prove we can do this-that's a big fucking if-he's going to get us a regular supply. 
The more we sell, the bigger our cut." Liam ignores Pinball's warning; all he concerns 
is how to do bigger and better: "We've got to prove ourselves. Sell more than 
anybody else without getting caught. We've got to move fast. That's the secret." Liam 
then smartly hits upon the idea of making use of pizza delivery-fast speed and good 
guise. He wins the cooperation of the local pizza delivery mates and they start to 
deliver drugs by hitching a ride on their mopeds. Liam compensates the late delivery 
losses of pizza boys with generosity. 
Liam's enterprising, inventive mind and his toughness soon impress and win 
appreciation of Douglas. When Liam is thinking of doing big together with Pinball in 
partnership, Liam is told to do alone. And he is put to serious trial: he is told to kill a 
man in a toilet with a lethal knife. With great nervousness and struggle, he passes the 
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trial. Douglas offers to supply drugs to him and buys the pizza place in Tony's name 
for him to run in disguise. He asks him to buy new bikes, pick some good boys and 
run the business. He even offers him an apartment to shelter his mother. But he wants 
Liam to punish Pinball for destroying his car and club first before collecting the key. 
"An opportunity like this for someone like you comes only once," Liam is told. So 
Liam has no choice but to go and report back that it is done. 
As Liam climbs to higher levels of the local underworld, we can sense the irony 
here on the Thatcherite ethos of entrepreneurial self-help. If Liam and Pinball's 
collecting 25 pence from kids in order to look at the stars through their telescope is 
clever self-help "business," their later drug business is clearly not. It is revenge. 
Matthews argues, "When the highest legitimate goal we hear about is a part-time job 
at a call center, it isn't remarkable that he should be embarking on a career as a petty 
gangster" (2002, p. 56). The solid advantages of crime for the culturally dispossessed 
are not just material, but also spiritual--security, status, companionship and even 
self-esteem. 
The film also shows the reversal of generational roles. Children have to take on 
the role of adults, such as Liam and Chantelle. And in a bizarre way, it is Douglas 
who offers Liam a kind of "fatherly care," providing him with a luxury apartment and 
designing him a promising future: "And if it works out and I think it will, Liam, you 
can buy it over a period of time." And the reason is simple: "You work for me, T take 
care of you. As easy as that." Bromley points out that, in a world lacking father's love, 
"it is a profound irony that Liam's only 'fathering' bond is with the man whose gifts 
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will help to destroy him" (2003, para. 8). 
The story ends with Liam on the riverside, alone, fighting back tears. His sister 
phones him and asks where he is, he answers "I don't know." Then the sister tells him 
that everybody is looking for him and the police have been round. She regrets for him, 
"Oh, Liam. What a waste. What a waste. It's your birthday, you're 16. Did you know 
that? What are we going to do? Eh?" With the sad sigh, Liam ends the call: 
"Chantelle, my batteries are running down." In the final scene, Liam, with his back 
facing the audience, gazes out over the river and faces his future. In the last crucial 
moment, it is the sweet sister, who earlier has told him that their mother is incapable 
of loving them, phones him to say "I love you, Liam." The absence of his mother 
affirms Chantelle's verdict and totally breaks Liam's dream. We can easily imagine 
the immense sadness and despair in this 16-year-old boy. Liam's desire to use his 
"head" instead of knife simply won't work. 
Stylistically, Loach used a mostly non-professional cast of young actors coming 
mostly from the deprived areas of Western Scotland where the film is set. They really 
gave the film a documentary-like feeling. 
Sweet Sixteen was given an "18" certificate by the British Board of Film 
Classification mostly for its strong language, e.g. the frequent use of the word "cunt," 
an act which was bitterly attacked. "It was ridiculous," said the producer. "My son, 
who was eleven at the time, saw the film and said there was nothing that he had not 
heard in the school playground when he was eight" (Hayward, 2004, pp. 258-259). 
The classification was overturned to "15" by the local authority in Inverclyde Council 
230 
where the story is set, so that those who were most prominently represented on screen 
could see the film in cinemas. Bristol made the same reclassification. 
Films of Loach, Frears, Leigh's 1990s film Naked, Gary Oldman's Nil By 
Mouth all share a profound pessimism. The characteristic pessimism makes this group 
of films in sharp contrast with films of the optimistic "feel-good" films which will be 
dealt with in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY IN 1990s SOCIAL REALIST COMEDIES 
Working class representation was carried more strongly into the 1990s when the 
economic and social damage brought by globalization, local industrial decline and the 
restructuring of the labor market led to the redefining of British traditional working 
class as non-working "underclass" in a post-industrial context. Similar to the New 
Wave but different from the 1980s, the 1990s' films were more characteristically 
"men's films" with an obsessive focus on white, "male no-longer-working class" 
(Monk, 2000a, p. 156), projecting pessimistic images of alienation and masculine 
anxiety and a world of disintegration. Apart from the somber critical films by 
independent directors and the youth problem films, a group of feelgood comedies 
emerged, represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997), Brassed Off (Mark 
Herman, 1996) and Billy Elliot (Stephen Daldry, 2000). They created humorous and 
comically absurd moments within the serious context of unemployment and its effect 
on male characters. The Full Monty describes the job-seeking Sheffield steel workers 
regaining self-respect through collective stripping; Brassed Off depicts Grimethorpe 
miners in the process of pit closure regaining self-pride through their brass band 
championship in national competition. Billy Elliot centers on a young boy Billy, who 
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struggles to win the support of his widowed father and elder brother, both are on 
strike in the context of the 1984-5 miners' strike, for his talent as a ballet dancer and 
ends up playing the leading role in Swan Lake. This chapter will deal with these more 
commercialized comedies, or tragi-comics, that have found huge worldwide success, 
with focus on two films-- Brassed Off and The Full Monty. 15 
Exploring the heavy issue of unemployment and industrial decay in a comic 
way runs the risk of appearing not serious enough or uncaring. Yet in the 
representation of working class, British cinema has had Ealing comedy of the 1950s 
as an important tradition, producing laughter through playing with notions of "English 
eccentricity." The 1990s feel-good comedies have been widely seen as both a 
continuation as well as an extension of certain traditions of Ealing comedy (Mather, 
2006, p. 29), for which they were also termed '''neo-Ealing' comedy-dramas" (Mather, 
2006, p. 18). 
But the tendency was more determined by the market-oriented nature of British 
film culture of the 1990s. In more fierce competition and broader cooperation with 
Hollywood, low-budget British films bore the pressures of commercialization and 
employed feel good comic style for market success. Simon Beaufoy, screenwriter of 
The Full Monty, revealed in an interview that the humorous elements pervading The 
Full Monty were part of a calculated attempt to make the film more appealing to a 
15 Hill regards these two films as "delayed" 1980s' films due to the setting of de industrialization and unemployment, yet he feels "It 15 
wUlkely" that the films "could have worked so effectIvely as comedy" If they "had actually been made during the early 1980s" (Hill, 1999, p. 
168) when the struggle to prevent the closure of heavy mdustries was still ongoing. Monk suggests that in their consistent expression of the 
problems of the post-mdustnal male as problems of gender, the two fIlms are "very much films of the I 990s" (Monk, 2000b, p 279). 
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wider audience: "we did sit down and say, 'Let's see if we can make a film about 
working-class people which working-class people will actually want to watch.' 
Uberto Pasolini. .. saw that the way to do this was to make it funny. Ken Loach's work 
has got funnier and funnier over the years, because I think he's realized that comedy 
is a way of pulling in audiences .. .It's a way of sugaring the pill- and sadly you now 
have to use more and more sugar." (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 6) Beaufoy also 
complained that in so doing, "political messages have to be so hidden in films these 
days that they are almost invisible" and he saw Ken Loach's Riff Raff (1990) as 
playing a "braver game" (as cited in Wayne, 2006, p. 290). 
The Full Monty won the most successful box-office in mid 1990s. Funded and 
distributed by Fox Searchlight, it cost only £2.2 million in production, yet spent 
around £25 million in distribution and marketing, and took $211 million worldwide in 
box office (Dyja, 2010, p. 99). Anne Dudley won Academy Award for Best Music, 
Original Musical or Comedy Score, and the film won nominations for Best Director, 
Best Picture and Best Original Screenplay. It also won BAFTAs for Best Film, Best 
Performance by an Actor in a Leading Role (Robert Carlyle) and Supporting Role 
(Tom Wilkinson). Brassed Offwas a less commercially successful film, but was quite 
popular at home and won much critical praise. Funded and distributed by Channel 
Four, the film cost about £2,53m and earned £3,388,319 in UK box office and $2.5 
million in US box office (Dyja, 2010, p. 109). The film won awards in France, 
Germany and Japan, and some British awards of lower level than the BAFT A. The 
soundtrack album of the Grimethorpe Colliery Band sold 60,000 copies and was 
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nominated for aBAFT A. To boost sale, regional cultures of north England were 
packaged for visibility in American market. Location shooting was taken and 
relatively unknown actors were used for realism effect. 
The two films share similar themes like unemployment, anti-Thatcherism, a 
northern community under threat, poverty and marital breakdown, suicide attempts, 
brass bands, collective support and a climax ending. Despite the feel-good mood, both 
films are in essence "elegies" for working-class (Dave, 2006, p. 61), and in this 
respect, Brassed Offis a far angrier film. 
Brassed OJJ(Mark Herman, 1996) 
The film was set in the small Yorkshire mining town of Grimley ten years after 
the 1984 miners' strike and tells the story of how the Grimley Colliery bass band, in 
existence for a hundred years as old as the mine and the only remaining source of 
community pride, competes for championship in the national brass band competition 
when the colliery community faces the threat of pits closure and unemployment. The 
Tory government is reviving a new round of pit closures and 7 pits have already been 
closed. The miners are now deciding whether to fight to keep the pit open or vote for 
redundancy. A few members are thinking of quitting the band as they cannot afford 
the weekly "kitty" payment, but are temporarily persuaded to carry on by their 
passionate band leader Danny (Pete Postlethwaite), a retired miner, and attracted by a 
newcomer to the band, Gloria (Tara Fitzgerald), the beautiful granddaughter of a 
former band leader. Gloria is returning to her home town to conduct a viability study 
of the pit for the British Coal Board. But she soon realizes that her report will not be 
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read as the decision to close the pit has been made two years ago. The brass band wins 
the national semi-finals, only to find that most miners have voted for redundancy so 
as to get the generous immediate redundancy payment. Danny, having worked all his 
life in the pit, collapses with pneumoconiosis and is rushed to the hospital. His son, 
Phil (Stephen Tomkinson), is in debt and loan sharks strip his house empty and his 
wife leaves him with the children. In great despair, Phil breaks down at a Harvest 
Festival clown performance, in which he attacks God for creating the heartless Tory 
Party, and he soon hangs himself at the colliery, but is saved. The band cannot afford 
to take part in the final in the Albert Hall in London. But Gloria contributes her 
unemployment pay-off money of £3000 to help. The band travels to London and won 
the competition. But now Danny realizes that it is a hollow triumph. The film ends 
with Danny making a powerful emotional winning speech on stage about how the 
miners have been betrayed and disposed by the Tory government and shocks the 
audience by refusing to take the trophy, though the trophy is reclaimed by other 
members. 
The film develops clearly along two lines, the political, around the pit closure, 
and the cultural, around the colliery band. The former is heart-breaking whereas the 
latter is heart-warming. The film's first 12 minutes economically introduces the major 
characters and with balanced weight provides us with the context of the imminent 
closure of Grimley Colliery, one of the few Yorkshire pits to survive the 1980s, and 
the community bond of brass band which is cherished by its leader above anything 
else. Then, to fit in with the comedy format, there is a gradual shift in scale and focus 
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which makes the band the central issue, trivializing the closure issue as a side line or a 
back drop. The world of the colliery brass band and its conductor is explored with 
comic and romantic sentiment, added with inspiring music. But beneath this surface 
line, the film takes basically a serious look at a British mining community and focuses 
on the stress and despair faced by the miners and their families as their source for 
making a living, the mine, faces closure. In so doing, it exposes the political and 
management strategy of choosing efficiency and profit over the welfare of the miners. 
Working-class identity is fully displayed in their response to the political and cultural 
changes. 
The film begins in darkness, with a series of glittering spots gradually moving 
closer to us in a dark background, accompanied by the beautiful music of brass band. 
These images soon become identifiable as lamps worn by miners on their cap to lead 
their way out from the depth of the earth to daylight. The coal-digging together, the 
communal showers and fun-making are soon followed in contrast by women in the 
street protesting against the anticipated pit closure, to whom the miners wave to show 
respect on their way returning home from work. Gloria moves into the town, settling 
in a small inn. Then Vera (Sue Johnston) and Rita (Lili Roughley), both miner's wife, 
were chatting over a backyard fence, stating their sympathy and support for the band 
to close if the pit shuts down, since there is no point in carrying on the one without the 
other. Between them a grey-haired man reading his popular paper speaks one sentence 
"You get used to it,,,16 which seems to indicate the dilemma of miners in the face of 
16 Quotations in this chapter with no citations are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films. 
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social changes wrought by unemployment. Then we have Jim (Philip Jackson) and 
Ernie (Peter Martin) discussing about quitting the band to avoid weekly payment, 
since they can only spend on "essential items." Next, we hear a more comprehensive 
coverage of the context through TV reporting: "We visit Grimley Colliery, which 
despite being one of the oldest and largest mines in Yorkshire coalfield has 
nevertheless become the most recent candidate for closure. Although the Grimley 
miners, and their wives, seem very determined to fight on and keep their pit open, a 
redundancy offer to the workforce is believed to be imminent. Other redundancy 
offers at neighboring pits recently have been too attractive to ignore. In the last few 
weeks, 7 pay-off packages have been offered to 7 pits. All accepted, leading to 7 
closures." An urgency is established as "Representatives of union and management 
meet tonight to discuss the Grimley redundancy offer to be put to the Grimley 
miners." Between the reporting, we see women in the street chanting "The miners, 
united, will never be defeated." We also see Phil pressed by his wife to take 
redundancy payment. At the rehearsal, the band leader Danny tries to boost morale 
with his passion for music. With all contradictions displayed in the film's first 12 
minutes, pace slows down for deeper exploration and representation. 
The political. 
With the political line, capitalist hypocrisy and Thatcherism are all under severe 
attack; working-class poverty and despair and working class consciousness are 
explicitly displayed. 
The management, represented by Mckenzie (Stephen Moore), the managing 
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director of the Coal Board, is marked by shameless hypocrisy. The Coal Board hires 
Gloria to conduct a survey on the future viability of the pit, and Gloria naively 
believes that with her report showing Grimley as "a profitable pit," she can "help it 
stay open." Mckenzie's proclaim on television that "Nobody wants Grimley to close" 
is viewed by Gloria in her room. When she gradually senses the half-heartedness of 
the management, Floria goes to Mckenzie and is assured that her report is "vital" and 
"absolutely paramount." He tells her, "If this pit goes to review, and we hope it will, 
we have crucial decisions to make and we can't make them without detailed accurate 
reports from highly qualified people such as yourself," although he hints that the 
business is "tricky." When Gloria finishes the report and hands it in, nobody seems to 
show any concern about it. Gloria is immediately awakened to realize that she has 
been cheated and made use of. Reports "have to be seen to be written," but "are not 
written to be seen;" "no one will ever read." When Gloria challenges Mckenzie that 
the decision to close the pit "wasn't made today-it was made weeks ago," to her 
surprise, she is told the cruel truth that the decision was made "two years ago" and 
"Coal, is history, Miss Mullins." 
Mckenzie is "the smiling, insincere, manipulative symbol of the government" 
who does his job "with the minimum of emotional involvement and the maximum of 
efficiency" (Dyja, 2010, p. 112). He "oozes fake charm" (Dyja, 2010, p. 112) in 
duping Gloria and cheating the public and suffers no moral guilt about making 1000 
men redundant. He has full confidence in his vicious strategy of bribery at union 
consultation and the outcome of miners' decision turns out to be as he foresees. Shots 
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of his smiling face after being informed of the result of the ballot on his mobile phone 
indicate how false he has always been when he claims earlier that "No one wants 
Grimley to close." 
Capitalist management tries to disintegrate working-class solidarity with 
blackmail. So, miners are offered two options. The first one is favored by the trade 
union leaders; they can "vote to take pit to Review Procedure" so that they can get "a 
decent chance" of keeping the pit open. The second, they can "vote to take pay-off" 
and get stuffed. To lure the miners into voting for money, the management raises the 
redundancy offer to a further £3000, "from a twenty grand maximum to twenty three 
with a five grand sweetener" and makes it only a temporary offer. As explained by a 
union leader, "If you say no, they're pulling any future offer down to a flat fifteen," 
which is "tantamount to bribery." Obviously the miners are "held to ransom" as the 
generous offer put on the table "comes with strings attached" (Dyja, 20 10, p. 112). 
The redundancy payment is really "dirty money," representing a ruling class seeking 
to divide and buy off the miners so that they will not vote for a review of the 
economic status of their pit. 
So the miners face dilemma. On the one hand, they have a clear class 
consciousness of the cold-bloodedness of the management, which is clearly illustrated 
through the mouth of a union leader at the union meeting hearing about the offer: "It's 
a profitable pit, this. There's hundreds of years of coal down there, but it doesn't seem 
to matter to them, bastards. We're making money for'em, hand over fist, we are. And 
still they want to shut us down." The union proposal asking miners to "Say no to 
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bloody blackmail and yes to keeping this pit alive" in ballot is warmly cheered. But 
on the other hand, they are pressed to take the money offer by the poverty-stricken 
economic condition. Phil is urged by his wife Sandra (Melanie Hill) to "Take money 
while it is still on offer," before they are "out on bloody street." The Thatcher attack 
on strikers and trade unions has removed their confidence and weakened their will. 
The shadow of the 1984 strike hangs over the film as a miserable memory, as Phil 
says "We didn't do what they wanted in '84 ... That's eighteen months on bloody 
strike pay. With a wife, bloody kids, mortgage." Phil was imprisoned for his union 
activities and dismissed by the pit in that strike. It took a year and half to get him 
reinstated, leaving him with debt he is "still frigging paying for." Now the miners 
can't see a sense of hope that they'll succeed against the authority. So the miners 
represented by Phil are tom between the will to fight for principles and the will to 
survive. In the end, a majority of miners, 798--"four to one"--vote for redundancy in 
the ballot, much to the expectation and satisfaction of Mckenzie. Phil votes for money, 
but is full of frustration and anger towards capitalists and the Tory government. So, 
money "distorts the vote by making it an unreliable representation" (Dave, 2006, p. 
63). 
Andy (Ewan McGregor) is sadly heroic in declaring to Gloria that he will vote 
to keep the pit alive: "No hope, just principles," a promise he keeps. He appears to be 
sharper than others in seeing through McKenzie's trick on Gloria that the decision to 
close the pit has been made long ago-- "probably when you were at college," and in 
accurately anticipating the ballot result--"Four to one it'll go for pay-off." 
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Working-class poverty and despair is also prioritized by the film, particularly 
represented by the suffering of Phil, indicating masculinity in crisis. The threat of pit 
closure undermines the men's self-confidence and hardship in daily life throws them 
into despair. Phil's difficulty is as his wife Sandra (Melanie Hill) lists when shouting 
to ask him to vote for the redundancy payment: "You have a wife and 4 bloody kids 
here, a house nobody'll bloody buy, mortgaged up to the bloody hilt, loan-sharks on 
our backs, no bloody money, no bloody job, and what are you going to do?" In a local 
shop, Sandra is seen greatly embarrassed by her shortage of £1.5 to pay for the very 
essential groceries. After returning one item, she is still short of sixty pence, which 
Vera kindly allows her to give back next week. Sandra sighs: "Me and money, total 
frigging strangers." In giving the receipt, Vera secretly passes a five-pound note to 
Sandra in sympathy. To earn some money, Phil works occasionally as a children's 
entertainer and dresses up as Mr Chuckles in clown outfit. At one such occasion, he is 
observed by a mother paying him that being a clown isn't his main job. Phil answers 
that he is a miner, and adds that "You remember them, love? Dinosaurs, dodos, 
miners." His home is twice looted by moneylenders. The first time, Phil is just back 
from a clown performance and he rushes to stop them clumsily in huge clown's feet. 
His made-up smiling clown face and funny movement is contrasted with those of the 
menacing loan sharks, creating a sense of a tragi-farcical situation. Phil is knocked to 
the ground by a punch in the face. The sequence ends with their threat that they'll be 
back with truck for all his things unless he pays up. The second time the loan sharks 
simply efficiently take away everything in the home with the wife in tears and the 
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kids in terror, when Phil is playing in the semi-final. 
His predicament is a result of the 1984 strike. The pass of ten years has 
accumulated his debt to the unbelievable amount of £12,000 due to "that interest" of 
loan sharks. His situation is further worsened when he purchases a new trombone in 
credit payment in order to please his dying father. The looting of his home by loan 
sharks leads to his wife's departure with all the kids. Under the double pressure of 
family break-up and his father's imminent death, Phil is on the verge of a mental 
breakdown, as is revealed by his absent-mindedness at job-finding club (ironically 
named the "Rescue Room") built on the former pit-site and by his sitting miserably by 
a canal. There is no work of any substance on offer for the redundant men. He suffers 
enormous humiliation as a breadwinner, when he finally loses his "wife, kids, home, 
job, self-respect, hope." So he hangs himself from the top of the pithead, but is saved. 
The scene from long shot of him hanging high up there in clown clothes to immediate 
close-up of him struggling with the noose around his neck calling "Help" is 
melodramatic, but chilling; "the joke isn't funny anymore" (Dyja, 2010, p. 114). 
Capitalist exploitation is cruel and cold-blooded. The mining job is dangerous 
and harmful. Danny appears to be dying from black lung which he has caught by his 
life-long work down the mine before retirement. And he is not alone in suffering from 
that. Gloria's grandfather, Arthur Mullins, "bravest miner" in Danny's words, had 
lungs packed in 1979. Danny tells his son when he is hospitalized: "I was alongside 
Arthur Mullins everyday of his working life. They say when they opened up his lung, 
there were nowt in there but coal dust. Slack. Slack everywhere. Took them a week to 
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get t'slab clean." The final shot in the film is a close-up of Danny's face, "a lifetime 
of striving and suffering engrained in his proud features" (Mather, 2006, p. 33) 
Thatcherism is forcefully condemned through the discourse of the father and 
the son. Phil, after the loan sharks loot his house and his wife and children leave him, 
continues his clown performance as Mr Chuckles in church celebration of the Harvest 
Festival with children. In a profound state of personal despair, he breaks out with a 
fierce attack on the Tory Party and Mrs Thatcher. According to him, God created the 
Tory party in an irresponsible and vicious way. When his little assistant reported to 
him that "we've got all these bodies left, but we're right out of brains, we're right out 
of hearts and we're right out of vocal chords," God simply responded "Sew 'em up 
anyway. Smack smiles on their faces and make them talk out their arses." Thus God 
created the Tory Party. Then he continues to scold God for taking lives of good people, 
such as John Lennon, three young miners and his dad, but let "Margaret bloody 
Thatcher" live. Yet Phil's attack is seen by Mather to be weakened by his guise as a 
clown, his rather inappropriate audience of a group of six-year-olds, and his state of 
nervous breakdown (2006, pp. 39-40). In contrast, Danny's speech at the end of the 
film in the glamorous Albert Hall to a decent concert audience is seen to be "the 
greatest moral and emotional statement" (Dyja, 2010, p. 113). Danny has kept a 
detached stance toward the political and industrial confrontations. But in the end, he is 
shocked into reality by Phil's suicide attempt and explodes in condemning the 
"bloody" Tory government, which over the last ten years "has systematically 
destroyed an entire industry" and mining communities "all in the name of progress." 
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He also adds attack on the public's general apathy toward working class fate. 
In general, politically, the film is "less interested in mining than in what this 
work means to a community predicated on its availability" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 25). 
Only a few seconds in the opening sequences and in the middle of the film are 
devoted to real miners at work, emerging blackened by the soot of coal and having 
group shower afterwards. The defeat of the 1984/85 national miners' strike has led to 
the loss of working-class people's power of political struggle. The political analysis is 
"broad brush and gestural" and class is "evacuated from both work and outside of 
work as a mobilizing factor in organization" (Bromley, 2000, p. 62, p. 63). More 
space is given to community life around the pit closure--the weakened and divided 
solidarity, the pain and despair of redundancy, the loss of self-respect and the 
destruction of community. In the context of job insecurity, weakened union leadership, 
many people resign to their fate, become depoliticized and can only resort to the 
cultural as resistance. Harry is an example. As his wife scolds him, "Ten years ago 
before the strike you were so full of fight, packed full of passion; now you just do 
nowt. All you do is blow your bloody trumpet." To this, Harry's response is: "But at 
least people listen to us." The film does show some human costs of closure in a few 
powerful and moving scenes, but this is somewhat eroded by the sentimental magical 
resolution in fantasy and victory, with the defeated workforce overshadowed by the 
victorious band. 
The cultural. 
The cultural line develops around the brass band and the mining community. 
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Hoggart in Uses of Literacy observed that working-class culture was in terminal 
decline. Yet Macnab drew our attention to the fact that Brassed Off "suggests how 
prolonged its dying throes have been" (1996, p. 44). The colliery brass band is seen as 
the cultural embodiment of the history and traditions of industrial communities, 
suggesting local pride and masculinity. In the case of coal miners, it symbolizes a 
class-specific form of solidarity in the face of a dangerous and exploitative occupation, 
providing an outlet for men in ups and downs. In the film, Danny, the conductor of 
the band, delivers several speeches in camera close-up defending devoutly the brass 
music. 
Danny persists in following his dream of winning a national championship, 
even though he is deathly ill with "black lung." For him, the band is "one thing more 
than owt else here that symbolizes pride." So the pit under threat is a minor issue 
compared with regional and national band competitions and is a "separate" matter. 
Acknowledging the reality as "worrying times," he draws members' attention to the 
band's long history of "[0 ]ver a hundred years" from 1881, in which the band 
experienced "two world wars, three disasters, seven strikes, one bloody big 
depression" and "played on every flaming time." The band will be the only one 
reminder of what he terms a "hundred bloody years of hard graft." He takes great 
pride in seeing the band now entering the national semi finals and is capable of going 
through to the Albert Hall in London for the first time in its history. For Danny, "This 
is music, and it's music that matters." When his son, also in the band, tells him that "I 
love the band. We all do. But there's other things in life, you know, that's more 
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important," he simply responds that "Not in mine, there isn't." 
Danny's passion for the importance of music and his striving for excellence is 
"rooted in a respect for northern working-class traditions of self-education, and of 
communities who refuse to be ground down by external pressures" (Mather, 2006, p. 
33). As he speaks to his band, "They can shut up the unions, they can shut up the 
workers ... they'll never shut us up. We'll play on. Loud as ever." 
The competition scenes set in fourteen Yorkshire villages act like carnivals with 
numerous trade bands marching and playing proudly, displaying a sense of a thriving 
local brass band culture and community spirit. During such performances, may be due 
to pints of beer, the Grimley band produces some inharmonious tunes and Phil's old 
trumpet falls apart. Danny is horrified by the casual attitude and ashamed that 
audiences are "Laughing ... bloody laughing at us." For Danny, the band's 
disintegration represents a lack of respect for the beauty of music, and an offence for 
working-class predecessors of the band. Bromley infers a deeper implication of this 
poor performance as the "emasculations" of the work force (2000, p. 62) 
Coming back, Danny wants his debt-ridden son to buy a new trombone: "you're 
a bloody good trombonist lad, you need a bloody good trombone." But Phil replies, 
"I'm not forking out for a new trombone just for one performance." Yet the father's 
deathly ill coughing prompts Phil to buy a new trombone to "make him die happy" as 
Phil tells his son, putting a down payment earned from clown performance without 
informing his wife. 
The band and its "surprisingly rousing and emotional" music (Macnab, 1996, p. 
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44) seem to serve as the last straw miners can cling to in a postmodem environment 
for community and collectivity. The cultural is highlighted to warm people's heart 
whereas the political is overshadowed as a doomed cause. Gloria's audition is intercut 
with scenes of the union representatives and the Coal Board officials negotiating 
together. The elegiac music performed by the band completely covers men's voices in 
the crucial discussion. We only see union representatives angrily waving arms, but 
never hear what is actually argued. Alexander Walker in his Evening Standard review 
of Brassed Off suggested that "Loach wouldn't have missed this class-confrontation 
opportunity" (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 36). The implication of the sequence 
appears to be that "nothing that is said by the union officials can deflect the moves 
afoot to close down the mine" (Mather, 2006, p. 36). The music chosen for the 
audition is from Cancierta de Aranjuez, written by a Spanish composer during the 
Spanish Civil War. It is thought to suggest a desire by the makers of Brassed Off to 
"imply a link between the struggles of the Republicans in the Spanish conflict ... and 
British miners made redundant since the I 970s" (Mather, 2006, p. 35). 
Similarly, the semi-final performance sequence is interwoven with scenes 
around the pit ballot results, which happen simultaneously-the announcement of 798 
votes for redundancy, the different reactions of the miners, Sandra's despair at 
discovering Phil's credit buying note when washing his clothes, Mckenzie's happy 
face when informed of the result, and men emptying Phil's home with a truck. Miners 
and town-folk are portrayed walking in slow pace and heavy footsteps, in silence and 
with heads down, an image of immense sadness. The sublime music and the winning 
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of the semi-final with 198 points appear hollow when the band returning home is 
greeted by words in red "We fought and lost" written on the Grimley Colliery sign 
board and a town in mourning, a bitter irony and contrast to the band which has just 
fought and won their semi-final. Shot from behind, Danny walks away alone from the 
crowd and suddenly collapses to the ground in front of their eyes. The band, led by 
Phil, rush to his aid, their worried faces convey a vivid sense of the urgency and 
despair. At this moment, "personal crises and social tragedies are inextricably linked" 
(Mather, 2006, p. 38). When Danny is hospitalized, Harry organized a performance of 
"Danny Boy" outside the ward building with the lighting by their mining caps, which 
is turned off in the end, creating a darkness of sadness. 
It is the cultural that offers a utopian solution to an unsolvable problem. The 
climax of the film comes when the band is determined to do a good job "for a 
thousand redundant miners and one poorly one" at the Royal Albert Hall in London. 
William Tell Overture "surprisingly thunders out with rage and power" (Dyja, 2010, p. 
114), suggesting "lowly members of the community rising to stake their rightful place 
in society" (Mather, 2006, p. 49). Harry (Jim Carter) replaces the sick Danny as 
conductor and conducts in a charismatic and impassioned style. In the middle of the 
performance, Danny, who escapes from hospital, emerges onto the stage. When the 
Grimley Colliery Band is announced the champion of the national brass band 
competition, the miners win back their dignity, respect and pride in the applause of 
audience. Danny'S lifetime aspiration is seemingly accomplished. So the narrative 
"seems to have solved an economic predicament through a humanist gesture to 
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community spirit" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 25). But this is as far as cultural consolation 
can go. Here, an ironic turning point appears as Danny goes to the front of the stage 
and delivers a bitter speech about his newly developed understanding about the real 
meaning and worth of music in the midst of mass unemployment and dashed hopes. 
He tells the hall audience (and the film audience in extension) that they are refusing 
the trophy: "This band behind me will tell you that trophy means more to me than owt 
else in the whole world. But they'd be wrong. Truth is, I thought it mattered. I thought 
that music mattered. But does it? Bollocks! Not compared to how people matter. Us 
winning this trophy won't mean bugger all to most people. But us refusing it, like 
what we're going to do now- well then it becomes news, doesn't it?" After a pause to 
attract camera attention, he targets the Tory Party for his fierce attack: " ... over the 
last ten years, this bloody government has systematically destroyed an entire industry. 
Our industry. And not just our industry. Our communities, our homes, our lives. AlI in 
the name of progress and for a few lousy bob." Then he draws audience attention to 
the band's pit closure a fortnight ago and criticizes public apathy toward miners' 
miserable fate: "Another thousand men lost their jobs. And that's not all they lost. 
Most of them lost the will to win a while ago. A few of them even lost the will to fight. 
But, when it comes to losing the will to live, to breathe, the point is, if this lot were 
seals or whales, you'd be up in bloody arms. But they're not. .. They're just ordinary, 
common or garden honest, decent human beings. And not one of them with an ounce 
of bloody hope left. They can knock out a bloody good tune. But what the fuck does 
that matter?" The speech ends with Danny gasping emotionally and close to tears. 
250 
From music matters to people matter, the public display of anger and dismay from a 
meek retired miner makes the message all the more powerful. And the sudden shift of 
mood from buoyant, inspirational music to angry discourse condemnation which 
denies the film an optimistic or hopeful conclusion makes the surprising ending all the 
more shocking. 
The band succeeds in winning the competition, but has failed in the effort to 
keep the local coal mine in operation. The men thus meet with triumph and disaster 
simultaneously, but in essence the triumph is emotional and symbolic whereas the 
disaster is economic and fatal. 
Working-class solidarity and collectivity is much prioritized in the film. While 
political solidarity is disintegrated by the forceful management and weak union 
leadership represented through the dirty pay-off money, the traditional working-class 
culture of collectivity and community spirit is presented as superior in the film. The 
working-class men are frequently seen to visit the pub drinking and playing together, 
to have regular band practices and rehearsals in their practice room; their wives chat 
at the backyard. After the failed suicide attempt, Phil, when found sitting sadly by a 
canal, is pushed for a drink with the team by Jim and the gang, despite his admission 
that he has voted for the pit to close. Dave drew our attention to the binary opposition 
of the vicious taking by pitiless neo-liberal market and its representative, the pit 
manager Mr McKenzie, vs. the working-class collective spirit of humanized giving. 
The giving includes: the payment from band members to their collective "kitty;" the 
"credit" given to Phil by the music shop; the "collection" to buy a gift for the 
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hospitalized, dying Danny; Gloria's donation; and the loan/gift given to Sandra in the 
community supermarket. Such kinds of giving are "non- productive expenditure" 
aimed to "sustain precious rituals of working class socialization." It represents "a 
rejection of the competitive individualism of the market and symbolizes a 
working-class moral economy whose values are co-operative and communal" (Dave, 
2006, pp. 63-64). The band solidarity is the most inspiring. However, on balance, it is 
a bit idealistic and utopian. Gloria's donation repeats many similar endings in English 
literature where a legacy or a fortune solves those unsolvable harsh social problems. 
The role of women. 
Women in Brassed OfJare placed in subordinate and marginal positions, except 
Gloria. The community under threat is a men's world. Women are not allowed to play 
in the colliery band and are excluded from the working-men's club. A performance 
trip is "traditionally ... a male-only excursion." Despite this, the female characters are 
represented rather positively. 
First of alI, they are firm supporters of the just cause of miners. They run 
rallying tents with slogans like "Women Against Pit Closures" and protest in the 
colliery streets chanting "The miners, united, will never be defeated." Their 
enthusiasm is respected by the men, although their behavior is seen to be naIve by 
some wiser male characters, who comment that women are "pissing in the wind, like 
the rest of us." Harry's wife is actively involved in such activities and her scolding 
Harry of losing the spirit to fight seems to take effect as Harry eventually regains it to 
take over Danny's conductor role in the final competition. Two wives dress in purple 
252 
and later even dye their hair purple, the color of the band uniform, as a gesture of 
solidarity and support for the band, despite one of them has asked her husband to 
resign and not to handing over any kitty money. 
Phil is urged by his wife Sandra to vote for money and Sandra later leaves Phil 
in hopelessness. But her such behavior can win our sympathy as we see that she 
almost has to bring up the kids with no financial support. She is quick in realizing her 
misunderstanding of Phil, as her son Shane informs her that the father buys the 
trombone not for himself, as she has thought, but to please the granddad to die happy. 
The son seems mature beyond his age, seeing through his father's covering of 
economic dilemma and persuades his mother "I don't like seeing Dad sad, Mam, but 
I'd sooner see him sad than not see him at all." The question the 
eight-and-a-half-year-old Shane asks his mother "How the hell do you die happy?" is 
heartbreaking for his mother as well as for the audience. The film finally gives us a 
happy resolution to Phil and Sandra's break-up, with Sandra saying "That sounds 
tempting" in response to Phil's invitation "I have got a chair now" (in his empty 
house). 
Gloria represents a modern new woman, educated out of the working class and 
economically independent. There is an element of fairy-tale in the way that she is 
depicted. Gloria is first "introduced as a love interest and sex object" (Dyja, 2010, p. 
115), subjected to male gaze and sexist humor (referred to as "Gloria Stits"). Her 
attractiveness is the reason why some band's men decide not to resign. Then, when 
she is seen to have a "management logo on her key ring," she is objectified as a class 
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enemy of the male working community, despite her claim to them that "I am on your 
side; I always was." Andy is mocked by his mates as "sleeping with the enemy." 
Gloria appears naive and politically insensitive. When Andy tells her that the decision 
to close the pit has been made long ago-- "probably when you were at college," she 
retorts "don't be ridiculous" in disbelief. But when she finally discovers that her 
report is really a public relations gesture to cloak the management's trick as Andy has 
predicted, she immediately resigns. In the end, she becomes a savior, almost a saint. 
When the band men are worrying about breaking Danny's heart who "is coughing up 
coal" by not competing in London, Gloria hands over what she calls the "dirty 
money" of her sack-off payment--a check of £3000, to enable the band to travel to the 
Albert Hall to attend the final. By being "a 'magical donor,' a helper and facilitator" 
(Mather, 2006, p. 40), Gloria wins the respect and trust of miners and is treated as one 
of "us." So, the success of the men is also "dependent upon the involvement of 
women" (Hill, 2000a, p. 185). 
Gloria's relationship with Andy forms a romantic sub-plot necessary for a 
commercial film. She seems to play the upper hand all the way through. At the 
beginning, she pretends not to remember the name of Andy-her teenage lover; in the 
middle, she easily rekindles the love fire by asking him for a cup of coffee in her 
room which she does not really have--"a euphemistic cup of coffee" (Dyja, 2010, p. 
115); in the end she hints Andy to kiss her by commenting on Yorkshiremen's 
traditional lack of showing emotion. Her resignation makes her a loyal and more 
equal partner for Andy, so she wins love through downward mobility. 
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Gloria typically represents the postmodern rising women. Her class mobility 
gives her a power of choice which is exercised positively; her donation of a good sum 
of money to fund the band trip demonstrates her economic power: though 
unemployed, she is confident that she will be able to find ajob soon. 
The film ends with the band, as ex-miners, journeys home In a victory 
celebration on an open top bus through the darkness of a London evening. As they 
pass the Westminster parliament building, Danny suggests playing what he terms as 
"Land of Hope and bloody Glory" to "make them listen for a change," implying the 
loss of social justice as a Thatcherite legacy. The emotional rendition of "Pomp and 
Circumstance" continues into the closing credits. The captioned postscript undercuts 
the comedy-fantasy to a great extent: "Since 1984, there have been 140 pit closures in 
Great Britain at the cost of nearly a quarter of a million jobs." The band is finally seen 
fading away into the darkness of a London evening towards a gloomy future. 
In conclusion, Brassed Off embodies enough necessary ingredients to be a 
typical working-class film, though the claim that "it comes close to being socialist" 
might be arguable. The film is "a powerful tribute, impossible to watch without tears 
at times, to a dying way of life" (Bromley, 2000, p. 63). However, with the 
stereotypical and commodified representation, it is seen as more like "a period piece, 
almost a costume drama" (Bromley, 2000, p. 63). A heavy subject-matter is dealt with 
in feel-good brass music and arousing emotions. 
The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) 
The film is set in the post-industrial city of Sheffield in West Yorkshire and tells 
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the story of a group of unemployed steelworkers who learn to do striptease to earn a 
living. Sheffield was once a prosperous steel city, but now it has fallen into ruins with 
the steel factories closed and thousands of men losing their jobs. Gary, also called Gaz 
(Robert Carlyle), is a former steelworker and about to lose his son because he cannot 
pay for the joint custody. His former co-workers are also going through difficulties: 
Dave (Mark Addy) is depressed and convinced that his wife is not interested in their 
marriage any more; Gerald, their former foreman, has been lying to his wife for six 
months about his unemployment; and Lomper (Steve Huison) has to take care of his 
elderly mom and is suicidal (attempts to gas himself in a car). When passing by the 
local work men's club holding a women's night only for the performance of the 
Chippendales, an all-male striptease troupe, and seeing many women paying for it and 
hysterically cheering it, Gaz hits upon the idea of copying their fortune. So he 
persuades his mates through all kinds of means, including trouble-making at Gerald's 
job interview. The four of them come together and recruit Horse (Paul Barber), who is 
black and slightly older with good dance moves, and Guy (Hugo Speer), who cannot 
dance but is exceptionally "well-endowed." This is an unlikely team because they 
have neither good looks nor excellent dance skills, so Gaz realizes that they have to 
offer something special to lure a lucrative audience. Hence, the guys are going "the 
full monty," which means going totally nude! Gaz proceeds to advertise with posters 
and he announces to women on the street that their show will be more worth watching 
than the Chippendales because they will go "the fulI monty." The police raid and 
arrest for indecent exposure during an "undress" rehearsal brings unexpected publicity 
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for these "steel strippers" and boosts tickets sales. The film ends with the men's 
performance and the last shot in freezing frame of "the full monty" with their front 
facing the club audience but their back towards the cinema audience. 
While Brassed Off sets its story in the middle of a cruel industrial dispute and 
exerts direct attack on Thatcherism and the management, The Full Monty is a 
follow-up story set in a post-industrial context, providing a portrait of the 
consequences of Thatcherism in a already much deindustrialized community and 
involving the search for new forms of livelihood. In content, direct reflection of 
politics is an obvious absence. Stylistically, it is a funny lightweight comedy. But 
beneath the surface, like Brassed Off, it explores quite serious issues. There is a more 
intense crisis in masculinity centered around shame and loss of self-esteem. And 
while Brassed 0fffocuses on Danny, Phil and Gloria, The Full Monty pays attention 
to all six members of the stripper team. With regard to themes, Peter Cattaneo, 
director of the film, says in the foreword to the published screenplay: "Issues of male 
identity, gender roles, body politics and the effects of long-term unemployment are 
dealt with ... " (as cited in Bromley, 2000, p. 64). For Hill, the "connection between 
unemployment and the erosion of masculinity becomes central" (2000a, p.184). Monk 
lists "the unemployed males' desperation for work, loss of self esteem and consequent 
relationship difficulties" as key focus of the film (2000a, p. 161). 
The film begins with a promotional documentary feature Sheffield-City on the 
Move (Coulthard Productions, 1971). The male voice-over narrates the prosperity, 
livelihood and joys of Sheffield based on an infrastructure of steel: "Welcome to 
257 
Sheffield! The beating heart of Britain's industrial North! The jewel in Yorkshire's 
crown is home to over half a million people, and thousands more flock here daily to 
shop and to work. All this is built on Sheffield's primary industry, steel. The city's 
rolling mills, forges, and workshops employ some 90,000 men and state-of-the-art 
machinery to make the world's finest steel. From high-tensile girders to the stainless 
cutlery for your dining table. But it's not all hard work for the people of Steel City. 
They can spend the day lounging by the pool, watching one of our top soccer teams, 
or browsing in the shops. But when the sun goes down, the fun really starts in the 
city's numerous nightclubs and discotheques. Yes, Yorkshire folk know how to have a 
good time! And it's good times for the city's housing, too! Sheffield leads the way in 
town planning. Victorian slums have been cleared to make way for the homes of the 
future. Thanks to steel, Sheffield really is a city on the move!" The film presents a 
sunny city with fountains, indoor shopping centers, football, almost tropical parks, 
swimming pools, the bright lights and neon signs of Sheffield's nightlife, and more 
importantly, shots of steel foundries and men at work. 
Then with the big characters "25 years later" on screen, the film cuts 
immediately to the contemporary reality of the city in sharp contrast, with shots of a 
disused steel factory and idle workers. Gaz and Dave, accompanied by Gaz's son 
Nathan (William Snape), are attempting to steal a girder to sell as scrap metal. The 
son complains that this isn't what other boys and their fathers do when they are 
together. Having once been employed in this very factory "for ten years," the men are 
now reduced to petty thieves surviving on its remains. A rehearsing brass band 
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associated with the factory (the British Steel Stocksbridge band) is seen passing and 
taken by Gaz as "the only thing round here," echoing the band culture in Brassed Off. 
This sharp contrast implies how two decades of Conservative policies have eroded the 
city's prosperity and its steel industry, leading to an important theme of the film: 
anger and despair towards de industrialization which has turned working class into the 
underclass. Thematically, the film develops around three lines: crisis in masculinity, 
cultural resistance through job innovation of striptease, and reversal of gender roles. 
Crisis in masculinity. 
While crisis in masculinity in Brassed off is mainly in the aspect of losing 
breadwinning power, the issue in The Full Monty is presented as multi-dimensional 
centered around shame. 
Gaz is ashamed of being unable to look after his son and prove his worth to his 
ex-wife Mandy (Emily Woof). He is desperate to maintain his relationship with his 
son Nathan. Mandy has settled with a new partner in a more affluent part of town. She 
threats to rid Gaz ofthe right for joint custody through legal procedure unless he pays 
his maintenance share of £700. Gaz also cannot afford his son to watch the football 
match between Sheffield United and Manchester United. So Gaz is mad for cash. As 
he explains to his son, he intends to take striptease "so as you and me can keep seeing 
each other. They're trying to stop us, you see." Meanwhile, Gaz is embarrassed about 
not being able to pay the £ 1 00 deposit for their performance venue. His desperation 
leads him to reluctantly take Nathan's precious bank savings when Nathan insists. 
Gaz is mentioned by his son as having stayed some time in prison. Now he continues 
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to hold an amoral attitude to petty cnme, secretly picking rusty girder and 
encouraging Dave to steal the Flashdance video and later a black suit for Lomper's 
mother's funeral from the supermarket where Dave has just worked as security guard, 
displaying explicit underclass features. Stealing, for Gaz, is "liberating" as he tells his 
son. 
Dave seems to have lost his self-esteem and is ashamed of lacking sexual 
appeal to his wife. He becomes increasingly self-conscious about his body size and 
tries dieting. He feels that with his jobless status plus his weight problem, he cannot 
possibly be attractive to his wife. His depression kills his sex drive and his poor 
self-image makes him fearful that his wife Jean will leave him. Throughout the film 
he is labeled as "a fat bastard," which normally he can easily laugh off when he has a 
job. The idea of stripping heightens his anxieties. He wants to earn money and show 
his worth but he cannot. He reluctantly takes security guard work, but quite clearly 
this does not help his esteem. His problem is as Jean notices: "it's like he's given up. 
Work. Me. Everything." But she does not know how to help him. In the private 
bedroom, Dave even asks his wife whether she has been out with a black bloke, 
implying his feeling of sexual inadequacy. Dave's lack of self-confidence hurts 
deeply his wife and their marriage. 
Gerald, the former foreman, is ashamed about being unemployed. He has been 
out of work for six months, but has not dared to inform his wife. And the longer he 
delays, the more difficult it becomes. So he pretends to go out to work each day and 
tries every effort in an attempt to maintain his traditional breadwinning role and the 
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living standard of his family. Indeed, we see him seriously applying for jobs and 
going through an interview. He is annoyed at the disturbance by Gaz and Dave during 
the interview. When he feels that his performance has been fatally ruined, he is near 
the stage of breakdown. In chasing them for a fight, he calls them "bastard," and tells 
his pressure of responsibilities: "I've got a standard of living! Responsibilities! I was 
on me way up! I am on me way up! It was my first interview in months!" Finally 
some men sent by loan sharks come to loot his home and his wife learns the truth. 
Lomper, at the beginning part of the film, attempts to kill himself by inhaling 
poisonous fumes in his car, but is rescued by Dave. Ironically, he has a job as a 
security guard of the disused steel factory and even plays in the works band. Yet the 
job is of low esteem as Gaz sighs: "No wonder he wants to kill himself" after 
knowing his work. He appears to be a social misfit and a loner without a single friend. 
He lives at home with his elderly mother, who needs being looked after by him. Later 
he is shown to have homosexual tendency as he takes the opportunity of escaping 
from a police raid to kiss and fondle Guy. 
As their innovation is amateur striptease performance, their attention is 
naturally diverted to the scrutiny of their own bodies. Dave is extremely nervous and 
uneasy that his overweight body cannot live up to feminine ideals. In a dance practice 
at Gerald's home, when Gerald consoles him that "Fat is a feminist issue," Dave 
replies "What's that supposed to mean?" implying that he takes it as a universal issue 
also applicable to men. In another scene when the men are practicing again in 
Gerald's house, making use of his wife's sunbed and exercise bike and are looking at 
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a copy of the woman's magazine, Cosmopolitan, Lomper's comments on women 
having too big tits inspires them to consider how they will be looked at in much the 
same way as men have traditionally looked at women. Their masculinity crisis around 
the body is more overtly conveyed. Dave expresses deep fear not only about himself, 
but also about other team members: "what if next Friday 400 women turn round and 
say 'He's too fat, he's too old and he's a pigeon-chested little tosser,' What happens 
then, eh?" After that, Dave wraps his stomach in cling film. Horse is worried about 
having "a doggy hip" and uses a penis enlarger (a pump) in a vain attempt to "live up 
to the bawdy connotations of his name" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). Among them, Guy has 
a perfect body, worthy of male pride. He is muscular and "well-endowed." When he 
shows his penis at the audition, the men are speechless at the size and Gaz exclaims, 
"Gentlemen, the lunchbox has landed." Yet, ironically, Guy turns out to be gay and 
later gets close with the rather pale and weak Lomper. 
News about doing the full monty frightens everybody. When Gaz says that 
"We've gotta give them more than your average ten-bob stripper," everyone shows 
worrying concern about his own "willy," which would be "A laughing stock. Totally!" 
Yet Gaz justifies that "folks don't laugh so loud when you've a grand in your pocket." 
Three days before the performance, Dave quits the group and takes on a security 
guard job in a supermarket. When the men are arrested by the police for indecent 
exposure during another rehearsal in the disused steel factory, their project seems 
doomed, but is rescued by the newspaper publicity. 
At the final stage, Gaz, the initiator of the whole venture, ironically refuses to 
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get on stage when he sees men in the audience, not "Women only!" as their poster 
defines. His shout--"It's suicide! That's what it is! Suicide!"-reveals his lack of 
confidence with his body. Only with his son's encouragement and assurance that his 
ex-wife's partner does not come that he finally joins others. 
The crisis in masculinity also leads to the infantilization of unemployed males 
and the reversal of generational roles (Bromley, 2000, p. 64). In the film, the 
unemployed men are childlike, behaving like adolescents. They wander in the streets 
and play in children's playground (sitting on swings). They wait for Gerald in a 
children's playroom. They act like undisciplined schoolboys in the job club, playing 
cards and having fights. To ruin Gerald's interview, they distract him with a 
puppet-show battle, which takes place outside the window behind the backs of the 
interviewer, using his beloved garden gnomes to attack each other. Gerald finds 
himself fatally distracted, especially when one gnome smashes another. So we see an 
angry and emotional Gerald condemning their lack of concern: "Bastard! That were 
mine, that job! You don't give a toss! You're kids!. .. Why did you do it?" Gaz and 
Dave later apologize by sticking it with superglue and buys him a four-wheel toy cart. 
The men also hold very funny rehearsals at various places. For Caplan, the fact that 
everywhere seems to have become a playground for them serves to highlight that 
"they no longer have any place in which to be grown-ups" (1997, p. 43). 
Gaz's little son Nathan conversely seems to be the most mature male character 
in the film, behaving like an adult. He shows understanding of his father's love for 
him by staying with him a lot, disapproves of his father's striptease idea, his petty 
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crime of stealing girder and his suggestion of gatecrashing football matches, and is 
willing to pay for Gaz's venue deposit. He also "acts as Gaz's conscience" (Dyja, 
2010, p. 104). When Gaz hesitates at last minute, it is Nathan who successfully brings 
him onto the stage by helping him win back self-confidence with such words: "I'm 
gonna get really annoyed with you. They're cheering out there. You did that. Now get 
out there and do your stuff." 
Bromley's statement best summarizes the state of men: "The male responses 
are seen to be, variously, depressive, suicidal, child-like and regressive, self-pitying or 
fantasy-adjusted" (2000, p. 65). This crisis in masculinity is deep and fatal. As Gaz 
comments to Dave at the job club about a woman's urinating standing up, "when 
women start pissing like us, that's it. We're finished, Dave. Extincto .... A few years 
and men won't exist, except in a zoo or summat. We're not needed no more, are we? 
Obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." "Like skateboards," Dave adds. The 
determining role of economic base is recognized. When Gaz challenges Dave for 
allowing his wife watch striptease: "where is your pride?" Dave says "It's her 
money." 
Cultural resistance: job innovation for post-working class. 
Unlike Brassed Off, which has direct anti-Thatcherism attack, the political in 
The Full Monty seems to be an absence. Work scene only appears for a few seconds in 
the 1971 promotional documentary. Although Gary and his friends are out of work 
and lead a desperate life, they do not resort to any political actions or voice any 
vicious political condemnations. There is no mention of trade unions or other 
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organizations for workers; the working men's club is shifted for striptease 
entertainment; and the job center where the redundant meet is not treated seriously. 
Like Brassed off, community spirit functions not in political struggle, but only in 
cultural resistance and self-healing. Bromley has a point in suggesting that the film 
"removes class as a dimension of analysis, which means that the interests of capital in 
de-skilling, downsizing and privatizing remain an 'absent content'" (2000, p. 65), 
though the statement that this is due to fore grounding of gender and identity politics is 
highly arguable. According to Bromley, in appropriating the slogan "the personal is 
political," "the political has only a muted presence" (2000, p. 65) throughout the 
representation. 
The political anger in the film is communicated via a more indirect critique 
reflected in their attitude toward work and more mocking cultural resistance toward 
Thatcherite ideology through doing striptease. 
Gaz's attitude toward work is thought-provoking. Though desperate for money, 
he constantly challenges the postmodern order by refusing to take on what he regards 
as low-esteem poorly-paid menial jobs. His wife pushes him to get any job available 
and suggests giving him one in the packing section of her factory at £2.50 per hour, 
but it is turned down by Gaz, describing the kind of job as "£2.50 an hour in Black 
Hole of Calcutta," disposable and under-paid. Later, in attempting to borrow money 
from Mandy for venue deposit, he again rejects her offer of work. In so doing, Gaz 
tries to keep his dignity as an experienced skilled steelworker. 
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In the film, the job of security guard is frequently taken as a reference example 
to convey Gaz's attitude. It has actually been an expanding kind of occupation in 
postmodem society. At the beginning after they have saved Lomper's life and known 
that Lomper is a security guard in the disused steel factory, Gaz sighs: "No wonder he 
wants to kill himself." Then, when Dave quits the team due to lack of confidence with 
his body for the full monty, he immediately gets a security guard job at a supermarket. 
Gaz tries to take him back, saying "you're worth more than that." 
Gaz and his mates are not treating reemployment seriously. Gaz invites his son 
to accompany him to the "job club," saying "That'll be a right laugh." The interview 
prank is followed by a fight between Gerald and Gaz, "accentuating the impression of 
a school classroom situation getting out of control" (Mather, 2006, p. 44). Though this 
can be taken by the authority to blame the redundant for their lack of 
self-responsibility, we can detect the sense of despair and depression amongst the men 
beneath the surface of childish mischief and abrasive banter. The prospect of "decent" 
jobs for them looks dim. 
Gerald, Gaz's former supervisor, forms a contrast in attitude toward looking for 
reemployment. His active and serious approach accords with what the dominant 
ideology approves as individual responsibility. What Gaz and Dave see as fun with 
their prank to ruin his interview is felt by Gerald as sheer cruelty. With apology from 
Gaz and Dave, Gerald agrees to be the choreographer, coach and a dancer of the 
group. Finally he discovers that he has got the job despite the prank. This conversely 
implies that management work is less rare. 
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On the other hand, Gaz demonstrates his elastic mind, keen vision, and smart 
leadership qualities. The loss of work deprives men of a public space, "feminizing 
them and turning their interests towards their bodies" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). Having 
an excess of free time and an absence of money, the ex-workers are forced to look 
more closely at themselves. The case is quite like the punk subculture of the 1970s, in 
which jobless youth only had their personal bodies to own and make use of. The 
1990s witnessed the thriving of male striptease as a lucrative business, typically 
represented by the Chippendales. Gaz is smart to realize that putting on a successful 
performance not only can earn quick money but also is an alternative way to reclaim 
identity, pride and self-worth. When they see the female crowd watching 
Chippendales striptease, Dave figures out the potential profit of ten quid per ticket for 
a thousand people, and Gaz instantly comes to the conclusion that "It's worth a 
thought." He persuades his mates by luring with profit: "Folks don't laugh so loud 
when you've a grand in your pocket." Ironically, Gaz's entrepreneurial zeal and free 
market economy success via the male striptease performance shows him "taking on 
rather than embracing the core of Thatcherism" (Dyja, 20 10, p. 103). As the writer of 
the screenplay points out, "literally and metaphorically men were being told to shape 
up, get fit, get smart, and get sexy" (as cited in Bromley, 2000, p. 65). The only way 
out seems to be an individual enterprise, finding a niche and increasing your market 
chances. But the team does not seem to have discovered an easy way to "lottery" 
wealth as they cannot live on a once-only performance. Their popularity is not due to 
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self job creation, but the audience's emotional admiration for their courage. What is 
unsolved is how long the new self-respect and reflexivity will survive. 
The loss of public space leads to more male body-consciousness. The redundant 
masculine bodies change into male strippers and by the close have succeeded in what 
Herbert Marcuse in Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (1955) 
described as the aim of "making the human body an instrument of pleasure rather than 
labor" (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 50). Dyja explores the significance that "Perhaps 
their striptease symbolically releases them from having to take on any job, in the 
reluctant way Dave worked as security guard, and quite literally liberates them by 
shedding the constraints of a uniform and revealing their manhood" (Dyja, 2010, p. 
107). The stripping of security guard uniforms in the final scene is further suggested 
by Bromley to be "a significant comment" on the low esteem of the job-poorly paid 
and ununionized-and also about "stripping off traditional male body insecurities" 
(Bromley, 2000, p. 66). 
In this job innovation, community collective spirit is much highlighted. But this 
collectivity is not political; only the works band is still going, seen several times 
playing seriously, carrying on the working-class cultural tradition. The de-unionized 
working class members have lost its ability for collective action and even the capacity 
to identify their common interests. The film makes great effort in providing collective 
solutions to personal problems. Where once the steel works gave men their 
livelihoods and a common bond, it is now gone forever. What can unite them now are 
the job club, the dole queue and the striptease rehearsals. Lomper gains a new sense 
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of meaning and confidence in life from community friendship. At the beginning of the 
film, he intends to commit suicide, but is rescued by Dave. His pitiful remark 
"Haven't got any mates" leads to Gaz and Dave offering him immediate friendship. 
Then through integration into the stripper team, he identifies his homosexual 
orientation and eventually finds happiness in his relationship with Guy. Gerald is 
another example. Despite his consciousness of his different status from all others as 
he claims "1 used to have a proper job," he is increasingly attached to the team and 
even allows the mates to practise stripping off in his front room. Their expected 
exposure is unexpectedly interrupted by the arrival of loan sharks, who threaten to 
take away the house belongings as Gerald owes them £120. At the crucial moment, in 
an extremely funny way, a half-naked Dave tells the men to "Put down and piss off," 
and at once all team members stand in a line, the sight of which indicating a 
homosexual orgy party encourages the debt collectors to quickly flee away. However, 
the reprieve is only temporary as Gerald's possessions are eventually taken away from 
him. Gerald only owes them "120 quid," but they are taking his belongings away as 
"second-hand. " 
Bound by the common mission of fulfilling a successful performance, the group 
is seen to be always together in the films. As Caplan observes, The Full Monty is 
"about group therapy, in both visual and narrative terms. Conversation, admission of 
need and collective action provide the only solutions to these men's situation. Talking, 
training, attending funerals or stripping, they are framed and filmed as a cohesive (if 
volatile) unit." (1997, p. 43) Yet paralleling this collective solidarity, it is worth 
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pointing out that the men take up more responsibilities than the angry young men of 
the 1950s, and are even more home-centered than them. Many of the group scenes in 
the New Wave tradition of poetic realism with "that long shot of our town from that 
hill. " 
The final full monty performance ending is amusing and powerful and has been 
much commented upon. Dave returns for the big night and Gaz overcomes his last 
minute nervousness, encouraged respectively by the wife and son. In front of an 
excited crowd, the men go on stage and conduct their performance accompanied by 
the beautiful sexy song You Can Leave Your Hat On sung by Tom Jones with great 
machismo. The old steelyard works band, in which Lomper is a member, is there 
providing the musical accompaniment. The six performers wear a costume similar to 
Dave's security guard uniform. Dave introduces their act by stating that they may be 
neither pretty, good, nor young, but "We're here. We're live, and for one night only 
we're going for the full monty!" For their sheer bravery, the audience cheer with 
applauds. The group dance in their amateur steps and step by step take off their ties, 
shirts, leather belts, trousers and throw them respectively to the crying crowd. The 
ecstatic audience include performers' wives, the police who have arrested the strippers 
and a few men. There are reaction shots at key time of audience who are specially 
related to performers on stage, e.g. shot of Mandy enthusiastically cheering Gaz's 
arrival and close-up shot of Linda hiding her face in Dave's shirt which she catches. 
By the time the thongs come off and the hats cover the dancers' private parts, the men 
swing their bodies with buttocks facing the audience in a move that brings the men 
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into a formation, with smirks on their faces. The crowd is reaching a feverish pitch, 
chanting "Off, off, off." Then the men turn to face the audience and as the music stops 
they toss their hats into the air and are caught in the famous teasing "full monty" 
freeze-frame shot with the image filmed from the rear. Tom Jones sighs off the last 
line with an extended cry, playfully instructing "You can leave your hat on" when in 
fact the hat is flying. 
With the success of the performance, the men seem remasculinized. They are 
back where they belong, centre stage, no longer marginalized in their own club as in 
the opening scenes. So, having reinvented themselves, class is back and men are in 
demand, the focus of attention, with a new kind of self-esteem as women come to 
working-men's club "Cos of us. Men." In their first practice, the audience laugh at 
them. This time they are not "laughed at, but laughed with" (Bromley, 2000, p. 67). 
Different from female stripping, the decision to expose themselves to the full is made 
by the men themselves. By showing their manhood in a public space again, the 
unemployed "boys" have become "men" again. The reconstruction of masculinity 
around men's bodies drives away their shame about it and resumes the tradition of 
celebrating of the male body for working-class pride. As Dave tells the audience, "we 
may not be young, we may not be pretty, we may not be right good, but we're here." 
The posters advertisement "Hot Metal--W e dare to be bare!" suggests the message 
that these men are "not the scrap which they initially feel themselves to be, but hot 
and malleable material indeed" (Caplan, 1997, p. 43). 
However, such remasculinization "feel-good" ending is naturally ambivalent 
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and flawed. Hill notes that the final screen scene avoids the full frontal nude display 
as the film's title promised and as a female stripper might have been expected to do. 
The effect of this is to "rescue the characters from the degree of indignities which 
such shots would have entailed" (Hill, 2000a, pp. 184-185). Despite the freeze frame 
that "literally fixes the moment of triumph," the performance can be no more than "a 
one-off event and not a permanent solution to the men's economic problems" (Wayne, 
2006, p. 295). Monk is more critical of the film's politics and argues that the ending 
that the ex-steel workers appear to remould themselves "with only temporary pain" 
into paid performers in "the creative and entertainment industries" is "problematic" 
and represents a Blairite celebration of neo-liberal entrepreneurial ism. The film 
proposes a career "that replaces the sale of labor with the commodification of the 
body." (Monk, 2000b, p. 285). In short, in return for their re-masculinization, the 
ex-steel workers have commodified themselves and have been commodified. 
Being creative and entertaining can be nothing but utopian solution. While it 
can be seen to be promoting the ideology that an individual can try all kinds of things 
for making a living, beneath this surface we see the inappropriateness of the model. 
To completely undress is not something dignified for maSCUlinity pride as the final 
rear shots hints. The kind of performance cannot last long as they do not have the 
build of professional strippers; so it is not applicable to more working people. 
Common sense would teach the general public that the film's identity reconstruction 
through the full monty and once-only gimmick lack universality as this is really not 
the sort of thing that real working-class can do for salvation. Reg (Bruce Jones), the 
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first applicant at the audition and is desperate to try anything for money, simply 
cannot overcome the psychological unease and is unable to transform taking his 
clothes off into an entertaining performance of stripping. He performs with 
unenthusiastic hesitation and soon halts the audition. In a medium close-up shot, the 
camera observes his uneasiness with the demands of stripping. He is similar to Phil in 
Brassed Off, who also lacks enthusiasm in reinventing himself as Mr Chuckles. As we 
are sure that Gaz and his mates cannot overcome their financial difficulty through this 
only-once performance, the fantasy solution can be viewed more as black humor, 
taking sarcasm as silent political attack and striptease as cultural resistance toward the 
ruling class, suggesting the missing of any hope for more sensible and dignified 
solutions. 
Reversal of gender roles. 
The representation of male-female relationship is marked by a reversal of 
gender roles as well as the continuing subordination and marginalization of women. It 
is widely acknowledged that this post-industrial male trauma was contrasted by the 
reversal of gender roles (Hill, 2000a, p. 184; Luckett, 2000, p. 95) with the shift in 
employment patterns. Women begin to enter spaces previously occupied by men and 
sometimes "at the expense of men" (Bromley, 2000, p. 65), "exacerbate[ing] men's 
plight" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). A blurring of male/female place and space can be 
identified. 
Women are shown generally to be confident with jobs and have a sense of 
pragmatic realism sadly lacking in their male counterparts. While Gaz and Dave steal 
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girder from the empty factory where they once worked, their wives all work full 
time--Mandy, Gaz's ex-wife, looks like having a senior job in a factory and Jean 
works in a decent supermarket. Mandy lives in a modem, detached house with her 
new affluent middle-class partner and a new car. She is annoyed by Gaz's lack of 
responsibility and general immature attitude to work and persuades him to 
realistically take any job available. 
Male striptease performance seems to have become a growing industry and 
men's traditional territory--the working men's club has been taken over by women as 
the venue for watching male strippers. So now men strip for money while women pay 
to watch, arousing a reversal of the male gaze. In such a women-only night at the 
beginning of the film, women pay for the male striptease show by the famous 
Chippendales, and they speak about sex, talk dirty and enter men's toilets in a way as 
bawdy as the men they are replacing. They use men's toilet (the only available in a 
working men's club) and a woman is illicitly observed by Gas as urinating standing 
up, representing "a symbolic appropriation of phallic power" (Hill, 2000a, p. 184). 
Though the scene seems quite surreal, the action leads to Gaz lamenting for man's 
obsoleteness and passing as dinosaurs, a condition imposed on them by the economic 
developments that create a feminized society. The traditional male gaze of women as 
sex objects (e.g. Gaz and Dave's points-scoring system of women who pass them by, 
Lomper's comment on female body in Cosmopolitan) is transformed in self-reflection 
into men scrutinizing their own bodies. At the end of the story, this gaze further 
develops into the female gaze of men as sex objects, through which the working men 
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have taken the club back, symbolically winning the battle over territory, though not 
through work, but through entertaining. We do not learn whether Gaz wins Mandy 
back by the end of the film and I see it as unlikely as the dance cannot play magic, but 
surely she is pleased that Gaz has finally made an effort and achieved something, 
Crisis in masculinity has led to breakdown of communication between men and 
women. Dave's inferiority conscience causes his sexual impotence and his timidity in 
being open to his wife about happenings around him. His wife Jean is later suspicious 
of him having an affair when she sees him coming back late all those nights and finds 
a red thong. It is only then that Dave is forced to explain that he is doing stripping 
with Gaz and other mates: 
Dave: "we'd make a bob or two taking us clothes off.. .We weren't that bad. Only I couldn't, 
could I?" 
Jean: "Why not?" 
Dave: "Well, look at me. Jeanie, who wants to see this dance? 
Jean: Me, Dave. I do. 
With this exchange of heart, their relationship is resolved. Jean's love immediately 
restores Dave's confidence, implying that men need women's love and 
encouragement in their effort to re-masculinize. 
Gerald and Linda represent a traditional couple with Gerald as breadwinner and 
Linda as housewife. Linda displays materialistic or consumerist passion. She is shown 
as loving luxurious furniture and housing facilities. She continues buying goods and is 
even booking skiing holiday on Gerald's Barclay credit card, without knowing that 
Gerald has been out of work for six months. When we seem to feel that she is all to 
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blame for Gerald's misery, the film ironically tells us that Linda's desire for material 
goods and holidays is not as great as her desire to know the truth: 
Linda: And this has been going on how long? 
Gerald: About six months. 
Linda: I can cope with losing the sunbed. Car. Television. I can even cope with the shame of 
everyone watching this. But six months! Six bloody months! And you wouldn't say to me, to 
your wife. 
Gerald: I thought you liked them. 
Linda: No, Gerald. I've never liked 'em. 
This breakdown in communication seems to lead to an ultimate tragic ending of the 
marriage. Gerald is thrown out by Linda. Unlike other mates who are childlike, 
Gerald is very patriarchal, clearly knowing his family duties. As he tells Gaz and 
Dave, "I've got a standard of living! Responsibilities!" The trouble with him is that he 
does not know how to communicate with his wife. He wants to shoulder everything 
alone so that his wife would "never have known." Linda at least can be blamed for her 
insensitiveness to Gerald's pressure and depression. 
The position of women in The Full Monty is more complicated than that in 
Brassed Off. Apart from women being depicted as the reason for men's dilemma by 
economically squeezing them out of jobs, they are also associated with consumerism, 
such as Gerald's wife Linda (Deirdre Costello), or snobbish upward mobility, such as 
Gaz's ex-wife, Mandy, which aggravate the problems of men. Linda's lust for 
consumer goods seems to prevent Gerald from informing her of his unemployment. 
Yet, such misogynist depiction is later counterbalanced. Linda is not that materialistic 
as she values honesty and truth more than consumer goods. Mandy is commented as 
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"one of the least likeable characters in the film" to change by Hill (Hill, 2000a, p. 
185). All through the film, Mandy is portrayed as snobbish, hostile, and 
unsympathetic, breaking with Gaz for a middle-class partner and even taking legal 
action against Gaz's joint custody. She presses Gaz to take any low-paid job. At the 
police office, she mocks that Gaz's "great money-making enterprise" equals to 
"pornography" and challenges that "Still think you're a good father?", to which the 
son lends his support for the father: "He is trying. " Yet, whatever is said about it, she 
finally appears at the club without letting his partner come (excusing that it is 
women-only) and becomes a part of the cheering crowd, thus achieving 
"proletarianisation" (Hill, 2000a, p. 185) at the film's end. Dave's wife Jean (Lesley 
Sharp) is treated more sympathetically as a loving and understanding wife. At the 
final performance, Jean catches Dave's shirt and Mandy gets Gaz's belt, things 
thrown by them to the audience. Such ending suggests hope for better mutual 
communication and understanding. Wayne is right in suggesting that Mandy's final 
presence "provide[s] moral support," but he goes too far in suggesting that it "hint[s] 
at a family reconciliation" (2006, p. 295). On the whole, women remain peripheral to 
the film's main action. There is no female character as important as Gloria in Brassed 
Off. 
The film is much commodified for wider appeal across country, class, gender 
and age. Humor, or comic element, is taken as one effective strategy. In The Full 
Monty, serious social issues are tackled in a gentle, warm, yet somewhat aching sense 
of humor. The men's vulnerability and dilemma are transformed into "an affirmative 
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upbeat story of masculine reinvention" (Wayne, 2006, p. 294). 
Scenes around the men's stripping practices are all funny. In the first scene, 
Gaz tries stripping alone--in car headlights, cigarette in mouth, to the music of Hot 
Chocolate's "You Sexy Thing." When he tries to take his shirt off, he bums himself 
with his cigarette, and the shirt gets caught and the dance steps come to a sudden stop. 
Meanwhile, we hear the scratching sound of the record needle. In the dole queue 
scene, the steel strippers unconsciously begin to practice their moves, lured by the 
radio music of Donna Summer's disco classic "Hot Stuff." So the training has taken 
effect. In the third scene in Gerald's home where the men strip to their diverse undies 
is visually amusing and made more so when the loan sharks are threatened away by 
the half-naked men. 
The most aching humor is around Lomper's suicide. Dave drags Lomper out of 
his carbon-fumed car, but Lomper blames Dave for saving him, so Dave pushes the 
ungrateful Lomper back into the car and drags him out again. Afterwards, Dave, Gaz 
and Lomper, sitting on a hill, jokingly chat about the best way for Lomper to commit 
suicide. Suggestions include shooting himself, finding a big bridge to do "bungee 
jumps, only without the bungee bit" and drowning himself, but all seem impractical 
because there is nowhere for Lomper to find a gun, he can't stand heights and he can't 
swim, to which Gaz responds "You don't have to fucking swim, you divvy." The final 
suggestion is for Lomper to "Stand in the middle of t' road and get a mate to drive. 
Smack into you right fast", but Lomper answers "Haven't got any mates." Gaz 
immediately offers friendship: "We just saved your fucking life, so don't tell us we're 
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not your mates!" and Dave offers to run him down soon. As Caplan points out, 
"Laughter at pain can be beneficial or harmful here" (1997, p. 43). 
Besides humor, the mood of nostalgia is also significant. This nostalgia arouses 
audience emotions not so much around industrial jobs as around the lost homo social 
communities and the powerful emotional bonds associated with them. It is this 
arousing of emotion around the idea of men as a community under threat, Clair Monk 
argues, that explains the widespread appeal to a 1990s' international male audience far 
broader than just the working class (2000b, p. 280). The nostalgic comic element is 
also appealing to a rather stereotyped image of working-class life that was common in 
the 1940s, people laughing and joking through hard times. Yet beneath the humor, the 
political message is blunted by nostalgia rather than sharpened by satire. 
Songs chosen to match men's dancing--Donna Summer's Hot Stuff, Hot 
Chocolate's You Sexy Thing, and of course, and Tom Jones' You Can Leave Your Hat 
On, all popular songs in the 1970s--have more sex appeal and more youth appeal than 
the visual images and also generate a feeling of nostalgia for "the good old days". 
They are used somewhat ironically, as the men are far from sexy and do not leave the 
hat on in the end. 
The film reimagines traditional working-class community with a better 
inclusiveness than films of Ken Loach and Brassed Off, in which gay and black 
characters are absent. The Full Monty has Horse and the brass band leader as black, 
Lomper and Guy as gay. Racial interactions are quite utopian. Horse is completely 
assimilated; he and his relatives are positively stereotyped as acquiring natural rhythm 
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and keeping a close-knit family. Nevertheless, such depictions can only be 
postmodern ornament intended for a unifying image. As Hill points out, the black 
characters "are simply accepted as a part of the drama without it becoming an issue or 
problem" (Hill, 2000a, p. 186). This multiculturalism "evacuates ethnic difference, 
transforming it into taste or style" (Luckett, 2000, p. 97). The film's display of the 
two gay characters quickly turning into a hand-holding couple is also utopian and 
problematic. 
In conclusion, Brassed Off and The Full Monty are two community-centered 
feel-good comedies with a more global appeal. While the former offers more a gritty 
harsh commentary on the impact of Thatcherism on traditional working class 
industries and tells a world we have lost, the latter makes more use of light humor in 
place of overt political criticism. What attracts the attention of both films is the 
erosion of traditional forms of working class masculinity and male dignity and no 
solution is offered except cultural resistance and collective consolation which is seen 
as largely utopian. In each film, beneath the cheerful bluster, "a much darker, sadder 
story is being told" (Macnab, 1996, p. 44). Both films reflect gender politics and the 
empowerment of women after feminist movement and The Full Monty shows better 
concern about postmodern hybridity in race and sexuality. Bromley is critical that 
"class analysis, rather than class signifiers" is an "absent content" in the films (2000, 
p.67). 
Continuity and Change in Working-class Identity: Theme Analysis 
Crisis of identity: from proud workers to humble "underclass." 
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Much has changed in the experiences of working class in the 20th century. The 
Documentary Movement in the 1930s produced working class as heroic labors in a 
collective sense. With full employment and general affluence, the New Wave films in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s presented confident, masculine, though discontented 
and rebellious young workers, such as Arthur and Joe. Then faced with the effect of 
Thatcherite de industrialization, films of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s focused on the 
pitiful redundant and the mounting pressure on them, most typically represented by 
Phil who loses his "wife, kids, home, job, self-respect, hope" and by workers 
deformed as performers. The works unanimously articulated a "sense of loss" (Kirk, 
2003, p. 78). Compared with the sense of loss of politics in the New Wave films, this 
time it's the loss of job or income, political power, union support, and the associated 
loss of family, traditional community, traditional male role, and etc. So the loss of so 
many factors all together has contributed to the loss of old form of working-class 
identity. The films are seen, to varying degrees, "elegies for an older, industrial, 
northern working class" (Dave, 2006, p. xiii). 
Huw Beynon described the world of neo-Iiberalism which started with 
Thatcher's policies and continued in Blair's Britain as a world in which a "growing 
complex of jobs and labor contracts" have combined with "gender and ethnic 
difference" to produce a "mosaic" of fragmented labor that is not easy to represent in 
"simple images" (Beynon, 2001, p. 38). So, some films since the end of 1 990s have 
explored the new image of workers on the fragmented neo-liberal labor market. 
Human Traffic (1999) and Late Night Shopping (2001) present youth with "McJobs," 
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a kind of casualized and "flexible" working practice of low prestige, low pay, and 
more intense exploitation. The characters in the two films try a variety of jobs such as 
seller in store, staff at fast-food restaurant, supermarket shelf-stacker, hospital cleaner, 
worker in micro-electronics factory, and operator at call center. They do not identify 
with their jobs. Nina even celebrated unemployment in Human Traffic. In Late Night 
Shopping, all the young people take monotonous work in the night, which is 
unpleasant and greatly affect their life, e.g. Sean and his girlfriend are never in their 
shared flat at the same time because of their work. Illegal immigrants are most likely 
to undertake such works, as shown in Dirty Pretty Things (2002). In Sweet Sixteen 
(2002), the job of operator in a calling center is the most Chantelle can dream about. 
With no solutions available, the films always carry a sense of pessimism. An 
irreversible trend is that the working class dignity and pride are gone for ever with the 
wind. Because of the various kinds of losses, the working class is imaged as victims 
in the films. 
Crisis in masculinity: the gradual loss of confident aggressiveness and 
sexuality. 
The New Wave films provided uninhibited display of masculine energy and 
sexuality, represented most prominently in Arthur Seaton's forceful, muscular 
physique in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. But in the 1980s and 1990s, 
industrial decay and mass unemployment undermined the traditional working class 
masculinity linked with pride in hard, physical labor, family feeding and trade union 
power. Thus, in focusing on working class in the north of England, films of the 1990s, 
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"to an almost unprecedented extent ... seemed preoccupied with men and masculinity 
in crisis" (Monk, 2000a, p. 156). They show a deep concern about male 
disempowerment--the loss of economic power, gender privilege and working class 
male community, providing sympathetic portrayals of working-class men as 
"physically redundant in the workplace and emotionally retarded in the home" 
(Hallam, 2000, p. 266). Albert Finney's Arthur with "vivid masculine force of the 
body" is physically undermined, transmuted into "the scrawniness of Robert Carlyle 
as Gary in The Full Monty or Stevie in Riff-Ra.fJ(Ken Loach 1990) (Luckett, 2000, p. 
95) or the nasty women-basher of Ray in Nil by Mouth. There are more images of 
men who are sexually inadequate, fat, gay, not working but entertaining. Family 
violence, drug and alcohol abuse are seen as symptomatic of a crisis in masculinity. 
The profound "gender anxiety" resulting from economic re-structuring IS 
widely reflected in the images of "gender reversal" with strong female characters 
often counter-posed with weak, socially impotent men. Clair Monk criticizes that The 
Full Monty and Brassed O.fJfocus so much on masculinity in crisis that they reduce 
"the economic oppressions of unemployment" to "gender oppression by women" 
(2000b, p. 282), which greatly weakened the sharpness of the social message. 
The role of women. 
Women have generally been in subordinate position in working class films and 
their screen image has been more negative or more positive to different extent. In 
New Waves films, there are such positive minder image of Alice in Room at the Top 
and Audrey in The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, but more often women 
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function either as elusive objects of desire or as a threat to masculinity-through their 
obsession with marriage, motherhood and "settling down"---or as agents of 
consumption. Narratives were centered on the devaluation and punishment of women 
(e.g. for adultery), displaying an obvious misogynist tendency. 
This gender gap was somewhat covered in the 1980s by more positive 
female-centered films which reflect the growing importance of women in the 
workforce and in society as a whole, e.g. Letter to Brezhnev (1985), Rita, Sue and Bob, 
Too (1986), Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987). Teresa in Letter to Brezhnev is seen as 
taking the traditionally "masculine space" for leisure, drinking, talking dirty, looking 
for sexual encounters casually. Depiction of women in High Hopes and Life is Sweet 
is more balanced, so we see the loving and caring Shirley and Wendy in the two films. 
In films of the 1990s and 2000s, old misogyny continued, though weaker, but 
with a new hostility toward the reversal of gender roles being added. Women's 
inroads into white-collar and service jobs were generally viewed as worsening men's 
plight. In The Full Monty, Gaz's wife and Dave's wife all have jobs and are enjoying 
life, but the husbands can't. Women were portrayed as passionate consumers, 
unsupportive of their husbands in Brassed Off and The Full Monty, as the victims of 
domestic violence and sexual abuse in Naked and Nil by Mouth, as lacking motherly 
duty in Ladybird, Ladybird and Sweet Sixteen. Women are not capable of resistance or 
rebellion faced with family violence in Naked, Nil by Mouth and there is an 
"Ambiguity of Critique" in such films (Monk, 2000a, p. 163). The absence of fathers 
in New Wave films is replaced by the absence of Billy's mother, who is dead and 
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totally unmentioned and we can't see any miner's wives involved in the strike in Billy 
Elliot. Unlike Brassed Off, their effort is totally ignored. 
The apparent ascendancy of women in the post-industrial workplace heralded a 
resurgence of masculinism and misogyny, though this time it was "cloaked in 
post-modern irony or humor, or justified in terms of a backlash against the gains of 
feminism" (Monk, 2000a, p. 163). In fact, the exercising of power over women by the 
working class heroes (both verbally and physically) may be read as a compensation 
for their actual social and political impotence. 
The de-politicization of the working class. 
Andrew Higson argues that the history of British realism is the history of "the 
changing conceptualization of the relation between the public and the private, 
between the political and the personal" (1986, p. 83). To great extent, British social 
realist tradition has been characterized by a movement away, since its very early stage, 
from the public and the social (the working class at work, struggles connected to the 
wider society or community) to the private and the personal (the focus on family or 
personal life and problems with little reference to social, political and economic 
conditions). Class consciousness against capitalist exploitation and against Thatcher's 
neo-liberalism was clearly revealed, yet on the whole social issues are explored 
through familial and personal relations. Generally there has been few representation 
of work in working-class films. In the 1960s it is because of consumption; in the 
1980s and 1990s, it is because of lack of work. Working-class identity is more 
constructed by consumption and entertaining (the performing working class) rather 
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than production. 
The documentary's distanced public gaze was soon replaced by the individuated 
private looks of the New Wave. The narratives were organized around a single central 
protagonist, and no longer required a multiplicity of plot lines. In the face of affluence 
and mass culture, the "focus on cultural aspects tended to preclude work" and the 
"focus on the discontented male involved a downplaying of collective conditions and 
actions" (Hill, 2000b, p. 251). 
The anti-Thatcherism films of the 1980s and 1990s seemingly rediscovered the 
political dimension, e.g. High Hopes and Brassed Off, and especially Ken Loach's 
films. The emphasis of Riff-Raff is firmly upon the world of work and class politics 
rather than leisure, but most of Loach's films focus on the working class as individual 
victims. The miners' strike as working class resistance is mentioned directly in Billy 
Elliot, but only indirectly in Brassed Off. 
The trend of identifying working class in domestic and familiar terms was more 
pronounced in the 1990s. The Full Monty typically acknowledges economic and 
political causes only as taken-for-granted background, if at all. The central problem 
that both The Full Monty and Brassed Off address is not so much unemployment itself 
as its psychic and emotional effects. Gary Oldman's Nil by Mouth is a 
semi-autobiographical tale of a working class family in which abuse and violence is 
cycling from generation to generation. Thematically, the film is not concerned with 
social, political and economic inequalities lying behind alcoholism and domestic 
violence, taking alcoholism as a family disease, not a societal one. By focusing too 
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tightly on individual's personal or family life, these social problems become personal 
problems. For example, the drug abuse in Nil by Mouth and Trainspotting can be 
attributed to individual's lack of discipline. 
Similarly, Julia Hallam notes that films of the 1990s constructed their images of 
the working class through "their relation to consumption rather than production, 
purchasing power rather than labor power" (2000, p. 261). This is also true to the 
1980s films. In High Hopes, it is the difference in consumption (domestic interiors, or 
dressing) that indicates the different social status of the three families. 
The focus on the private and the personal has been regarded as weakening the 
political and social messages of the texts as they "focus on the individual or family 
and their struggles without making connections to wider political, economic and 
social factors" (Lay, 2002, p. 121). Poverty, unemployment and social exclusion are 
not treated as the driving forces, but merely as contributory factors to family troubles, 
so that it is the working class families that have failed, not the state or capitalist 
society. 
Samantha Lay is critical of the trend towards autobiography and nostalgia. She 
believes looking back instead of looking at the contemporary settings from a highly 
individualized perspective can be seen as further undermining a sense of the "public" 
(Lay, 2002, p.123, 107). However, it is also argued that the lack of party politics in 
working class films, in another way, by virtue of the language and the lives they 
uncover, "might be seen to have political ramifications. You seldom see these people 
or hear this language, and this in itself harbors a political message" (Mcfeely, 1997). 
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Community and solidarity. 
Collective experience is not a characteristic of British social realism. In general, 
class has been mainly presented as an individual and moral, rather than collective or 
social/economic experience. In other words, social issues are explored at the micro 
level of character, rather than the macro level of the social. The blame is thus more 
often on the weak characters of the individuals. Rather than questioning class 
inequalities, these films appear to advocate escape from the confinement of working 
class position as the only feasible solution. 
The Grierson's documentaries aimed to represent the society at large rather than 
particular individuals. British films in the Second World War period attempted to 
project a sense of collectivity on the screen, multiplying the number of central 
characters. In contrast, the New Wave films rested little on the collective experience 
of working-class life, seldom showed their characters at work, playing down class 
inequalities, and promoting what John Hill described as an "accentuated 
individualism" (Hill, 1986, p. 143). In so doing, the possibility of collective struggle 
are excluded. Since the 1980s, with the deindustrialization, the representation of the 
older working-class communities--especially northern ones--has effectively 
disappeared, replaced by the cold and indifferent neighborhood in High Hopes (1988) 
and community in decay in Sweet Sixteen (2002). 
However, in the late 1990s, male togetherness was given positive values in the 
comedy films like Brassed Off and The Full Monty, marking a superficial return to 
class-consciousness and collectivity repressed in the 1980s. So, in Brassed Off, the 
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brass band is able to go on to claim victory in the national championships despite the 
coming closure of the pit. In The Full Monty, the unemployed community gain respect 
through doing collective strip show. And it is through involvement in the group that 
Dave is able to regain his sexual potency and Gaz wins the respect of his son. In this 
wishful solidarity, even middle-class or upwardly mobile characters are shown to 
return to working-class communities, reinventing the cross-class union in wartime 
films. 
These comedies, similar with TV soap operas like Coronation Street, present a 
geographically-bounded working-class community in which everyone appears to 
know everyone else, reminding us of Hoggart's version of pre-war working-class 
community. They celebrate the recovery, in a post-industrial context, of the collective 
spirit. Hill holds that the idea of working-class community is mobilized "less in the 
service of class politics than as a metaphor for the state ofthe nation" (2000a, p. 183). 
He argues that such depiction and emphasis "give voice to a certain yearning for 
'national wholeness' in the face of economic and social divisions and the rise of 
self-interested individualism that characterized the Tory years" (2000a, p. 184). Monk 
comments that both films appeal to emotions that "the male social and emotional 
bonds once associated with the workplace and the working-men's club are threatened, 
mourned, struggled for -and finally restored." (2000a, p. 161) 
The concern for the decline of the traditional working class initiated in the New 
Wave films was sustained in films of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the old anxiety 
about the corrupting effects of consumption or embourgeoisement was replaced by 
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the new anxiety about the damage wrought by de-industrialization, mass 
unemployment and poverty. The brass band has been appreciated through all decades 
as a symbol of authentic working class traditional culture. In A Kind of Loving, it was 
treasured by Vic, but devalued by Ingrid and her mother. In Brassed Off and The Full 
Monty, the brass band is revived to suggest local pride and the centrality of 
masculinity, both phenomena eroded by the hegemony of the south. In the former, it 
is glorified, but in the latter, it is seen sentimentally as the "only thing left going 
here." 
Youth unemployment and subcultural resistance. 
The working class youth experienced shifts and fragmentations of 
de industrialization in direct material, social, economic and cultural forms. In 
addressing the anxieties of young male audience, the youth underclass films presented 
joblessness and social exclusion as taken-for-granted facts with no history, no 
proposed solution and no expectation of change. With detached irony, they framed the 
male underclass (their drug-taking, petty crimes) "not as a 'social problem,'" which 
requires a solution, "but as a subcultural 'lifestyle' with certain attractions for a young, 
post-political male audience" (Monk, 2000a, p. 160). Instead of attempting to arouse 
consciousness or anger, Trainspotting (1996) and especially Twin Town (1997) 
encourage subcultural dissent and escape from the demands of adulthood, women and 
work with their story of heroin users and petty criminals, although irony is never 
absent from this framing. Beynon sees their exploration of the under-side of British 
society as through the use of "black humor" (2001, p. 39). But Loach's Sweet Sixteen 
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deals with the issue in a serious way, encouraging people to trace the reasons behind 
Liam's tragedy. For Hall, there is simply no "subcultural solution" to working-class 
youth unemployment, educational disadvantage, dead-end jobs, low pay and the loss 
of skills (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 47). 
Cultural hybridity - the intersection of class with other identities. 
Since 1980s, echoing the postmodern shift of concern from working class to 
other marginal groups, working class has been represented in the form of cultural 
hybridity. Filmmakers began to explore the intersection of class with other identities 
such as race, gender, and sexuality best represented in such films as My Beautiful 
Laundrette (1985) and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987). 
Stuart Hall argues that "the postmodern subject" is conceived not as having 
"fixed, essential or permanent identity" but rather as assuming "different identities at 
different times" (as cited in Hill, 1999, p. 207). Concerning the multidimensional 
identities, Rani's identity, in Sammy and Rosie Get Laid, is not simply a working-class 
Asian, female, or lesbian, but one which is "overdetermined" and shifting. Hill agrees 
with Bhabha on that the identities in these films are not then simply overlaid, or added 
on top of each other, but are themselves '''interstitial,' formed, 'in-between,' or in 
excess of, the sum of the 'parts' of difference" (Hill, 1999, p. 208). 
Central to the films My Beautiful Laundrette and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid is 
the insistence upon difference. In line with Hall's idea of the "living" of "identity 
through difference," the films stress upon heterogeneity without any attempt to give 
expression to one "authentic" or "essential" "black" or "Asian" experience, or offer 
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straightforward "positive" images (Hill, 1999, p. 209). In these films, the dealing of 
homosexual relationship is also designed to be taken for granted as "difference" rather 
than as "problem." 
This tendency of showing cultural hybridity continues in the 1990s, but the 
strength is somewhat weakened. Jorge in Ladybird. Ladybird, a political exile from 
Paraguay, is positively depicted. He is the one who attempts to cooperate with the 
social services, who "brings his intellect to bear on the case, ... not out of cowardice, 
but in order to survive" (Francke, 1994, p. 47). In Brassed Off and The Full Monty, we 
see unemployed black and gays but there is not much difference between their life and 
the life of the white male workers. Racial interactions are quite utopian. For Luckett, 
the "strategy of inclusion" subsumes cultural difference for an exotic, updated 
national image; yet the "multiculturalism" is "superficial" and only exists "at the level 
of the unifying image" (2000, p. 96). Paul Dave agrees that The Full Monty relies on a 
"facile populism and multiculturalism" which act to conceal class struggle and 
continuing ethnic division and conflict (2006, p. 70). 
Diversity in solutions. 
In tackling working class problems, no real solutions can be given. In New 
Wave films, resolutions include social conformity, escape through climbing the social 
ladder, or rebellion. And it is common for the desire for escape to prove impossible, or 
to demand too high a cost. Films since the 1980s have also involved diverse kinds of 
endings. 
Mike Leigh's antagonists more often take life as it is, value family and endure 
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with positive attitudes, though his Naked is more tragic. Loach and Oldman's films 
are social tragedies, showing men caught in circumstances they cannot change; the 
central protagonists mostly face defeat in the end with absolutely no hope of escape. 
For Joe in Loach's My Name Is Joe, "Some of us don't have a choice. I didnae have a 
fuckin' choice." Tn Oldman's Nil by Mouth, Ray's alcoholism, drug abuse and 
violence render the whole family vulnerable. Sweet Sixteen breaks our heart with the 
impossible dream of the 16-year-old Liam to live together with his mother. My 
Beautiful Laundrette by Stephen Frears offers solution of gay love, suggesting how 
sexual desires may permit the crossing of borders and provide forms of connection 
which subvert conventional social divisions or pieties. As Omar announces to Salim, 
in his opinion, "much good can come from fucking." 
The 1990s commercial comedies offer more positive resolutions, transforming 
the problems of male unemployment, economic hardship, loss of self-esteem, and etc. 
into up-beat, feel good stories. Working-class characters regain male pride and dignity 
through collective actions and mutual support, a tendency identified by John Hill as 
"utopianism" (2000a, p. 178). Through re-establishing the bonds among men, the two 
films have achieved the recovery of masculinity and community, and even mark a 
return to the class consciousness and collectivity repressed in the 1980s. So, utopian 
fantasy is used to relieve the stress, hardship and agony. Such resolution is naturally 
ambivalent. Claire Monk complains that The Full Monty, along with Brassed Off, 
seeks to resolve the problems of class disadvantage in terms of gender relations and 
the "healing powers" of the all-male group (2000b, pp. 280-282). Hill sees the explicit 
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reliance on fantasy as "an acknowledgement of the very 'impossibility' of escape, a 
'magical' resolution to conflicts which remain unresolved, and an ironic recognition 
of the actual impotence" (\ 999, p. 170). So the solutions offered can only be symbolic 
and inevitably problematic. 
In 2000, Billy Elliot brought the old theme of personal escape into full play with 
the glamorous success of the working class ballet star Billy. The final scene of strong 
and broad-shouldered Billy doing a high masculine vertical jump glorifies masculinity, 
yet obviously Billy's escape can only by personal and rare. Happy Go Lucky (2008) 
explores how one, who still stays at the lower social stratum, should live in today's 
society with a proper attitude. While Billy escapes by resorting to individual talent 
and sticking to one's own belief and with the help of the working-class community, 
Poppy in Happy Go Lucky escapes through her irrepressible happy-nature and 
optimistic life attitude in coping with the hard reality. 
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CHAPTER VII 
IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, IDENTITY: 
ANALYSIS OF WORKING CLASS REPRESENTATION 
This chapter will analyze working class identity in post-war social realist films 
within the context of post-war political ideology and cultural condition using British 
Cultural Studies as theoretical framework. 
The logical connection between film and society has been widely 
acknowledged. Aldgate & Richards are more wholesome in suggesting that the 
cinema functions "to reflect and highlight popular attitudes, ideas and preoccupations, 
and to generate and inculcate views and opinions deemed desirable by film-makers," 
as well as to "act as a potent means of social control, transmitting the dominant 
ideology of society and creating for it a consensus of support" (1999, p. 2). Stuart Hall 
in "Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effect'" identifies three ideological effects 
under capitalism. The first appears to be that of "masking and displacing" of class 
domination or the class-exploitative nature of the system. The second is that of 
"fragmentation or separation" of the collective interests of the working classes. The 
third is that of "imposing an imaginary unity or coherence on the units so 
re-presented" under such ideological totalities as "the 'community,' the 'nation,' 
295 
'public opinion,' 'the consensus,' the 'general interest,' the 'popular will,' 'society,' 
'ordinary consumers. '" (Hall, 1977, p. 337) 
This chapter intends to deconstruct British working-class screen identity to see 
how far they reflect historical change, what common "structure of feeling" of 
filmmakers leads to the common features of each cycle of representation, and to what 
extent the identity reinforce or undermine the dominant ideology. The analysis will 
make substantial reference to Hoggart, Williams and Hall's writings. 
The New Wave Representation: The Ideology of Affiuence and the New Left 
Hall on affluence, embourgeoisement and consensus. 
The post-war social development was characterized by three dominant 
sociological terms of the time: affluence, embourgeoisement, and consensus. The 
Conservative Right argued that "economic growth dissolved the old class structure 
and created new social groups, in particular affluent workers and the technical 
intelligentsia, whom a dynamic Toryism could attract" (Gamble, as cited in Hill, 1986, 
p. 7). In such a context of political agreement, "it became plausible to suppose that the 
consensus between the parties ... reflected a consensus in the nation. In the spectrum 
of political opinion from right to left, the majority of the electors had moved towards 
the middle, the breeding ground of the floaters, leaving only minorities at the 
extremes ... Success in the political market now seemed to depend on capturing the 
centre and winning the support of the floaters" (Gamble, as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 7). 
At the same time, affluence was dismantling old class barriers, "embourgeoisifying" 
the old working class with rising living standards and an accompanying conversion to 
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"consensual" middle-class values. In Resistance Through Rituals, Hall et al. argue 
that the whole debate depended crucially on the validity of these three common-sense 
concepts. 
In Resistance Through Rituals, which Hall edited, Hall thinks affluence, 
embourgeoisement, and consensus are highly ideological terms "woven together into 
an all-embracing social myth or 'explanation' of post-war social change" (Clarke & 
Hall,1976,p.21). 
"Affluence" refers to the postwar economic boom of full employment, rise in 
income and mass consumption, especially working class consumption. In general 
terms, it is an inarguable fact that the years 1951-64 experienced greater 
improvements in living standards than at any other time in this century. Between 1951 
and 1963, wages rose on average by 72 per cent while prices rose by only 45 per cent. 
In 1961 the working week was reduced from 48 to 42 hours. The worst of the housing 
shortage was cleared over; in 1954, 354,000 new houses were built compared with 
284,230 in 1947 (the best year of Labor's term). This was added by some important 
extensions of the Welfare State and educational expansion, with about 6000 new 
schools and 11 new universities. (Lowe, 1989, p. 575). 
However, the other side of the coin revealed that the affluence as a matter of 
fact developed from the improvement in world trade (e.g. the fall in world commodity 
prices), rather than government policies of economic restructuring or long-term 
investment. The "stop-go" fiscal policies l7 carried on by the governments actually 
17 For details of the "stop-go" economy, see Lowe, 1989, pp. 576-577. 
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hindered the country's economy. Soon, in the early 1 960s, the economy seemed to be 
stagnating. There was the balance of payments crisis in 1961 and subsequent 
imposition of a pay-pause, credit squeeze and higher taxation. By early 1963, almost 
900,000 people were out of work (Lowe, 1989, p. 578). Due to its unwillingness to 
devalue the pound and its high expenditure on defense (7-10 per cent of GOP) to 
maintain global power, Britain was repeatedly troubled with the balance of payment 
crisis. Facing increasing competition in world markets, it was losing its share of world 
output and exports. Its level of investment and economic growth was low by 
international standards. So, British economic growth only looked impressive in 
isolation, but lagged far behind almost all her main industrial competitors. The 
Conservative governments' devotion to "stop-go" economic management was seen by 
Pinto-Duschinsky as "the sacrifice of policies desirable for the long term well-being 
of a country in favor of over-lenient measures and temporary palliatives bringing in 
immediate political return" (as cited in Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). For example, the 
"give-away" inflationary budget of April 1955 was followed by a snap April election, 
and then by the deflationary autumn "cuts" after the election and hence the stagnation 
of 1956. As such, Britain's affluent "miracle" was rested upon purely "temporary and 
fortuitous circumstances" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). 
So, for Hall et aI., "affluence was, essentially, an ideology of the dominant 
culture about and/or the working class, directed at them (through media, advertising, 
political speeches, etc.)" in order "to give the working-classes a stake in a future 
which had not yet arrived, and thus to bind and cement the class to the hegemonic 
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order." In so doing, the ideology of affluence "reconstructed the 'real relations' of 
post-war British society into an 'imaginary relation.'" So, affluence is a "full-blown 
ideology" or myth used to conceal real inequalities. (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 37) By 
the end of 1960s the dominant ideology of affluence no longer held hegemonic sway. 
"Consensus" refers to the broad "agreement" across political parties and the 
electorate after 1945 on constructing postwar British society along lines such as the 
welfare state and mixed economy. Even a political term "Butskellism" was coined 
from the surname ofR. A. Butler (Churchill's Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Hull 
Gaitskell (leader of the Labor party 1955-1963), to show that this was a time of 
consensus politics. On the basis of the war-time practice of political coalitions, 
economic planning, and enforced egalitarianism, the post-war Labor governments 
(esp. between 1945 and 1951) conducted social reforms of welfare safety-net, mixed 
economy of private and public ownership, and etc. The Conservative governments 
after 1951 largely complied with this notion of "a 'reformed' capitalism, a 
socially-mindful capitalism with a 'human face'" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). 
Anthony Crosland argued that "capitalism is undergoing a metamorphosis into a quite 
different system " (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 14). The success of Conservative 
management seemed to prove their superior fitness to run a welfare capitalist system, 
and to negate the need for Labor's continuing commitment to public ownership of the 
economy. The Labor leadership, on the other hand, in trying to attract votes from 
outside the working class, became less radical in posing party opposition. 
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Hall et al. acknowledged the tendency in party politics toward the politics ofthe 
center, but he saw the fragility of this consensus as revealed "in the nature of the party 
struggle" during these years and challenged the Conservative superior fitness for 
governing the country. He agreed with Duschinsky that despite the continuous Tory 
rule for 13 years, "the political battle was desperately close throughout the whole 
period" (Duschinsky, as cited in Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). The notion of a political 
consensus obscured the fact that the Conservative survival was largely rested upon the 
vote-catching "politics of bribery" most notoriously exemplified by Sutler's purely 
expedient pre-election budget of 1955. Even despite the "politics of bribery," for the 
whole 13 years of Tory rule, practically half the electorate voted against the Tories at 
each election. As Goldthorpe et. al. found out in their survey, "the large majority" of 
the affluent workers "were, and generally had been, Labor supporters" (1969, p. 172). 
So Hall et al. recommended reading "consensus" in a different way "as betokening a 
waiting attitude by the British working class (often mistaken at the time for 'apathy') 
which an effective lead to the left by Labor at any point in the period might 
effectively have crystallized in a different direction" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 24). 
"Embourgeoisement" refers to the erosion of the working class and reunifica-
tion of British society around middle-class values, an assumption of "classlessness." 
With rising living standards and educational expansion, the concept suggests that 
working-class life and culture was losing its distinctive features, with the members 
assimilated into middle class styles, aspirations and values. Embourgeoisement 
centers on the meritocratic ideology of social mobility primarily through the 
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education system and views consumption as an important indicator. Though having 
some real basis, Hall held that embourgeoisement was "the most constructed term of 
the three," since "the frailties of the other two terms were compounded in it" (Clarke 
& Hall, 1976, p. 24). It should be understood as an ideological term, rather than a 
matter of fact. 
He made reference of the empirical research by Goldthorpe et. al. which shows 
that "embourgeoisement" is far more limited in scope than imagined by its promoters: 
"what the changes in question predominantly entailed was not the ultimate 
assimilation of manual workers and their families into the social-world of the middle 
class, but rather a much less dramatic process of convergence, in certain particular 
respects, in the normative orientations of some sections of the working class and of 
some white-collar groups" (Goldthorpe et. aI., 1969, p. 26). He asserted that, looking 
at the Goldthorpe and Lockwood's "affluent worker" from the perspective of the later 
1960s and 1970s and at the sustained wage militancy and militant shop-floor union 
organization, "the whole 'embourgeoisement' thesis looks extremely thin and shaky" 
(Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 25). 
Absolute increases in income and wealth did not mean automatic decrease in 
relative inequalities. As a matter of fact, increase in income, shifts in occupational 
structure or changes in value located more movements within classes. Social 
democratic policies for meritocratic advancement through expansion in education, 
while benefiting a minority of working class, benefited more of the middle class. The 
fundamental relations of power and wealth remained unchanged and hard to challenge. 
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As Westergaard and Resler detected, despite some redistribution of income following 
the Second World War, the overall pattern is that of "continuing inequality" (as cited 
in Hill, 1986, p. 9). 
Hall had argued as early as in 1958 in his essay "A sense of classlessness" that 
popular cultural transformations had not seen class differences disappear, as was 
commonly assumed. Rather "classlessness" was an ideological effect of the new 
consumer culture, promoting a sense that increasing access to commodities had driven 
away working class poverty. Actually, the purpose of a great deal of advertising was 
to break down the class resistance to consumer-purchase which had been an integral 
part of working class consciousness. He used the Morris advert as an example to 
illustrate his point. The Morris advert "When you buy your second car, make sure it's 
a Morris" was "far from innocent." The personal pronoun "you" constructed the 
worker "as a freely choosing individual rather than a communal member of the 
working class." Such adverts "erode[ d] class alliances and, therefore, the possibility 
of resistance." (Procter, 2004, p. 18) 
Through these three terms, Hall et al. sought to demonstrate that while there 
was a "real basis" for all three terms in the postwar economic boom, it had not pro-
duced the classless society many commentators claimed it had, with "the stubborn 
refusal of class" to "disappear as a major dimension and dynamic of the social 
structure" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 25). The general rise in living standards obscured 
the fact that the relative positions of the classes had remained virtually unchanged. 
Hence "affluence" and "classlessness" are "full-blown ideologies" which worked to 
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"cover over the gaps between real inequalities and the promised utopia of 
equality-for-all (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 37). The role of "affluence" and 
"embourgeoisement," as an ideology, was to "dismantle working-class resistance and 
deliver the 'spontaneous consent' of the class to the authority of the dominant classes" 
(Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 40), since with a "classless" society, there seemed no need 
preaching class consciousness. 
In Resistance Through Rituals, Hall also identified the rise of working-class 
youth as a dramatic representation of social change. He quoted Colin Macinnes who 
speculated that "The 'two nations' of our society may perhaps no longer be those of 
the 'rich' and the 'poor' ... , but those of the teenagers on the one hand and, on the 
other, all those who have assumed the burdens of adult responsibility" (as cited in 
Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 27). While the disappearance of class was intensely arguable, 
there seemed no doubt that youth was making an impressive appearance. Alongside 
the social rise of working class man, youth caught media attention through leisure 
consumption, subculture style and managed to establish a distinctive cultural identity. 
As Harry Hopkins puts it, "Never had 'Youth'-- with the capital 'Y'-- been so 
earnestly discussed, so frequently surveyed, so extensively seen and heard" (as cited 
in Hill, 1986, p. 10). The Angry Young Man novels and plays quickly discovered and 
presented the youthful energy and rebelliousness. New Wave films affirmed this and 
popularized the images. 
The cultural concerns of the New Left. 
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The New Left was represented by scholars such as Richard Hoggart, E.P. 
Thompson, Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, who explored British working class 
from cultural aspects and inspired people to broaden their notion of British culture. 
The New Left emerged after Russia's invasion of Hungary, an event which was 
considered so immoral by Communist Party members such as E.P. Thompson and 
John Saville that they responded by resigning from the party (along with 7000 others) 
(Hill, 1986, p. 26). Discontented with both the "barbarities of Stalinism" and the 
debilitated politics of the Labor Party, these scholars initiated a new magazine New 
Left Review and started studying working class mainly from the perspective of culture. 
On the other hand, with the working class transformed from primary producers to key 
consumers, the new climate of consumerism in postwar Britain gave a blow to the 
traditional Left. It challenged their faith in the working class capacity for a socialist 
revolution. Their concern then was shifted to the effects that working-class 
"affluence" and an Americanized mass culture might have on traditional working 
class communities and politics. 
Under the dominant discourse of "affluence," "consensus," and 
"embourgeoisement," the political and economic aspects of the issue of class seemed 
settled facts. Culture became a key arena for contestation about the disappearance (or 
not) of the British working class. Even the New Left took the economic affluence for 
granted, though dismissed it as a myth. It was the moral and cultural aspects that were 
now open to question. Perry Anderson observed, "As material deprivation to a certain 
degree receded, cultural loss and devastation became more and more evident and 
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important" (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 26). So the New Left scholars such as Hoggart 
and Williams provided views of seeing the working class culturally in their respective 
works The Use of Literacy (1957) and Cultural and Society (1958}--influential and 
founding texts for the New Left, as well as for the discipline of Cultural Studies which 
emerged at this period. Stuart Hall, from the late 50s, began to be engaged with the 
New Left in the serious analysis of the new consumer society and the popular cultural 
forms and lifestyles associated with it. Thus class as economic category or political 
entity yields to class as primarily cultural identity (Kirk, 2003, p. 59), for which the 
New Left were criticized as "being more of a cultural than a political movement" 
(Procter, 2004, p. 14). Yet a significant contribution of the New Left was to 
demonstrate that popular culture is itself political and that "cultural politics" (culture 
as politics) should be taken seriously as culture is not a secondary reflection of 
economic conditions, but a constitutive dimension of society, a view challenging the 
reductionism and economism of Marx's base-superstructure metaphor. Both Hoggart 
and Williams were concerned with the erosion of the traditional working class and its 
popular culture. Williams even went as far as rejecting mass culture as the culture of 
the working class, "arguing that it was not produced by them, but for them" (Kirk, 
2007, p. 65). 
For Hoggart in Uses of Literacy, traditional working class culture developed 
from working class communities which were bound together by material hardships. In 
these communities, the individual's most valuable resources were collective: family, 
community, and a shared culture of mutual support and of resistance with a clear 
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sense of "us" and "them" class divisions. As working-men's lives were mainly 
defined by work, characterizations of the traditional working-class community and its 
culture were masculine and work-related ones. But now, rise in income and housing 
relocations into new estates which isolated them were feared to be breaking the ties of 
such community. Modern mass-produced goods as well as consumerism were offering 
new aspirations and new temptations. Affluence and the new mass culture were 
undermining the old values and destroying traditional working class cultural life, as 
could be seen in Hoggart's portrait of the 'Juke-box boys ... who spend their evenings 
listening in harshly lighted milk-bars to the 'nickelodeons'" (Hoggart, 1998, p. 189) 
and in his observation that "[t]he hedonistic but passive barbarian who rides in a 
fifty-horsepower bus for three pence, to see a five-million-dollar film for 
one-and-eight-pence, is not simply a social oddity; he is a portent" (Hoggart, 1998, p. 
191). Hall saw that the worst effects of the new "mass culture" was "its tendency to 
'unbend the springs' of working class action and resistance" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 
19). Hoggart's book crystallized the fears about the erosion of working class culture 
with the shift offocus from work to leisure. The writing set in the traditional Northern 
working-class community was "a nostalgic affirmation of the values and strengths of 
a way of life whose imminent passing it lamented" (Lovell, 1990, p. 360). Hoggart's 
community was the one experienced in childhood, and remembered with affection. 
The point of view of The Uses of Literacy was Hoggart's own -a working-class 
scholarship boy whose education had taken him away, literally and culturally. It was 
an insider's view from outside. 
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For Williams in Culture and Society (1958), the crucial distinction between 
bourgeois and working-class culture is "between alternative ideas of the nature of 
social relationship," not evidence as housing, dress and modes of leisure in which 
industrial production tends to produce uniformity (p. 325). The bourgeois social 
relationship is marked by "individualism," in which each individual is "free" or has "a 
natural right" to pursue his own development (p. 325). The reforming bourgeois 
modification of this version of society is "the idea of service" (p. 325). This can be 
sharply-contrasted with the idea associated with the working class: "an idea which, 
whether it is called communism, socialism or cooperation, regards society neither as 
neutral nor as protective, but as the positive means for all kinds of development, 
including individual development.. .Improvement is sought, not in the opportunity to 
escape from one's class, or to make a career, but in the general and controlled 
advance of all... Not the individual, but the whole society, will move." (p. 326) In 
short, working-class culture is "the basic collective idea, and the institutions, manners, 
habits of thought and intentions which proceed from this" whereas bourgeois culture 
is "the basic individualist idea and the institutions, manners, habits of thought and 
intentions which proceed from that" (p. 327). The culture which the working class has 
produced since the Industrial Revolution is ''the collective democratic institution, 
whether in the trade unions, the cooperative movement or a political party" (p. 327). 
Working-class culture is "primarily social (in that it has created institutions) rather 
than individual (in particular intellectual or imaginative work)" (p. 327). 
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In Culture and Society, Williams also offers his unique understanding and 
critique of the idea of individual opportunity-climbing the social ladder. The social 
conscience of this idea requires the service from government only in providing such a 
ladder, in industry, in education and elsewhere, and in extending the ladder to the 
working class. Yet, for Williams, the ladder image is "a perfect symbol of the 
bourgeois idea of society, because, while undoubtedly it offers the opportunity to 
climb, it is a device which can only be used individually: you go up the ladder alone" 
(p. 331). He therefore objects to this ladder version of society as it "weakens the 
principle of common betterment, which ought to be an absolute value" and as it 
"sweetens the poison of hierarchy" (p. 331). 
The major directors of the New Wave films were associated with the New Left 
and quite some script writers belonged to the Angry Young Man team. Deeply carried 
by social democratic concerns, they projected a broad social awareness and general 
sense of political responsibility in filmmaking. Anderson attacked traditional English 
cinema as "snobbish, anti-intelligent, emotionally inhibited, willfully blind to the 
conditions and problems of the present, dedicated to an out-of-date national ideal" 
(McFarlane, 1986, p. 137) and called for a more socially conscious and responsible 
British cinema as well as for personal vision. He declared that "I want to make 
people-ordinary people, not just top people-feel their dignity and their importance" 
(Hill, 1986, p. 128). This determination to put working-class characters on the screen 
confirmed their humane values and the value of a "socially committed" cinema. 
The representation in New Wave films. 
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The New Wave films contributed to the accurate portrayal of British working 
class in the changing conditions of affluence and consumption. In so doing, there was 
a prominent structure of feeling to convey the sense of social rise of new working 
class with their ample masculine confidence, youthful sexuality and rebelliousness as 
well as the sense of frustration and alienation they felt in the time of change. 
Responding to the affluence and political consensus of the time and echoing the 
cultural concerns of the New Left, there was also the structure of feeling to articulate 
the sense of loss of politics, the loss of radical intent on the part of the working class 
and of a deep anxiety about the decline or demise of traditional working class culture 
under the threat of the mass culture consumption. The protagonists all display mixed 
feeling toward the ideology of affluence and toward working-class consumerism. 
What New Wave films depicted was not the traditional working class, but the 
rise of new working class-the affluent workers. The protagonists are mostly 
benefiting from the affluence of the time, e.g. rich income, secure employment and 
diversified choice of consumption. Occupational and educational change leads to 
better chances of limited upward and outward mobility. 
Arthur Seaton, an efficient and well-paid worker and big-spending consumer, is 
a typical example for the new affluence. Murphy comments that "'terribly limited in 
his sensibilities' and 'narrow in his ambitions' though he is, Arthur is still able to take 
advantage of full employment and a fat wage packet to assume a belligerent, 
devil-may-care attitude to the world" (1992, p. 30). For working-class 
grammar-school boys like Joe and Vic, they don't have to follow their father's 
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footsteps into mines and factories and have moved into comfortable white-collar jobs 
and thus are good examples for embourgeoisement. Joe's final success in marrying 
Susan and climbing up is sincerely congratulated upon by his colleagues, which 
shows wide public approval for working-class entitlement for betterment. In 1950s 
British society, his ambition is reasonable and legitimate. In A Taste of Honey, the 
stark economic necessity cut against the gain of the ideology of affluence. 
On the whole, the New Wave films conformed to the dominant ideology of 
affluence. This is vividly displayed through the lifestyle of Arthur, Joe, Frank, Colin's 
mother and the new housing estates enjoyed by Doreen and Ingrid's mothers and 
which can be afforded by Arthur and Doreen in the near future. However, echoing the 
sociological denial of classlessness, the films undermined the dominant ideology of 
embourgeoisement and more reflected the illusionary nature of such ideology. As I 
have explored in Chapter IV, class difference and antagonism is clearly shown in 
Room at the Top; class consciousness (of economic exploitation) and class hatred are 
explicit in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning and The Loneliness of the Long 
Distance Runner. Embourgeoisement is denied and seriously mocked in The 
Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner and is seen to be won at huge cost in Room at 
the Top. In all these films, whether overt or implicit, the class structure in British 
society is seen as an important cause of alienation felt by the protagonists. The 
suffocating and tiresome work for Arthur, the bleak, drab living environment for all 
protagonists, the sense of hopelessness felt by Colin, and of perplexity felt by Joe, all 
influence their conception and behaviors. As Street has observed, "the existence of a 
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Labor Government did not mean that class divisions were eroded, and many sections 
of the working class still experienced profound economic difficulties despite the 
media's obsession with affluence" during this period (1997, p. 80). With protagonists 
like Arthur, Joe and Frank who earn a relatively satisfactory amount of income, the 
money seems comparatively meaningless to them: "it is something to be spent or 
wasted" (Shafer, 2001, p. 7). For those who sincerely seek outside mobility, the social 
hierarchy is too rigid for them to breach, as Joe is told in Room at the Top in reference 
to Susan Brown, "That's not for you, lad." Despite Joe's bitter protest that "it's old 
fashioned, all that class stuff," all these representations provided evidence to the 
persistent class system in Britain, and negated the "classlessness." 
Concerning working-class desire for upward mobility into the middle class, 
different explorations have been given. John Braine, author of Room at the Top, 
pointed out, "Most ambitious working-class boys want to get to hell out of the 
working class. That was a simple truth that had never been stated before. The English 
working classes are the least politically-minded in the world; they always have been. 
Give the English working-class man half a chance and he becomes a bourgeois." (as 
cited in Murphy, 1992, p. 13) Film historian Anthony Slide also shared the view: "the 
British working class has one overall ambition-to become middle class ... " (as cited 
in Shafer, 2001, pp. 7-8). Yet Raymond Williams in Culture and Society is against 
such assumption. He is against the suggestion that "the working class is becoming 
'bourgeois,' because it is dressing like the middle class, living in semi-detached 
houses, acquiring cars and washing-machines and television sets," arguing that "[t]he 
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worker's envy of the middle-class man is not a desire to be that man, but to have the 
same kind of possessions." He holds that the English middle class tend to think of 
themselves as a standard and to suppose that the working class is "desperately anxious 
to become just like itself." Long deprived of the means for material wealth, "[t]he 
great majority of English working people want only the middle-class material 
standard and for the rest want to go on being themselves." (1958, pp. 323-324) Such 
contradictory feelings are clearly reflected in the deep confusion and alienation felt by 
Joe and Frank. Hall views the limited mobility as involving the young people "valuing 
the dominant culture positively, and sacrificing the 'parent' culture" accompanied by 
"a distinct sense of cultural disorientation" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 51). While this is 
largely true, however, in breaking away from traditional working-class and being 
adrift in a world where the rules are uncertain, they also retain a defensive affection 
for old values. 
Changing trends In production, increasing social and geographical mobility, 
urban redevelopment and mass culture were breaking up traditional or "old" 
working-class marked by the intimate relationship between work and cultural identity, 
and the "proletarian consciousness" characteristic of the "occupational community" 
especially in industries such as mining. The identity of the rising affluent or "new" 
working class was characterized less by work or production than leisure, patterns of 
consumption and entertainment. Thus, as Colin Sparks has observed of the work of 
writers like Hoggart, there is a significant absence of a discussion of work and trade 
unions in their consideration of patterns of working-class culture (Hill, 1986, p. 154). 
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This shift of concern of the New Left and the sense ofloss of politics are reflected in 
the New Wave films, which acknowledged, if not consolidated, the dominant 
ideology of affluence and consensus. The political field simply has to be given up by 
the Left. Many of the New Wave films are less concerned with "a reassertion of the 
continuing gap between capital and labor" (Hill, 1986, p. 174) than with exploring the 
transformation of working-class life in the face of affluence and consumerism. 
Politically, the working class tends to be represented as largely "inert and conformist" 
(Hill, 1986, p. 174). Industrial action and collective activity are hardly possible 
alternatives; only individual working class members may rise above or rebel against 
the general condition. So in the films we see little depiction of radial class politics or 
radical class conflicts. Strikes is a rarity which only appear in I'm Alright, Jack, in 
which it is shown to be laughed at, with union leaders depicted as clowns and workers 
as lazy greedy trouble-makers. The targets for political anger are generally ambivalent, 
directed towards authority or establishments and continuing social injustice. 
Conscious of economic exploitation, the protagonists can only exert passive resistance 
by choosing not to have a job or not to work too hard. This evident lack of collective 
political response to alienation and exploitation in New Wave films constituted a 
recognition that collective potential had been harnessed by the false promises of 
affluence, which had improved material aspects of working-class life but robbed it of 
the possibility to forge a political economy and culture more definitively of its own. 
The protagonists' anger and personal revolts assert their "working class 
consciousness" and present a challenge to the conformity of the Conservative 1950s, 
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but that's as far as they can go. As Hill commented, "'The class war' might not be 
quite over in Macmillan's sense, but it certainly has become contained and 
constricted" (1986, p. 174). The prevalence of individualism caused the lack of group 
depiction of working-class characters in New Wave films. 
Under the influence of the New Left, the New Wave films privileged the 
representation of the working class from cultural aspects, shifting the emphasis on 
work and production in the Documentary tradition to leisure and consumption. Alan 
Lovell notes how the concerns and representations of The Uses of Literacy can be 
seen in the films of the British New Wave. They share a "structure of feeling" defined 
as "a sympathetic interest in working class communities, [combined with] unease 
about the quality of leisure in urban society" (as cited in Lovell, 1990, p. 358). 
Hoggart's hostility to the new materialism, to affluence and to the homogenizing 
effect of the mass media was also widely shared by the mainly left-wing directors and 
script writers of the New Wave. As Hill points out, respect for the traditional working 
class and hostility to the corruptions of modem mass culture is "a tension ... which is 
characteristic of the work of the 'new wave' as a whole" (Hill, 1986, p. 152). The 
New Wave films show that the post-war explosion of material and cultural goods, 
while representing social progress (affluence), leads to the erosion of traditional 
values and therefore arouses concern about the decline or demise of the traditional 
working class associated with work and community and anxiety about the growing 
"corruption" of the working class by consumerism. Yet the working class themselves 
are not to blame for the "corruption," because they have their situation settled by 
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other forces. Doreen's aspiration for a new housing estate in Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning is reasonable for the time. 
Women played a vital role in the post-war affluence not only because of their 
contribution to the rise in household income with their job earnings but also because 
of their patterns of consumption. But in New Wave films female characters are 
endowed with subordinate role and the representation of their relationship with 
"affluence" is less female labor than female consumption. Women are degraded to 
consumers. The female "consumer" imagery is simply portrayed as the target for the 
objection of the male anger. On the whole, the portrayal of women is negative and 
"dismissive." The dominant ideology in British society of the time was still to see 
women belonging to domestic sphere. A variety of stratagems were designed to 
encourage women back home from work, especially in the fields of psychology and 
social welfare. Thus it was not surprising for the New Wave films to reveal 
misogynist tendency and a failure to acknowledge the changing social and economic 
role of women in British society other than as consumers. Placed in social and 
historical context, they could be seen to be "confirming, rather than querying and 
challenging, the dominant ideological assumptions about a 'woman's role'" (Hill, 
1986, p. 174). 
The New Wave films also reveal a general conservative mood, represented in 
the treatment of sex relationships, the subordinate position of women, and the 
conservative endings of stories. The conservative resolutions favored were 
"remarkably consistent with the ideological values and assumptions of the period" 
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(Lay, 2002, p. 66). The male protagonists' settling down for marriage suggests their 
conformity to the social mainstream and signifies a kind of "closure" oftheir personal 
revolts of cultural resistance. Morally conservative solutions are chosen for female 
characters concerning the expression of their sexuality, e.g. Brenda's returning to her 
husband and avoiding the abortion. 
The treatment of sex in New Wave films is featured with an honest exploration 
of sexual relationship, which was more permissive than past decades due to the 
changing time and the baby boom, and which was tolerated and guided by the BBFC. 
However, sexual "permissiveness" in the 1960s was only in relative sense and was far 
from rampant. Unwanted pregnancy was certainly a very real fear for many women in 
the early 1960s, and most of the cases resulted in marriage. This is all indicated in 
New Wave films despite all the lure of greater sexual explicitness. 
The major directors of the New Wave films, as working class "scholarship 
boys" who climbed up, are "the university educated bourgeois making 'sympathetic' 
films about proletarian life but not analyzing the ambiguities of their own privileged 
position," according to Roy Armes (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 133). They offered an 
"outsider's view" which tended to romanticize individual male working-class figures 
rather than presenting radical viewpoints. As a result, the significance of class 
relationships was obscured and sexual attitudes had a rigid conformity. 
In conclusion, the New Wave films echoed the progressive trend of the British 
Cultural Studies to extend to the working class and achieved a breakthrough in the 
positive, dignified and more rounded representation of working-class identity. They 
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"assisted in 'opening up' the British cinema with their innovatory contents and more 
socially enquiring attitudes" (Hill, 1986, p. 174). However, Hill has a point here in 
suggesting that the films were, in the end, "something less than radical" as the ideas 
and politics which they inherited from the 'Angry Young Man' and the New Left 
were still "shaped and structured by the dominant discourses of 'affluence'" (Hill, 
1986, p. 174). For me, I see a reasonable balance in the representation between the 
power of the dominant ideology and the cultural rebellion/resistance of the Left. 
Films of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s: Neo-Iiberalism and Working-class Identity 
The post-war social democratic political consensus remained a cardinal 
principle of British public life until 1979, when it was abolished and ever since 
replaced by Thatcherite New Right political and economical ideologies. Mrs Thatcher 
has given the "swing to the right" "a powerful impetus and a distinctive personal 
stamp" (Hall, 1983, p. 19), remarkably reversing the whole postwar social democratic 
trend and rolling back the historic gains of the labor movement and other progressive 
forces, such as full employment, welfare state and the "caring" society. The 
opposition of the Labor and trade union movement were effectively disorganized. 
Labor was split and transformed; the labor movement was undermined through 
exploiting the unpopUlarity of the trade unions. Unemployment was deliberated 
created and made use of to compel workers to accept the harsh reality of low wage 
settlements or the dole queue. Mrs Thatcher massively transformed the country, 
shifting the balance of political forces "in favor of capital and the right" (Hall and 
Jacques, 1983, p. 13). Through ideologically moulding the return to possessive 
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individualism and free-market competitiveness "look like 'common sense'" (Hall and 
Jacques, 1983, p. 14), Mrs Thatcher established and consolidated the hegemony of 
neo-liberalism. Blairism of the New Labor Party was not much different in the main 
direction, though some effort was made to balance a bit the weight of equality of 
opportunities. Tony Blair's Cool Britannia is a vision of a middle-class nation built on 
"creative" entrepreneurialism. 
Neo-Iiberalism, authoritarian populism and Blairism. 
Neo-liberalism, or "neo-liberal" capitalism, has been clearly defined by Paul 
Dave. "Neo" signals "the return of 'free' market after the post war interlude of social 
democratic regulation." "'Liberal' signals that any such regulative, welfarist 
tampering with the market is to be viewed as an infraction of the 'liberty' of capital." 
(Dave, 2006, p. xiii) Neo-liberalism, in its ideology and practice, seeks to "replace 
society with the market" (Dave, 2006, p. 46). 
The context for neo-liberal ideology is that capitalism has transformed into 
post-Fordist production, a stage which is called by Wood as the "commercialization 
model" of capitalism (as cited in Dave, 2006, p. xiv). In this model, the importance of 
production is eclipsed; emphasis is laid on commerce, trade and finance services. In 
the cyber-assisted world, wealth is now believed to be created by the market itself and 
by the flow of finance capital. So it seems that capitalism has successfully 
emancipated itself from the labor of the working class, whose value can be ignored. 
Neo-liberalism has immense ideological impact. In this "post-historic, 
post-political reality of capitalism," it is the capital, not labor, which is viewed as "the 
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exclusive origin of social wealth" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). So the location of social value 
is generally shifted away from labor, and decisively towards capital. The New Right 
managed to promote the ideology of "irresistible capitalism" and "politically finished 
proletariat" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). Labor is demanded to adapt to flexible employment 
and to engage with capital outside the regulative, welfarist activities of the state or 
trades union. Jobs are not only "not for life", but also "not/or the 'working class' at 
all" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). The widening inequalities between the beneficiaries and 
victims of neo-Iiberal capitalist modernization have been ideologically underscored in 
New Right political discourses as a division between "winners" and "losers," with the 
latter viewed as the "undeserving poor." 
So the vast number of laborers nationwide is "to be consigned to the historical 
dustbin" through the long process of de-industrialization and the creation of a 
north/south divide. In 1989, Alan Sinfield observed that unemployment in Britain was 
not just a consequence of recession. Out of the unemployment rise between 1979 and 
1983, "40 to 50 per cent has been variously estimated as due to government policies" 
(1989, p. 254). Tom Nairn suggested that Mrs Thatcher's economic policy was "no 
more than an attempt to utilize the recession to hasten and complete the dominance of 
financial capital. The apotheosis of 'Freedom' is de-industrialization ... " (as cited in 
Kirk, 2003, p. 78). 
For Stuart Hall, "it is difficult to call an economic strategy which results in 
some four million unemployed and the shutting down of substantial sectors of the 
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economy, a 'success'" (1983, p. 12). Yet Mrs Thatcher successfully consolidated 
social support or "consent" through authoritarian populism. 
On national identity, inheriting a land caught in "British Disease" of slow 
development, high inflation and industrial disputes of the 1970s, Mrs Thatcher strived 
to cut across divides and conflicting interests and unite people through mobilizing 
populist patriotism and a sense of belonging around identity politics, with the focus on 
the nation and ideas of Englishness. The official interpellation of "We British" 
represents a cultural and political hegemony which "facilitates the articulation of a 
selective past for the construction of an acceptable present" (Kirk, 2003, p. 165). 
People are constructed in alliance with the new power bloc in a great national crusade 
to "make Britain 'Great' once more" (Hall, 1983, p. 30). The Falkland crisis was 
constructed ideologically into a war of populist patriotism. 
Economically, Mrs Thatcher wisely and effectively translated hard-faced 
economic doctrine into the language of "experience, moral imperative and common 
sense," substituting the "caring society" with an alternative ethic of individualism and 
competition" (Hall, 1983, p. 28). The national economy was debated on the model of 
the household budget-"You can't pay yourself more than you earn!!"- and "being 
British" became once again identified with the restoration of competition and 
profitability (Hall, 1983, p. 29). The essence of the British people was identified with 
self-reliance and personal responsibility, as against the image of the over-taxed 
individual and welfare-dependent. This assault, not just on welfare overspending, but 
on the very principle and essence of collective social welfare-the centerpiece of 
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postwar consensus politics-was mounted through "the emotive image of the 
'scrounger': the new folk-devil" (Hall, 1983, p. 29). 
Politically, Thatcherism launched a fierce attack on "the State," which was 
transformed into "the enemy." It is ''the State" which "has over-borrowed and 
overspent; fuelled inflation; ... above all, interfered, meddled, intervened, instructed, 
directed - against the essence, the Genius, of The British People." It is time, as she 
says, with conviction, "to put people's destinies again in their own hands." (Hall, 
1983, p. 34) In the polarization of "state" and "people," Labor is made to equal the 
state, which is "the bureaucratic embodiment, the powerful organizing centre" (Hall, 
1988, p. 23) whereas Mrs Thatcher, "grasping the torch of Freedom with one hand," is 
seen to identify "with the people" (Hall, 1983, p. 34). 
In ideologically identifying with "the people," Mrs Thatcher once told the 
readers of Woman's Own: "Don't talk to me about 'them' and 'us' in a 
company ... You're all 'we' in a company. You survive as the company survives, 
prosper as the company prospers--everyone together. The future lies in cooperation 
and not confrontation." (Hall, 1983, p. 31) Thus the traditional binary opposition of 
"them" and "us" was easily replaced with the high-sounding "we-the people" in a 
particular relation to capital: dominated by its imperatives (profitability, 
accumulation); yet identified with it. This ideology is what lay behind the 
"share-owning democracy" Mrs Thatcher practiced. 
Socially, Mrs Thatcher was hostile to collectivism of all sorts. In a September 
1987 interview with Women S Own magazine, she lambasted people for looking to 
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"government" or, worse, "society" for solutions to their personal problems and 
delivered her most notorious statement of her conception of society: "[W]ho is 
society? .. There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are 
families and no government can do anything except through people and people look 
to themselves first." (as cited in Mandler, 2006, p. 232) 
Mrs Thatcher's way of dealing with the miners' strike of 1984-5 can be seen as 
a typical example of how she maneuvered neo-liberalism and authoritarian populism 
to full extent in the "national" interest of the capital. The 1974 miners' strike has been 
accused of "holding the nation up to ransom" by the then Heath government. So this 
time, to arouse stronger national antagonism, the Thatcher government charged that 
the government and indeed the whole society is now "run by the trade unions." (Hall, 
1988, p. 26) Ideologically, the striking miners were designated and condemned as the 
"enemies within" (Mandler, 2006, p. 232) and those who did not withdraw their labor 
were thus, in Thatcher's words, "working for Britain"-a mode of identification with 
the state (Kirk, 2003, p. 167). To fully defeat the miners, after 1984, subsidies had 
been provided to other energy sources, such as gas and nuclear power, so that they 
could compete with coal, which is ironic for neo-liberal free market principle. As 
Seumas Milne points out, at the time of the large scale pit closures of 1992, there was 
a "sea-change in popular attitudes" towards the strike of 1984 (as cited in Dave, 2006, 
p. 64). A ruling-class conspiracy was sensed. The Tories' economic arguments against 
the miners (the National Union of Mineworkers) were easier to be seen in 1992 as 
part of an ideological offensive of a ruthless class war. 
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In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the Left, Hall holds 
that traditional class alliances had become unstable and contradictory. The old 
political identities were collapsing; there was no such thing as a unified working class 
to be rescued. For him, Labor was very much split: "Socialist Man, with one mind, 
one set of interests, one project, is dead" (Hall, 1988, p. 169). And Labor was too 
weak to face the challenge to the left which Thatcherism and the New Right posed 
directly. The Labor Party, the labor movement and the left had "no national 
paper. .. [n]o powerful journal of opinion, no political education, no organic 
intellectual base from which to engage popular consciousness ... " (Hall, 1988, pp. 
73-74). Hall insisted that the renewal of the Left could not simply be thinking and 
acting in the same way "only more so, harder, and with more 'conviction'" (Hall, 
1988, p. 11), but that it had to begin by learning from the lessons of Thatcherism. 
In late 1980s, a decade before Tony Blair became British Prime Minister, Hall 
and Jacques wrote of the danger "that the Left will produce, in government, a brand of 
New Times which in practice does not amount to much more than a slightly 
cleaned-up, humanized version of that of the radical Right" (1989, p. 16). This is not 
for the first time that Hall's prediction about contemporary British politics appeared 
prophetic and turned out to be true later. New Labor under Tony Blair appeared to 
have learned Thatcher's lessons only too well. It won a landslide victory in the 1997 
election, building support through presenting itself as a "modernizing" catch-all party. 
Yet it is largely agreed that the success was more based on ideological wordings than 
substantial economic policy changes. The re-branded, re-packaged Labor Party 
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displayed its capacity of quickly imitating Mrs Thatcher and entering into the 
ideological struggle over image and imagery. 
The attempt, for Hall, has been less to re-articulate the new times for the Left, 
than to re-occupy the old terrain of the Right. In his 1998 essay "The great moving 
nowhere show" (Hall wrote "The great moving Right show" in 1979), Hall argued 
that at global and domestic levels, the neo-liberal "tum" which Thatcherism made had 
not been radically modified, not to mention reversed. It seemed that the economics of 
neo-liberalism had become unquestionable and unchallengeable; there was not much 
room left for Blair. The pressure for the left to modernize was so enormous that old 
thoughts like class and left politics were dismissed as redundant. The pessimism was 
shared by many more academics. Chantal Mouffe described Tony Blair as Thatcher's 
final victory and Isaac Julien saw New Labor's reign as "really just business as usual" 
(Julien, 2001, p. 181). Julien felt that the neo-liberal shift is unstoppable and more 
class divisions and problems will be created. 
The ideology of Blairism was centered on the imagery of "Cool Britannia"--a 
vision of a middle-class nation built on "creative" entrepreneurial ism. The rebranding 
of Britain proposed by think-tank Demos involved the ridding of Britain's 
international image as "a backward-looking island immersed in its heritage ... bogged 
down by tradition, riven by class and threatened by industrial disputes" and promoting 
a new Britain as a highly creative and diverse country, innovative, dynamic, 
forward-looking and optimistic (as cited in Monk, 2000b, p. 283). The "modernized" 
new British national identity Blair wanted to build, as analyzed by Driver and Martell, 
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mainly emphasized three aspects, namely, "patriots and populists in the 'giving age,'" 
"creative Britain" and "the young country" (2002, pp. 145-148). By "patriots and 
populists in the 'giving age, '" Blair positioned the Labor Party as the "patriotic party" 
with a strong sense of history and tradition, as a "People's party" (with the "people's 
budget") serving public good and aimed to inspire a sense of community by appealing 
to national pride underpinned by the collective values and institutions such as social 
justice and National Health Service. By "creative Britain," Blair meant to tap the 
potential of the British nation as an inherently creative people for the historical 
inventions initiated in Britain. Lastly, "the young country" indicated the 
characteristics of being creative, inventive, dynamic and forward-looking which Blair 
wanted the country to be associated with in globalization age. So New Britain was 
marked by the Blairite repression of class. 
The ideologies of Conservative Thatcherite neo-liberalism and New Labor 
Blairism have had much impact on the representation of class across a range of 
different types of film, from art cinema of Loach and Leigh to the more commercial 
mainstream films of the 1990s. 
Anti-Thatcherism of independent filmmakers: Leigh, Loach and Frears. 
Thatcherism, despite its powerful ideological intepellation, did not command 
popular ideological appeal among lefiwing intellectuals and large section of the 
working class, failing to win over their "hearts and minds" (Hill, 1999, p.29). 
Although Thatcher did not create a favorable climate for the film industry (abolishing 
the quota system and the Eady Levy, and privatizing the National Film Finance 
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Corporation), her policies did help create the subject for British directors. The intense 
and unwavering hatred for Margaret Thatcher ignited the creativity of Britain's 
filmmakers to new heights, offering "a viable alternative to officially sanctioned 
versions of the truth" (Friedman, 1993, p. xix). More social realist films which are 
anti-Thatcherism or with anti-Thatcher sentiments were produced. 
In the words of Peter Wollen, "independent filmmakers of the eighties reacted 
strongly against the effects of Thatcherism. They responded to the imposition of 
market criteria in every sector of society, to political authoritarianism, to the 'two 
nations' project of Thatcherism, and to the leading role of the City" (1993, p. 35). 
Stephen Frears chose the feature film to attack Thatcherism, claiming that his film 
Sammy and Rosie Get Laid was "an attempt to bring Margaret Thatcher down" 
(Dixon, 1994, p. 233). Hence, Lester Friedman argues that what united the British 
directors during the 1980s was "their revulsion, to one degree or other, for the 
ideology of Thatcherism" (1993, p. xix). Leonard Quart sees that the "film 
renaissance" of this period was "one of the more positive by-products of the Thatcher 
ethos, though in an almost totally oppositional and critical manner" (1993, p. 17). The 
films made in response to enormous social changes under Thatcherism are, "if not 
completely socially committed, at least socially aware" (Lay, 2002, p. 82). 
One of the most effective anti-Thatcherism products is Mike Leigh's High Hopes, 
in which class difference is a central theme. Leigh's interest in class is solid. As he 
explains himself: "This is a deeply class-ridden society like nowhere else, and 
everything resonates around that. Since I make films which are about England, 
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because I'm specifically concerned with creating a real world, implicitly and 
inevitably, problems of class are part of the texture." (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 185) 
His concern about class leads to the comment of his works by Dennis Potter as "often 
in the minefields of English class consciousness" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 12). 
High Hopes provides serious attack on Thatcherite greed, possessiveness and 
selfishness represented by the "new rich" couple and the upper-middle-class couple. 
At the same time, it glorifies the working-class consciousness for equality and 
fairness and working class human kindness and sincerity typically represented by 
Shirley and Cyril. The focus of the film is on the ordinary, the everyday, the family, 
the relationship, the lifestyle. Hill points out that no equal attention is paid to work or 
the community surrounding the work. In so doing, the film then offers "less an attack 
on the economic hardship suffered by the losers" in Thatcher's Britain than "a critique 
of the cultural 'barbarianism' associated with its economic beneficiaries" (1999, p. 
193). Leigh is concerned about conflict and tension of different classes, not just of 
working class figures. The working class he picks up in his films are not the 
traditional enterprise workers of collective labor, but mostly the isolated labor of 
service industry. So we sense from his films an end to the working class as a 
collective force in the 1980s. Besides, in High Hopes, working-class consumption of 
the 1960s is also gone, replaced by the middle-class consumption. 
Ken Loach made directly political documentaries in the 1980s. For him, the 
experiences were frustrating and restrictive. His documentary Which Side Are You On? 
about the miners' strike in 1984-5 was censored and rejected by London Weekend 
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Television's South Bank Show (though later shown on Channel 4). In order to get his 
message across to more people, he slightly modified his style in the 1990s. Since the 
de-politicization left no hope for successful collective political struggle or radical 
political change, even Loach turned to depend on individual experience, and began to 
avoid political consciousness or seeking for any political solution in his films. Active 
individual fighting back in the films only led to worse-off dilemma; and personal 
"escape" was impossible. 
Pessimism is the dominant mood for Loach's films in all the decades. His 
political pessimism extends to the prospects for any social democratic, cross-class 
solidarity in the face of neo-liberalism 's impact on the most vulnerable sections ofthe 
working class. Ladybird, Ladybird and My Name is Joe both demonstrate how 
working-class dilemmas tend not to be amenable to the solutions offered by 
middle-class, professional intermediaries associated with the welfare state. However, 
the determinist pessimism of a film like My Name is Joe needs to be seen as a 
response to the moralizing prejudices and class antagonisms fostered by the illusions 
of unconstrained individual choice that have flourished under neo-liberal political 
regimes--illusions which support the ideology behind that paragon of poor choices, 
the "underclass." 
In the new millennium, Loach's films continue to draw attention to the losers in 
society. Sweet Sixteen is a warning to anyone who thinks that kids who drop out of 
school and grow up to be drug addicts and drug dealers have only themselves to 
blame. What's particularly disturbing and sad is that Liam and Pinball, two teenagers, 
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instead of being protected, are actually made use of and even ruined by the adults 
close to them. Drug selling becomes the reachable business for decent life. 
For Peter Mathews, "A certain lack of novelty is the price Loach pays for his 
conviction that human misery is systemic. The basic rules of capitalism haven't 
changed, and he keeps plugging away at that unfashionable truth for the few who care 
to listen." (2002, p. 56) His films all address the limited choices facing those at the 
bottom of the society. 
Race began to draw serious concern in the 1980s. Several films were to subvert 
and extend prevailing definitions of the working class with acute and complex 
portrayals of race, ethnicity and national identity, e.g. My Beautiful Laundrette, Queen 
and Country. What's so unique about Frears' My Beautiful Laundrette is that class is 
seen as a more determining factor than race in a film about the colored. In a culture 
hegemonized by neo-liberal capitalism, enterprise culture is identified. For example, 
My Beautiful Laundrette is critical of Thatcherism, materialism and the selfishness 
which they generate, but the enterprise culture is taken as providing opportunities and 
furnishing the Asian immigrants with status. Those who embrace the enterprise 
culture have learnt, as Nasser puts it, how to "squeeze the tits of the system" and they 
embrace it to win wealth as "revenge." Enterprise culture is also shown in Riff-Raff, 
the hero is divided between self-interest and the collective struggle for survival. He 
dreams to become a successful businessman by selling boxer shorts and set up his 
own market stall, but is no nearer his goal at the end of the film than at the beginning. 
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Paul Dave suggests that My Beautiful Laundrette "proposes a liberal-libertarian 
'politics of irony' that has a relationship of flat rejection towards traditional forms of 
left politics grounded in class" (Dave, 2006, p. 97). The film is critical of the social 
inequity and brutalization of life in Thatcher's England, but it does not intellectually 
explore "an alternative political vision" and that absence of political certainty "is in 
itself an eloquent statement of where the Left stands in the late eighties and early 
nineties" (Dixon, 1994, p. 248). 
Entertaining working-class images: the "feel-good" comedies. 
Postmodern commodification of the "underclass." 
In the 1990s, although working class had been marginalized in British politics 
and social life, in film it seemed to become an icon or marker of Britishness for export 
to the international market. Films like The Full Monty or Trainspotting were widely 
consumed in both the UK and the USA. 
The tendency was promoted on two grounds. One is the self-adaptation of the 
British film industry. Faced with deepening Hollywoodization of British cinema and 
more intense cultural globalization, the British film industry since the 1980s had 
adopted art cinema strategy to promote national cinema by avoiding direct 
competition with Hollywood. The strategy aims "to differentiate itself textually from 
Hollywood, to assert explicitly or implicitly an indigenous product, and to reach 
domestic and export markets through those specialist distribution channels and 
exhibition venues usually called art house" (Crofts, as cited in Hill, 2009, p. 15). With 
the unique British class culture, the working class was taken as "recognizably British" 
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codes or icons that could be highly marketable to ensure cinematic success. So British 
working class transformed into profitable "exportable" images to be consumed. 
The other is New Labor's rebranding of Britain into an imagery of Cool 
Britania of a competitive and innovative enterprise economy in the late 1990s. Monk 
sees the close association of the commodification of underclass films with the 
inherently market-driven "modernizing" project adopted by Tony Blair's New Labor 
Government. This is reflected in the paradox that the focus on underclass "on the 
whole supports this projection of an optimistic, 'modernized' Britain rather than 
undermining it" (Monk, 2000b, p. 283). 
The films were marketed on a highly stylized and stereotypical set of class 
images, with the focus on the traditional industrial regions (esp. northern England) 
and traditional jobs (e.g. iron and steel, coal mining), reinforcing the notion of what is 
national can become international. The films celebrated locality, yet at the same time 
commodified the cultural identities of the working class, re-packaging their 
experiences for sale in the global marketplace and "post-modernizing" the cultural 
landscapes of such cities as Sheffield, Liverpool and Glasgow. 
Neo-liberal self-help and enterprise culture. 
Within the "millennial" ideologies of neo-liberal capitalism, opportunities 
demand strenuous efforts of self-reinvention. Success seems to depend on "a 
relationship in which there is nothing the worker will not do or be asked to do, and in 
which there is nothing that the magical world of neo-liberal capitalism will deny such 
compliant workers" (Dave, 2006, p. 71). While in the deindustrializing elegies like 
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Brassed Off, unemployment is still seen as a sign of political crisis, representing a 
break in the lives of traditional industries and communities, in The Full Monty 
unemployment is viewed more as an accepted challenge to labor and as a structural 
part of new, post-industrial labor markets. It is the unemployed individuals who 
should try every means to meet the challenge. The Full Monty explores unemployed 
workers putting on a show of striptease which is "a pitiless test of the willingness to 
do whatever it takes, in the name of self-help" to seek magical fortunes (Dave, 2006, 
p. 71). So in the film we see Gaz calculating the monetary rewards of stripping in 
terms of a miraculous multiplication sum. 
In neo-liberalist ideology, unemployment is changed from a vicious structural 
problem of capitalist system into simply a problem of training. A Department of 
Employment advertisement from the late 1980s went like this: "Let's train the 
workers without jobs, to do the jobs without workers" (Dave, 2006, p. 62). So the 
unemployed needed to learn and adapt themselves to jobs without workers--those new 
kinds of jobs, which are in reality the "Mcjob"--casualized and "flexible" working 
practices of low pay, low prestige and most exploitation, e.g. the security guard job, 
the packing job in The Full Monty and the kind of jobs featured in Late Night 
Shopping. Such ethos shifts the responsibility as well as the blame away from the 
government and management onto the jobless underclass themselves. Yet, in 
denouncing the security guard job, Gaz is actually trying to keep his dignity as an 
experienced skilled steelworker. 
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The job center in the past was now changed into the mandatory "job club" in 
The Full Monty for the unemployed The Full Monty (in Brassed Off, it is "Rescue 
Room"). Like the change of "Unemployment Benefit" into "the Job-seeker's 
Allowance," such clubs are reoriented according to neo-liberal principles to "place 
greater emphasis on self-help and responsibility as opposed to entitlement" (Dave, 
2006, p. 72). The club is for training and exchange of information, but the workers 
play cards in it as a kind of resistance. Gerald, Gaz's former supervisor, forms a 
contrast in attitude toward looking for new job. His seriousness toward filling forms, 
attend interviews all comply with the mainstream desire of self-help in enterprise 
culture. 
The Full Monty projects creative entrepreneurial values. As Monk comments, 
"if these guys (skinny, fat, middle-aged, unsexy) can succeed as male strippers, it 
surely follows that Britons (or anyone) can make a success of any enterprise" (Monk, 
2000b, p. 284). Hence, leaving the underclass is "simply a matter of exercising free 
choice" (Monk, 2000b, p. 285). 
New-Labor optimism 
The historical context for the feel-good comedies is the collapse of heavy 
industries during the Conservative Thatcher and Major administrations. Yet the films 
actively work to "heal the wounds" through "a Blairite vision in which 'Things Can 
Only Get Better'" (Lay, 2002, p. 122), offering utopian solutions to the dilemma of 
protagonists. Tragi-comic scenes dominate the film as the pain of divorce, 
unemployment and attempted suicides are explored through humor. Eventually the 
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redundant workers meet the challenge and endure, though through becoming 
performers. The highlighting on working-class endurance, imagination and survival is 
also the way Hollywood has best dealt with the world of labor. So the New Labor 
optimism goes hand in hand with the American dream. 
Imagined community. 
The realist comedies display the imagery of northern working-class community, 
which "regain their pride through a healthy burst of team spirit" (Beachment, as cited 
in Mather, 2006, p. 5 ) This collectivity/community is so out of step with the historical 
context that it attracted wide critique. Paul Dave sees it as representing an imagined 
community of inter-class and cross-class solidarity (2006, p. 11). Julia Hallam sees it 
as representing a "hankering for the spirit of Ealing ghosts," that is to say for "an 
idealized image of a nation united by adversity" (2000, p. 267). Hill detects in it "a 
certain yearning for 'national wholeness' in the face of economic and social divisions 
and the rise of self-interested individualism that characterized the Tory years" (2000a, 
p. 184). In the films, middle class or upward mobile characters such as Gerald, Gaz's 
ex-wife Mandy in The Full Monty and Gloria Brassed Off are all willingly incor-
porated into the working-class community. From such, the films can be read as 
"calling on the assistance of superficial, multicultural images of collectivity in order, 
like New Labor, to banish an older world of class and class conflict, and move into a 
stylish, modernized future" (Dave, 2006, p. 61). 
Working-class poverty and capitalist exploitation. 
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As illustrated above, working-class comedies manifest much dominant 
neo-liberal ideologies that had been prevalent for over a decade. But on the other hand, 
they also successfully exposed the poverty and tragedy of working-class families. 
Unlike the New Wave films, there is now little sense of the corrupting effects ofafflu-
ence or embourgeoisement. What is foregrounded is the damage wrought by 
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty typical of the Thatcher years. 
Phil's poverty, breakdown and attempted suicide, Gaz's inability to find money for 
joint custody of his son and the stealing of girder iron, the "funereal" facial expression 
and pace of the miners after the vote for redundancy, Danny's collapse and 
subsequent illness, all display to us a elegy of the post-industrial "New Times." 
Loan-sharks behaving cruelly is a common scene both in comedy films as well 
Loach's films. 
Despite the feel-good mood, the comedies present masculinity in crisis of the 
1990s workers. The continued success of consumerism in the absence of any real 
work propuces male trauma concerned with the sense of loss of bread-winning power, 
sexual attractiveness and a social space. Pictured as "Nostalgically patriarchal, 
impotent and domestically confined" (Dave, 2006, p. 61), we see a working class 
struggling to cope with economic dilemmas and reserve their last bit of dignity and 
respect. 
Capitalist exploitation and cruelty was severely attacked. Brassed Offreveals to 
us indirectly what happened to the coal industry after the 1984 miner's strike through 
the characterization of the pit manager McKenzie. The neo-liberal market and Mr 
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McKenzie are seen as pitiless toward working class sufferings. Danny's "coughing 
coal" breaks the audience's heart. Mather notes that Danny's sentiments and 
denouncement echo the observations of Raymond Williams in a New Socialist article 
written during the miners strike of 1984-85 in which he rebukes "the logic of a new 
nomad capitalism, which exploits actual places and people and then ... moves on" (as 
cited in Mather, 2006, p. 41). Brassed Off, in attempting to balance the relationship 
between the political and the cultural, ultimately proves that culture has no value and 
cannot function without the support of the economic base. However, in displaying the 
liveliness and longevity of brass band (existing even after the closure of workplace), 
working-class traditional culture is given due value and appreciation. 
The powerfuL effect of comic satire. 
Monk argues that the commodification of the underclass in such comedies is 
"symptomatic of the abandonment of the project of a socially committed British 
cinema" (Monk, 2000b, p. 277). Lay also comments that "class politics as a major 
preoccupation of British social realist texts have been abandoned in favor of 
autobiography and nostalgia" (Lay, 2002, pp. 122-123). While they all have a point 
here, I would argue that the effect of comic satire can be as powerful taking into 
consideration of the large number of audience they reach. So in this post-working 
class age, so long as humor goes hand in hand with satire, all should be welcome. 
For Williams' "Equality of Being:" The Need of Cultural Policy Support 
Raymond Williams in Culture and Society argues, "The only equality that is 
important, or indeed conceivable, is equality of being" (1958, p. 317). A common 
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culture is not an equal culture, yet equality of being is essentially necessary to it. In 
acknowledging human individuality and variation, inequality in the various aspects of 
man is seen to be inevitable, yet inequality which "denies the essential quality of 
being" is "evil" and intolerable as it "rejects, depersonalizes, degrades in grading, 
other human beings" (1958, p. 317). "The struggle for democracy is a struggle for the 
recognition of equality of being, or it is nothing" (1958, p. 337). 
British cultural studies academics see the present suffering from social 
deprivation of British working class more from the cultural perspective of "dignity" 
and "respect." Throughout the two world wars and the immediate postwar decades, 
the lower classes were widely revered for their courage in battle and their stoicism in 
peace. Values such as "solidarity, thrift, cleanliness and self-discipline" were 
regularly identified as characteristic of them. But this is no longer the case in the 
present post-industrial and post-modern stage. Mount argues that, for the ultimate 
deprivation that the English working class has suffered-in fact the consequence of 
all the other deprivations-is "the deprivation of respect" (Mount, 2004, p. 108). 
Annette Kuhn sharply points out, "Class is something beneath your clothes, under 
your skin, in your psyche, at the very core of your being. In the all-encompassing 
English class system, if you know that you are in the 'wrong' class, you know that 
therefore you are a valueless person." (as cited in Lawler, 2000, p.117) 
The New Right has relentlessly politicized poverty, with their ideology of the 
"undeserving" and "unrespectable" poor working class. Michael Young, in his 
satirical book The Rise of the Meritocracy, which is a history of English education 
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between 1870 and 2003, challenged the decency of meritocracy ethos. "Today the 
eminent know that success is just reward for their own capacity, for their own efforts, 
and for their own undeniable achievement. They deserve to belong to a superior 
class." Their social inferiors are also inferior in the two vital qualities, "of intelligence 
and education." (as cited in Mount, 2004, p. 59) So the lower classes have an inferior 
status not as in the past because they were denied opportunity. Both Young and 
Mount uttered their suspicion and denunciation that the emphasis on meritocracy is 
intended to throw the responsibility and blame on the poor themselves. 
The working class oflate capitalism is experiencing a pressing existential crisis. 
They no longer have the power to make effective revolt. In a culture hegemonized by 
neo-liberal capitalism, despite all its benefits, working class face its cold indifference 
which is hard to cope with, both in theory and practice. This cruel dilemma must be 
seen and understood through whatever sources of media communication. "Class is not 
a thing but a relation and one that puts a heavy burden on representation" (Hitchcock, 
2000, p. 23). Stuart Hall has categorized theories of representation as "reflective, 
intentional, or constructionist" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 22). Edward Said from a different 
aspect has argued, ''the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming 
and emerging" represents a crucial mode of cultural hegemony (as cited in Kirk, 2003, 
p. 187). From such, the significance of representation can be easily understood. For 
the working class subjectivity, they "must be seen in order to confirm that class is 
there and negotiable in stable and unthreatening ways. The 'must be seen' of 
working-class subjectivity is intimately connected to modes of representation and 
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power." (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 21) Here, I am strongly for Tony Bennett's stand in 
"Putting Policy into Culture Studies,,18 and would argue for state cultural policy 
support for the screen representation of working-class identity, as this will bring 
concern about the dignity of working class. This is logical and feasible in the sense 
that cinema not simply reinforces dominant ideology, but also reflects the humanistic 
structure of feelings of (left-wing) filmmakers. 
In British film industry, the debate about film as business or film as culture is 
never-ending. The common agreement in the 1990s film culture seemed to be that 
film is both business and culture, though the weight lay much more with the former. 
Caught between the European cultural mode of film production and the Hollywood 
business mode, the necessity for a national cinema which can represent the different 
components of the national whole has been confirmed by the government agencies as 
well as filmmakers. The conviction that films should also be a moral force with a 
social purpose, rather than being merely entertainment, is shared to varying degrees 
by almost all the filmmakers. "The realist tradition from the 1930s to the 1990s has 
always been promoted in terms of cultural value, pitting the authentic, indigenous 
culture of 'ordinary people' against the Americanized culture of glamour, spectacle, 
commercialism and mere entertainment." (Ashby & Rigson, 2000, p. 9). So, cultural 
policy support has an essential role to play here. But having said that, we need to also 
acknowledge that commercialization is a powerful trend of the postmodern age. So 
the incorporation of diversified styles of representation is reasonable in order to win 
18 Among his arguments, Bennett calls for "intellectual work calculated to make more strategic interventions within the operating procedures and 
policy agendas of specIfic cultural institutIOns" (1992, p 32) 
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audience, so long as it shows concern about the disadvantaged "one-third" of the 
population. 
To conclude, this chapter argues that continuity and change in major themes of 
working-class identity in post-war social realist films from the New Wave to the 
present have reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position; but at the same 
time conveyed more left-wing progressive views. Identity is an important matter as 
individuals and groups want to be seen and considered as possessing cultural 
significance and dignity. The neo-liberalism of the New Right is making capitalism 
irresistible and the proletariat politically finished and culturally dwarfed. So, cultural 
policy support for socially purposive British national cinema is crucial here to keep 
social realism as a democratization of representation of national cultural life as well as 
a sustained concern for working-class dignity. 
340 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. In 
Britain, there has been a rich tradition of social realist film-making from the 
documentary movement in the 1930s to the present, playing a crucial role in the 
construction of working-class identity. 
The Grierson Documentary Movement contributed tremendously to the 
humanist and social democratic representation of working class, presenting the 
dignity and heroism of labor. This resulted from a social democratic consensus in the 
1930s based around "the middle way" between unrestrained capitalism and a 
nationalizing socialism (Addison, 1994, p. 35). Then in the 1950s, the call for "social 
extension" by the New Left helped to consolidate social realism as a way of artistic 
expression. Because of this "social extension," social realist film has become a proud 
tradition and a special national color for British cinema, almost a brand. 
British New Wave cinema was born out of the social and cultural changes of 
the late 1950s that embraced the rise of working-class affluence, the emergence of a 
distinctive youth culture, the passionate anger of the Angry Young Man, and the 
revival of the intellectual left. The films portrayed the social rise of new working class 
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in the changing conditions of affluence and consumption. Room at the Top (Jack 
Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960) display 
the ample masculine confidence, youthful sexuality and rebelliousness as well as the 
sense of frustration and alienation of their protagonists in the time of change. 
The New Wave films so accurately and powerfully caught the mood of time 
that their dominating status was widely acknowledged. An article by a film critic 
wrote that "A British film nowadays, if it is to be taken seriously, must set its scene 
among the more or less rebellious young people of the industrial North or Midlands; it 
must be tough, realistic, iconoclastic (possibly nihilistic, too) and thoroughly working 
class" (The Manchester Guardian, 25 September, 1962; as cited in Walker, 1974, p. 
68). 
Brown notes that this history includes an iconography: "Think British realism, 
and you think inevitably of kitchen sinks, tall chimneys, cobblestones, railway arches, 
bleak stretches of moor or beach, graffiti-lined council estates, people and landscapes 
placed in spare and striking juxtaposition. You also tend to think black-and-white: the 
perfect color scheme for gloomy skies, smokestacks and poetic melancholy." (2009, p. 
29) This fits more with the New Wave films. In later decades, styles have been much 
diversified. 
Representing the rising postwar new working class, the New Wave protagonists 
are confident about the social change for betterment and proud of or dignified about 
their class background despite the frustrations they experience. Joe in Room at the 
Top claims "I am working class ... and proud of it!" Jimmy Porter in Look Back in 
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Anger is a university graduate but chooses to run a market stall to show solidarity 
with the working class. 
But such confidence or pride has disappeared in the working-class films since 
the 1980s. Films since the 1980s have focused on the exploration of the damage 
brought by de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, showing life as a 
difficult struggle in a society dominated by social injustice and greed and projecting 
pessimistic images of masculinity in crisis. In the 1990s, substantial attention has been 
given to the "underclass" rather than the industrial workers with decent jobs. More 
focus was on masculinity crisis, projecting victim images of masculine anxiety, 
alienation and social impotence. The serious social criticism films represented by 
High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), and 
Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) by independent directors are bleaker and angrier 
films, whereas the commercial comedies of the 1990s represented by The Full Monty 
(Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off (Mark Herman, 1996) transform gritty 
underclass material through humor and utopianism into an appealing, profitable and 
exportable commodity. 
The works unanimously articulated a "sense of loss" (Kirk, 2003, p. 78). 
Compared with the sense of loss of politics in the New Wave films, this time it's the 
loss of job or income, political power, union support, and the associated loss offamily, 
traditional community, traditional male role, and etc. All these factors have been 
essential for the construction of working-class identity. So the loss of so many factors 
all together has contributed to the loss of old form of working-class identity. The 
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films are seen, to varying degrees, "elegies for an older, industrial, northern working 
class" (Dave, 2006, p. xiii). 
In short, from statements, such as, "I'm working class and proud of it" in Room 
at the Top (1959) to "We're obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." in The Full 
Monty (1997), the working class experienced heartbreaking transformation from an 
identity of masculine energy, pride and dignity to "underclass" collective shame and 
loss of respect. 
The way of defining working-class identity after the Second World War has 
been continuously dominated by consumption rather than production, by the private 
and personal rather than the public and political, and has become more inseparable 
with other identities such as gender, race and sexuality since the 1980s. The concern 
about working class traditions has survived all decades, with the 1990s commercial 
comedies picking up working class collectivity and solidarity to a utopian new height. 
The attack on consumerism remains and is as usual linked with women. The way to 
escape is individualistic through education or highly utopian through special talents. 
Yet there has been a tendency to marginalize, or under-estimate, the experience of 
women and black and Asian workers, ignoring the multicultural nature of British 
society and the rising importance of female workers. The elevating skilled working 
class, associated with the rise ofThatcherism, is also neglected. 
The shift reflects changes in fundamental attitudes in British post-war society 
from welfare egalitarianism to the neo-liberal enterprise culture. The cinematic 
representation has reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position, but at the 
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same time conveyed more left-wing progressive views of filmmakers. 
Among the New Wave films there is also a prominent structure of feeling to 
articulate the sense of loss of politics, the loss of radical intent on the part of the 
working class which is in fact a response to the affluence and political consensus of 
that time, as well as a structure of feeling which privileges and appreciates traditional 
working class culture, which was threatened by the emerging mass culture in the 
post-war society. Also apparently, a structure of feeling to reveal a "sense of losses" 
among the films of the 1980s and 1990s was driven by the enormous social changes 
under Thatcherism. 
Social realism films can be taken as contributing to the contestation about the 
existence of working class. The structural inequality and exploitation still affect the 
life-chances and the lifestyles of the working class people, as we can see in the films. 
Thinking over the long history of British social realism, its greatest achievement 
should be, in Hill's words, "provid[ing]--despite the persistence of politicians in 
arguing for the classlessness of British society--a reminder of the continuing 
economic divisions within Britain as well as giving voice to the desire for a different 
kind of society in which community and social attachment are accorded greater 
importance" (2000a, p. 186). 
In the 21 51 century, the working class is definitely faced with more severe 
challenges. It has declined drastically as a cultural and political force. The "classless" 
ideology keeps its dominance. With the shrinking in number and the diversification in 
structure, it is now even more difficult to define the working class, which has been 
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termed as the "post-working class." The growing complex of jobs and labor contracts 
combine with gender and ethnic difference to produce a mosaic that is not easily 
represented in simple images. Taking all this into consideration, it should be of 
growing difficulty to keep a distinguished cycle of working class films in the future. 
Creative adjustment from filmmakers is crucial to find new perspectives if he or she 
wants to make working class films. Mike Leigh is focusing on family and personal 
adaptation; Ken Loach is also stressing more personal life in families and his films are 
funnier. The social realist comedies are commercializing working-class experiences. 
In fact, the potential for working class films to be successful is a common sense 
among many directors. As Lee Hall, the screenwriter of the successful Billy Elliot, 
once said, "I always knew that if you can write something about working class people 
with some integrity, and can represent their lives ... there 's a real chance of it being 
successful" (Hall, 2000, para. 2). I hold that so long as social realist films continue to 
care about the laboring public, the "one-third" in New Times, it is functioning its role. 
In short, working class films will keep its place in British cinema, and continue to be 
successful when certain film-makers make it right. With the changing political 
economy, it seems clear that the commercialization of British working class images 
(favoring comedy) and the focus on the private and the personal will continue into the 
future. 
In short, from masculinity to crisis of masculinity, the public to the personal, 
alienation from community to collective action, and realistic presentation to more 
aesthetic one, the British cinema never fails to show a concern for the life of 
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working-class in the changing society. In the face of more severe challenges in the 
new century, this dissertation calls for cultural policy support for socially purposive 
British national cinema to keep social realism as a democratization of representation 
of national cultural life as well as a sustained concern for working-class dignity. 
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